The OPCW's IIT Issues its First Report

April 9, 2020
rough, incomplete
edits April 12, 14...

So after much delay and coronavirus, the first report of IIT is released, just after the 2-year anniversary of the Douma chemical massacre (which it does not consider, by the way).
S/1867/2020
8 April 2020
Original: ENGLISH
NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT
FIRST REPORT BY THE OPCW INVESTIGATION AND IDENTIFICATION TEAM
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 10 OF DECISION C-SS-4/DEC.3
“ADDRESSING THE THREAT FROM CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE”
LTAMENAH (SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC)
24, 25, AND 30 MARCH 2017

https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2020/04/opcw-releases-first-report-investigation-and-identification-team

The IIT had promised last year to consider nine incidents including Douma, one attack blamed on ISIS, and 7 others blamed so far on Damascus, ranging from 2014 to 2017. I took a good look at most of those with work assembled here. Three of those cases are covered in this initial report, the three in al-Lataminah, Hama, spanning about one week in March, 2017.

The motive aspect has never been very clear. the Syrian government has negative motive to have committed any of these attacks; they deny all of them and logically the denials should be true. It'll take some actual facts - not just authority - to show otherwise.

Bashar Assad learned that US president Obama had a "Red Line" over CW use; after Ghouta alleged sarin attack was taken as killing over 1,000, threats of war led to Syria joining the OPCW and surrendering its CW program. Allegedly, Assad spent the following years mainly avoiding deadlier agents like sarin, attacking instead with relatively harmless chlorine. Then in late 2016, after using chlorine to random effect in his efforts to re-take all of Aleppo city, he seemingly wondered if Trump had a sarin "red line" too, and started sneaking the deadly nerve agent back in. As soon as Trump was elected, a string of December 2016 attacks near Uqayribat, Hama (ISIS-held) killed nearly 100, it seems with sarin. This was reported, but to little protest and no action - maybe Trump just didn't want to be seen as bailing out ISIS. So Assad tries in "moderate" turf, replicating a near-100-dead sarin attack in Khan Sheikhoun on 4 April, just after signals the US administration would take a more favorable stance on Syria. Then he finds Trump has "many, many lines" that crossed, Washington's softer line was withheld, and US missiles fell on Syria, damaging an airfield.

Prior to that gamble, these 3 Lataminah attacks (among a few others) allegedly tested the waters:
3-24 a bomb with deadly sarin used near militant cave base, affects at least 16, kills no one - doesn't even get mentioned publicly by anyone. I reviewed that one here.
3-25 a cylinder with caustic chlorine used at a cave hospital, affects 30+ and kills 3 - moderate protest. I reviewed that one here
3-30 a bomb with deadly sarin near militant cave base affects 170 mostly militants, kills no one - mild protest, followed by friendly US signals (I did a review of the 3-30 evidence, which I'll use to flesh out a main post on that fairly soon.)
So we can see how Assad might be emboldened to try the Khan Sheikhoun stunt - if that made sense, etc.

In blaming these three incidents more explicitly on Syrian military aviation, the report explains "the IIT gradually came to these conclusions as the  only ones that could reasonably be reached from the information obtained, taken as a whole." Huh.

…
Michael Kobs: After a first look at the IIT (OPCW) report, I have to say that it looks like a rebranding of old evidence to construct a somehow halfway credible narrative.
The opus revolves around the assertion that the SAA wanted to reclaim territories that it had lost to advancing HTS.
https://twitter.com/MichaKobs/status/1248038976650391554


New details on 24-3:
- M-4000 identified from debris
- the one fragment shown might is the same exact one already used for the 30-3 incident ...
I wasted some time with this visual proof before reading the explanation that 04SDS does in fact = 04SDS. "7.29 Moreover, the IIT identified through videos and forensic analyses another fragment as originating from the area of the crater of 24 March 2017 (which the FFM marked as 04SDS when the object was handed over to it with samples related to the incident of  30 March 2017)."
Report S/1548/2017 gives 04SDS date of receipt 18-7 (meaning 17-8, after being recovered 30-7). That report being about the 30 March incident, it had seemed related to that, but nothing in there really specifies - it's not seen at the sarin impact point, and not given as being there either.

- Video of crater said to filmed 26-3 per metadata - can be faked, but logically 24-3 would be a bette date - likely filmed on 26-3, possibly because it didn't exist yet on 24-3, or not...
- soil collection said to be done then, possibly explaining how active sarin could be detected in it 10 months later.

