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Showing posts with label ZNPP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ZNPP. Show all posts

Monday, August 19, 2024

2024 Escalations at ZNPP

August 19, 2024

"Dirty Atomic Bomb" Allegations

RT reported on August 16 that, according to military journalist Marat Khairullin “Sources on the other side report that the [Ukrainians] are preparing a nuclear false flag – an explosion of a dirty atomic bomb ... They plan to strike the storage sites of spent nuclear fuel of a nuclear power plant.” Specified as possible targets: the Zaporozhye and Kursk nuclear power plants (hereafter ZNPP  - in Ukraine but Russian-occupied since the 2022 invasion - and KNPP - in Russia, but threated in the ongoing Ukrainian invasion of Kursk). (RT)

A "security official" told RT about the same thing: "Kiev’s intention is to accuse Moscow of a false flag so it could justify using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, the security official said. The Ukrainian government has received orders from its Western backers to “escalate as much as possible,” he added." Unnamed officials were concerned Ukraine already had the capability and a special warhead already in place at the Vostochny Mining and Processing plant in Zhovti Vody (~100km nw of the ZNPP). 

I haven't looked any deeper into this claim, if there's anything public to even look into. But it's worth noting that only the most powerful bomb might seriously damage one of the plant's 6 reactors, and these are all shut down. A "dirty bomb" is radiological, not atomic - it just spreads some radioactive material that causes little harm. And if this bomb also released any stored radioactive material, AFAIK the issue is worse but similar - a moderate, localized leak of radiation, fairly easy to contain and clean up. So this could hardly be more than a stunt to raise concerns and tensions, and wouldn't even serve Russia vey well as a pretext. (as far as I know - I'm no expert)

Of course, Ukraine dismissed the allegations as absurd. But the Russian-occupied ZNPP - the largest nuclear power plant in Europe - has already suffered rocket, artillery, and drone attacks, dozens of them just between April and November, 2022. My previous analysis of the visual evidence (all posts tagged ZNPP - an attempted overview) shows these attacks were launched from the north, northwest, and northeast of the plant - across the Dnieper river on the Ukrainian-held north shore. This is what the Russian-affiliated plant managers had said all along, conducting investigations that tend to comport with my own. Ukraine, of course, denied this and blamed the Russians for shelling themselves, offering no explanation as to why or how they could keep doing that FROM THE NORTH BANK. 


After November, I didn't follow as closely, but it seems there were almost no attacks on the plant. Just one I know of happened in 2023, in April, with muted and delayed reporting, that just broke windows at the turbine hall of reactor 4 (see here, "4/12" entry). Then there was an attack I missed on April 7 this year, using a drone, inside the plant. Images: a small hole punched through a roof, "damage to the training building," the larger office-type building at the plant's main gate. (Zveda) A video shows several broken windows boarded over. IAEA would complain "For the first time since November 2022, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant was directly targeted in military action." (IAEA)

Then on July 3, a reported 3-drone attack damaged a power station near the plant, injuring eight ZNPP workers who were there, one of them seriously (msn.com).The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported July 3 that, according to the plant's management, "several drones struck locations in the vicinity of the site today, injuring workers and causing forest fires. These repeated drone attacks are a threat to nuclear safety and people’s lives and must stop, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said. The IAEA experts stationed at the ZNPP said they saw thick smoke and heard explosions coming from near the plant’s 750 kilovolt (kV) switchyard after they were told that drones had hit an adjacent forest, starting fires in windy conditions." (update 236) July 11: "The Director General reiterated that an attack last week that reportedly injured eight ZNPP workers at an electrical sub-station in Enerhodar had violated several of the seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety during a conflict, notably one on protecting plant staff." (Update 237)

But it seems calm inside the plant held until a week ago. This dirty bomb concern comes on top of three attacks, in the span of one week (August 10-17) on or very near the ZNPP, and as Ukraine's invasion of Kursk oblast in Russia brings them perilously close to the KNPP there, perhaps hoping to occupy or just attack it. In fact, on August 14, it was reported "as a result of the drone attack, an explosion also occurred near the open switchgear of the Kursk NPP." (Rosatom 8/19)  I decided to cover all three incidents in a single post, with some excess detail left off for now.  

August 10 Incident

Around 6PM on August 10, as Vladimir Rogov reports, Ukrainian Armed Forces shelled Energodar - the city surrounding the plant -with at least 9 shells that impacted at the city's main water intake. I didn't find any visuals for analysis and unsure of its location, especially since the river changed shape last year following the collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam (my research suggests Ukraine and its hydropower agency jointly engineered that disaster, as they attack the nuclear plant, to complicate Russia's position as greatly as possible). 

As Rogov put it in that Telegram post: "The Nazis continue to purposefully try to deprive the residents of this city in the Zaporizhia region of access to drinking water," Rogov wrote. "They do this intentionally - in the summer heat. What is this if not genocide? But all sorts of international "human rights" organizations will not say anything about this, because they work for the owners of ZeReikh - Western intelligence services." Strangely enough, the same was reported at least one other time, one month earlier, by several sources but with Rogov posting almost exactly the same news on July 11 - Ukrainians shelled Energodar's water intake amid the summer heat, followed by perhaps the same exact commentary he would use in August, maybe just copy-pasting it by then. How many times has this happened?

IAEA, August 8: On several occasions over the past week, the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ) observed several fires at various distances from the ZNPP," some under crucial external power lines which, luckily, were not severed. "Over the weekend, the IAEA experts observed smoke coming from an area  to the north of the ZNPP near the Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP) inlet channel." (update 241

The August 10 incident was soon eclipsed by the one discussed below, and didn't get mentioned until a week afterwards, when the IAEA would report "On 10 August ZNPP informed the IAEA team that artillery struck the local power and water substation in the nearby city Enerhodar, home to most ZNPP staff. The attack caused the failure of two transformers, leading to a citywide power outage. As a result, water had to be supplied using diesel generators. On 11 August the IAEA team was informed by ZNPP that power has been restored in the city." (update 245)

Aug 11 Cooling Tower Incident

The first word many heard about this was from Ukraine's president Zelenskyy on X: "Enerhodar. We have recorded from Nikopol that the Russian occupiers have started a fire on the territory of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. ... Russia must be held accountable for this. Only Ukrainian control over the Zaporizhzhia NPP can guarantee a return to normalcy and complete safety." It remains strange how he can be so certain "Russia" will stop attacking the plant once Ukrainian troops are inside it instead of their own.

People assumed there was usually nothing flammable at the site, so something was added. They decided on tires. "According to unofficial information received from sources on the opposite coast, the Russians set fire to a large number of automobile tires in cooling towers. Perhaps this is a provocation, or an attempt to create panic in the settlements on the right bank of the former reservoir", - said the head of Nikopol RVA Yevhen. (https://x.com/RussianPropX/status/1822722660272689456) Perhaps they thought this opening scene from The Simpsons was footage of the ZNPP? 

The psychology of the alleged Russian plot is pretty simple: these towers remain for many the only recognizable structure in a nuclear plant, confused by some with the nuclear reactors themselves. In fact, these towers are only used for cooling water, and at the ZNPP are set about kilometer from the nearest reactor, and all six reactors are in cold shutdown. But a huge, visible fire at a cooling tower is perhaps the most visible and understandable sign of danger at the nuclear plant, the best chance at causing a major panic. 

