Regarding How the Victims were Killed, by Whom, and Why

Douma Chemical Massacre 2018 Revisited, Part 3

Adam Larson 

February 12, 2023 

(last edits 2/18)

WARNING: GRAPHIC IMAGES

The latest report from the OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) on the 2018 Douma chemical massacre maintains the blame on Syria's government, and even offers clues to help narrow accountability efforts. It's been taken as another sound basis to pursue the 12-year regime change agenda, now by punishing the Syrian people with widening sanctions (both de jure AND de facto) for their general refusal to play along so far. This continues even as Syria reels from the massive earthquakes that killed thousands in both Government and Terrorist-held parts of Syria.

Continuing the tradition of the preceding FFM investigation, the IIT proposes a chlorine gas cylinder was dropped from a helicopter at "Location 2," impacting with a velocity too low to penetrate the ceiling but so high it blew the ceiling open much like a mortar shell would do. Then an optimally swift gas release caused acid injuries of an extreme nature, but with oddly limited visual signs, leading to a delayed-then-sudden paralysis or unconsciousness in 35 cases, when we should expect that in about zero cases. 

All these rather dubious conclusions were posed exclusively as "reasonable," as the IIT acted like every alternate explanation had been ruled out. 

My personal review tries to be open-minded, "chill," and long on concessions. Part 1 considered the alleged airdrop of the cylinder at Location 2. The best explanation remains that it was manually placed next to two existing mortar shell impacts. Part 2 went through the likely release and possible concentration of chlorine gas in Location 2, and how it could not well explain those 35 fatalities. The victims were quite possibly killed somewhere else and then arranged beneath the cylinder "impact" for an entirely staged crime scene. Nothing in the IIT report adequately addresses my arguments, although it did entertain some other theories that were suggested to them. 

All of that would mean this crime remains unsolved. And that brings us to this part 3, to explore what else might have actually happened to those people. The truth can't be known with certainty, but the available evidence reveals signs of a managed and marketed massacre of civilians, held prisoner by foreign-backed terrorists. Unusual signs suggest the toxic agent used was probably not chlorine. I propose it might have been diesel exhaust. The same signs also point to direct bondage at the time of exposure, probably in what we call a gas chamber. Finally, there's a strong case the ruling Jaysh al-Islam saw the specific victims as enemies, including a central targeted family whose members they might have kidnapped and later executed. I'm not saying they "gassed their own people."

This all runs long enough it could made into a part 3 and 4, but I feel all this needs to be seen together here, for the full impact it deserves.

A Managed Massacre Was Ruled Out?

In his IIT report review thread, OPCW coverup helper Eliot Higgins said: "some of the loudest voices in Douma denialism claim the victims were killed elsewhere and placed at the site, rather than killed by chlorine gas exposure at the site. The OPCW IIT makes clear this is a fabrication." 

How? As covered in part 2, they decided on a chlorine gas level that killed swiftly, probably based on a prior assumption the people died swiftly (circular reasoning). But that wouldn't be swift enough, so they also suggest some unexplained instant immobility making escape "impossible" and death certain. They only made a case - a possible but not a compelling one. 

But, as Higgins also noted, "The OPCW IIT again addresses the claim bodies were moved to the site at location 2, a claim from the tankies that unsurprisingly is not supported by any real evidence." He cited a passage from the report to explain. Summarized: The victims were not shot, stabbed or bludgeoned. They died around the time of the alleged chemical attack. The IIT haven't seen any videos of bodies being planted, and they never noticed any visual evidence for it. Therefore, the victims most likely died at Location 2, from chlorine exposure, as implausible as that is in reality. 

Full passage (optional):

"Finally, with regard to the alternative scenario in which the fatalities would have been killed elsewhere and subsequently moved to Location 2 in an attempt to “stage” an attack, the IIT notes that signs of blunt-force trauma or penetrating trauma are not visible in any of the fatalities observed in verified videos and images from Location 2, and that neither witnesses nor medical personnel recount observing blunt-force trauma or penetrating trauma in any of the fatalities, and that those signs are not observed in verified videos and images from Location 2 either. Furthermore, fully established rigor mortis, observed in fatalities being carried out of Location 2 in the early hours of 8 April 2018, indicates that the time since death was no more than approximately 9 to 16 hours. The IIT also notes that it did not obtain from the Syrian Arab Republic or other States Parties, nor was it able to identify, any evidence—including videos, photographs, satellite or drone imagery, open-source information etc.—which would corroborate that the aforementioned staging actions were performed at Location 2."

Now compare that to my own long-standing take: 

* I've always proposed the victims were truly dead, and were killed with a toxic gas, to explain the observed pulmonary edema and other signs. Chlorine was a distinct possibility until some signs, discussed below, pointed away from it.

* The victims were probably held in captivity, explaining the prolonged exposure to a toxic agent they never fled from, and explaining some very unusual clinical signs. 

* I noted a case of developing "tache noir" of the sclera that placed time of death pretty close to the reported one (somewhere between 7 and 9 PM), and rigor mortis always seemed to agree. Activists reported the deaths wrongly, but they got the time about right. 

* The massacre managers, aligned with approved media and medical crews (White Helmets, etc.)  did not film their massacre of the victims or their staging of the "attack" scene, or they never published the video if so. That might be why there were no videos for the IIT to see. It's not clear why the IIT would expect any different, if they actually entertained this scenario in a meaningful way. 

* There are supportive clues I and others have noted in the visual record, all of which the FFM and IIT have also seen but didn't recognize. I highly doubt they ever tried. I'll relate some of these. 

Four bodies are laid by the curb at the entrance, one of them on a stretcher, and another laid as if being carried head-first into the building, OR feet-first out of it. This looks like an interrupted body planting OR an interrupted rescue, depending. All 4 bodies are there from the first images around 10PM, and not moved until daylight next day (see here - NEW images to me = new to most). If that was an early rescue, it's strange, and it was never resumed.

At least 5 doors at Location 2 were visibly forced and/or removed (see here), reportedly by rescuers. But at least one door, just inside on the ground floor, that had many bodies behind or next to it (right), would almost have to be removed by the victims (immobilized or soon-to-be), or by some body managers. 

The bodies are seen in debatably unnatural positions - people just laid on their backs spread-eagle, etc. One victim (right) was laid by the removed door with skirts and socks askew, black soles free of dust after "walking" up those dusty stairs (but then again: knees? crawling?). Babies were left just lying there nowhere near any protective mother. Bodies were piled, left in strange poses, or re-arranged in different familial embraces, some with vanishing jewelry, as noted in Stephen McIntrye's useful timeline. 

Some bodies were seemingly piled on a rug (below, green) just inside that removed door, and the rug was dragged at an angle into the shower, presumably to aid the widespread and mysterious washing of faces and hair shortly before the first videos. We see rags, discarded gloves, even a green respirator mask likely used in that unexplained process. 

Activists had surmised and "witnesses" had claimed the victims washed their own faces before they finally couldn't move. But that's kind of absurd, and all this wet hair is seen 2.5 to 3 hours or more after their alleged deaths. 

Some victims had been coated with soot, but some of it was washed off their faces, perhaps, using soot-smeared water basins. It seems they were also trying but failing to erase the unusual yellow-brown skin discoloration  beneath that (we'll come back to this).

So to be clear, scene and body manipulation aren't certain, but they are supported as possibilities by plenty of evidence. 

It's been argued that if bodies were planted, someone in the neighborhood would almost surely witness the crime, and they would report it, perhaps with video documentation. That certainly is a risk, but an overrated one. 

This part of Douma was largely in ruins and seriously depopulated by then. It was under active bombardment that had people sheltering, and there had been orders communicated to stay inside and away from windows, due to the shelling and the toxic gas allegedly coating the whole area. Furthermore, if anyone saw the perpetrators - and were seen seeing them - they could be arrested or killed on the spot. 

We don't know where the victims would be killed. It could be somewhere inside Location 2, but there was no sign of another lethal chemical (and the evidence points away from chlorine - see below). It would probably be a remote place never tested by the OPCW, and the bodies were likely brought to Location 2 via the underground tunnels, which are big enough to allow pickup trucks. The tunnels open some 50 meters from Location 2, and the last stretch would be traveled under cover of dusk (sunset 6:59PM vs. rep. attack ~7:30, on average of a few versions). 

So it would run a risk, but no guaranteed exposure, and this does nothing to prove there was no planting. The evidence for it cannot be dismissed.

The OPCW FFM consulted some German toxicologists who doubted simple chlorine would explain the scene. The chief expert suggested on his own that the bodies could instead be part of a "propaganda exercise," offering some unspecified "elaboration." It's not clear why the OPCW was consulting "tankies" like that, but they were clearly unhappy with the results. 

Finally, grubby hands and clothing - in many but not all cases - might indicate captivity under poor conditions, which could have extended to murder. 

But whatever your doubts or questions about this circumstantial evidence, the evidence we'll consider below strongly suggests the victims were prisoners, were deliberately poisoned, and did have their bodies planted here. 

The "Mask of Death" Clues

One issue I noticed immediately was a very unusual yellow-to-brown discoloration on some of the victims' upper faces, and assorted issues in the same area of other faces. I established the basic cause quickly, as explained in some detail at the post Douma's Mask of Death (2019 re-write). I stand by that assessment, which I'll re-explain here with important expansions. 

The discolored area seems to correlate with the flow of pulmonary edema fluid, originating at the nose and mouth. They would cough this out trying to breathe, but from there it seems to flow over the face in a pattern similar to a "domino" mask. This is most evident on a woman dubbed W7 in my system (see here), also called Mask 1. She's widely seen, including in the IIT report (see below). This extract shows what should normally not be there, without the disgusting foam and terrified eyes we don't need to see here (and minus some details hidden under the foam). 

If that face gives you the spooks like it does me, realize that's not because Assad's chlorine is so especially evil. It's because part of you realizes that is truly bizarre, and something might be EXTRA-wrong here. 

I've been looking at alleged chemical attacks in Syria and associated fatalities since December 2012, and I've never seen anything else like this. But in Douma, some form of this mysterious skin effect and/or its "mask" pattern appears on some two thirds of the seen victims. I'll show some of them below. Some show it strongly and some fainty, and others not at all. But all 35 victims at Location 2, and 3 others also seen most likely suffered the same fate (as did the full reported 43 - if not even more). 

Note this discoloration is not really a stain, but rather a process inside the skin, frequently accompanied by or replaced with a rash-like irritation in the same area. It seems the edema fluid has a strange effect on the skin. We'll come back to that.

Almost all details of all cases suggest this fluid flowed primarily "up" their face from the nose and/or mouth, avoiding the chin and lower cheeks. Of course fluids can only flow down under gravity, so this requires a certain position with the victims' faces upside-down, or with their bodies fully suspended upside down at the time of exposure, presumably bound to stay that way and so they could not wipe their faces of the edema fluids, allowing for this readable pattern. 

What a terrible detail. This is not something people at liberty would be doing in their home at Location 2. Some other points in favor of this: some display cyanosis that's often worst at the upper face and ears - some burst capillaries in the face - hair needing washed along with faces.

The skin effect is deeper in areas where, it seems, the fluid moved the slowest, lingering in its contact. Here's mask 1 extract again, flipped so we can see it how gravity would have: the flow was quickest at the origin, for less staining at the mouth and nostrils, and slower where it was obstructed and piled up - intensely along her nose, and less so in a widening area "up" the mid-cheeks. The clear lines here across the cheeks and crossing at the bridge of the nose are unusual - likely straps in her case, slowing the fluid on her nose. 

But almost every case is like hers in that the color is somehow deepest right under the eyes, around the outer rims, and a bit along the top, trailing off before the middle. Finally, discoloration appears at other points including the temples and spots across the forehead, perhaps a lowest point where the fluid would pool up before dripping off, for some lingering contact there. 

Note, 2/13: to drip from these forehead points would almost require the victims were suspended upside-down AND craning their necks to face the floor (like at right, or more so). That was probably the best way to cough the fluid out, but you can see how some of it might roll "up" the face as well. I've seen boards JaI used to strap people to. These turned upside-down might explain it, or maybe leaned against the wall at an angle - whatever best explains it. And if the gas used were heavier than air, any position like this would keep their heads down in the worst of it. End note.

There are unclear cases and a few exceptions; a pregnant woman (W5), an infant girl (or toddler? G10), and a younger infant (I2) at least, seem laid just on their backs, with fluid to the sides "across" the cheeks and ears, on the back of their clothing, over the chin, and less "up" the face. We also see effects of later flow matching different body positions in Location 2 (see Mask 2), so these only testify to body arrangement after the killing.