Unseen Debris 
Remnants and possible origin "7.18 On 19 February 2018,74 the FFM received metal fragments retrieved from the crater as remnants of munition parts related to the incident of 24 March 2017 in the southern outskirts of Ltamenah. These were later analysed by OPCW designated laboratories. The IIT assessed all six metal pieces retrieved from the crater and listed by the FFM. After consulting with munition specialists, the IIT reached the conclusion that, out of the six fragments, two can be linked to potential chemical weapons use. "

The other four were either inconclusive or perhaps even contradictory. Let's presume the former and move on to the two that seemed clearer on the point.

"The first of these two fragments, which the FFM identified as SDS28, consists of a very heavy thick metal cone-shaped part, with an attached metal sheet/liner.76 Forensic analysis of this fragment also shows traces of paint. According to munition specialists, the form and shapes of the fragment are consistent with the design of the nose part of Syrian chemical air-delivered bombs, namely the MYM6000 and the M4000 models."

This is not shown, but described as similar to 04SDS (see above): "both SDS28 and 04SDS originate from the same aerial bomb, “based on the similar steel layer assembly, thickness, curvature, and specific linear indentation in the steel liner”.

"7.25 The second fragment received by the FFM, SDS29,77 consists of a large corroded fragment of sheet metal of approximately 38 cm by 50 cm, with traces of dark green paint. According to munition specialists, the form and shape of this fragment are consistent with a fragment resulting from the explosion of an ordnance with limited explosive quantity, and fragments from the explosion of conventional explosives filled munitions would be smaller and have sharper edges. Some of its measurements lower the possibility that this is part of a chemical aerial bomb from the stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic, and further analyses would be required to reach solid conclusions on the origin of this fragment. "

As described, this might be paneling similar to these partly-connected plates logged for 30-3, but one huge piece bigger than all these combined. The size was apparently an issue, and a big enough one they had to drop one of two rather vague pieces of evidence.

"7.26 The IIT, aware of the importance of the chain of custody in this type of investigation, pursued several lines of inquiry in order to establish it. However, in light of the uncertainty on the origin of this fragment, and as the IIT was unable to fully confirm its chain of custody, it did not pursue this second fragment in this area of inquiry. "
So - two fragments considered, then one discarded as a possible non-fit and unverified provenance, and neither is shown. But somehow there's more; it seems the other 4 recovered items are not described, and it's a coincidence that four other items are then discussed as also relevant, three of them seemingly not recovered. If so, that's 6 recovered plus the other 4 for 10 items. Otherwise, these are the other four:

"7.28 The IIT further considered three fragments that are visible in a video of a crater taken on 26 March 2017, which the IIT confirmed through witnesses and assessment by a specialised forensic institute as being the crater of the incident of 24 March 2017. Two of these remnants were partly buried. Although these large metal fragments are consistent with those created by an ordnance with limited explosive quantity, not enough details are available to confirm their origin. The third fragment, however, is more visible: it consists of what appears as a flat metal part with holes, some containing bolts, and a folded end. The specialists consulted by the IIT found that the visible characteristics of the fragment in the crater are consistent with a ring-shaped component used to attach the membrane of the M4000."

So 3 items seen in the video but not handed over, and the video frames aren't shared, so that's 5/6 all unseen. We've seen a partial support ring … I don't suppose this is the same item.

"7.29 Moreover, the IIT identified through videos and forensic analyses another fragment as originating from the area of the crater of 24 March 2017 (which the FFM marked as 04SDS when the object was handed over to it with samples related to the incident of 30 March 2017)."

And there's an item seen in the video, and handed over - but as recorded that was in August, 2017, as samples related to the 30 March incident were received. It was listed with them, seemed to be one of them. The two fragments they considered SDS28 and 29 were handed over (apparently with four others) on 19 February 2018, AS debris from the 24-3 crater, months after they had 04SDS. So this item was double-booked.

Report S/1548/2017 listed 04SDS(B) date: 18/7 (apparently with 18-7 swapped in for 17-8, as the report gives, noting some fragments were collected on 30 July). It had Sarin, DIMP, IMPA, MPA, MPFA, HFP, TPP, DIPF, hexamine.

04SDS was never seen at the sarin impact site for the 30-3 incident, and wasn't labeled or specified as being found there. Its appearance in situ at what's said to be another crater that could be geolocated clearly trumps any basis for inclusion in the other set. That is this item belongs with 24-3, not 30-3.