And, of course, the same cartoonish thinking would underpin it if this were a Ukrainian false-flag instead. It's random coincidence that has no reason to paint such a picture, although it could wind up doing so, hypothetically, at this juncture of events.

IAEA reported on the 11th that their team of experts stationed at the site "witnessed thick dark smoke coming from the north-western area of the plant, after hearing multiple explosions throughout the evening. The team was informed that an alleged drone attack on one of the plant’s cooling towers took place today. There is no impact on nuclear safety, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi confirmed."

"The IAEA team reported hearing an explosion today at the same time the ZNPP informed them that a drone had allegedly struck one of the plant's two cooling towers." (update 242) Note: "an explosions" heard, "a drone" reported. Many reports will cite 2 drones, but these may be based on confused guesses (see below).

Russian operators Rosatom (via Elena Evdokimova on Telegram (anyone else still miss her on X?)): "On August 11 at 20:20 and 20:32, one of the two cooling towers of the Zaporizhzhya NPP was struck twice directly by Ukrainian attack drones, resulting in a fire with burning internal structures. By 23:30, the main fire was extinguished by the Ministry of Emergency Situations."

"However, the internal structures of the cooling tower were seriously damaged. "The threat of the structure's collapse will be assessed by specialists when the situation allows," Rosatom notes." 

"Dmitry Rogozin published new footage of Zaporizhzhya NPP  ... According to him, the fire at the station was extinguished yesterday by 23:30." Video filmed from the east, inside the plant, into the setting sun - the tower with the fire is partly obscured - lights of a firetruck are visible, apparently between the towers.  https://t.me/readovkanews/84707

ZNPP director Yury Chernichuk: The drone, he said, “entered the tower from above and detonated.” Judging by how fast the fire spread, the official presumes that it carried something such as petroleum or napalm. “The fire spread very fast over a large area,” he added. https://www.rt.com/russia/602490-zaporozhye-npp-ukraine-drone-attack/

"the plastic steam traps caught fire" https://t.me/tass_agency/265728

"The administration of the #ZNPP reported that fire at one of the plant’s cooling towers on August 11 was associated with the burning of plastic separators. A flammable fuel, a container with which was attached to a Ukrainian drone, helped the separators to burst into flames." https://x.com/Amb_Ulyanov/status/1823103504203821488

This talk of structures, mesh and separators refers to one or another elements just above the tower's base, as shown in the following diagram (source: Natural Draft Cooling Tower (Natural Draft Cooling Towers) Explained - saVRee - saVRee)

After cooling the reactors, hot water is piped into the tower (pipe input on the left here) and sprayed into the air. The steam that escapes from the top is waste they try to limit. Droplets are partly captured with a drift eliminator, usually some kind of mesh, and drizzled into the cooling fill below - often a plastic honeycomb material. The warm water runs down the sides of each shaft as cooler air is pulled up the center. Finally, the cooled water drips down into an open basin across the bottom, where it's piped back into the plant for re-use. 

With the ZNPP entirely shut down as it is, the cooling towers were not running. Therefore, the basin, fill and everything would be totally dry and prone to burning in the right circumstances. The tower design is terrible when a fire breaks out - it works like a chimney, with the open bottom sucking in plenty of oxygen to feed the flames from below. An image taken well after dark from the west seems to show the fire worsened, even accounting for image overexposure - fire seems to be shooting out the top here. Note also at the base more fire or glare on the left/north side, closer to the Ukrainian side. 

The IAEA mission was given a chance to do a cursory inspection of the tower the following day, amid the contrary allegation. Would they discover the drones, the burned tires, or neither?  

Russian news outlets with video of this visit and the state of the cooling tower:

Tass 1:42 https://t.me/tass_agency/265856

Readovka 5:33 https://t.me/readovkanews/84777

zveda 0:45 https://t.me/zvezdanews/147687

iz.ru 1:46 https://t.me/izvestia/181663

IAEA Update 243, August 12"Neither tyre nor drone remains were observed during the walkdown," although they only looked in the basin at the tower's base. "The team confirmed that there were no significant signs of disturbance of the debris, ash or soot located at the base of the cooling tower."  The following video still shows what they mean, and it suggests there was no site cleanup here to remove evidence. Other items seen include a nice square of mesh material and a short section of metal pipe, both seeming the belong somewhere above in the tower. 


Radial metal bands or wire usually remain after tires have burned, but nothing like that was observed. A drone, on the other hand, will be made mostly of plastic that breaks up on impact or detonation, and most of its fragments will probably vanish in such a fire. Who can say if some melted propellor blades or bits of circuit board rendered to ash are scattered in here? So we can be clear there were no tires burnt here, but we can't say one way or another regarding drones.

"[The IAEA team] observed droplets of burnt plastic and fragments of fallen concrete distributed across the cold-water basin. The team assessed that these droplets were consistent with melted and fallen plastic mesh from the fire. Samples of the debris, including burnt and molten plastic, were collected. The lingering odour from the fire was assessed by the team and determined that in the absence of a sulphur smell, was more likely caused from burning plastic" than from burning tires. 

The agency was likely just trying to shut down both sides' politicized allegations and trying to find some random accident, or a different, mysterious attack that fits neither side's story and could cleanly be blamed on someone in the group "both sides." No matching debris for either story is one aspect of this. Another as a new finding that the fire started higher up in the tower than it was reported or assumed. Update 243 also related:

"During the team’s visit to the cooling tower, it determined that the damage was most likely concentrated on the interior of the tower at the water nozzle distribution level, located at roughly ten metres high. The team has requested access to the water nozzle distribution level." Access was not granted at the time, "for safety concerns." (update 243)

A second visit followed the next day, on August 13. "Due to safety reasons, the team observed from ground level as ZNPP staff filmed and photographed the fire damage to the interior of the tower from the water nozzle distribution level, which is approximately 10 meters high. The photographs and video footage were shown immediately to the team." It's not clear how they observed, visually through some gaps in the fill (see their ceiling below), or by watching a video feed. So far, I've seen none of these images published.

“The evidence gathered reinforces our conclusion that the main fire seems unlikely to be at the base of the cooling tower,” Director General Grossi said. From the photos and footage of the cooling tower’s interior, the team identified debris consistent with a significant fire and observed dark scorch marks across the interior of the concrete walls rising from the water nozzle distribution level. No foreign objects or materials were visible." (update 244)

Aug. 11, My Analysis 

Looking at the visuals, I suspect they made the right call. It seems an upper fill was melted, dripping down black as seen, while initial views show the lower fill - a sort of light gray ridged material different from the black, honeycomb type material commonly used. PavewayIV tells me this might be "corrugated bonded PVC sheet fill" that has "been used for the last few decades." I suppose all the fill is the same, with the melted stuff turning black, but there may be a different layer above this. A piece of mesh rests on top. It may be too fine and clogged to be drift eliminator. Maybe the mesh-reinforced remains of some upper fill that mostly burned away? We can see here there's nothing else above that except the sky.

Broader view of this material in its fuller context: It seems all intact, with no visible blast signs or melting. There's also fairly little soot deposited anywhere in this scene. Dark streaks may be just from the dripping material, but in spots it looks more like smoke stains from the fires we saw. However the smoke would vent up, the fire and tower design would make sure it did. But the volume suggested here seems far below what was seen coming out the top, suggesting a much bigger fire raging unseen inside the tower. 