The OPCW's early FFM final report made the briefest note of a "periorbital discoloration" which they found "is not associated with any specific known toxic exposure." It was a mystery. "To determine whether it is due to a physiologic response to exposure to a toxic substance or simply post-mortem changes would require additional steps." (8.101) It's not clear if those steps were ever taken, by them. The IIT report twice lists symptoms including "discoloration of the skin" - no longer "periorbital" - as supporting reports of a chlorine attack, and as unlikely to result from simple dust inhalation. Nothing else of what I'll cover here was even noted by either investigation.

I could find no information about chlorine discoloring the skin like this, across the upper face or anywhere. As far as I could find, there is no post-mortem "masca mortis" like this, and there's no other cause I could find or think of that wasn't some kind of strange. And an important distinction helps us get on track; the "periorbital" part is not so relevant. This is a skin effect where edema fluid ran "up" their faces, including around the eyes, in an area better called peri-periorbital. In fact, there is a total LACK of skin effect within the actual periorbital area (immediately around the eyes, or inside the eye socket). 

WARNING: GRAPHIC IMAGES BEGIN HERE

The completely clear patch immediately around the eyes has exactly the shape and size of swimming goggles, everywhere the shape can be discerned. Victim G6 aka Mask 5 is especially typical. There's usually a full and sharp outline on the bottom, where fluids rolling "up" the cheeks would accumulate against the projecting lenses, thence rolling over and around them, but more slowly. A wide backup with deep skin effect continues for the entire curve, and then there's a clear outline around the outer rim where it would flow "up," and a thinner line along the top up to the middle. Any fluids clinging to the curved rim might drip off under gravity here, or just roll up the brow quickly, leaving little sign until the forehead spots.  

The unknown agent presumably caused the pulmonary edema observed. This is usually caused by an irritant or corrosive substance - including but not limited to chlorine. Any such thing would probably affect the eyes much like chlorine would, but as I have noted in part 2, the victims' eyes totally lack redness to indicate such contact. The skin around the eyes is also unaffected, and the shape of this area suggests just how it was all shielded - with goggles. And this would explain the fluid slowdown marring the upper cheeks so badly. All these mysteries click together. 

4 other clearest examples of varied issues surrounding ovals of no such issues at right, Masks 2, 3, 5 & 6. (Examples were numbered upon identification, with #4 less clear) Images saturation and contrast enhanced to clarify, and some "smart blur" to smooth out artifacts, but nothing added. What unifies them is the shape of the affected area - widening up from the mouth and nose, and most extreme around the implied goggle lenses and the bridge of the nose where they would secure.

Mask 1 displays the colors of burning toast, and in these other cases, the mask area is filled with: yellow discoloration with a red rash surrounding it (Mask 2), skin turned almost black and seemingly hardened, perhaps with blood involved (Mask 3), vivid orange-brown surrounded by mottled and purple-shifted irritation (Mask 5), and a late-appearing red rash with just faint yellow (Mask 6). 

Several others of differing clarity were identified for a total of 11 cases I call "mask" (with #11 just now added - see below) + another 13 with no visible mask but some mixture of the related signs (called PPR) = 24. What made for Mask vs. PPR was a bit arbitrary, but 24 total out of 38 seen victims (35 from Location 2 + 3 others seen later) = almost 2/3 of them. Some of them display it mildly, others display it not at all, and some just aren't seen well enough to say. But they probably all suffered the same fate. They all suffocated, yet as far as we can see, they all have those white eyes.

We'll consider the effects in a bit more detail, but first, a few questions arise here....

Why Goggles? 

Why do I conclude they were used? The concave shape of the eye socket, the possibility of wiping or extreme squinting are among the other possibilities that could explain the lack of eye burning. But these don't seem to explain this clean and total an effect. It seems the evidence requires swimming goggles, or something of a very similar shape and similar effectiveness shielding the eyes, with enough thickness to cause the suggested fluid slow-down just "under" the eyes. Thin plastic or paper eye covers of the same size might explain it, but not as well. 

Other skin effect exclusions also seem related, maybe ways of securing the goggles with a tight fit: straps across the cheeks and crossing at the nose with Mask 1 - maybe straps up the outer cheek with the pregnant W5 and Mask 3 - some tab or lump of adhesive, perhaps, on the underside of the goggle shape (Masks 2 & 5), or the same on the top side (Mask 3). Previously I decided the goggles were not secured with the usual side straps. I revise that to say there may have been side straps, just not tight enough to the skin to interrupt the flow there.

Then a question I'll ask: Why would I want to make up something so strange?  I'm just following the evidence. Sometimes, they say fact is stranger than fiction. Maybe this is just one of those times.

Ok, it is strange, because the question is raised: Why would the killers apply eye protection to the people they were murdering? 

That's not obvious, but I have some guesses. They all stem from this crime being meant for display and propaganda - something about the visual impact it would have. Maybe the planners felt that acid-burned eyes would look wrong for a sarin-chlorine attack, for some confused reason. Maybe they wanted open eyes staring at the world for best effect, while chemical-injured eyes almost always squeeze tightly shut. One compelling and terrible possibility between those two emerged looking into events preceding this, as the ruling Jaysh al-Islam coalition was battered from Eastern Ghouta, one district after another. See blog post here for details - for just the relevant faces and a summary, see below.

* March 14, a chlorine attack in Hamouriya was reported with 2 young boys shown dead - the smaller one has tightly-closed, swollen eyes, perhaps suggesting irritant/corrosive exposure and that he wasn't given any goggles. The older boy's eyes look fine. No better detail seen. No CW fatalities listed by (now-defunct) VDC for this day. Opposition forces fled from Hamouriya by March 17 (per this map). If they had any civilian prisoners they didn't feel like transporting or setting free, they might kill them in the last days, just for convenience and minor propaganda points.

* Further back, one I just now ran across (not included in the linked post). February 19, a young child "killed in today’s heavy airstrikes on the rebel-held city of Douma" - infant with oral foam and swollen-looking eyes - blood on the face that is likely someone else's (it's a very bloody morgue scene). A uniform yellow skin color might suggest a prior illness, not directly related. No VDC database to check anymore. No chemical attack on this date had popped up in my earlier looks. No one was fleeing Douma yet.

https://twitter.com/sakirkhader/status/965722168427466753

* Then the one that stood out: A March 17 shelling attack in Ain Tarma got confused with a "chlorine attack" in Douma, but just the "shelling" is listed as leaving 3 children dead - likely of a Tarablisi family displaced from Jobar, as listed by the VDC. "Displaced" has often seemed to be code for "kidnapped," and Ain Tarma fell to Syrian forces after March 18 but before the 28th. Two older girls have signs of cyanosis, yellow suffocating foam, yellow or brown fluids on their clothing. One has open white eyes, but there's no visible staining to trace out any goggles they wore, or any fluid pattern. A baby boy shown with them clearly did NOT have goggles - he has red, raw, tightly-closed, badly swollen eyes, with separately burned eyelids,... cyanosis, with purple lips and upper face, white mucous or foam in the mouth and nose - dries yellow residue all over his face from the nose up, some fluid with a brown edge on his cheek (possibly blood-tinged mucous) - irritation but no yellow or brown staining of the skin.

Sorry, but it seemed worth showing all 3 puffy-eyed child martyrs:

There are various other causes for each of these signs that could, hypothetically, result from prior circumstances and the complex and variable event called "shelling." Two of these anyway were not supposed to be chemical attacks, and none of them is clear on being one. None of these clearly matches the effect seen with the April 7 chemical massacre, and they differ intriguingly with regard to eyes. But they're similar to what happened, with the suffocating edema and skin and eye irritation, and very close in time and space. 

This occular issue doesn't appear that I've seen with older children or adults. Any of them that were secretly gassed may have already been given eye protection. Perhaps the killers just didn't have any goggles in the smaller size these tykes would need. It could be these babies, especially the last one, were such horrible sights that the massacre planners finally located some protection in their size before trying the same thing again with a bigger number of victims.

Could Chlorine Explain the Mask?

The "Mask of Death" skin effect, again, is not evident in those last 3 faces or anywhere else I've seen, but it was widespread at Location 2. This effect is nowhere in the literature on chlorine, which produces hydrochloric (and hypochlorous) acid on contact with water. The only skin color it usually causes is that of the blood flushing the skin - regular irritation. And it happens wherever it contacts, not in a special area of the upper face. 

Closest matches: Chlorine gas can stain things its own yellow-green color, as seen at Location 4, but not a golden yellow or orange-brown. I've read reports (Hurst?) of some soldiers killed in WWI with faces stained chlorine color after a long stay in a dense cloud of the stuff. It's not something I've heard of anywhere else, and it would probably be all across the face and exposed skin, not in a mask shape like we see. 

Concentrated chlorine, as seen dripping on a pillow at location 4, does also oxidize to brown. The whole bed there gets stained green by the gas, and it all shifts brown. I haven't read about brown faces in WWI, but ... 

Considering all that, maybe it was the same blamed gas. If I were to learn chlorine can do this, as well as what's described below, then it could have been the poison after all. The mask shape would be chlorine in the air reacting with edema fluids flowing "up" the face, with all the points above: victims seemingly in captivity, upside-down in googles, with chlorine in the gas chamber. That's still not the reported story at Location 2. 

A Xanthoproteic Process?

But even then, there would be a contender, that for the moment stands alone as a specific, plausible explanation. This exact kind of skin discoloration is a classic effect of Nitric Acid. When it comes in contact with "aromatic amino acids," nitric acid (hereafter NA) initiates a "xanthoprotein reaction" (or "xanthoproteic reaction") - hereafter "XP reaction." 

The XP reaction is used in a laboratory setting as a test for amino acids; in a positive test, the solution turns from yellow to orange. https://warbletoncouncil.org/reaccion-xantoproteica-10005 It's also an effect of NA that just happens on the skin or anything with the right kind of proteins. It's most commonly seen in humans with accidental exposure to liquid NA, which has various industrial, chemical and military uses. 

As far as I know there might be 5 other chemical explanations, but I could find none yet. Here I'll relate why this fits the bill for the Location 2 fatalities. (also: I'm crowd-sourcing additional references and knowledge, be it pro, con, or whatever, or to propose an alternative cause - comments are open.) A few online sources give details matching what's seen in Douma:

The xanthoprotein reaction:

* stains the skin yellow and produces deep, painful burns

* causes mild irritation

* causes hardening of the skin

* When in contact with the eyes it is possible that severe burns and permanent damage result.

https://www.reference.com/science-technology/nitric-acid-stain-skin-yellow-9475502370e787b5

* causes "specific yellow- to brown-stained wounds with slower accumulation of eschar and slower demarcation compared with thermal burns."

The nitric acid burn trauma of the skin - PubMed (nih.gov)

* "Chemical skin burns induced by nitric acid initially showed a bright yellow to brown 

staining with surrounding red and oedematous swelling" 

sciencedirect.com

* A progression of the effect over time, with irritation deepening and color shifting from yellow to brown

A case study with example images - paywalled: I lost the copy I had, but this image can be shared. Victim splashed with liquid NA, direct skin contact - probably not what we see in Douma. The victim washed early, and effect initiated by then is mostly mild - just a golden yellow color, mainly around the facial hair where it might linger. A more brown color, albeit faint, can be seen at the forehead and presumably on the scalp - maybe he didn't rinse as well here and had wet, partly contaminated hair over his forehead for a while, for longer contact. Other areas show red irritation, maybe with slight hardening. White patches are probably from a topical treatment.

See also The Nitric acid burn trauma of the skin - Journal of Plastic, Reconstructive & Aesthetic Surgery (jprasurg.com) and limited  abstracts: semanticscholar.org/ - sciencedirect.com/  Several cases of accidental exposures to liquid NA are described. Photos show "IIa-b chemical burn on day 1 with relatively pale staining" vs. "intensified yellow-brown staining" seen on day 2 (unclear if this is 24 hours after exposure, less than that, or more than that). This is from brief exposure with early treatment, maybe slowing the effect. A shoulder is shown with small liquid splashes all over, but connected by a burnt line along a shoulder seam that held more soaked-in liquid next to the skin, and it gets worse at the underarm creases. 

Some cases in Douma show a widening and deepening of the skin effects over time quite similar to this, but seemingly faster from a lack of early management: clear-looking areas grow an irritated red, red areas turn yellow, yellow ones shift to orange and brown, and brown to darker brown. 

Time-frame (approximate, worth refining): death rep. around 7:30 or as I found sometime between 7:00 and 9:00 - first seen 10:15-11 pm, then around 1 am, maybe later in the dark hours, in some inside view after sunrise and up to mid-day - then some bodies are seen outside Location 2 mid-day, including 12:30-1pm, then inside the tunnels, and finally at an underground collection spot near medical point 1, between 5 and 6pm. Some are seen for nearly 24 hours after death before being taken off to a secret burial.