The only one they show is the one of six we've already seen, linked to two incidents now. The other was vague paneling that may not fit, and one piece seen on video SOUNDS interesting. No more filler caps, unique tail assembly, parts for a mixing arm, etc. In summary:

Soil returns and sarin samples
Previously it seems the soil sample that tested for sarin was only handed to the FFM on 19 February, 2018, perhaps after being collected recently, but possibly back to April, 2017. That could mean active sarin was found on samples that had weathered for nearly ten months, plus an unclear delay to actual analysis.  But according to the new report, munition fragments were delivered in 2018, while the soil came in earlier, after being collected and sealed just days after the alleged attack. If true, that should make the later finding entirely plausible (which is not to say it was dropped there by a Syrian jet)

Paragraph 7.31 relates the two key areas the IIT verified sarin in relation to this incident:
"In relation to this incident, the IIT specifically–though not exclusively–focused on the analysis performed for the FFM by two OPCW designated laboratories of the fragment SDS28, for which the chain of custody was described above...."
(not clear why they didn't also cite the similar 04SDS seen in the same crater and tested to show sarin as well)
"... Moreover, the IIT requested two OPCW designated laboratories to carry out analyses for a subsample (denominated SLS35) of a sample which had been identified (but not analysed) by the FFM as 01SLS. ..."

Okay, the FFM had this soil sample (SLS) dubbed 01SLS, but didn't have it analyzed for some reason. The FFM or IIT sets out a subsample and gives it a name SLS35 - where the SLS switches order (as it does between uses, for reasons I'm not sure of).

".. This environmental sample from the crater was collected on 26 March 2017 and provided to the FFM on 12 August 2017."

S/1548/2017 (2 Nov. 2017) has SLS02, 03, 04, 05 - any SLS01 is missing from that, which makes sense, except … this shouldn't be included in that list of samples for 30-3 - its missing 01 should be a coincidence. But then again, debris from this incident (04SDS) shouldn't have been included there and it was. Maybe this is the same 01?  It shouldn't be - the Next in line: 02SLS to 06SLS, came on 17 July - nearly a month before the IIT now say investigators were handed that 01SLS.

So presumably - or most innocently - that was 01 in its own system relating to the 24-3 incident. Report S/1636/2018 relates the acquisition of samples for the that incident, giving only the Feb. 2018 date. There's no SLS sample #01 OR #35 listed here. Instead it's SLS18 to SLS23, all with evidence numbers including the date 20180219. No sign of anything dating back to August. So where has this 01 and its subset 35 been since the FFM got it?

To risk adding to the confusion ... they say this 01SLS had a portion set aside called 35SLS. But was it the other way around? There is a 35SLS Soil, ostensibly from the sain impact point for the 30 March incident. Date of Receipt: 12/4/17. It was analyzed, found to have DIMP IMPA, MPA - no active sarin.
It might go like this:
- There were some 30 soil samples (SLS) that didn't matter, or they start counting at 30 instead of 0
- then 31-35 are logged in April
- the last has a portion set out and given the number 01SLS - because now they start at zero again?
- That sits in some limbo, later has its subest develop sarin and becomes the 24-3 soil described with a backwards origin story and an August date
- Later in July they get more from the 30-3 crater, under metal, and dub these SLS02 and so on.

Likely it didn't go like that - the same numbers might be used and passed in different systems, besides for each incident, allowing for confusing coincidences. But in this case, the lines between one incident and the other are so blurry, it seems likely they share the same numbered samples that came in whenever, described as whatever suited the day's purpose.

"Staging" considered 
The IIT addresses the possibility of a false-flag incident or staged chemical attack for each of the three incidents. Previously when this was aired, it was rejected, said too close to attributing blame; we know who's hands those would be. To decide an object is falling from the air with a velocity is just as specific; we know who operates aircraft in Syria. But that line of investigation was not just allowed, but actively pursued even when the evidence didn't support it. https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-ffms-mysterious-mandate-to-blame.html

In light of last year's troubles and growing awareness of the OPCW's gross institutional bias, they bring it up - always in quotes as "staging" - and find that it would count as a "use" of weapons worthy of calling out: "“staging” of chemical attacks (or organising “false flag” chemical attacks, as this is at times described), if done through the use of chemical weapons as defined in this section of the report, would constitute “use” of chemical weapons under the Convention."

In contrast, the FFM had put manual placement (staging) as outside its mandate for being too blamey AND not being a "use" of CW, which is all they were tasked with finding. Now they explicitly consider it and talk about that, to clarify that's not off-the table. As we'll see, it's just set precariously at the table's edge and then knocked off - "gradually."