This all suggests the fire was in fact concentrated higher up and probably started out that way, like the IAEA found. Like the absence of drone remains, this elevated fire was seen as refuting Russian claims. But I'm not sure who, if anyone, specified the impact was at the base. The plant's director Chernichuk said the drone(s) “entered the tower from above and detonated.” Someone else may have evidence the other of 2 drones hit the base, or someone may have just guessed that from how the fire wound up there. I would guess that. In fact the whole second drone might be deduced from the knowledge of one coming down, alongside a fire also breaking out at the base.

But if the IAEA was trying to shut down the "Russian version," they failed: the meaningless lack of damage or drone parts and the fire beginning at the water distribution level are fully in line with a drone arson from above as reported. As in the basin, the IAEA reports "No foreign objects or materials were visible" in the fire area. Again, this is strong evidence against tires being burnt up here either, and fairly neutral evidence regarding possible drones.

No obvious blast damage is shown in these bottom views, and there is perhaps none in the upper views.  But little to no damage is expected in the alleged scenario. Just a strong pop would be needed to splash and ignite the liquid. Two drones allows for one to come "down the chimney" and one to hit the base, with both vanishing in the fires. But no base hit seems necessary - the design is for liquids to drain entirely below, and I reason the same would happen here, but with the fluid on fire, melting some plastic, getting too complicated to be sure, and then ... whatever mix of solid and liquid might wind up spread over most of the area to start with, and easily fill the basin as seen, better than the alleged drone blast would. Maybe both drones came down from above, with 2 containers of fuel to spread inside the tower. Or maybe there was only one drone, as some of the best sources say, and some confused guess had others thinking 2 would be needed to explain all that.

The IAEA findings leave other options open: some strange accident in the same area, perhaps involving strangely hidden Russian weapons, or a Russian false-flag, maybe just as described but with Russian drones. However, none of the IAEA's findings seem to contradict the allegations of a deliberate drone attack from the Ukrainian side. All their observations are, in fact, fully consistent with that scenario.

Note: update 244 from the 13th also mentions "During its walkdown and just after requesting access to cooling tower 2, the ISAMZ team was promptly accompanied back to a secure location due to an air raid alarm."

August 17 drone attack

Four days after the IAEA's second colling tower examination, yet another attack was reported. Zaporijie24: "Today at 7 am, a Ukrainian Armed Forces drone dropped a charge on the road that runs along the power units on the outside of the perimeter. Personnel constantly move along this road."

"No one was hurt. But once again, a direct threat to the safety of personnel and the plant was created."

"IAEA inspectors present at the plant were informed of the incident and visited the crash site." (includes 3 photos, including one with inspectors, at right) https://t.me/zaporojie24/11009


Mapping: on the main access road just outside the eastern security perimeter, alongside the spray ponds and fairly near the main, southern entrance. https://x.com/CL4Syr/status/1824751662227210345

"The nuclear safety situation at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is deteriorating following a drone strike that hit the road around the plant site perimeter today, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said."

"“Yet again we see an escalation of the nuclear safety and security dangers facing the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. I remain extremely concerned and reiterate my call for maximum restraint from all sides and for strict observance of the five concrete principles established for the protection of the plant,” said Director General Grossi."

"Earlier today, the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ) team was informed by ZNPP that an explosive carried by a drone detonated just outside of the plant’s protected area. The impact site was close to the essential cooling water sprinkler ponds and about 100 metres from the Dniprovska power line, the only remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) line providing a power supply to ZNPP."

"The team immediately visited the area and reported that the damage seemed to have been caused by a drone equipped with an explosive payload. There were no casualties and no impact on any NPP equipment. However, there was impact to the road between the two main gates of ZNPP."

The photo at right, facing south towards the training center, shows the road impact with light scoring on the north side of the impact (the small indentation), chipping to the south, including a large chunk knocked lose, and debris spread to the south. This suggests the drone was basically following the road, from north to south, when it hit. That doesn't mean much for most drones than can maneuver and turn any direction, but it's a small detail I can add.

Was it trying for anything specific? Maybe targeting a certain employee on the road who just managed to escape injury? Or was this just a vague signal they wanted to send, or just another random escalation? The external powerlines are very close by (seen in the above photo), but these are vulnerable to fire, and hitting the road is unlikely to start one. Unless maybe it had managed to blow up the car it was targeting?

Below, the partial drone remains as shown in a third photo I know of. I don't know what to make of that, but here it is.


Others Attacks to Come?

If so, I've already made this space to cover it here with updates.



Saturday, July 1, 2023

Why it was Probably Ukraine that Wrecked the ZNPP

... When and If That Happens.

July 1, 2023

rough, incomplete - updates likely - urgent ones hopefully not

small adds 7/2... 

I don't know just what happened to cause the disastrous radiation leak at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear plant in Europe. That's at least partly because the event hasn't even happened yet, and hopefully it won't. 

Bookmark this post. If the disaster finally happens, as many smart people have predicted will be in the next few days, check your immediate news feeds, then come and read this, as needed, and share it. Better yet, share it now. 

But if it does happen, Ukraine and not Russia will probably have done it, just like every attack so far on the Russian-occupied plant has evidently been done by Ukraine, not Russia. My imperfect but good ballistic readings have added up to something pretty undeniable here (and I'm open to see any denials anyone might try). Here they are finally mapped together, and below find some brief explanations with links to the work I've been showing for almost a year now, regarding the attacks between August 5 (off-frame) and November 20 of last year. There have been an alarming few attacks this year as well, briefly considered below. Finally, I'll argue how "everyone already knows who will have done it."

Recent Ukrainian Claims (Partial Review)

For the last month in particular, Ukraine's president Zelenskyy and his aides and government ministers have been repeating warnings that Russia plans to very soon destroy the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). On the other hand, Dmitry Polyansky, First Deputy Representative of Russia to the UN, published a letter "warning about the impending provocation by the Kyiv regime at the plant," which he had circulated in the UN.

"I must draw your attention to the heinous allegations ... that the Russian Federation could deliberately mine and destroy a nuclear power plant that it controls and which is located on the territory of one of its subjects are simply absurd. The absurdity of such statements exceeds the absurdity of the Kyiv regime's accusations that the Russian Armed Forces are shelling the ZNPP." "we urge the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the international community at large to make every effort to prevent the Kiev regime and its sponsors from staging yet another catastrophic provocation, this time on an even larger scale." https://t.me/zvezdanews/123119

Can it really be that absurd? "Russian shelling on the morning of May 22 has severed the last remaining external power line to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), Ukraine's nuclear energy company Energoatom said. The nuclear plant, located near Enerhodar in Zaporizhzhia Oblast is now reportedly running on backup diesel generators, which can only last up to 10 days, according to the company. External power supply is vital for the operation of the nuclear fuel cooling pumps in the holding pools and nuclear reactors." https://kyivindependent.com/russian-shelling-threatens-nuclear-disaster-at-zaporizhzhia-plant/

This might risk a disaster, but was swiftly refuted by Vladimir Rogov: "Zaporizhia NPP was transferred to standby and emergency power supply from diesel generators. Due to the actions of the Zelensky regime, ZNPP is completely disconnected from external power supply. Energoatom disconnected the power line Dneprovskaya controlled by him." https://t.me/vrogov/9696

ZNPP official channel on Telegram refuted this too. Later on the 22nd they reported “At 14:20, the supply of electricity to the Zaporozhye NPP was restored. The station is operating normally. Diesel generators have been stopped and put on duty,” said Yury Chernichuk, director of the Zaporizhzhya NPP." They don't mention why power was lost, but operations were normal and "There are no violations in the operation of the nuclear power plant." There was no shelling by either side, they say. https://t.me/znppofficial/272