Mask 1, icky foam included, specific areas compared: 

Here the expansion and deepening of the color are quite evident in images taken hours apart, but all at Location 2 (to pin down: best estimate of time between images). This victim is one of the few that's never seen again after the bodies were moved mid-day on April 8. The latest view is probably 14-18 hours after death. Again, the clear stripe in the middle of this is probably where a tight strap ran across her cheek. Also less affected: an odd spot on her nose might testify to other masking, or to something randomly stuck on there, shielding the skin from most of the fluid - even at the end it's partly unaffected.  

Her exceptionally dark pattern color suggests she had the fluid left on her face longer than most. Killed earlier? No. Observe - her face is in a similar position to what it was in bondage, so new foam here at Location 2 flows "up" her face in about the same way, adding to the earlier mask pattern in a way that perhaps no others do. By having "more of the same," she clarifies what they all had to start with, when they were killed.

Mask 2: 

2 views inside Location 2: early with almost no visible mask, but it's strong by the yellow-tinted photo - probably later, around noon, and different camera & lighting as well). 1 view outside with advanced mask, just before the dried foam cone was hosed away. In 2 PM views at Location 1, it's stronger yet. Last view is ~20-23 hours after death, and a bit longer since the skin exposure began. Note the later flow from the corner of the mouth sat longer than the original up-the-face fluid, for deeper brown stains along the edge vs. a deep-looking upper cheek burns just hitting the yellow-orange stage ... and one hopes he was upside down for less than the 15 hours before they hosed that foam away. 

Mask 6/G10 ("G9" in error): 

Just irritation, appearing late but aggressive, especially at a chin scratch, a cheek spot - discoloration strongly at the yellow left earlobe, just faintly on the face. No visible foam/fluids, and no additional skin effect to go with its flow. Location 2 views are hours apart - one well before 1 am and one well after (it was around 1am that she was picked up by a White Helmets "rescuer" for a photo opportunity, moved a few feet, and set back down on top of other bodies). Left view enhanced for best view of any issues - almost zero aside from that earlobe, faint pink at the chin scratch. Later: orange earlobe, faint yellow, intense rash filling in a partial mask pattern. Time frame: same as above.

M1: alleged survivor Nasr al-Hanan claims this is his brother Hamzah, whom he watched washing his face at the sink before he collapsed, at least 3 hours before this view with wet hair. He was left in a strange pose. Nasr showed a cell phone image taken later. I caught this late, not included in Mask of Death post, but he fits, with brownish color at the upper lip where his last foam had pooled up, and the usual area on the nose and upper cheeks, below unaffected, open, all-white eyes. He's Mask #11 then (unless I revise and demote #10, or #9 - both are kind of weak). Timespan unclear.

Mask 5 progression is shown below. Others also show some deepening of the effect, but let's move on. 

Compression and hardening of the skin also occurs with the XP reaction, and this is seen in at least some of the Douma victims with the more advanced effect. There is some indication with Mask 1, especially on the ring above the left eye, but it's more evident with mask 5, a girl, and mask 2, a boy.

Mask 5/G6 (left): sunken appearance, orange color fading to brown at the upper boundary below the eyes, but not past that line - seemingly pressing blood from the capillaries to create a mottled flushing of the cheeks well below the orange patch, outside of a wide ring of pallor along the mask's edge. Mask 2/B6 (right): deep yellow coloration under the eyes, perhaps blistered out, but likely compressed - a flushed area just below, with an extra-red band along the mask's edge, just overlapping the yellow - Some brown patches near the mouth appear sunken, with a narrow band of squeezed pallor separating them.

And note in these 2 cases that whatever the effect, it remains in the surface affected area and not in unaffected areas - blood is displaced mainly into tissue that's already flushed, with little to no creep into the undamaged skin. Clear skin is found lower on the face, sporadically in the middle, and inside those perfect goggle outlines. The boy has one spot of yellow beginning under his right eye, probably from after the goggles were removed, and nothing else inside those rims.

Finally, some points on the edema fluids that seemingly caused this.

IIT 6.105 "...some of the secretions observed were also pinkish/brown in colour, which is likely due to a combination of blood-tinged sputum and changes in its colour due to the time elapsed between when the exposure occurred and when the fatalities were documented."

FFM: "Some of the secretions also have an additional light brown colour, which is similar in appearance to gastric contents or blood tinged sputum." 

Perhaps all of it is the relevant yellow-brown; white foam is more an optical effect of many reflective bubbles than it is the true color. Collapsed to liquid, this can be seen on faces and the floor in golden yellow, brownish yellow and brown states. Fluid by victim B4 at least does include blood (it's seen on his face later), but most don't seem to. This is quite possibly from the XP reaction with proteins in the mucous. It may happen slower than it does in the skin. Mask 5/G6 has skin change drastically, as her pool of edema fluid expands but barely changes color from golden yellow. Mask 1 foam collapses for less glare, but also seems brown-shifted in the late view.

This is a detailed process that is not known to result from chlorine exposure. 

Diesel Exhaust? 

The evidence could suggest poisoning directly with pure liquid Nitric Acid, in a breathable vapor. But that might cause a quicker and bloodier death than we see. The NA was more likely produced secondarily to - for example - inhaling airborne NOx. NOx refers to nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO 2), one of which turns to the other in rapid order. NOx creates nitric acid on contact with water. This is much like what chlorine does, but it's a different acid with different effects. The suggested skin contact is with NA only in a dilute form, in the edema fluids that were coughed up, but likely reacting further with particles still in the air. Eye contact, again, seems absent.

Atmospheric NOx can have many plausible sources, but perhaps most commonly, it comes from diesel exhaust. This is generated automatically as waste by all kinds of vehicles and machinery that burn diesel oil as fuel. Just fill the tank, turn the key, and the exhaust can be piped into a sealed room full of people.

The Nazis used this method in some of their extermination camps, including Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka. As I've had explained to me, the diesel used then produced enough carbon monoxide that it was the primary cause of death in those gas chambers. As I gather, modern diesel produces much less CO and would, most likely, kill more slowly with the NOx it also produces. 

I'm no expert, but Diesel exhaust also seems a likely source for the black, sooty residue seen heavily on some victims. At right: Infant I2, seen above, embraced by a sooty water basin, here at Location 1 much later, with some developing rash on the nose, upper cheeks, at some cheek scratches. This baby looks like someone who climbed up a chimney. Others who don't look like that could just be the ones suspended across the gas chamber, further from the exhaust pipe. 

Impurities in diesel exhaust might also add to the viscosity of pulmonary edema fluids. The FFM had noted an unusually persistent foam in some cases. Mask 5 as shown above has foam that collapses into a gummy residue, almost like artificial whipped cream. Mask 2/B6 as seen here, B1 more notably, and several others have the foam dry into a cone that never collapses and had to be hosed away the next day.

Note 2/13: The basement at Location 2 might be worth another look. There was a sooty area, some details I forget, and would the OPCW even see diesel exhaust in their tests, or consider it an issue?

A New Method?

Again, I've never seen anything like this before. It may have been a new method with unexpected results. Consider: This appears alongside sarin claims that fell apart. Maybe they still had some sarin, had meant to kill the victims with it, and/or spike the scene with it. But say it was blown up en route, along with its handlers, amid Jaysh al-Islam's general military rout. If so, they might rig up a diesel exhaust gas chamber, and then find out about this downside later. Last-minute improvisation seems likely all around, and might explain a lot of the exposed seams. 

Or maybe it was a known method, one used before less visibly, but some additional mistakes or developments messed it up here. For example, the gas chamber might have been damaged by shelling, delaying body removal and cleanup. And there are other possibilities, of course including that I'm completely off base.

It could well be another agent than diesel caused the NA. Maybe there was no NA and there's another explanation for the process we see. Perhaps there's another way to explain the skin effect, the flow pattern and/or the exclusions. But so far only one proposed scenario actually explains all this evidence.

When they stopped moving, I suppose the victims had their goggles and binding removed, were initially washed, and found to look fine. They were transported to Location 2, probably by truck via the underground tunnels, then carried and arranged inside. The chlorine cylinder was placed then if it wasn't already, and the valve was opened however it was, filling the site and leaving a chemical footprint. 

The gas release may have been rushed, causing the last body movers to drop and leave 4 bodies at the entrance because the gas cloud was coming. Maybe the mysterious 8 bodies of the reported 43 were simply in the bed of a pickup truck when the work team fled the scene. 

The process might have been rushed due to that deepening skin reaction - it looked wrong and was getting worse. Even then, by the time the gas was thin enough to work the scene again, W7 and B3 looked terrible and others were getting there. They tried and found it did not wash off, so the first photo shoot was rushed before they looked even worse, and included wet hair on most victims. Then some later views look worse anyway. 

Review of OPCW Consideration

I don't expect to convince many people, or any of the coverup helpers, of this exact hypothesis. They can confidently assume the features noted must have another explanation, even if none is evident. Like everything else, from the cylinder "impact" forward, it "must be" whatever allows a definite Syrian regime chlorine attack that's fit to impose new sanctions over.

But OPCW investigations never explained any of the related mysteries I've correlated here. The FFM considered the "periorbital discoloration" to be a mystery seemingly unrelated to chlorine. To find out what it was "would require additional steps" they probably never took before the IIT presented skin discoloration as probably some kind of chlorine effect after all. They listed it that way twice, alongside miosis, which also has nothing to do with chlorine. 

The IIT report's figure 6 shows a baby, a boy and a woman killed, labeled "PERSONS WHO DIED AS A CONCEQUENCE OF BEING EXPOSED TO CHLORINE." End "fact." The pixelated vs. clear areas indicate they want to show us clouded white eyes and edema foam, and perhaps the discoloration as well.

Shown: mask 6, mask 2, mask 1 with signs more consistent with death involving nitric acid instead of chlorine (which produced hydrochloric acid), and exceptionally clear mask patterns showing they died under bondage in a story the FFM/IIT "witnesses" - White Helmets and otherwise - would likely have known, but never told them about. 

But why would the "rebels" gas "their own people?"

Thought-impaired critics reflexively ask this, assuming the answer and assuming a faulty premise that the people running Douma at the time cared about the victims, considering them "their own." But in fact, the ruling militants of Jaysh al-Islam ("Army of Islam" - hereafter JaI) may have murdered some of their enemies among the Syrian people here, people whom the OPCW's flawed investigations claim to champion.

It's worth relating some backstory that, for a few paragraphs, might seem unrelated. I've never researched this deeper than presented here: Bakriyeh Family Deaths for a clunky, fuller explanation of what I summarize below, with sources linked. I probably have a few less-relevant details wrong. Feel free to read up double check me or learn more.

Jaysh al-Islam started out of Douma in 2011 as Liwa al-Islam ("Banner of Islam" - LaI), supported by Saudi Arabia to hopefully lead a march on Damascus and to head up a new government. They gained fame for some assassinations in mid-2012, and grew to control Douma by year's end, amid grisly and contested massacres. From this base they expanded across the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus and into the city too (Jobar). Along the way, they absorbed other groups until, in the Fall of 2013, LaI became the head part of the larger Jaysh al-Islam coalition. 

Just like its head, JaI was known as brutal, repressive, and anti-democratic. JaI was almost certainly behind the December, 2013 abduction & later killing of the "Douma 4" - local activists, including Razan Zaitouneh, who had criticized abuses of the militia and its founding leader Zahran Alloush. Alloush was the son of a preacher exiled in Saudi Arabia. He had openly expressed sectarian and genocidal views, promising to "cleanse" Syria of Alawites, Shi'ites, and people of Iranian ancestry. He walked those comments back, but LaI/JaI kidnapped civilians on sectarian lines by the thousands. In Adra alone, early December 2013, they teamed up with Al-Qaeda franchise Jabhat al-Nusra to commit a grisly massacre of unclear size, and then a mass kidnapping of several hundred (maybe over 1,000) mostly Alawite citizens. JaI kept the captives in squalid conditions and used them at will. They openly placed women in cages on rooftops to deter airstrikes, and used men for slave labor. Some died while digging a famed "tunnel city" beneath Douma and much Eastern Ghouta. 

These and other captives before and since may also have been killed at will to flesh out allegations, like the August 2015 Douma market "attack" (112 killed, almost all of them adult males) and the August 2013 Ghouta chemical massacre of several hundred (2021 Ghouta reports). Whatever all they did, it was met with occasional muted criticism from Western Human Rights groups and nothing from hostile governments, except maybe to blame some of their biggest crimes on the Syrian state. 