5.4 lists four scenarios "developed for this investigation" and "bearing in mind the specific circumstances of each specific incident"
(a) chemical weapons were prepared elsewhere, brought to–or around–the sites of the incidents identified by the FFM, and used; or
(b) chemical weapons were air-delivered on–or around–the sites of the incidents identified by the FFM; or
(c) chemical weapons were launched, spread, or deployed otherwise to–or-around–the sites of the incidents identified by the FFM; or
(d) no chemical weapons attack occurred, but conventional weapon(s) were deployed or brought to–or around–the sites of the incidents identified by the FFM, while chemicals were used at the sites later to “stage” a chemical attack and blame one side of the conflict.

I don't see this list as very helpful. It's not clear what a and c actually mean (CWs were "brought", or deployed by whom?), with ony two being clear on perpetrator. The choice is mainly between b (government airstrike) and d - the CWs were brought in order to blame someone else, perhaps planted via deployment (d via c). In other cases, I find the an option like that generally explains the evidence best.

The report helpfully gives some detail on how they presumed an option d might play out. 11.4 "... the aerial munitions used on both 24 and 30 March 2017 are very likely M4000 aerial bombs, developed and built only by the Syrian Arab Republic." 11.5-11.7 sarin made using the same formula of DF as Syria's (or one that yielded the same markers they were looking for). 11.9 ... the IIT could not find any information supporting the hypothesis that the Syrian Arab Republic lost control of its chemical weapons stockpile, whether aerial bombs or sarin and its precursors."

But it's still not clear the sarin they keep finding is made by Syria or even uses the same formula as them. The DF similaities seem to be genuine and might even be fairly specific, but even exact forumlas can be reverse-engineered and replicated by states or non-state actors who could get their counterfeit agent into the right hands in Syria to have the govenment framed. The main thing anyone has poven is the same kind of sarin keeps being used - they think by the authoities, but maybe it's the terrorists behind all these incidents. (see here).

As for the bomb, the IIT notes the Syrians claiming to have repurposed all their remaining M4000s in 2013 to carry conventional explosives and help in the fight against the foreign-backed militants. The IIT pointedly didn't agree to this, but didn't dispute that at least some M400s were so converted. Bellingcat noting two examples found totally or mostly intact were probably of this kind and had failed to detonate. Presumably others had been dropped, some of them would have worked, and they'd have scraps from these. There's no need to raid stockpiles when the things are falling into rebel hands, as I had noted here, sometimes from petty low altitudes (low enough it hadn't even settle on a nose-down position?).

Or maybe the one shows there HAD BEEN some raiding? It's also quite possible the militants used their skills and tools to fabricate their own copies of the M4000, as soon as the design was known to them. In fact the noted differences between the schematics and field examples always suggested this (but far from poved it - the authoritativeness of the schematic is unclear).

The IIT and its experts doubted the fragments were small and twisted enough to be from a TNT bomb that detonated, suggesting ather a limited-size CW bursting (or opening) charge but I think they were wrong. The small number, small size, and extreme distortion of some fragments might prove that to a true expert (the distortion might require partial melting like in a very high energy blast, and some of it seems to include black scorching as well). The back end didn't fare too poorly, but the rest of it seems to have nearly vaporized. Only the most solid and central bit(s) of the front survived, joined by almost nothing from the middle, or the bulk of its exterior. Be it a full load of TNT or just the opening charge, if it was so powerful to rip the bomb into such small pieces, how would it fail to vaporize the sarin blamed for sickening some 170 people? That's with what IIT calls the "overabundance of elements" from the most intact of three uses alleged, arguing this pointed to a limited-power opening charge. But that point doesn't hold up well with the other two alleged uses.

It's most likely these things were planted manually at each of the sites. With three filler caps seen between the 3 incidents, we're looking at parts of 2 bombs. But aside from the caps, the remnants might all be from one unit they just gathered the biggest pieces from and divvied them up unevenly between their two and then thee incidents.

The IIT seems to have considered just one method for getting M4000 scraps that could wind up testing positive for sarin:

11.10 The IIT further explored the possibility that armed groups could have retrieved used (fragments of) chemical weapons from sites where the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic had tested chemical weapons prior to accession to the Convention in order to “stage” chemical attacks. Such an act could in theory have enabled them to place contaminated fragments at the locations of the incidents of 24 and 30 March 2017, for example, in order to “stage” a chemical attack there.
In pursuing this line of inquiry, the IIT identified through its investigations only one such testing range where some warheads and aerial bombs were tested with sarin prior to and in 2009. The IIT obtained information that armed groups close to ISIL/Daesh reached the vicinity of this testing range in 2016 and early 2017, but was unable to confirm that they ever took over the facility. Moreover, the IIT considered the low likelihood of an armed group deciding to retrieve contaminated fragments from before 2009 or before, keeping them in the appropriate conditions, and then using them in March 2017 to “stage” an attack at the exact time when military airplanes of the Syrian Arab Republic were overflying the area of the incidents. However, such an armed group, even if it had succeeded in achieving all this through careful planning and execution, would not have been organised enough to ensure that the area was sufficiently secured to protect the fragments in question carefully collected and stored, or at least to ensure that an independent third party could sample the fragments shortly after the alleged incident. In other words, the planning and execution would have to have been carried out impeccably for the first part of this complex staging operation, while the group would have missed, or would not have been able to properly plan and carry out, the second–critical–aspect of the same operation (i.e., ensuring the proper chain of custody of the staged fragments and samples so as to promote their propaganda aims)."