On May 26, Ukraine's Defense Intelligence representative Andriy Yusov said "The occupiers are going to make an imitation of a strike on the station's facilities and continue to blame Ukraine for this. ... In the near future, they are preparing a provocation, namely, an imitation of a strike on the facilities of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant with elements of leakage of nuclear materials. For this purpose, the occupiers have already deployed appropriate weapons on the territory of the ZNPP," Yusov said. He also said "the occupiers want to use the so-called Rosatom experts to allegedly "fix" the strikes. In parallel, representatives of international structures and organizations, including the IAEA, will also be invited," and he says that the Russians also plan to use chemical weapons on the Zaporizhzhia front. https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/rosiya-gotue-provokatsiyu-udarom-zaes-gur-1685123809.html

Yusov said the same about Donetsk ahead of Ukrainian shelling there over Christmas and the New Year. He claimed on December 20 that the Russians were planting bits of Western-made weapons around the city just to implicate Ukraine. Fragments like that were then shown next to the damage of impacts from the Ukrainian-held northwest - also simulated, Yusov would say. Hit in the alleged Russian false-flag attacks over the next 12 days: Donetsk Regional Clinical Traumatology Hospital/ Republican Hospital, "Road clinic," Donetsk Technical School of Industrial Automation, Solovyanenko Theater, "Youth Palace, " Shevchenko Monument, Monument to tankmen, Donetsk City shopping mall, Kindergarten no. 151, Shesh-Besh restaurant and resort, Hotel Victoria, various streets and apartment buildings and a park. The day after Yusov spoke. A Dec 21 assassination attempt on the DPR's prime minister Vitaly Khotsenko and the former director of Russia's space program Dmitry Rogozin just south of Donetsk was actually admitted by Ukraine. Then a December 30 attack on Hotel Victoria in the heart of Donetsk that killed a top Russian military investigator was left more ambiguous. Maybe that was another Russian/DPR false-flag like the rest? And presumably it will be the same at the nuclear plant if anything happens there? see Donetsk PRE-Christmas Shelling, 16-24 December - https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2023/01/donetsk-new-years-shelling.html

On June 6, of course, the Nova Kakhovka dam collapsed. Kyiv's Banderite brains spent a couple weeks taking advantage of the opportunities it afforded them, blaming Russia for the event in a few different ways, sowing related fakes like "Russians firing on rescue boats" (it was a dislodged mine, dummies), claiming the breach threatened the ZNPP's cooling pond (not immediately, if ever), and then claiming the dam's destruction meant the Russians would deliberately destroy the ZNPP next, or at least use it to stage a more limited radiological event. The most logical motive I've seen is to make the area unfit for living OR fighting, preventing the obviously-fated Ukrainian victory. 

By June 21 the threats about the ZNPP resumed at a greater pace. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) - who had just been rumored to be dead - resurfaced on the 21st to say: "First of all, ZNPP was and still is under the temporary control of the occupation forces. The truth is that by destroying the dam, they destroyed the normal access of water to the coolers operating at ZNPP. Second, the plant was additionally mined. The worst thing is that it was the cooler [cooling pond] that was mined," DIU's head said. According to the head of military intelligence, if Russians disable the cooler by blowing it up, there is a high probability that there will be significant problems." https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3725681-budanov-russians-mine-cooler-at-znpp.html

These claims have been around since last year - the cooling pond or the cooling tower was filled with/surrounded by/covered with landmines that could destroy it on command. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) finally had some words about this allegation: "The IAEA is aware of reports of mines having been placed near the cooling pond. No mines were observed at the site during the Director General’s visit, including the cooling pond." They had previously seen mines set outside the plant perimeter and some places inside it, described as defensive. To the IAEA, that was "not in line with safety standards" but "the main safety functions of the facility would not be significantly affected” even if some of the mines went off. 

https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-167-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine

Budanov was undeterred. On June 25 he had a new story: "Russian troops moved vehicles charged with explosives to four of the six nuclear reactors ... It is unclear if the International Atomic Energy Agency was granted access to these units during its visit on 15 June 2023." Apparently not - the IAEA was not able to refute those new claims in the same way. https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/06/25/russian-troops-plant-explosives-near-4-nuclear-reactors-at-zaporizhzhia-npp-ukraines-intel/ 

This might refer to military trucks which the Russians parked in some reactors' turbine halls last July, after Ukraine had attacked their troops and vehicles parked in the open with Warmate drones, killing some. Russia claims the vehicles moved into the halls were all unarmed, and everything seen there is. shown. Ukraine claims to believe the trucks were crammed with explosives ready to blow the reactors, but this is probably nothing but fantasy. 

On June 28, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told the OSCE Chairmanship’s Security Review Conference: "Today, Russia is threatening Ukraine and the entire OSCE area with a radiation incident at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. No matter what Russian propaganda says, it is Russia and only Russia that has the motivation and means to carry out an incident at ZNPP." So even if it looks like Ukraine did it - and military intelligence predicts it will - it must still be Russia, if not because of their plan to make it look Ukrainian, then because Ukraine has no motive - even here 6 days after the Graham-Blumenthal resolution (see below). It's important that he lay the groundwork of fantasy in such a way. This is how Ukraine since 2014 has always been run.

June 29: Ukrainian Health Minister Viktor Lyashko went on TV to assure the public that if someone with the motive were to damage the plant and cause a leak, "Residents of Kiev will not feel the consequences," or at least people would keep a close eye on radiation levels, so there was no need to panic. Just Europe, and NATO partners in North America should feel threatened enough to desperately intervene. "On the air, Lyashko also admitted that it is impossible to protect the entire population during a radiation accident. According to him, people who live in the potential affected area have already been given drugs to protect the thyroid gland." Sounds like the plan is ready to roll. https://twitter.com/dana916/status/1674482466562748416

June 30: In Zaporizhzhia at least, emergency drills were carried out. "Dressed in white and yellow protective suits and armed with devices to detect radiation levels, Ukrainian emergency workers took part in a drill Thursday to prepare for a potential risk of radiation leakage from the Russian-occupied ZNPP" https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jun/30/ukraine-holds-drills-to-prepare-for-radiation-leak/?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=SocialFlow

June 30 the allegations gets kind of chilling: "The Russians are reducing their presence at #Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate reports. The Russian representatives of #Rosatom have already left, and Ukrainian employees of the plant who signed contracts with Rosatom are being advised to evacuate by July 5. Meanwhile, the number of military patrols in #Enerhodar is gradually decreasing." KyivPost on Twitter

June 30: further claims published by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on its Telegram channel (which I didn't find yet): employees are ordered to leave before July 5, relocating to Crimea, and "the personnel who remain at the plant are ordered to "blame Ukraine in case of any emergencies."https://twitter.com/quakes99/status/1674858289971208192

Ukraine says Russia says blame Ukraine, and all this other stuff. Any or all of it COULD be true, as far as I know, even though the well-informed Russian-affiliated Vladimir Rogov swiftly denied it:

The head of the movement "We are together with Russia" Vladimir Rogov called the statement of the military intelligence of Ukraine about the evacuation of personnel from the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant a lie. ... "All this is a lie and information stuffing in order to sow panic. The Zaporozhye NPP is operating as usual, its employees carry out their duties with dignity, despite threats and blackmail from the Kiev terrorist regime," he said. Рогов назвал заявление Киева об эвакуации персонала с ЗАЭС ложью - РИА Новости, 30.06.2023 (ria.ru)

It seems the same was alleged before: May 12, 10 days before they would say Russia bombed the power lines,  Energoatom reports "The Russians plan to "evacuate" more than 3,000 workers from the ZNPP" https://twitter.com/uacrisis/status/1657029293917057027 and later, as the workers were "slaves," it was their families to be relocated from the drone-ravaged city of Energodar. Maybe the latter was even true, but on May 12 : "no evacuation, as stated by the Ukrainian side, is being carried out." https://t.me/zaes_energoatom/1800 

The workers are still there now, but allegedly just about to leave again, in one of those "troubling signs" you have to make up every so often.