Jaysh al-Islam proudly opposed the Syrian government and ISIS, the Islamic State, claiming they were secret allies (along with Iran and the "Mahjoos" and maybe even the Israeli Jews). Besides that 2-front war, fought alongside Jabhat al-Nusra, and another waged on civilians they considered apostate ... and another on opposition activists who opposed them ... some of Jaysh al-Islam's endless struggles were with other Sunni Muslim opposition fighters. 

As they expanded from 2011 onward, they variously allied with, displaced, absorbed, or crushed other opposition groups. And sometimes they pushed it too far. The biggest rebellion JaI faced was called Jaysh al-Umma - Army of the Muslim Community (as opposed to the more abstract Islam). This was led by a prominent group called Douma Martyr's Brigade (DMB), but included others who had had enough. It ran at a low boil from September 2014 until Jaysh al-Islam formally declared war on the rebels in January 2015. They wiped out the rebellion in a few days of this, perhaps with Saudi intelligence help. 

Jaysh al-Umma fighters and leaders, of various original groups, were amnestied and re-absorbed, killed, arrested then killed, or left scattered in hiding. Those who escaped the purge stopped rebelling at all, and sided with the Syrian government in its fight against the Islamist monster ruling Douma and E. Ghouta. That's not a flattering story for the Jaysh al-Islam "freedom fighters" or the Saudi Kingdom backing them. It seems JaI were just too effective and too ruthless for their own good. 

Others whom Zahran Alloush rubbed the wrong way likely helped betray his position so the Syrian air force was able to kill him and several top commanders on December 25, 2015. Jaish al-Islam carried on with its control of Eastern Ghouta until the offensives of early 2018 whittled that down to Douma and then nothing. But Alloush's death seems to mark the start of a long slide from quite a height of power they held in 2014.

The Douma Martyr's Brigade was led during the rebellion by Majid Khayba. He took the helm 5 months earlier when its founding leader, Omar Diab Bakriyeh, was killed in fighting. When only those who cooperated with Jaysh al-Islam were allowed to exist, DMB cooperated. But Bakriyeh reportedly died in clashes with the Syrian army on April 4, 2014, when his JaI allies failed to get reinforcements to him in time. Or maybe their men got there and killed him. And maybe there wasn't even a battle that day. The true story can't be known. 

On the same day, 4/4/14, one Amjad Diab Bakrieh from Douma - the commander's likely brother by matching middle and last names names - was reportedly killed in unrelated "shelling." (an Arabic middle name is usually the father's first name). Bakriyeh is a rare local name. Per the database of the Douma-based VDC (now defunct), only two people named Bakriyeh had been killed in the whole Syrian  conflict from 2011 to then. It doubled to 4 that day. And from such a small pool, how many men named Diab Bakriyeh were there to have sons killed on the same day? Probably just one. This smells of family targeting, papered over with some falsified reporting.

After Bakriyeh's death, Majid Khayba took the helm at DMB until he was arrested and executed in 2015 following the rebellion. The open friction leading to that was yet to come when Bakriyeh was slain, but that might play in. Beyond his brother, the commander 's wider family might eventually be seen as targets, especially if other relatives continued annoying JaI. And that could matter since the OPCW's Location 2 with the 35 bodies was reportedly a home of several Bakriyeh families. As some media reports noted and as the Douma-based VDC listed them, 11 of the identified 35 fatalities were named Bakriyeh. With relations not all clear ("maiden" names are kept in marriage), some other victims will surely be related, and it could be that most or all of them were related. 

Commander Omar Diab Bakriyeh would likely have a son named Diab, in honor of his own father. But then so might any of his brothers. So these 2 girls found at Location 2 could be the commander's granddaughters or grand-nieces: Jouri Diab Bakriyeh (Child - Female), Qamar Diab Bakriyeh (Adult - Female). Others might relate, but middle names are left off in most cases.

It's not a common name. Including these 11, the VDC martyr's database listed a total of 17 Bakriyehs killed in the conflict from 2011 to 2018. Another source adds one more for 18. All but one clearly hailed from Douma, and the other likely does. Some 2/3 of them allegedly died under that one chlorine cylinder.

Side-note, optional: What seem to be two other relatives are telling. The VDC listed a Fahid Mohammad Dyab Bakrieh killed 3-23-2012, adult male, age 22, from Douma. Notes: "shot in the heart by a sniper's gunfire" - presumably a regime sniper, except that allegation is always dubious. Dual middle name makes the father clear, and commander Omar was also called "Abu Fahed." His son here was likely the main namesake of the Martyr's brigade as it set out rebelling, ultimately on 2 fronts. And this means at least 3/4 of the first Bakriyeh deaths were probably all related. Maybe it's 4/4. Then on April 14, 2018 - just a week after the chemical massacre, as it happens - a probable nephew of the fallen commander, Mustafa Muhammad Diab Bakiriyeh, from Douma, was killed fighting on the Aleppo front and/or with an "Aleppo Front" (Jabhat al-Halab), apparently allied with the Syrian Arab Army. Times change.

Let's return now to those two likely mortar shell impacts on the balcony at Location 2 (see part 1 as needed). The obvious culprits of this explosive shelling would be the Syrian Arab Army, but that's not so certain. Syrian forces engaged militants in a police and then military fashion only until October 2012 (IIRC), when they gave up on trying to control Douma. They probably engaged in some shelling then, but I don't think they ever got back in at short-range mortar distance of this building even at the end in 2018. I think SAA was fighting only on the outskirts of Douma, to the south and maybe east, when the surrender came down. As noted in part 1, the balcony damage suggests those shells came from the north, at a relatively short range. That is the SAA might be ruled out, meaning this damage had to come from opposition infighting.   

For example: following the crushed Jaysh Al-Umma uprising, Jaysh Al-Islam might have put out a fatwa (religious decree) ordering the arrest of the whole Bakriyeh family. Or maybe it came earlier, helping to spark that uprising. It could be some were nabbed at their various homes, but here at Location 2, the greatest number of Bakriyehs lived, alongside in-laws and maybe some family friends. Perhaps an armed few of them put up resistance when JaI came to take them.

A family sniper may have been holding attackers at bay up on that balcony and/or the room below. A larger punched hole (white box) allows for a limited but protected view, and maybe room for a rifle barrel to poke through. The NE corner next to that was unusually free of fragmentation marks (tan box). The shooter might have been there when the corner shell arrived, and his (or her?) body absorbed all the shrapnel directed into this corner. 

And at any rate, that's one possible cause that might relate to the fate of the families living there -  not because the chlorine cylinder landed there but because that's when they were kidnapped, after their defenders lost a fight. As far as I know, there's no clear evidence for or against that - nothing to prove they had been at liberty in their homes until that night, or to prove they were imprisoned. But they might have been held captive ever since, along with others captured before and after, coming to include all those faces we would see dead in 2018.

Perhaps the name link has no relevance to the Douma massacre, and true story is another one we don't know. But then this other story might be similar anyway, given the circumstances. And considering the probable staging of those cylinders, and that the victims were apparently killed under direct bondage, the finger of blame would best point to the brutal and deceptive maniacs in charge of Douma at the time.

But why would they gas even their enemies in such a brazen manner? 

To start, they would face almost no risk of exposure from Western and allied governments (including Suadi Arabia) or the international agencies, NGOs, mass media, and millions of private minds they exert control over. There would be very little risk to such a venture, and some potential gains. 

As they faced a final defeat even in Douma, JaI might pin some hopes on a Hail Mary move, a gamechanger to actually reverse that. The first reports on April 7 had a rising death toll stopping at 180-190 killed in what seemed a massive chlorine-sarin attack. Everyone who mattered initially reported this version, and 187 killed by chlorine AND sarin was later "confirmed" by some informed insiders (these death toll disagreements were ignored by the FFM/IIT as if they were obviously some simple confusion). 187 would be easily the second biggest CW death toll in Syria, trailing far behind Ghouta 2013. That's consistent with a serious try at a strong international reaction that might force the Syrian government to stop or be too distracted - or maybe even destroyed by massive airstrikes - to finish their push on Douma. 

Up to 200 dead from sarin is why Donald Trump launched his limited airstrikes - as he had done almost exactly one year earlier - just as OPCW investigators arrived. In the end it didn't bail the "Army of Islam" out of imminent defeat, but it might have seemed worth a try, 

The chemical "attack" and more dead babies certainly put a taint on Syria's final victory in Douma. And on the flip-side, it was a huge PR boost as a consolation prize for the defeated Islamists. Instead of simply being defeated and surrendering, they made a show of defiance and even provocation until the April 7 "chlorine attack," and only then agreed to surrender, as they said, to prevent a repeat and "save lives." 

Furthermore, Jaysh al-Islam members knew they would probably be taking a green bus to Idlib soon. They would have their families and some belongings, maybe allowed one pistol for self-defense but no heavy weapons, and certainly no kidnapped people. Part of the deal was that prisoners would be set free ... unless of course they were killed and buried first. A lucky 200 were released, but an unexplained 3,000 or so were NOT released as promised. These had probably been killed off over time, including at that last chance in April. 

If the scenario above were true, the decision-makers probably would not want the Bakriyeh prisoners released to tell their terrible part of an ultimately embarrassing story - how Zahran Alloush, Jaysh al-Islam and the Saudis ruined the rebellion in Damascus with their unhinged and unchecked brutality. And that might be why they were picked for poisoning and then brought back home one last time for a sick little PR stunt - used to people JaI's "chlorine attack" site.

This may be some of Jaysh al-Islam's brutality that still goes unchecked - and pointedly so - by "OSINT" hero Eliot Higgins. He leans and drools on the FFM and IIT findings, which he might have helped to shape with some heralded-then-denied "collaboration." He helps the IIT elevate the regime-blaming option with junk science and displays of confidence, with some permissible facts mixed in. They've got this piled atop all the other dismissed possibilities, almost surely including the actual truth. And so they just might assist - perhaps unintentionally - in a coverup of this hideous and reasonably well-illustrated Islamist massacre. 

I'll let Higgins have the last word, where he urges his readers - and now mine - "Just remember who was behind spreading and promoting these lies about a horrific war crime." 

Ghouta "FSA" Fatalities

 Ghouta Chemical Massacre(s): "FSA" Fatalities

April 18, 2021 

Recently I noticed this line from a Sept. 2013 statement by Liwa al-Islam, denying ...

"In the targeted areas in Gouta, there was a battalion affiliated with Liwa al-Islam. Ten soldiers of this battalion were killed and around 50 were injured."

There were a lot of presumably affiliated militants who died in E. Ghouta all spring and summer, often related to each other, and to civilians targeted for killing in the same span - maybe their affiliation was just then expiring? (see here for some details on that)

The VDC martyrs database I've long used in finally defunct - the general site is marked unsafe, having certification expire nearly a year ago, and I checked that the site still exists, the database I used for years simply doesn't. 

ACLOS, citing what was there: Non-civilian deaths in what included a government offensive against rebels and rebel-held areas: of 301 men listed as dead from the gas attack, just 13 are listed as non-civilian. The same number of "FSA" men were listed as killed with other weapons, for a total of 26 acknowledged rebel fighters killed in the Damascus suburbs that day.

And Liwa al-Islam claims ten of the 13 gassed were from a single LaI-affiliated battalion?

From saved files: Starting with two or maybe three listed as killed "in the Jobar neighborhood," when it turns out no rockets landed there - though it seems they were launched from there by Lia al-Islam, denials aside. Also the wind almost surely would carry an drift away from Jobar. Early reports of fatalities there were later explained as confusion - people from there, or taken there after exposure elsewhere. Maybe it's the same for these. 

#1 194. Mujahid: Abdul Rahman Medawar (Abu al-Bashar) / from rural Damascus, Douma, with "Army / free" (FSA, general term, maybe Liwa al-Islam) "killed in the Jobar neighborhood of Damascus" 

I think VDC in English gave "Trochanter" as his family name, and/or another list from Facebook (link dead) also translated Trochanter but gives Arabic " عبد الرحمن المدور " Abdul Rahman Al-Medawar. Another list mentions that he was "of the Mujahideen of Al-Farouk brigade" - the only specific formation mentioned. There was a photo. He looks like a possible sarin victim, dead of asphyxiation, a bit cyanotic, red, roughed up eyes, mucous from the nose. Possibly related: giant beards and gas masks don't mix all that well.