This is not the only scenario to consider, but it's one that fails, and the one they chose. It assumes sarin can only be deposited on fragments by the Syrian government, and remnants tested in or before to 2009 should have active sarin after planting in 2017? 8+ years? That's an absurd plan no one would have, and the IIT seem proud of themselves for showing it wrong. In fact, they identified a further defect of this straw-man argument:

"11.13 Finally, the IIT obtained information that, in any event, none of the aerial munitions tested at the testing range mentioned above contained sarin, and that the M4000 model (which experts assessed as being most likely the model from which the fragments found for both the 24 and 30 March 2017 incidents derived) was not tested by the Syrian Arab Republic with sarin, but rather with sulfur mustard. In light of various factors, including these considerations, the IIT considered this “staging” scenario as implausible."

So there wouldn't be sarin on the ten-year-old scraps anyway! The IIT didn't want to consider that the foreign-backed terrorists might have their own sarin to contaminate things with, having filled weapons with the stuff and fired them on soldiers several times (at Khan Al-Assal anyway, the UN-OPCW saus it's the same stuff used in Ghouta, Khan Sheikhoun, these Lataminah attacks, and others). And as I've said, a more plausible way to get fragments of an M4000 is to have a repurposed one blow up after it's been dropped on you. They could also seize intact copies as they overrun a military installation, or even make their own, then possibly re-fill it themselves with sarin, and then modify it to be launched from a mortar. Maybe a catapult would work. The likelihoods vary, but there are countless possible ways this could be done. The IIT picked a lame one and then discounted it, leaving the remaining options as open as they ever were.

The IIT calls on a few specifics for each of the thee incidents, so I'll consider each in chronological order.

"Staging" dismissed: 24-3
They didn't have much to say against fakery here: 7.9 explains how the crater, "between 1 to 2 metres deep and approximately 2.5 metres in diameter, with a circular shape" was probably from a jet-dropped bomb; "The estimated size of the crater fits the scenario of an aerial bomb with a burster-type explosive charge, impacting the ground." But they note it "might also be consistent with an event “staged” on the ground, as long as the person(s) “staging” the attack were applying the correct amount of explosive to create similar crater characteristics, and had knowledge of the type of soil in the area." I suppose those points are both true; it could be explained by either option. The remaining evidence will help narrow down which it is.

As seen above, only two pieces of nosecone material and a possible large segment of outer skin, and no other fragments of the bomb were recovered - not a very good set-up to claim small-charge blast of an M4000. And as the scene doesn't support a larger blast, a problem appears.

"7.10 Flight data, including information from an early warning network, show that between 5:30 and 5:45 a Syrian Su-22 military airplane took off from Shayrat airbase and attacked Ltamenah. ..."
(I don't believe this Sentry Syria is radar-reliable or verifiable. They issue specific notices that don't seem entirely made-up, may be all true or partly untrue)

"... The attack was further confirmed by persons who either saw or heard a military airplane–with its distinctive sound–around the location of the site of the incident between 5:30 and 6:00 that morning, with one specifically recognising it as a warplane engaged in a diving manoeuvre described as typical of Syrian military aircraft."
(so they say, with an excess of condemnatory information )

"7.11 In assessing the information from witnesses to the event, the IIT sought and obtained additional information corroborating the accounts by the victims."
The witnesses - including sentry Syria - were supported by: "Su-22s were based at Shayrat, "flight data from 24, 25, and 30 March 2017 reveal that Su-22s departed from Shayrat airbase at least 19 times" and "the Su-22 is used in that theatre of operations only by the Syrian Arab Air Force." (7.12, 7.13)

11.4 In addition,... The IIT was provided with expert advice that the aerial munitions used on both 24 and 30 March 2017 are very likely M4000 aerial bombs, developed and built only by the Syrian Arab Republic."
and as noted above - falling into rebel hands, sometimes from not so high.