Green-Lighted with a NATO Red Line

A week earlier, on June 22, the United States Congress gave Ukraine a red-line sort of green-light to go ahead with any Russian attack they have planned. U.S. Senators Lindsey Graham (ghoul, South Carolina) and Richard Blumenthal (tool, Connecticut) introduced a resolution "to respond to the Russian Federation delivering tactical nuclear weapons to the Republic of Belarus, but also including a clause that "the destruction of a nuclear facility, dispersing radioactive contaminates into NATO territory causing significant harm to human life," will be seen "as an attack on NATO requiring an immediate response, including the implementation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty."  Graham, Blumenthal Introduce Resolution To Address Threat Of Russian Tactical Nukes - Press Releases - United States Senator Lindsey Graham (senate.gov)

It doesn't seem to matter who causes the nuclear disaster, or it goes without saying that - whoever it actually is - it will be Russia. It wouldn't mean any country is forces to send troops, and it's not clear if a resolution by 2 US senators can bind whole other countries to do anything, but ... the idea is it will be bad for Russia and good for Ukraine, raising Ukraine's motive to have some disaster occur.

This is akin to former president Obama's "red line" over chemical weapons use in Syria, issued in August 2012 and repeated in December. Hundreds of chemical attacks blamed on Syria followed, killing probably well over 1,000 civilians in total, dozens of militant fighters and some family members, and dozens of Syrian troops, between 2012 and 2018. As a former US ambassador in the Middle East told journalist Charles Glass, “The ‘red line’ was an open invitation to a false-­flag operation.” (via Kit Klarenberg

I saw it that way too. See here for how it started and how I started following CW attack allegations a few days before they first appeared, in early December, 2012. As far as my research can tell, foreign-backed terrorists were responsible for all of these attacks, as some suppressed findings of the OPCW suggested - at least - with the 2018 Douma incident. It may be the same in other cases they investigated, and we just haven't had materials leaked like that before. 

When and How?

Russian sources are said to indicate their "Ukrainian" false-false-flag even will come in early July, and specifically on or after July 5, but Russian-affiliated sources deny this. 

June 22 Zelenskyy advisor Iullia Mendel wrote about clues for and veiled predictions of a ZNPP disaster that were "happening against the backdrop of intensified Russian propaganda in the southern regions, which explicitly mentions the beginning of July. ... Residents I keep in touch with in Kherson, my home region, already know that this may be a kind of warning about Russia’s own plans."  https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/18572

The July 5 deadline recently floated by Kyiv clearly fits this allegedly Russian timeline. I haven't seen actual Russian reports mentioning early July, but I actually miss most things, so they may exist. Here's someone, also on June 22, reasoning out a similar time frame that has just proven inaccurate: June 26-29. This was based on a possible secret deal where Russia could surrender the ZNPP, by this date - the 22nd - or else "the West will give the green light to the second wave of the "counterattack" - by all means, aiming at the Crimea and Energodar, and at the same time organizing attacks on the Kherson region and the border of the Russian Federation." That date passed with Russia still at the ZNPP meant the two weeks before the NATO summit will be "difficult." https://t.me/melnikby/76230

Boris Rogozin aka Colonel Cassad, June 30: predicts the incident will happen prior to the NATO summit in Vilnius on July 12, if that measure proves necessary. Otherwise, it's just a feint - they have several of those, he thinks, each one ready to be real or a distraction. https://t.me/boris_rozhin/90839

As for how they might do it ... The Ukrainian landing attempt on September 1 comes to mind. They reportedly used 2 unpowered barges, both of which were noticed anyway, damaged or sunk, with many Ukrainian troops drowned and others reportedly killed or captured on land. The allegations were declared fake with the aid of a Ukrainian fake that only shows they were faking, just after the fighting ended, making claims of dead Ukrainians look fake even before the Russians even made the claims, and on the same coastlines they would have launched their denied attack from - possibly first thing after surviving on some other boat of their own, and making it back to shore.  https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/10/how-ukrainian-fake-confirms-russia-on.html

Now that the reservoir is dried up following the dam collapse, crossing will be different. There is still some river to ford, but not enough to bother with boats. Land-based armor could now cross much of it, and can pick their best spots to try, although they'd be exposed. But a false-flag attack is best done from a distance similar to what they've always had, by fired rockets as usual, or perhaps with some sabotage with the aid of any workers at the plant they still operate as agents.

As cited above, Defense Intelligence spokesperson Andriy Yusov had warned Russia planned "an imitation of a strike" on the plant and planned to ""fix" the strikes" as Ukrainian, using experts from Rosatom and the IAEA. They might even agree it looks like Ukraine did it, although that could hardly matter unless the IAEA broke their eternal silence about blame for these attacks. 

Yusov will be keyed into Ukraine's own military plans, and he tells us the attack will look like Ukraine did it with an artillery strike that can be read (fixed.) So if it winds up looking like Ukraine did it, that's because of the Russians did it. Because, as Kuleba said, only they have the motive and the means to attack the plant. 

How the Precedent Swings: to the North

That's a highly convenient narrative, considering when the plant has been attacked before, obviously by people with adequate motive, it has always looked like Ukraine did it. I've still never compiled a masterlist to organize my posts on the ZNPP, but here are all posts with that tag. There aren't that many attacks really - almost all of them addressed in small clusters in just 5 posts here, running August to November of last year. There were no attacks since November 19 & 20, until April of this year. Since then, there have been a few drone attacks tried and some artillery attacks succeeded in causing new damage. 

My ballistic analysis excludes the 2023 attacks (so far), an admitted Ukrainian attack with drones last July, and other drone attacks, where the flight path can't be read the same way as with artillery and rockets - the Warmate model primarily used is made in Poland and used by Ukraine. You just can't tell which way they sent it from. - https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/09/warmate-drones.html

Unguided rockets, mortar, tank and artillery shells can only travel a ballistic arc in a straight line (on the map), and that line can often be determined from patterns in the damage its blast causes. These clues, when they can be determined in attacks at the ZNPP, always point back to the north, from the Ukrainian-occupied bank of the Dnipro, across the then-expansive Khakovka reservoir. Northwest directions from north of Nikopol are the most common, but firing positions to the WNW, NNW, north, and NNE have all been used to attack the plant. A onetime appearance of fire from the east may have a special explanation (see Sept. 1).

August 5, 2022 - first known successful hit - 750v external power switchyard is hit in shelling I can't assess.