#2 178. Mujahid: Safi Khaled Al-Nabki  ( صافي خالد النبكي ), the / Damascus - Jisreen Army / free / "cited (killed) in the Jobar neighborhood of Damascus" The rebel (coordinating) media office in Douma called him "unidentified," killed by "barbaric shelling." Douma revolution on Tmblr. That could explain the massive head wounds  leaving him with bandages all over and "raccoon eyes" from cerebral bleeding. However the VDC lists the same guy as a victim of the day's poison gas attack, the only CW victim listed as from Jisreen district and identified fine as Safi Khaled Al-Nabki - 92786. Of course no gas was credibly reported in Douma.

#3 victim 92785, Muhammad Aakash Balla, the only martyr of the gas listed as from the outlying Saqba district. An active list says he was civilian. But per VDC< he was a local "FSA" fighter, with photo and video that's a better fit - unscathed outside, inside leaking foamy yellow fluid, perhaps a bit blood-tinged. He and Safi, from the outlying districts, were reported together in a pair of oddball entries (92785, 92786). Interesting. Maybe both Jobar deaths logged in Douma.

#4 180. Mujahid: Asad Sosag / Damascus - Rankous رنكوس Army / free / cited in Zamalka city of the Rural Damascus - VDC Asad Sosaq 92749 Non-Civilian FSA photo (not saved), from Rankus, killed 8/21 by Chemical and toxic gases

in Zamalka, three fighters who came from al-Bukamal to help wound up dead

#5 Mujahid ** : Mahmoud Jumaa Al-Aran, 50 years old / Deir Ezzor - Al-Bukamal  / martyred in East Gouta Rural Damascus as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons

#6 Al-Mujahid: Abbas Asaad Al-Barghout, 21 years old / Deir Ezzor - Al-Bukamal / martyred in East Gouta Rural Damascus as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons

#7 Al-Mujahid: Hassan (Abu Ahed) (the nickname did not arrive) 21 years old / Deir Ezzor - Al-Bukamal / He was martyred in Eastern Ghouta Rural Damascus as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons

And four more "FSA" martyrs were from the Daraa area. Two are related

#8 * Martyr : Mohamed Hassan al - Balkhi / Daraa - Al-Najih / martyred in the East Gouta Rural DamascusDamascus, by chemical weapons

#9 Mujahid ** : Nasser al - Balkhi / Daraa - Bosra Sham, FSA, martyred in the East Gouta Rural Damascus, by chemical weapons

And so are the other two men from Daraa province, and both are named Sami Qanbas/Guenbs (different middle names = fathers - likely cousins), and both of them had other family members die with them, so not jut out in the fighting.  

#10a Mujahid ** : Sami Mohammad Kurdi Samih Muhammad Qanbas / Daraa - Al-Harrah  / shield - warm Army / free / cited in the town of Zamalka Damascus countryside as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons. Somehow his wife (name unknown), 3 children, and his mother (family name unknown) suffered the same fate, presumably in their home-away-from-home.

#10b** Martyr did not reach its name (the wife of the martyr Sami Mohammed Guenbs ) / shield - warm / cited in the town of Zamalka Damascus countryside as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons

10c** Martyr : Fatima (the nickname did not arrive) Sami's mother: (Umm Sami Qanbas) / Daraa - Al-Harrah / cited in the town of Zamalka Damascus countryside as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons

10d* Child: Abdul Karim Sami Guenbs / shield - warm / cited in the town of Zamalka Damascus countryside as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons

10e* Child: Abdullah Sami Guenbs / shield - warm / cited in the town of Zamalka Damascus countryside as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons

10f Girl ** : The names of Sami Guenbs / shield - warm / cited in the town of Zamalka Damascus countryside as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons

The other Sami Guenbs was maybe more of a newlywed, dying alongside only his wife, whose name again was unknown. 

11a ** Martyr : Samih Mohamed Guenbs , / shield - warm / cited in the town of Zamalka Damascus countryside as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons

11b ** Martyr did not reach its name (the wife of the martyr Samih Mohammed Guenbs ) , / shield - warm / cited in the town of Zamalka Damascus countryside as a result of the bombing of regime forces to chemical weapons

That would be just 11 listed for E. Ghouta, affiliation unclear, but LaI claims just ten, all from a single unit allied to them. If that 10 and this 11 are the same, it's odd how so many could be killed unless grouped in combat, in 2 groups (Jobar, Zamalka) - especially none is from Jobar or Zamalka, only 3 from E. Ghouta at all, and they tend to die in displaced-seeming little groups - and then how some died with their family members too. , all those from Daraa dying alongside relatives.

Unclear if any of those is this militant-looking guy who apparently died in the basement of the old Tuberculosis hospital in Kafr Batna, E. Ghouta. Is that 12 or still 11? Are any of these people rellatives of his?

The one from Rankous, Asad Sosaq, has company - but apparently in West Ghouta, not East. 

12a Aaked Al-Bettar #92789 - Non-Civilian FSA - From Damascus Suburbs: Rankus, Killed 2013-08-21 by Chemical and toxic gases. Notes: "He was martyred with his wife during ambulance her" - photo 

12b Wife of Aaked Al-Bettar #92788 - Civilian - Adult - Female - Damascus Suburbs: Rankus - killed 2013-08-21 by Chemical and toxic gases. Notes: "She was martyred with her husband." 

It's not as clear where these died; Rankous had no sarin attack ever reported, and is just as far from Zamalka as it is from Moadamiya. FSA man Sosaq died in "Zamalka," but perhaps off fighting, and this FSA man died with his wife - presumably not fighting. And also, an apparent relative from even further out of town is said to die in Moadamiya, Western Ghouta. Bitar is a fairly common name, but...

12c Jamil Mohammad Beetar #91999 - Civilian - Adult - Male, from Lattakia (Alawite majority but with plenty of Sunnis), he was in Damascus for some reason. Died 2013-08-21- Chemical and toxic gases. Martyrdom location: Damascus Suburbs: Mouadamiyeh. Photo: not saved, prob. portrait, not showing him dead.  

A similar-named Gamel (Jamil) al-Betar, middle name Mahmoud (not Mohammed), age 33, from Rankus, died a month later. That may be the same man, considering listing differences, but presumably not. He was among some 15 men and boys in Rankus named Bitar killed in a supposed mosque bombing a month later, listed differently between 9/27, 9/29 and 9/30/2013. 46 total killed, and 1/3 are named Bitar. It wouldn't be surprising if the other 2/3 were all intermarried with them. http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Talk:Alleged_Chemical_Attack,_August_21,_2013/Victims_Analysis#Al-Bitar

Hussam Ismael al-Bitar Adult male 9/27 9/29 "explosion" "indiscriminate shelling" From Aljoulan , Altelawia clan" - apparently  the largest clan in the Golan Heights (Jolani). Otherwise, all "Rankus," no more Latakia people listed. 

 

Do Videos Show Liwa Al-Islam Launching the 2013 Ghouta Sarin Attack?

Ghouta Chemical Massacre(s)

by Adam Larson (ka Caustic Logic), March 15/16, 2021

updates 3/20, 4/18...

Note: This post is fairly complete AND readable at long last, but may be rough in spots, and all-told pretty long. See the summary, and the article can be skimmed for specifics of interest. Considering the importance of it, this will have to stay open to revisions and updates at least.

Summary: What follows is, in my mind, a near-certain case that the dubious 2013 "Liwa al-Islam volcano videos" (as I'll call them) show the same rockets used in the August 21 alleged sarin attack, fired at the same angle from the same place as that attack, on or close to August 21, which they said it was. The videos either show the attack or a very thorough re-enactment of it. 

Though limited, the video has enough scenery details to provide a remarkable match with a certain field - well-inside opposition territory - that is almost exactly indicated by the best-yet analysis of seven related rocket impacts; the estimated trajectories cross most reliably as close as 15 meters from this field.  And right where the launcher would have been if the videos were filmed there, the grass in this field is burned shortly before aerial views of August 23. 

This likely identifies the exact firing spot, and confirms the videos as extremely relevant all at once. Again, this spot is firmly within opposition-held territory, although it is close to the front lines at the time. Furthermore, as already established, it's very near a reported incident just 3 days later also involving alleged opposition use of sarin.

---

The Basic Firing Area

Since the days after the 2013 Ghouta attack stunned the world, many firing locations have been proposed for the reported 12 sarin-filled rockets deployed. Some efforts were based on reading the physical evidence that tended to point close to due north or, sometimes, in a northwest direction. Pointing north to rebel turf was taken as a best reading to factor in when, in 2017, "Rootclaim’s algorithm concluded overwhelmingly that the opposition was the most likely culprit." That was the finding of the excellent "Who Attacked Ghouta" blog, and several others. But these were mostly summary exercises or based on reading just one confusing impact scene extrapolated to the rest. 

About a year ago, I wrapped up some re-analysis of rocket impacts and trajectory estimates relating to the attack, using some amateur skills I had acquired in the interim. It's only a little bit fancy, mainly taking persistence - in this case off-and-on persistence over a few years. Following some work with Michael Kobs, Chris Kabusk, Qoppa999 and others, I left that for the time in good shape, with every impact that could be placed done so and an angle of fire estimated. 

Michael drafted a PDF summarizing our findings quite well, at least at an introductory level, with ample illustration to get the main ideas and, by and large, to get convinced. 

* https://www.docdroid.net/t7cVSc6/ghouta-chemical-attack-locations-angles-pdf 

* ACLOS alt. posting, added 3/20: File:Ghouta chemical attack - Locations Angles.pdf - A Closer Look On Syria (shoutwiki.com)

Some of it via my own notes was assembled here. This work is crucial and deserves even better summation than what's available. But for the moment we need to leave it there, and here summarize the significant parts and the newer findings. More than ever, it seems we've been on the right track, and now perhaps we've gotten to its end. As the truth often does, it seems to open onto other truths, to be related in this article. 

This summary graphic from Michael's report shows trajectory estimates for five "volcano" rockets claimed as part of the attack. 

Documented impacts across the Zamalka and Ain Tarma districts were mapped following careful geolocation (including by others but verified, and original work). The damage was carefully assessed from many images leading to a range of angle/trajectory estimates meant to be definitive, including all reasonable wiggle-room, and with varying centers of greatest likelihood not shown here. This is traced back 2 kilometers (the approximate maximum range of these rockets) to mark all the area it might have flown over. All of the paths show some kind of northwest origin. 

Another located impact has consistent angle but seemed like a different weapon (it may be worth re-including in future versions), and one more alleged volcano impact (UN-OPCW's site 5) has been placed and roughly estimated since this image. So as many as 7 analyzed impacts fit this same pattern.

The firing spot for each rocket should be somewhere within its triangular path, more likely near the far/wide end, or perhaps further out is possible (range calculations are sill debated, and I don't have my own estimate). But any single firing spot for all five would be somewhere in the intersection of all their triangles. Other details include how some range intersections (notably purple) makes any further than 2km in general unlikely. 

I made this based on the above just now: black outline starts where all 5 intersect and ends where just 2 of them do, with colored lines marking where each path estimate ends at 2km out. For what it's worth, middles usually work best, and near the green and blue lines is the most likely band to look in.

Also note the red and narrow triangle above is centered on an extra-clear reading of 316° +/- 2, from the UN-OPCW's site 4. Still, I decided to use 315 early on, after seeing or reading it at both 314 and 316, and also because it's nicely rounded off for simpler math and graphics - exactly 45° north of due west, or perfect northwest. It's still an estimate, the difference is tiny and here, it seems, makes my lines a tiny bit better. Anyway, the spot is more likely to be found along the red triangle's centerline, or maybe a bit west of that, and the whole span is possible. For it to be outside the red is also possible, but I would bet against it.

We'll come back to that area in a little more detail below. But first, I left off last February with a mapping using 315°, marking that line's end at 2km, and then drawing a coffin-shaped box (hexagon - it seemed like a good shape, where widest = most likely) around it. This stretches to almost a 2.25km max, a longer possible area further in range, and I added a bit of extra possibility in an outer gray hexagon. Note that this covers a bit more to the west than Michael's does centered on 316. At the outer end, the bus station's parking lot is a bit less indicated.

Areas of control in this map are per Higgins, Charles Wood, others, and reflects the situation on August 24. On the 21st, Tohme checkpoint was government held (unless someone fudged that timeline), but the northern triangle with AFV's probably wasn't. However, the rest of this - including all the areas of importance here - was probably the same as shown on the 21st. So my trajectory crossover "coffin" includes some of each side's territory.