But it seems their favorite agument for this case simply inverts its biggest problem. This same move was made earlier by Eliot Higgins: "I've been unable to find any social media posts or open source reporting on the attack, so it doesn't really stand up that it's a false flag, because if it was why did no-one talk about it?" It doesn't "stand up" that it was real, at the time. Why else would no one talk about it? The IIT also seems to miss that point:

"11.11 With specific reference to the incident of 24 March 2017, such an intricate staging exercise is also at odds with an almost complete lack of publicity, not consistent with the complex and lengthy efforts which would have been necessary to retrieve from elsewhere, store, and prepare contaminated fragments for use and collection as samples. ..."

As Michael Kobs noted "After the OPCW report, however, Higgins hastily rowed back. How could it have been a 'false flag' operation if nobody talks or writes about it? Interestingly, the IIT report coughs up Eliot Higgins' argument. Coincidence? Certainly not."


Well it's hard to say if they did or would have come up with that thought on their own, but either way, it's a lame point. If the militants had faked it correctly at the time, it is almost certain they would have mentioned it. Therefore we conclude they staged it later, either because they did it wrong the first time didn't do it at all. Lacking a time machine, they had to stick with the existing lack of mention. I've suspected that they simply didn't think of the allegation at the time, and would therefore have done none of those "intricate" things. The IIT report adds reference to a video, which was never shown publicly. To the extent they may have filmed a video on the 26th (as the metadata says), maybe there was such a plan by then. But if so, their failure to follow up with mention is a problem, not a strength; it suggests the plan didn't work out right, perhaps leading them to delete the event and try it again a week later.

"... Even assuming that this was a case of “staging” an incident that did not fully work out as originally intended (because, for instance, the contaminated sarin was released in the wrong place or at the wrong time), had an armed group gone through the trouble of retrieving, storing safely, and preparing sarin-contaminated fragments of a weapon, it remains unclear why it would have then failed to properly publicise the intended message."

Uh ... IF the video proof or other aspect of their allegation didn't support the intended claims, the IIT wonders why they didn't just publicize the claims anyway. Probably because they wanted the video and a correct story for an important claim on the re-emergence of sarin. If the relevant story was mucked-up badly enough to ignore it, then it WAS mucked-up that badly, and that's why you didn't hear about it.
Perhaps the problem was with the 25-3 incident - maybe their use of sarin there was deemed problematic (I couldn't say just why), so they reported just the chlorine. But then they had sarin in the samples sent in, and at about that same time, had the 24-3 incident to explain it - patients had washed off there prior to treatment. It could be that anomaly was the central reason FOR the 24-3 incident to materialize.

To be clear, that "almost complete lack of publicity" is a TOTAL LACK, AFAIK, until the FFM got to break the story. The better question stemming from that was always why no one mentioned it then - except to say it DIDN'T HAPPEN - if it did happen? Because the "elaborate staging" was done long after the window for at-time reports had closed. This video from well-connected parties followed the 30 March incident and they still didn't know to mention this had also happened last week - they still say it's never happened before. From this, we can deduce the idea to claim a 24-3 incident still hadn't gelled even at this point. It was thought up by the time they mentioned it first to the FFM sometime afte 10 April, but not long before that.

Furthermore, if there were messed-up plan they didn't want talked about, people might conspicuously deny any such prior event But I don't see that as suggested; the few denials feel sporadic and natural, not the work of people told to deny it - the newness of a jet sarin attack is just another feature of it some mention but most don't. It seems as if the prior event just hadn't been thought up yet.

"Staging" dismissed: 25-3
…

"Staging" dismissed: 30-3
...

More to come ...

More on Al-Lataminah, 30-3-17

Re-Considering the IIT's Nine Unsolved CW Cases
More on Al-Lataminah, 30-3-17
March 16, 2020
typos + cleanup, dated updates, March 19, 2020


There were several lesser points about Philip Watson's M4000 research I didn't finish writing up after three posts dealt with a serious issue and two egregious clusters of error. Among those left off, two at least deserve mention for general interest, and one of them merits this post that could include them both. Both points relate to the 30 March, 2017 alleged sarin attack in al-Lataminah that displayed the alleged weapon best (maybe too well). First the other issue, then the one on unusually rectangular debris.