August 6, late afternoon, an Urugan rocket with cluster munitions landed near the dry spent fuel storage site, dropping bomblets that caused minor damage - One of the bomblets injured a security guard at the spent fuel storage site, and another may have landed inside it, chipping one of the massive containers inside. Rocket fired from the NW, Kamianske direction. https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/09/ukraines-systematic-shelling-of-znpp.html

People love to cite Rosatom's expert Renat Karchaa claiming the rocket in this attack, with a tail pointing SE (Russian-held), came from the northwest and must have "U-turned." He is translated as saying that, but misspoke or was mistranslated or is an idiot. The soil will disperse in the forward direction, and here it dispersed to the southeast. At least 10 cluster bomblet impacts are located to the northwest, consistent with its having come that way. The rocket probably U-bent so the tail point somewhat forward on its trajectory from the NW. 


Make fun instead of the experts consulted Energoatom (Ukraine's nuclear agency) who pretended they couldn't see that, and suggested the soil here U-turned to pile up entirely BEHIND the rocket. This one attack they dared to analyze implicated Russia well enough for them that it stands in for all other cases - they must all come from the SE or be totally fake. Using the slightly famous image of Karchaa, standing in for Energoatom's remote experts in propaganda spin...


Aug 11, 17, 20 & 21 -  4/11 a water pumping station ("hydro plant") was damaged, hit on the north side from an unclear angle (image at right). 4/17 American Eagle Picher shells were fired from the northwest and damaged a perimeter fence nearby. Both sites are near what Russian maps label near "radioactive isotopes storage." August 20 four impacts reported, 2 dirt craters seen, near Special Building 2. WNW origin, Nikopol south. https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/10/maxar-and-cnn-turn-blind-eye-to-august.html

August 25-28 and even 29 - several attacks ahead of IAEA visit, conflicting reports - 8/27 at least 3 impacts around special building 2 and reactor 6 - all 3 are pretty clear in coming from NW, Prydniprovske direction. (see below and note impact 1 is visible from space - trajectory is perpendicular to that fuzzy line) - 8/28 artillery shells and drones arrived from the NNE, hitting the roof of special building 1 - 8/29 more of the same at SB1. https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/09/ukraines-systematic-shelling-of-znpp_15.html


Sept. 1: some impacts near the liquid nitrogen cooling station, coming from the east, an unusual direction that would seem to implicate Russians on the far (east) side of the reservoir. The IAEA team arrives the same day, after a Ukrainian landing and offensive. Two artillery strikes in Energoadar share the same direction, jointly indicating a coastal spot near where Ukrainian landings were reported. Between the two angles of fire, I propose a firing spot about here, near Victory Park. https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/10/how-ukrainian-fake-confirms-russia-on.html


Sep 4/5 - artillery and drone strikes on and near Special Building 1, passage to reactor 1 - from northeast around Illinka, and an unclear E-W impact, probably from the WNW (Nikopol south) - https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/09/attacks-of-september-45.html

Here's a view I didn't get around to including there. And looking back now, I'm not sure why I called that roof impact - or the one to its left - north origin. Now it looks opposite, like south, much like the roof impact on Nov. 19 or 20. Maybe drones U-turned a few times, or these roofs display damage weirdly (they do, at least a bit). Sept. 5 is an extra-tricky attack, in retrospect - 2 unclear north-or-south impacts and a hard-to-call east-or-west impact of something in the ground nearby. Maybe that was done on purpose. It would be the first new attack on-site IAEA inspectors would get to measure. Maybe someone wanted to stump them or even make them wonder if it really was the Russians shelling the plant after all. Whatever the case, this kind of ambiguity is unusual, and the overall picture is really quite clear.  

9/20 & 21 were never put in a post. 9/20: pipe damaged in spray ponds near cafeteria (damaged) - unclear origin of fire from NW, W, SW or even south. 9/21 - power lines damaged near the cooling reservoir just west of reactor 4 - scene geolocated, but direction of fire unclear.

Nov 19/20: Some 2 months since the last attacks, and the latest attacks I'm aware of. Shells from WNW (Nikopol south) on the 19th, NNE (Marganets direction), and maybe drones (one seeming to turn and impact from the south) on one of those days, hitting roof of Special Building 2. 11/20 3+ hits near Reactor 5 (one impact shown at right), damaging the crucial passageway, the reactor's service rail line, and the roadway - the evening before, impacts were noted in the spray ponds, and the grounds south of them and reportedly in the dry spent fuel storage site, where some thick concrete prevents a leak of dangerous nuclear material. Below: impact south of the spray ponds, video made the 19th, filming from the north - the video shows spray from previous hits in the ponds, hears another rocket pass overhead then quieting before its seen impact to the south = flying partly from the north - as the crater seen there suggests. The other part is west, adding up to roughly a Nikopol direction. see: https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/11/shelling-attack-on-znpp-november-1920.html



To add: report on the first attack, evening of 11/19: "For the first time since the end of September, the Ukrainian military launched a massive attack on the ZNPP perimeter. Between 17:15 and 17:41 (less than 30 minutes), 12 rockets were fired directly at the station. It is known that 6 got into the pool of the reactor cooling fountain, 2 - into the storage facility (dry storage of nuclear waste). It is still impossible to determine the consequences of the shelling - the danger of repeated attacks remains. None of the station personnel were injured." https://t.me/zaes_energoatom/1254

The impacts at reactor 5 were probably on the following morning. 3 impacts on the road and rails were readable as from the North (just west of local north). Adding some later views I found from there suggesting another impact. One shows a strange concrete slab near some trucks of the Russian occupiers that are the "root cause" of the shelling that has the nuclear plant crumbling away. 

That comes from the south side of the passageway to reactor 5, following what seems to be in internal blast, following another shell punching through one of the many broken windows visible on its north side. This might have damaged water pipes feeding into reactor 5, although I don't see signs of a major leak. This might be the most dangerous impact thus far. Reactor 5 was active at the time - as of now, July 2023, it's the last one still in "hot shutdown" and producing some power. The rest are in "cold shutdown."


2023 Attacks on the ZNPP

That may have pushed it far enough. There were no more attacks on the plant reported to the end of the year. 2022 attacks mapped above with estimated firing directions. I haven't followed in 2023, but catching up now, it seems there have been additional attacks. I'll see about visuals and ballistic analysis of these later.

3/29 https://t.me/IntelRepublic/17365 No Ukrainian shells hit the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant territory since the beginning of the year, but the situation remains unstable and dangerous - Renat Karchaa, Advisor to the General Director of Rosenergoatom.

4/4: Ukrainian UAV crashed near the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant - presumably, the Ukrainian Armed Forces tried to attack the plant. Ukrainian militants fired an attack drone that fell in the ZNPP area. The drone produced by Poland weighed about 2 kg, RIA Novosti reports. The location of the UAV wreckage proves that the ZNPP infrastructure was the target of the strike.