And I left it off last year noting, as shown on that map and as explained at the same link, how the middle of that zone is just ~400 meters from an alleged incident about 2.5 days after the sarin attack, in which "opposition forces" reportedly fired two sarin-filled mortar shells at soldiers of the Syrian Arab Army (shells shown at right - one didn't work). At least four were badly affected, but none of them died. The SAA says it found a weapons facility in the immediate area after they cleared it, with more of the sarin-filled shells used. OPCW-certified labs confirmed sarin in the shells, and in the blood of one soldier (a month later - more presumably had it before the signs faded), but they did not confirm the whole narrative connecting them.

Now, within that black-bound area are some spots I shaded white. These are open fields suitable for rocket firing. I suppose some smaller spaces in there could work, and a parking lot at the bust station perhaps. One field stood out initially, along the middle eastern edge. Sometime before August 23, it was largely burnt, if in a general way many fields are, especially brown fields like this, and driven around on, besides taking some apparent artillery hits and having the fence breached for access. The southern half seems extra-burnt, and seems to die off and stay gray from then on, or is filled over with gravel. This still seems like a possible fit, but as I'll explain, another spot nearby proved far more compelling in its relevance.

Some Whodunnit Basics

At right is "volcano" rocket #165, one of those blamed for the sarin attack, but removed from its unclear original impact. These were first and most notably researched by Eliot Higgins (later Bellingcat founder, "Brown Moses" blog at the time). He first called them UMLACA (for Unknown Munition ...), later found they were called Volcano by the Syrian military, and has called them that since.

The volcano was a nearly unknown weapons at the time, and and looked improvised and thus likely militant-made. But Syria has to improvise too. Aside from many others, Higgins and "Sasa Wawa" at the "Who Attacked Ghouta?" blog agreed the government or one of its allies probably improvised the volcano and had so far used them mainly, if not exclusively. I don't dispute that general consensus at all. But like Sasa Wawa, I can't endorse Higgin's acceptance they have a sarin version as well, plainly marked with red instead of black numbering. The more reliable evidence only supports their use as conventional or fuel-air explosives.

I think both Higgins and "Wawa" have acknowledged it's entirely possible these can be seized, whoever made them. Both sides are known to take and even re-use each others weapons as a matter of course. Sasa Wawa did more than acknowledge it here, and over here learned of a nearby UMLACA staging ground at Qadam station was overrun by opposition fighters in January, 2013, possibly stealing some units then, for example.

Similar issues apply to the sarin inside those rockets (or just later found on them?). It's understood the Syrian military had the capability to field the deadly nerve agent. There's little to no evidence anyone has stolen their materials, but there's a fair amount about the insurgents making their own sarin. This is often claimed as definitely beyond the reach of terrorist groups, except of course for in Japan 25 years ago. And with nothing reliable about the different formulas used by either side, save for the debatable hexamine connection, it's hard to be sure the yellow, caustic, foul-smelling 60/40 mix of sarin and impurities that keeps turning up comes from a high-end government-funded program or a terrorist lab, as the Syrians and Russians have been saying all along. The August 24 incident mentioned above is just one of several examples where SAA soldiers or allied forces are the targets of sometimes deadly sarin attacks, dating back to December 22, 2012.

Areas of control also can be pierced, but it's less likely, and an attack coming from one's "controlled area" as they say is a better indicator of guilt. The UN-OPCW investigation, Higgins, and many others have found or indicated a great many Syrian military installations the attack likely came from, every one seeming to serve as effective proof. And now we have trajectories that converge mainly on opposition turf, but a bit on the government side, and near a crossing either side could use. And whoever chose to attack from this close to the front line might be trying to implicate the other side (false-flag - an almost ancient concept), raising the motive to cross right over. I don't suspect anyone did, but it still seems possible.

In short; 

- the claimed allegiances of an attacker, the weapons used, and the involvement of sarin are all quite inconclusive as clues 

- while area of attack staging isn't certain, it still seems the best indicator of the lot 

- all of it should be considered in the fullest context possible.

Are the Liwa Videos Real Evidence?

I never expected to make much of the "Liwa al-Islam volcano videos" of contested relevance. These appeared online in mid-September, 2013, with an original description / explanation from the previously unknown source (as passed on by Higgins at his Brown Moses Blog):

"September 15. Kurdish Peshmerga killed three Syrian terrorists on border. They found cell phone in pocket. Night bombing video there. Terrorists on video wear gas masks. Video was shot August 21. One terrorist name it Storm operation."

The videos were allegedly made by fighters of Liwa al-Islam (LaI or LI = Brigade of Islam - not banner, thanks Qoppa), a Saudi-backed sectarian gang based in Douma. It was founded and led  by Zahran Alloush ('til his killing by Syria in December, 2015), the charismatic and ruthless son of an exiled preacher harbored in Saudi Arabia. Alloush's Liwa al-Islam had brutalized their way into general charge of all Eastern Ghouta by August of 2013, co-opting other militias and allying with Al-Qaeda franchise Jabhat al-Nusra and others. They would soon after form a larger coalition Jaish al-Islam (Army of Islam) that would continue to rule over E. Ghouta or at least Douma up until April, 2018, and would be central in forging a nationwide "Islamic Front" thereafter.

Following the video release, Higgins passed on and seemed to agree with a statement of denial issued by Liwa al-Islam, via the alternate Syrian government in Turkey, SNC/ETILAF, but by now "The page does not exist." See then: Liwa al-Islam Brigade Issues a Statement in Response to Fabricated Videos - The Syrian Observer, dated Sept. 20, 2013. Their public face explained, in part, "Those videos were not published on our official channels. They are thus forged and completely fake." Well that's a pretty narrow definition of fake, allowing for easy dismissal of any leaked information, for example.

"Only the Assad regime has chemical weapons in Syria," they continued. "Assad admitted to that by agreeing to turn over his stockpile of chemical weapons to the international community." He agreed to this while blaming terrorists for every gas attack so far = "admitting" only he has CWs. Finally: "The UN team report, moreover, confirmed the rockets used in the attacks on August 21st were launched from regime-controlled areas." Actually what the UN-OPCW did is falsely finger Syria for the Ghouta attack without even explicitly saying it. The refutation of that terrible (error?) was a major inspiration for the better analysis that led us right into Liwa-controlled territory, as related up top. So that's a big fail.

2 rocket shafts, flag (video 2)

Higgins noted the men in the video "are shown to launch the same unusual munitions ... used in the August 21st sarin attack," the UMLACA/volcano he had just made some waves for tracing to Syria's military. In fact the men claim it is August 21 as they use these same rockets, which on camera they call "Ababeel." That translates as "flock of birds," possibly in reference to god-sent birds that chase off invaders in pre-Islamic mythology (Wikipedia). It's apt; Pakistan makes a missile with that name (Wikipedia). But there's no mention of sarin or anything similar, and they claim they're targeting "Assad's Shabiha" or "Assad's dogs" (meaning troops?) in Jobar and then in Qaboun with these volcanos - not the civilians in Zamalka and Ain Tarma Liwa al-Islam claimed to protect.

It's hard to make much of a direct view, so the summaries and analysis should suffice. But for reference, here are the actual videos - all still available so far on Youtube.

Brown Moses copies with better color and quality, but sideways as filmed

1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNuBPG_naa8 - unrelated (?) firing of a D-30 cannon, but wearing gas masks

2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=beGNN6QtAgs - volcano firing - the one my frames are from (but using Liss Nup's posting) - I though it shows one firing repeated, but others say that 2 rockets.

3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CdN1LacobzA - volcano firing - extremely similar but different scene (even the truck flag is different) - illuminated, it seems to be the same area they used in part 2

Next, gamma-enhanced and rotated copies by Liss Nup. See right for the relevance: some original sharpness and color is lost, but much is gained. The proportions or aspect ratio also look different. Liss Nup seems to win only on visibility in the shadows, which is a very helpful win.

"1 of 3" contains "parts" 1-3, all combined, sideways, including part 1 of unclear relevance: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5KhtkwJsTy4

part 2 rotated - volcano firing - the one my frames are from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r9Ztl0bm7u8

part 3 rotated - different volcano firing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2QbEuRhgY4

No one disputed the bulk of the basics, but there's wide disagreement on what to make of this evidence. These men are seen firing two or maybe three of these weapons believed (by Higgins for one) to be exclusively used by government forces at the time. That would mean these are government-allied forces engaged in a false-flag conspiracy, probably using non-chemical rockets for show, and filming just about anywhere they control. He points to several valid issues to support such a theory, like the whole floodlit scene, the too-obvious and yet incorrect flag displays, the apparent bragging of something they shouldn't want to brag of, showing off a weapon they shouldn't have, etc.

Of course they didn't mean to release it, ostensibly; it was intercepted after a firefight. Also, naturally, Higgins found "Kurdish sources deny any knowledge of finding the videos."

Another twist take a moment to get. <revised 3/20> They call the operation "Reeh Sarar."Reeh translates clearly to wind, but sarar is trickier. Most translate it as "cold" or "destructive" or - combined, reeh sarar = storm. In the Koran, the meaning of the phrase is usually rendered destructive wind, and they're probably referring to that. But sarar itself (صارار) seems sound-related. Google-translated: "squeaky." I hear it's also a verb (to make a shrill or sharp sound). I suppose in context, "shrieking" would be the best direct translation  (Amin25 agrees - to make a terrifying sound). Ababeel - god-sent birds that destroy - they might shriek, or fly on a shrieking wind, as from a rocket's engine. comment below suggests the volcano does this more than usual, so maybe the name has a noise-related double-meaning, and I'll keep "shrieking" for those who aren't Koranic scholars.<end 3/20 rev>

Anyway, as Higgins noted, the operation name matches a "Reeh Sarar chemical battalion" mentioned in a previous video from Dec. 2012 by a masked terrorist threatening Syria's Alawites. He gassed two rabbits to death as illustration, using Turkish-made chemicals, in what observers suspected was Turkish territory. (Whatever was used, it doesn't seem to be sarin.) The video was then uploaded to brand new and disposable YouTube and LiveLeak accounts. Pro-Assad fakers were suspected. (ACLOS) 

And as Higgins notes the September videos were, in the same manner, "uploaded to brand new YouTube and LiveLeak accounts." And further, both instances involve Turkish border/Kurdish themes, consistent with being anonymous forgeries from a common source - pro-Assad fakers, many would assume.

But Higgins tried a bit too hard to cast doubt in spots. For instance, he mused "It's also rather odd it's so dark when August 21st was a full moon, and there's no lights in the city visible." The latter is relevant as city light will tend to drown out the moon's glow, especially with some older camera phones. It won't do that as totally and specifically as a giant flood light set up right next to you would do, but ... it's another possible-wink-certain sign of Assad fakery to his gullible readers (like this one, certain the videos are from some other night). In fact I suspect it was full moon or near it; note how the video goes pitch black for us as he walks across the field, yet by sound, he walks evenly - no halting or stumbling in the dark. He can see okay, because of ample natural light for his fine-tuned human retinas, regardless of how the camera deals with it.

Everyone realizes some of the problems with this evidence, but it keeps seeming possibly relevant to some people like myself. But despite being perhaps the most direct proof imaginable rubbed right in our faces, they never seemed of much use as evidence, as in to convince people. Especially as I realized how near the frontlines the firing spot must be, it seemed whoever did it was hoping to implicate the other side. And if these are the people who did it, who are they dressed as, claiming to be, displaying so many flags of?

Open-minded as I am, zero layers of deception still seems faintly possible; the men are who they say, just acting odd as they do this unusual task, maybe speaking in some code or maybe not even realizing the significance of their part in this operation. But in many ways this does look like a sloppy attempt to impersonate some Islamists - a one-layer deception, a simple false-flag conspiracy theory. That's fine. Some note the lackluster takbeering ("Allahu Akbar" chant). Nine times they're ordered to do it in one video, and repeat with muted enthusiasm. They do this 14 times in another video, as Qoppa999 counted in the recent Twitter discussion, surmising "the only good explanation is they're not used to the rebel Takbeer," specifically because they're SAA troops putting on an act. 

But then used to it or not, if you were trying to mimic someone's well-known style, wouldn't you actually try? How much practice should it take? And as Saar Wilf said "I don’t think we can seriously hypothesize how people about to gas 1000 people for a noble cause would execute the takbir. It’s an extreme situation and nothing can be claimed to be weird." Or at least, not by what little we know about just who they are and what they were truly up to. 

I still don't have a confident feel for what's normal (especially in gas masks), but it seems quite possibly it was deliberately sloppy, because the Islamists were impersonating someone poorly impersonating them. If the missteps are notably obvious, that adds to this possibility. Qoppa999 finds it "in your face obvious," comparing to exuberant Jabhat al-Nusra fighters and White Helmets famously caught celebrating the fall of Idlib together. But then maybe these Islamists could have impersonated themselves better, but they didn't want to risk the fakery going unnoticed, and so they made it clumsy and undeniable. Plus maybe they wanted to poke fun at Assadists' intelligence, conviction, or acting skills along the way.