Sarin in the Wrong "Crater"?
A recent and informative update from the Working Group on Syria Propaganda and Media included a positive reference to this claim (I'm a member, but wasn't consulted on this, or I probably would have prevented it):*
"Another commentator has noted anomalies in the published report of the FFM on the alleged incident in Ltamenah on 30 March 2017: no explanation was given for the detection of sarin in samples of gravel provided by the White Helmets that were purportedly recovered from a “crater” containing no munition fragments some 200 metres south of the alleged impact point."
http://syriapropagandamedia.org/update-on-the-opcws-investigation-of-the-douma-incident

* 3-19: "probably would have prevented" - that's been called petty, as if I'd force a rejection of Watson's valid work. To clarify: If I were asked, I'd point out early on (as I did later and do again below) the assumption behind that point was unfounded. Then I reasoned they would agree the point wasn't as solid as it seemed, and considering just the one specific point was raised about that alleged attack, they would "probably" (as I put it) include a different leading point instead of that inconclusive one, or maybe include no examples at all. If they had picked another finding from Watson that seemed correct, I wouldn't have complained. But "that's not how it went down, man." I just like to get things right, and for those around me and groups I'm in and as many people as possible to get it right. end add.

First, I just noticed he's got the scene wrong, with "withered grass crater" set about 60 meters north of "debris collection area" where "first debris" landed (after some flight, but clustered and landing arguably backwards?). They're actually the one and same spot, as Michael Kobs and I and others had geolocated it (where a truck parks at a faint cross road just south of three taller trees along the edge of the western fields). The following shows this (middle) compared to OPCW FFM (left) and Watson (right). The other location in consideration here is "crater" per FFM, at the bottom of their image, also indicated by Watson, not in those by Kobs and I (smaller area focus).

FFM map and other points cited in this post can be seen in this report: 

S/1548/2017, 2 November 2017

https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2017/en/s-1548-2017_e_.pdf

Another set of images to clarify this cross-road is the location of the kicked-up soil, blackened vegetation, and debris recovery - see how it's pretty much in the middle of that dirt road sloping down on the right (and that item boxed in red is the FFM's item 08SDS, apparently the base of the binary weapon's "mixing arm"):

That makes the distance between craters about 140 meters - still too far for sarin to fly. But was sarin found at the other crater?

The “crater” - where one of three conventional bombs presumably impacted - is placed by Watson unclearly "between 160 and 290 yards south from the “impact point” and its associated debris" (146-165m). And he read how "gravel from crater" tested positive for sarin as well, despite it having no sarin bomb impact alleged. That would be interesting, but probably isn't.

Watson cited the OPCW FFM report S/1548/2017, noting how this "is the only location in their report that is referred to as a “crater”" - he thinks without a single exception, and therefore a major deception is suggested in its "TABLE 2: SAMPLES AND ANALYTICAL RESULTS FROM DESIGNATED LABORATORIES." Sarin and common breakdown products found in and near "crater" must mean in the wrong spot, so likely planted! For some realism, they planted it at least to 50 meters out too.
https://www.hiddensyria.com/2019/09/05/opcw-ffm-willing-dupes-at-lataminah-again/

I wouldn't be so sure. In fact, I find it much more likely they got this from the usual spot that's not USUALLY called "crater" - though it is one - and in the assembly of that table, it was given, UNUSUALLY, as "crater." Has that been somehow ruled impossible? As I'll show below, that wouldn't be the only contradiction between the text and the tables in this same report.

A simple imprecision with terminology would mean nothing's amiss on that point, and still the sarin may have been planted there - it won't be that easy to prove.

Add 3-19: One more re-consideration of the suggested ironclad rule that "crater" always means the other spot and the spot w/sarin and bomb parts is always called "impact point," even in the report's tables. "Impact point" appears just once in the full report, indeed relating to the sarin impact point. "Crater" appears just 2 times, in two references to the same sample - in the applicable table 2 and table A3.1. Can the rule be seen there? No. Soil and gavel samples have these given locations:
- "under metal piece" x 5
- "crater" x 1
- "50 m away" (from crater?) x 1
- unspecified x 3
- "impact point" = 0
If that rule really applies, the report would also suggest there were no samples taken at the sarin impact point, or it somehow went unspecified, while the locales proving a deception WERE specified. That's possible, but kind of odd. end add.