Then a successful attack on April 12 was reported, but only later on, that I could find. 4/22: "At ZNPP, windows of the turbine hall of the fourth power unit were shattered by an explosive wave - adviser to the head of the Rosenergoatom concern Renat Karchaa. It is reported that the APU used a drone." https://t.me/chp_donetskv/49289 4/28: "The windows in the turbine hall of the Zaporozhye NPP were repaired after the attack by Ukrainian military drones on April 12. Renat Karchaa, adviser to the general director of the Rosenergoatom concern, announced this. "The windows in the turbine hall were repaired: they closed it somewhere with glass, somewhere with chipboard," he said. "https://t.me/zaes_energoatom/1755

4/27 Zaporozhye nuclear power plant restored after attack by Ukrainian drones – Karchaa. Windows were repaired in the turbine hall of the fourth power unit of ZNPP after the attack (https://t.me/readovkanews/57353) by APU drones. Then the openings were literally knocked out by an explosive wave. The damage was covered with glass and chipboard, Renat Karchaa, adviser to the head of the Rosenergoatom concern, told TASS. https://t.me/readovkanews/57701

In the meantime, on April 23: Another Ukrainian drone tried to attack Zaporozhya Nuclear Power Plant right during Grossi’s talks with the head of Rosatom in Kaliningrad. It was a Polish attack drone - anti aircraft  forces managed to drop it down. https://t.me/Elena_Evdokimova_Digest/8322

4/28 a new attack  just as repairs from the last were finished? This time it was at the liquid nitrogen cooling station - where they attacked just ahead of the IAEA team visit on Sept. 1 - exact geolocation and possible analysis maybe soon - heavy fragmentation damage seen on posts - said a fire was started but swiftly extinguished. - video: https://t.me/Slavyangrad/43619 - https://twitter.com/skadefron/status/1651920456956477441

Update July 2: probably no April 28 attack. The story is vague, told by no one else, and the damage is old, apparently part of the September 1 barrage ahead of the IAEA visit - see here: Adam Larson #EndtheOPCWCoverup #FreeAssange on Twitter: "Levels of fake in #ZNPP attack claims (short thread)

May 28 reports: "Ukrainian militants attempted to attack the ZNPP using a strike UAV, the device was landed and neutralized 500 meters from the station, a representative of the law enforcement agency said." https://t.me/zaes_energoatom/1874

June 9: "In the morning, EW forces landed 3 Ukrainian UAVs with PG-7L wearable ammunition, which flew in the direction of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, the law enforcement agencies of the region reported. The UAVs were examined by explosives specialists. As a result, it was decided to destroy them on the spot. No damage or casualties." https://t.me/izvestia/133753

In Other News... (add 7/2)

June 12: The ZNPP's official website - which doesn't seem to mention these new attacks - notes some minor news: "During the cleaning of the bowls of the spray pools of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, aimed at eliminating the consequences of last year's shelling of the station, fragments from the projectile of the American M777 howitzer were found in one of the bowls of the process water system" https://znpp.ru/novosti/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=9694

June 15 video shows IAEA's Grossi making a visit to check on the plant after the dam collapse and assure everyone there was no immediate danger. This is when he saw no friggin' landmines in the friggin' cooling pond he checked on, or in the spray pools either. Here he is at the latter, being shown pipes long-since punctured in Ukrainian attacks, and probably those US-supplied M777 howitzer shell fragments they found, that probably did this damage. https://t.me/readovkanews/60852


Everyone Already Knows Who Will Have Done It

Before 2022 was out, I was able to plausibly argue how Everybody Knows Ukraine has been Shelling the ZNPP. They might have forgotten by now, but I doubt it, and here's a reminder for everyone, summarized from that post, with some additions:

The UN and IAEA Know It: Ukraine attacked the plant and Energodar and even landed forces around the city, according to the balance of evidence, early on September 1, initiating widely-noted clashes along the coast. This happened just as the IAEA inspection team was driving to the plant, threatening to cancel their visit. Russian forces were seen in action, claiming to turn back that offensive just in time to allow the inspectors safe passage. UN spokesman Stephane Dujarric afterwards thanked Russia, apparently, for protecting the IAEA team in this way. “We are glad that the Russian Federation did what it needed to do to keep our inspectors safe,” 

Since then, the IAEA team has been there, heard everyone's accounts, seen the damage firsthand, and then left 2 observers behind as most of them returned home. They're clear the plant was shelled on several occasions, threatening operations. But in their September 5 report, before it and ever since, the IAEA apparently cannot say who is to blame, aside from someone within the class "all parties." Or they could say but refuse to, perhaps at someone's behest. But they are clear the responsible part(ies) need to stop it, or else they risk ... being told that again. 

When asked who is "playing with fire," referencing Grossi's own remarks from Sunday following powerful explosions that rocked the nuclear power plant Saturday and Sunday, Grossi said "it is very difficult for us to identify from inside the plant who is doing that," adding "by the way, our main goal is to get this to stop, not to get into a game of attribution." (CNN) There are several ways they could find this out, ESPECIALLY from inside the plant, where the impacts occurred. I didn't invent the principles involved in the ballistic analysis I've used to get an idea, just from available images. The IAEA had experts documenting the damaged on-site, and probably subjecting it to some analysis. But the agency has never publicized the results of any analysis. As far as I know, they are allowed to pin blame, and are capable of determining it, and yet they refuse. 

Western Leaders Know It: A September 9 statement from "the ministers of Foreign Affairs of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Ukraine and senior officials from the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United States of America, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy" says: "We emphasize that Russia’s seizure and militarization of the ZNPP is the root cause of the current threats" to the plant and it will stay this dangerous "as long as Russia remains present on the site of ZNPP." What do they mean here? 

* The root cause of Russians attacking the plant is ... because Russian forces are there 

* The root cause of Ukrainians attacking the plant is ... because Russian forces are there 

Yeah. If they could bring themselves to explicitly pin the root AND direct cause on Russia, as Ukraine brazenly and illogically does, they surely would. But Western leaders realize that the actual shelling - the direct cause of the danger - is by the Ukrainians. They could demand that Ukraine stop, but they share the same goal as the attackers - to demonize and complicate Russia's occupation of the plant and hopefully force it to end. So they say nothing about the actual attacks except to suggest they are completely justified by Russia's presence, and will rightly continue, or maybe even escalate into a catastrophe to be blamed, one way or another, on Russia.

The Ukrainian Forces DOING It - And Their Relevant Leaders - Know What They're Doing: Maybe they don't all know it, but President Zelenskyy for one seems to get it, so I imagine quite a few brighter people also realize. 

It's his government that initially resisted an IAEA visit and investigation into the shelling. BBC, Aug. 3: "The IAEA's director-general said he was trying to put together a mission as soon as possible to visit the plant but this required the approval of both the Ukrainian and Russian sides ...  In June, Ukraine's state nuclear company [Energoatom] said Ukraine had not invited the IAEA - and any visit would legitimise Russia's presence there."  Bloomberg Aug. 8: "Russia told diplomats it’s ready to welcome international monitors" but "[IAEA director-General] Grossi said he needs permission from Ukraine’s government" but he still didn't have it. Al Jazeera, Aug. 8: "In a statement, Russia’s foreign ministry said it wanted the (IAEA) to visit ... but that Kyiv was blocking a potential visit. ... Zakharova also claimed Moscow had done everything it could to facilitate a visit by the UN’s nuclear watchdog to the plant but that Kyiv saw it as “beneficial to keep the IAEA away”."

"Mikhail Podolyak (& hence the Zelensky Office) are skeptical about the IAEA visit to the ZNPP. “International institutions and mediation missions look extremely ineffective, extremely cowardly. ...You don’t trust them already at the entrance,” said Podolyak." (Evdokimova) They could be another "Russian Propaganda front" like Amnesty International! You don't need people like snooping around.

The mission pushed ahead, arriving in Ukraine, crossing through Ukrainian territory as Kiev demanded, then faced shelling after it crossed to the Russian side, and UAF allegedly tried to conquer the area immediately ahead of the inspectors, again, raising dangers that are maybe best answered by turning back ... but after Russia blew some things up, the mission pushed ahead with thanks.