If one can imagine a single layer of deception here by pro-Assad elements, they'll need to consider the findings below and ponder how they might have pulled it off well inside opposition turf. Two layers of deception is surely possible and, odd as it might sound, some solid evidence almost eliminates every other possibility. It's what I always suspected, but I never saw the value of arguing it - until now.

Would they do that? 

Considering the kind of criminal activity Liwa / Jaish al-Islam has over the years admitted to, denied, and sometimes admitted while denying, I'd say they have an unusually brazen style. (I wrote a list of examples, but moved to the conclusion so we can continue with the core analysis. It's worth review for anyone stuck on these questions.) I've long sensed a pride in their ability to deceive infidels and manipulate them against each other, and to not even have to hide it, maybe because they had God's clear blessing to cleanse Syria. From them, such a dual deception makes a fair amount of sense.

But even with that relevant style note, it still seems weird for them to fake someone faking them and then let use see that, so I say: Sure, they might well do that - or quite likely not. I couldn't and really shouldn't say, so let's get back to giving the primary evidence more room to unfold. Perhaps that will narrow down what makes the most sense.

Looking For ...

So maybe the videos do contain real clues. There didn't seem to be much of the visual kind, but more than realized, and it turns out a lot can be made of the bit there is. I guess the recent discussion on Twitter started March 1 with this tweets asking some questions that were never answered, so Higgins and promoter Ahmad helped inspire this, aside from these lone contributions to the discussion:

 

I named Michael Kobs as helping identify a different basic firing spot, which happens to be even nearer to a different CW facility. He started revisiting that, quickly bringing in the LI videos for comparison. Actually I brought it up first but in passing, then he brought in visuals that made it stick. It makes sense as a next step; in an area that small, a match for the videos might be found or ruled out. Soon "Liss Nup" - who did the 2013 video enhancement - and others including Charles Wood, HRI Mark, Qoppa999, Stephen McIntyre, Amin25 and now Rootclaim founder Saar Wilf, have joined in (or in support of) another re-analysis and attempted geolocation of those videos - limited though it has to be.

The footage is so dark we can't see anything half the time, even enhanced. So clearly we have no mountain or minarets visible in the distance to help verify the location, nor even a sunlight angle to clarify basic directions. We only have vague nearby details that are fairly similar place-to-place and are sometimes hard to match with images taken from miles above. Higgins on our efforts: "Oh god, good luck to them if they want to try figuring out that one with satellite imagery, I hope they enjoy chasing their tales, pun intended." (on chasing tales in Ghouta, and Eliot ... to be covered in another blog post soon)

Looking around Jobar or Qaboun for a possible fit is likely to be futile, and had been so far. In fact hardly anyone has really tried before, past looking for open fields in one direction or another. But now we have such a good trajectory reading we're down to the equivalent of a few city blocks to check for something that really should be in there, and close to the middle of it.  

Realizing now that we always did have enough details to bother with the exercise, Michael and I (mainly and in that order), found the likely match pretty easily. Even with a newly-expanded view, I say we can't be absolutely certain any spot is or isn't a total fit, so let's settle for degrees of consistency and see if it reaches eyebrow-raising levels.

Available light: a floodlight situated near the launcher has replaced the dimmer but more even moonlight we might expect, only allowing a few things to be seen well. Then the rocket's initial detonation and glowing exhaust trail light the scene up more broadly for a few moments. We see the launcher center stage, a heavy truck with crane (its dangling hook glints in the light for a frame or two, but is otherwise invisible), a pole that seems fixed at a slight distance, not connected to the launcher. Three distinct trees are clearly visible in video 2, but not in video 3, where the light is angled differently. 

Top view above is from video 3. Bottom view here is actually spliced from pre and post-firing frames in video 2 to try and show truck relation to the visible trees in a single, clear frame, Below, the whole scene as lit during ignition (at more stages than needed, sorry) and just after takeoff

Here's a coding of visible features to look for (or for signs of) in the aerial imagery. 

The three sizable trees catching the floodlight, from l-r or n-s here: 1) a really wide one, 2) a smaller one, and 3) a bigger one of less clear shape. Mostly smaller but unclear other trees on another line (90° tried below), or maybe on a continuing curve; from the always-visible 3 at right and reading to the left, there is a general sense of shrinkage, as with a single row running north. But that would have shrunk more than this, and dropped to total shadow well before the left side of the frame. To be so visible and close to the glow, these trees are aligned kind of east-west here, as they appear. 

Beige lines indicates wide paths (paved? gravel? earth?) that parallels the trees both ways, and/or as shadows suggest, a raised level or mound the trees are planted on. This would catch the light all around as we see.

The view is from some light, paved surface (visibly it could be gravel, but not audibly). Distance from launcher: Michael checked and found "The cameraman walks 44 steps from the launcher to the canopy. For a usual man we get a distance of about 22m." That will be approximate. Where he ends up, there's a visible loop in the camera's upper right field of view (unclear but foreground, blends with one of the trees in some frames, marked brown above). This suggests ... something here it hangs from. And the cameraman should be seeking shelter, which takes ... something.  Finally, something low, indistinct but with some reflectivity, may be fixed around the (corner?) where it goes darker gets a pink circle.

This tiny model was made after the likely spot was found and partly based on it - hence the unusually sweet line-up to follow. But I did try to just use what was visible and known prior to that, as if we'd used this model to guide our search for the spot. This reference scene is set from 135°/315° trajectory as found from impact 4 (rounded off the same way I already did to good effect), estimating 45° outgoing fire, and for simple drawing (all 90° lines from there, or regular e-w orientation). So besides the scale and proportions of the scene, its compass orientation may differ, but not by a whole lot. If this were an Aug. 21 firing video, the line of 3 big trees will run roughly to the north, etc.

The cameraman is looking out over some scrub and apparent tall grass. Though it looks pretty barren in most views, some grass is seen and heard during the walk, and the heads and upper stalks are illuminated at rocket ignition as they catch the glare of that temporary fireball. And that happens twice in video 2, I guess, and again in video 3. So add to the list: any grass you find at the right spot will likely be burnt on the eastern half of the field, perhaps worst right by its tree #1. And from the visible and audible clues, a lot of soil and various-sized rocks were kicked up and came back down. The effect of that may be visible from above. Finally, the truck and launcher won't be there in satellite views, of course. The blue pole might be invisible from being narrow, or being part of the launcher assembly (?), but it or its shadow is worth looking for.

Distance out: range considerations better handled by others, like Charles Wood, who notes the angle of fire in the videos seems slightly higher than the optimal 45°. Michael agrees, finding 46. This shortens the lateral distance the rocket will fly, but also shows it will be close to optimal distance, so the firing spot is probably just a bit less than 2 kilometers out, and no closer than that. That's about where we would have looked anyway based on how the compass angles intersected. 

Finding it?

In my red-green map at top, I have the black coffin with white-shaded areas inside it. Michael Kobs had his own look at the different spots, after a more detailed assessment of their intersections. He noted general areas worth checking, shaded red on the map below. I'm not sure which ones he meant, but let's take it broadly. The government-held bus station parking lot is red, out of range as shown but maybe within range, as explained. The red line nicking it relates to a reported impact that may not exist, tested for inclusion at 2.5 km - not very relevant. Plus that's a bit far especially for the yellow and purple paths (just over 2.4km out  for the latter). Then there's a large L-shaped red area divided in 2 parts, which I guess he meant. This is all in opposition turf. https://twitter.com/MichaKobs/status/1367400169730412545

Next he tried using details in the Liwa al-Islam volcano videos to see if they turned up, starting with requiring field, trees, pavement (so not the bus station). To start, compass directions can't be told from the video, but the interest is in a possible match with the Aug. 21 launches, with rocket fire to the SE. So if it's relevant, the scene will have the lot south of the field, the main 3 trees to the east, etc. 

Inside that L-shaped area, the upper part had had earlier grabbed my attention. It's no match for the volcano videos, but for the D-30 cannon video, perhaps. But in the bottom 2/3 of that Michael found 2 spots that might fit for the rocket launches, circled in red here, as first compared to some video frames:

As he mused "these videos could well have been filmed in the possible launch area." I could see it right away. The site on the left has a small gray lot, trees in a row perpendicular to lot edge, more in a parallel row to the north, light paths or strips all along, and rather lush grass between. The field on the right has a paved lot that might fit, but too few trees in the wrong pattern. Another spot he noted nearby to the south is similar to the right one, but even less compelling (pavement less certain, too big and too many trees in no pattern). If anyone else can find a better match in or even close to our intersection area, let me know. So far just one even seems to merit a closer look. 

33°31'57.08"N, 36°20'28.73"E

Google Earth's satellite imagery for 2013 has a wide gap between Feb. 20 and August 23, so it only means so much that a burned patch across the eastern half of the grass has appeared in those 6 months. It looks to be pretty recent though, dead and gray into 2014, while at what would be 2 days after, it's a mix of gray, black and brown.

Below are some historical and enhanced views I did early on, with sloppy labeling (may be replaced),  focusing on a corner marked in yellow that might show the churned earth. But that corner isn't suggested otherwise. The launcher would have been more in the middle of the burned patch, just north of that yellow-marked zone (where it's redder next to the big tree?). 

Features line-up: the paved area matches, as most would, and it's aligned right with the trees. The three biggest ones are in the same size array (a wide #1, smaller #2, bigger #3). More but smaller trees to the north, in a tight row running to the west, and all of them are set on two long mounds or low earthen walls. With dense trees, that would make this field unusually shielded from view except of the buildings to the south - another consistent clue. Further, Michael thinks the blurry loop may be linked to the entrance of a canopy-looking structure that appears here. Its entrance would provide shelter, and is about 25m from where the launcher seems to be (green here - later aerial view). Note if this were sort of an oversized carport, it seems about the right size to house the truck used, even with the launcher loaded. Is that how far it had to drive?

Modeling the Spot

Then the awesome Michael modeled the area in 3-D, albeit a quick job for now, populated with items from the video. This is not authoritative, but at least helpful in testing the correlation between the site and the video footage. Trees were sketched in for size, height not established, just guessed for now. A taller nearby building that might be visible is modeled in, to find it would probably be off-frame or, given the low light, in frame but too dark to see. (and it's not clear how many lit windows to expect if so) The scene gets quite dark with automatic lighting turned off. Under a full moon, it wouldn't look like that, except to the dim-sighted camera, which is what matters here. Tall building: see very faint dit of dark brown behind the truck - just off frame most of the time. https://twitter.com/MichaKobs/status/1369944883188924418/

Comparing the model to the video, emphasis on tree pattern.

The three trees line up nicely for shape and spacing: wide-small-big, just like on video. This is a very good sign we have the same place. The northern line of trees first came out looking much shorter, due to quick sketching, and quickly-estimated sizes for all of them. A more thorough modeling with solid tree sizing based on 8/23 imagery might be worth the effort I'd contribute to. Missing mounds under the trees added at my request, a bit higher than suggested, raising the trees to line up better, while still being too small (pending request: shorter mound, and the same under the eastern row).

How many trees in the north row? Not fully clear, but shadows in the Feb. view suggest, as I count, at least 16. Michael inserted 14 trees, stopping a bit short of my last one - I counted one more, and defer, assign numbers here. His spacing is like mine but better. Counting from right, #5 and #7 are out of line in a way you can see in the model, for reference. Only #1 would be partly blocked from view, and however many to the west would be left off-frame. We should see about ten trees in this field of view (?), and it's hard to be sure, but that seems about what the video shows = tree size & spacing here are pretty consistent. The vertical size issue is evident here - to be addressed as possible with more analysis. (I plan to compile enhanced frames for a clearer picture of trees in the videos - next time including from video 3)  

The tenacious Mr. Kobs had placed a red ball to mark, at my request, where we see a mound from above. He found it seems to line up with the pole instead of the blob I circled in pink (so pole set in mound, pole invisible from above, mound unclear in video?). The pink-circled blob doesn't have a clear match from aerial views, but it's a small issue. It could be remnants of a (chicken coop?) once there. Two white blobs appear there in February, one quite close to trees 5 and 6. It could also be the man with the launcher's controls hunched over a bit too close, or not even an object - maybe a light to the north seen between trees. The red ball may have served its purpose.