And what did the commander-in-chief of the alleged attacks have to say? Once the team arrived, Zelenskyy said "Today, the IAEA mission arrived at Zaporizhzhia NPP. It's good that it happened. The fact itself despite all the provocations by the Russian military and the cynical shelling of Enerhodar and the territory of the plant. Ukraine did everything to make this mission happen. But it is bad that the occupiers are trying to turn this IAEA mission - a really necessary one - into a fruitless tour of the plant. I believe that this will be prevented." I suspect he had just TRIED to prevent it and failed.

No one was explicitly called out. The motives and methods stayed about the same, and attacks continued into September and October before Zelenskyy "said the only way to ensure radiation safety near Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), as well as in the rest of Ukraine and Europe, is "the complete demilitarization of the territory" surrounding the plant." Russia needs to leave. Many agree that the Russians should leave, of course. But note that until his demands are met, Zelenskyy seems quite sure someone will keep shelling the place and denying "radiation safety" to a lot of people far and wide. He's certain the Russians WON'T attack once they leave ... because they ONLY shell the places they are? That is possible, but how can he be so SURE? Is this shelling somehow an issue that's up to him (at least ostensibly), so he can issue such assurances? If we can take Zelenskyy at his word on this point, what does that mean, folks? It's called NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL, plain as day. It's greased along with cynical inversions of the truth of the kind underwriting the new Ukraine since its bloody birthing in the dark corners of 2014.

The Russians Know it:  Just for one example, a Russian statement to the IAEA Board of Governors last September claimed "since July 18, 2022, Ukrainian armed formations have shelled the territory of the ZNPP and its infrastructure more than 30 times, firing more than 120 artillery shells and using at least 16 kamikaze drones." Furthermore,  it states, "the satellite city of ZNPP Enerhodar, where the station's employees and their families live, was shelled more than 70 times during the same period (10 times from drones and more than 60 times from barrel artillery and multiple launch rocket systems)." 

The Locals of Energodar Know It: Over 20,000 residents reportedly signed a petition for IAEA chief Rafeal Grossi ahead of his September, 2022 visit, declaring "Mr. Grossi, leaders of the IAEA member countries, We, the residents of the Zaporizhzhia region, appeal to you to stop the provocations of Ukraine aimed at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. We ask you to strongly condemn the actions of the Ukrainian leadership to escalate the situation around the Zaporizhya nuclear power plant and warn of responsibility to the world community in the event of continued shelling of the station." Grossi thanked them. The shelling has continued with hardly any note from the outside world.

Energoatom Management Knows It: Here's Energoatom's president Petro Kotin. I'm not sure if he's military or just likes that style, but he's an active weaponizer of his nation's nuclear plants. He'll collaborate on any nuclear false-flag plan Kyiv cooks up. He's a threat to global peace and security. Ukraine's nuclear regulator regularly complains of Russian attacks from and against the ZNPP, ignoring an admitted Ukrainian attack there, and ignoring or even distorting the ballistic evidence in other attacks to absolve Ukraine and keep blaming Russia, and repeatedly helped sow fake stories to keep fears stoked, and allegedly switched off the external power to the ZNPP just to blame it on Russian shelling and complain of the danger it creates. They also seemingly allowed their South Ukraine NPP - or the grounds dangerously near it - to be used for Ukrainian rocket shelling. Energoatom only complained with video when the Russians fired back at the launcher, as the video shows (by showing the lingering exhaust plumes or the outgoing rockets), hitting dangerously close to their nuclear plant. It was entirely unprovoked, they say, just the Russians mindlessly hoping to cause a nuclear disaster anywhere, unlike the heroic Energoatom. (see here

Former ZNPP Director Murashov Knows It: Igor Murashov was trusted to be the plant's general manager until he wasn't, and the Russians famously arrested him on September 20. There were fears he'd be murdered, but he was soon released after speaking to investigators and "expelled to the territory controlled by Kiev." Under duress, but maybe truthfully, Murashov admitting to "having ties with the Ukrainian special services" and helping them coordinate "terrorist activities" at the plant and in Energodar. "He said he was aware that the shelling of the strategic facility was done by the armed forces of Ukraine and could cause emergencies." 

Plant Workers Variously Know It: There was a story I saw in passing, but never included in my blog, about a security guard at the plant who was injured in one of the shelling attacks, is sure Ukraine was behind it, and now fully supports the Russian military, collecting supplies to help them out. If that's true, he'll be on Ukraine's kill list of traitors. One security guard - perhaps the same one - was injured in the August 6 attack from the NW. 

Another plant worker at least was killed August 22 in an off-site attack as he was on his way to work, along with the taxi driver. The responsible shell was clearly fired from NW, Kamianske/Chkalove direction, likely aiming for an electric substation they were passing. It's hard to say what he knew or thought about the shelling that killed him.   

Others know and process the facts differently. An unnamed engineer at the plant told the BBC he realizes the artillery fire is coming in largely from the northwest and thus appears to be Ukrainian, but ... it's all faked in a Russian false-flag, he claims, "simulating "arrivals" from Nikopol." Otherwise, hardly anyone mentions how the shells seem to come from the north. 

Yet other "employees of the Zaporozhye NPP receive messages with threats of reprisals from the Kyiv authorities, the head of the Zaporizhzhya movement "We are with Russia" Vladimir Rogov told RIA Novosti. “They try to intimidate people, publish personal data on social networks, and also threaten with reprisals and murders. This is done both publicly and personally by sending messages through various instant messengers." (May 12 https://ria.ru/20230512/zaes-1871185656.html - https://t.me/zaes_energoatom/1800)

Some Arrested Plant Workers Probably Know It Quite Well: On August 17, following 4 UAF artillery attacks on the plant in a week, Russian-linked sources reported the arrest of two plant workers in Energodar: artillery spotters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine who "helped to strike at the territory of the nuclear power plant and the city." Two detainees are named. I don't feel like sharing the names here, but jobs: one was "a security guard at a 750 kV open switchgear (ORU-750)" (area hit by shelling on August 5) and the other is "an engineer." (not the same one that spoke to BBC?) Russian news video shows the arrest raid, a man laying face-down at gunpoint. We're shown notebooks full of numbers and diagrams, including of military vehicles. They had a crude but accurate model of the nuclear plant built up from scraps - see below. There's a raised security perimeter along the right lines, all 6 reactor blocks (but not turbine halls), and important nearby structures, including both special buildings, #2 with a "melted" smokestack and #1 with none at all. But they painted the stripes! They must just love their work.

Adds: April 11, 2023: Karchaa: informants of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are periodically identified at the Zaporozhye NPP - Special services periodically identify informers of Ukrainian nationalists at the Zaporozhye NPP. Renat Karchaa, adviser to the general director of the Rosenergoatom concern, announced this. - He clarified that there are few UAF agents, and they are calculated very quickly. In this case, measures are taken only if the fault of the informant is proven. https://t.me/zaes_energoatom/1692

May 28: Saboteurs preparing a series of terrorist attacks at the ZNPP reportedly arrested in Energodar. The attackers had (https://t.me/energodar_ru/6224) maps and plans of the nuclear power plant with marks for delivering strikes that could lead to a nuclear catastrophe. In addition, Ukrainian saboteurs used foreign satellite systems for communication, as well as weapons for strikes and equipment for conducting reconnaissance and sabotage activities. https://t.me/zaes_energoatom/1873