And again, this spot has the pavement, the possible canopy structure there, and ~20-25m of tall grass between him and where the launcher would be. That's an uncanny match. I would never say we've found our spot somewhere in Damascus or even in Jobar based on such a similarity. But add that this is found almost exactly where the rocket trajectories best cross, 1.9km out from impact 4, on a bearing of 314.4° as I measure it - 0.6° off from the best angle I used. If I had ended 315 at 1.9km, we'd be 15m from this spot (red circle). Up top I suggested on or just west of the red path's centerline near the 2 km end mark for blue and green would be a most likely spot. That also points right here to within a few meters. 

The hardest rocket path to correlate is the purple one, ending in a shallow impact with the bottom of a courtyard wall near "Zamalka ghost house". This spot is about 120 meters past its 2km mark. I think we can still see 2.12 as a likely enough range. If not, maybe that one was launched from another spot. 

And add that the grass at this spot gets burnt on its corresponding eastern half shortly before August 23. Michael may be overstating what's still the salient point here: "it is a 1:1000000 coincidence that we find any fitting point right where we analyzed the search for the launch spot." Not just where broadly, but where it was centered - exactly where it would be if we were totally awesome, and not anywhere else. 

Conclusion

So we have a roughly perfect match for those rocket launch videos, including launch angles. It was found right at the intersection of the most and best trajectory estimates - not 100% in itself, but finally pinned down because it also matches those murky videos - also not 100%, but finally pinned down because we know the rockets came from around there, and it so lines up with that freshly-singed field. Is that circular? Well, I say it's the virtuous kind, not the vicious one. Truth is truth because it's true.

There are still a few possibilities for what this means, or would mean. Obviously we might be seeing the same Volcano rocket launches of August 21 it all lines up with; maybe just the 2 or 3 launches were filmed in this style and the rest just fired normally off-camera, with more genuine takbeering. It's possible this was staged later, but by people replicating the original attack so well they likely put another volcano within meters of one of those we've seen.

And then there are the possibilities as to WHO that is. If someone in this exact field launched at least 2 volcano rockets the night of Aug. 20/21, seeming like poor impersonations of Liwa al-Islam fighters, they did operate freely in an area run by that group. And the attack that did serve their agenda best. Some clues of their thinking in these days - the final passage from Liwa's statement denying the videos

Sept. 20, 2013 Liwa al-Islam Brigade Issues a Statement in Response to Fabricated Videos - The Syrian Observer

Liwa al-Islam pledges to continue the fight to rid the country of the filthy terrorist regime. We will not be weakened by videos faked by those who have the blood of innocent people on their hands and those who used chemical weapons against innocent civilians. We will continue the fight until we bring the criminals to justice. Liwa al-Islam emphasizes that any political solution that does not involve accountability for crimes against the Syrian people is completely unacceptable. The world has forgotten all crimes by the Assad regime and focused only on the use of chemical weapons. When the international community makes a deal with Assad to eliminate his stockpile of chemical weapons and then hands him a certificate of good conduct, which puts him in a position to freely continue killing with other means, it becomes a partner in Assad’s murderous crimes.

The "red line" stuff left them feeling only this could make "the international community" come bomb his enemies. But after the most extreme possible example was made real ... they failed to do so. September 12, 2013: The U.S. and Russia began talks on Moscow's plan for Syria to surrender its chemical weapons rather than face ongoing threats of military action. Treachery. And after all that effort, all those people killed. September 15: maybe since no NATO air force is coming, "Kurdish Peshmerga killed three Syrian terrorists on border," supposedly, and these videos appear, allowing the bitter Sept. 20 comments above. Then on the 24th, in another westward middle finger, Alloush forged a new Islamic Front including Al Qaeda’s Nusra Front (Greaves) - but then launched a different Jaish al-Islam coalition excluding al-Nusra five days later, on Sept. 29 (ACLOS) which then made itself the center of a nationwide Islamic Front (IF) soon after, which formally also excluded al-Nusra Front, and with Zahran Alloush as their head of military operations.

Now we realize the men are more than likely in this identified field in Jobar as they fire. Liwa al-Islam claims they're regime-allied imposters, so they must have snuck in. HRI Mark has a view of the area as seen from an observation post on the SAA side, in an ANNA video from August 29. After a quick try at lining things up with his map, I added some labels for at least a basic idea (below). With all those windows looking down, would you want to drive in there, set up and launch some (12?) noisy rockets while Takbeering 10x each time, and then try to get back out?  And they must have escaped, to retain the footage and then release it just too late to complicate the blame and threats of war directed at them over the stunt. (again, Russian plan over airstrikes agreed 9/12 - video "found" 9/15)

Update 3/20: the initial geolocation was wrong, starting from the wrong obervation point. But Chris Kabusk nailed it. Without making and marking a new map, I find the abandoned vehicle marked yellow lines up perfectly with the impact site, back apparently near the mosque and taller building to the left of the red arrow.

And further, in this bizzarro world scenario, Liwa al-Islam never did mention these infiltrators in their turf, let alone catch or stop them, insisting on government areas being proven, like Bellingcat or Human Rights Watch do. This despite how Zahran Alloush almost seems to have known the imposters were coming well in advance, with his "surprise" prediction of August 13 (see below). As I'll explain, that's just their style. It could be the same exact SAA fakers who came back in December to kidnap Razan Zaitouneh just to go unmentioned again (also see below). 

Would They Do That?

We're down to the abnormal psychology of dedicated jihadists. Liwa al-Islam denial, Sept. 20, 2013: refuting some beheading allegations, LI insisted "it is not part of its policy to execute detainees." They added some stuff about truth and justice, Allah winning in the end, crushing filth, and so on. Now let's compare with reality of LI/JI crimes admitted, crimes denied, and crimes they sort of admitted and denied.

When prominent antigovernment activist Razan Zaithouneh was kidnapped from Douma in December, 2013, JaI denied involvement, but they named no one else and never tried to find her. She was abducted with her husband and another activist following criticism of JaI and death threats sent by Alloush (as they tacitly admitted curing court procedings). Her computer was reportedly opened by password inside Jaish al-Islam's notorious Tawbeh prison, among other clues that still don't include her located body. (Mroue)

Their founder Zahran Alloush has openly expressed genocidal goals only occasionally, as in "an anti-Shiite tirade and “bring-back-the-Umayyad-Empire” propaganda piece," as Syria expert Joshua Landis put it. "Zahran calls for cleansing Damascus of all Shiites and Nusayris. (“Nusayris” is the old term that referred to the Alawites prior to the adoption of “Alawite.”" (Landis) Alloush later walked back these comments as some gibberish brought on by the stress of being under siege. But the highly sectarian December 2013 Adra Massacre happened at the hands of JaI and al-Nusra Front. Whatever truly happened there (it's disputed). it was no simple slip of the tongue. Kidnapped survivors from Adra - including women and children - were imprisoned, forced to dig tunnels, tortured, starved, openly placed in cages on rooftops to shield against airstrikes, and whatever else we don't know about. Some few thousand mostly civilian prisoners once held by JaI were never released and never accounted for.

On April 7, 2016, Jaish al-Islam's new branch in Aleppo reportedly launched a chemical attack on Kurdish defense forces, with a yellow gas (but not chlorine-color, per video) that had "a strange smell" (not a smell like regular bleach), that caused "convulsions, spasms and vomiting" and, by some reports at least, caused nine deaths. Since key indicators of sarin were lacking, chlorine was almost universally suspected. Jaish al-Islam answered the controversy with a formal public statement later the same day explaining a commander was in trouble for using "prohibited weapons" and acting "contrary to the charter of Jaysh al-Islam," and would be punished. (RT) It was naturally read as an admission, and not just by Kurdish and Russian sources. Only later did JaI spokesman Majdi Nema (now jailed in France) explain the commander had just made some innocent modifications to a rocket which they didn't authorize - not usually worth a public press release. As for the gassing incident they seemed to refer to - apparently it was no comment then, before, and ever since. (ACLOS, the denial)

Exactly 2 years later happened to be JaI's last day operating even in Douma, April 7, 2018, when they finally surrendered "only because" some 35 likely relatives of a rival rebel commander named Bakriyeh were killed by sarin, chlorine and found piled near sinks with strange facial stains, wet hair, and not a red eye among them. Plus, early reports said, some 7 other people and at least 150, maybe 180-190 or 200 total were killed by the sarin. But then only chlorine could be found, and after a few days it turned out "at least 42" were killed. Then 187 dead was sworn to a year later by "Abu Azzoun," a sectarian "civil society leader" in Douma who worked with JaI and was central in managing the corpses of those killed in the 2013 alleged sarin attack - a real insider who would know best. (Monitor masterlist for 4/7/18) 

In both cases (2018 - 2013), there's compelling evidence to suggest many or all the victims were held prisoner, before they were deliberately killed in gas chambers. And it's the local "Shabiha" and "Assad's dogs" that get imprisoned, no matter where those rockets fell and what was actually in them. To Islamists, these phrases don't always mean soldiers; in Latakia, also August 2013, 30+ soldiers, 115+ non-combatant men, 57+ women, 18+ children (mostly boys = more "men") were killed in the Turkish-backed raid by a united front of Islamist groups including Al-Nusra and ISIS, but somehow "rebel" sources bragged of wiping out 175-200 of "Assad's men" and zero civilians (but they did openly "rescue" every "abandoned" person they found, that wasn't too crippled to hassle with)

And ... we're getting to the point and the days around that epic massacre and those 2013 videos: German researcher einparteibuch found an odd note On 13th of August 2013 on the Facebook page of "Abu Hamza from Duma“ (this Abu Hamza al-Doumani?) where he relates (as the screengrab says, basic gist) "The final steps in preparing a new surprise for the regime are about to be completed - pray for the success of your brothers - may Allah grant us and all Muslims victory" The attached photo was said to show "Zahran Alloush posed with other insurgent leaders in Turkey" where - photo aside - I believe he was for a big gathering of regional commanders, and he was the main one for Eastern Ghouta.

This always lined up intriguingly with a detailed report by terrorism expert Yosef Bodansky, which hasn't been confirmed or refuted that I know, so let's neither ignore nor get hung up on the possible relevance of this:

On Aug. 13-14, Western-sponsored opposition forces in Turkey started advance preparations for a major and irregular military surge. Initial meetings between senior opposition military commanders and representatives of Qatari, Turkish, and U.S. Intelligence [“Mukhabarat Amriki”] took place at the converted Turkish military garrison in Antakya, Hatay Province, used as the command center and headquarters of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and their foreign sponsors. Very senior opposition commanders who had arrived from Istanbul briefed the regional commanders of an imminent escalation in the fighting due to “a war-changing development” which would, in turn, lead to a U.S.-led bombing of Syria.

A development like ... Obama's Red Line being crossed, causing a Libya-style "no fly zone," the fall of Assad and Zahran Alloush leading the march on Damascus? Maybe. He looks excited there already.
Alloush would be a regional commander being told about this, but it could be after he proposed the idea to them in the first place, by special invitation up in Istanbul. Maybe he refused to specify, even to them, just what the surprise would be. Whatever it was, it may have happened around August 20/21. Bodansky: "Indeed, unprecedented weapons distribution started in all opposition camps in Hatay Province on Aug. 21-23. ... Opposition officials in Hatay said that these weapon shipments were “the biggest” they had received “since the beginning of the turmoil more than two years ago”."

Now, would people like that film themselves launching their flock of birds, those Ababeel rockets as part of their Shrieking Wind plan to take over Syria, just to do at least part of it in a fake-seeming way and then - perhaps in time - have it released in a fake-seeming way, to sort of both admit and deny the crime in one move?

I say sure, they might well do that and I don't see who else has the motive and capability. As we question the peshmerga origin via killed terrorists, we have a likely leak of the videos there in mid-September - only after U.S. intervention was called off. A regime fake to implicate the terrorists and prevent attacks on themselves ... could have had better timing. Maybe whoever released it then, and not earlier, had a change of heart around then - as seems likely Alloush and JaI would.

Add 3/20: Prior map of impacts per Local Coordination Committees, Human Rights Watch, and us, adding ref. numbers for HRW, and expanded to include the likely firing spot. Then I took the two angles related by Al-Jazeera from 2 unique but unplaced impacts, ran from our new spot. As it seemed, they point to the right basic area, and may indicate LCC5/HRW6 and HRW9 (I wouldn't expect them to be right about that, but if so, ok). Also by now a consistent arc of attack is apparent - the part of a circle with the weapon at center, its range as a radius (drawn in gold below, but a little way out for labeling clarity). Of 12 reported impacts (14+ locations provided or found), NINE of them fit this pattern so nicely. The remainder are still unclear, but as given, are all within that zone marking the general arc of attack. 

Add 4/18: New post with some more interesting comparisons between the videos, the burned field, and rocket trajectory analysis