Rectangular Debris
= Fake?
On to the more interesting point. Watson on Twitter:
https://twitter.com/PhilipWatson_/status/1183188233305411586
"And those straight, almost perfect, edges! Only bomb explosions in #Syria create them! All part of an upcoming report." This issue emerges mainly with debris found after the same incident - Al-Lataminah, 30-3-17. The debris has been fairly well identified as likely from a M4000 chemical bomb once stockpiled by the Syrian military. That's not a certain ID, and there are differences from a published schematic, but it's still likely enough. And it seems that was designed for binary use (precursors can be held separately inside and mixed to produce sarin just before use), contrary to Watson's assertions. (Since then, officially, Syria has foresworn chemical weapons, given up its sarin-production capabilities, and destroyed its related weapons or - as is the case with the M4000 - re-purposed them to hold conventional explosives, for use in fighting the foreign-backed insurgents then occupying much of Syria).
https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2019/10/m4000-id-structural-questions.html
https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2019/10/m4000-binary-or-unitary.html

Watson's tweet noted the rectangularity issue with fragment 07SDS, the one filler cap (of two found) that's on an almost perfectly rectangular fragment. In fact some pieces show multiple straight edges, all parallel and perpendicular, with numerous perfect right angles shown. He doesn't specify what to make of it, but the reader could easily slip to imagining Islamists with hacksaws cutting up the bomb up into squares, maybe just so they can be stacked in a box during transport to the locale, with no care if it makes sense.

I would only be slightly surprised to learn they were this stupid. But here, I don't suppose so. The straight edges coexist with rough ones and with severe bending, as if they had been through the detonation of a bomb with partially self-segmenting skin. First, all the possible illustrations of this among the debris.

Note on dates received: the repot says samples were handed to FFM on 17 July and then 17 August. The table listing them, however, gives no August dates, instead giving 17 and 18 July as the two dates. It's not clear if the 18/7 or 17/8 date is correct, but two consecutive days makes more sense than two days a month apart, and this seems like someone's dyslexic slip, and a contradiction between the table and the report text - where the table seems more likely to be correct.

07SDS
"Metal piece" received 17/7
"The metal plate to which it is attached is roughly 5 mm thick and is ruptured on all sides. One side has a very straight cut." Fill port cap, seen here from the inside. It's about 19 cm along its straight-cut side (using the ruler from one photo on another), so about 190mm. Width: at least 135mm with an unclear far edge.

11SDS
"Metal piece" received 17/7
This displays that square-ness to an even higher degree. These generic slats (with traces of app. dark green paint) are thinly connected to each other on one side, and otherwise hanging loose with NINE right angles and NINE very straight sides between them. The FFM report gives a 5mm thickness (as the M4000's skin seems to be), and each piece measured at "approximately 180 to 200 mm" long, with a total width at the connected end of about 320 mm. The outer two slats are 180mm long, while the middle one is longer (200mm) and narrower) - (maybe 120mm for the two and 80mm for the middle one?). This was likely part of the outer skin, wrapping around 1/4 to 1/5 of the bomb's circumference, wherever the blast damage might be lesser (tail end?).

10SDS
"Four metal pieces" received 17/7 - these are warped, separate, looking perhaps thinner than the usual, but that might be a visual trick, and they all have roughly the same, uniform size. At least 4 notably straight edges are seen between them, with a couple others likely, if too distorted to call.

update 3-19: 10SDS probably doesn't play in. As the FFM's report explains: "10SDS comprises four smaller metal pieces. Less rust is visible than on the other items. Fragments are grey with sharp twisted parts and are made of thinner material than most of the other items. The deformations indicate that explosion has torn them off of a larger system. Although the flat lines on the sides, together with the general shape and thickness, indicate that these items could potentially be a part of the tailfin assembly, the exact origin of this part could not be determined."

04SDS(B)
(is there a 04SDS(A)?) "Metal piece" received 18/7 (meaning 17/8?).
Taken as a section of nosecone ballast (heavy material, gentle curve of outer surface) "04SDS(B) consists of very thick, heavy metal part and another thinner part, which looks like it is been partially peeled off the main body. The items are heavily corroded with dark discoloration on one side." Seen here from three angles (not three pieces, as I had once thought). It's not as clear if this plays in - the ballast seems to have broken on a clean line, but that's another issue. The small piece of metal peeled back might did the same, but I'm not sure what that originally was. It seemed worth including.

12SDS: received 17/7.
The "curved rail" or "partly straightened ring" has on one side, as the FFM describes it "an attached layer of metal, which is approximately 5 mm thick," meaning outer skin. This - perhaps being small parts of 2 rectangular tiles - is shown below marked in green (the larger one extends past the edge and was bent over). There's also a thin rib of metal down its length where other 5mm thick rectangles of the stuff had torn free from either side, on edges just that straight. Note this image just show the thickness of the plates, not their span over the bomb's surface. And note this curved section seems to be the original shape - less distorted, it retains broken bolts and these outer skin remnants. The straightened part seemingly lost all that in its greater distortion.

= CW Weapon?
To me that makes the issue pretty clear. Chemical weapon munitions are often designed to perforate evenly under low pressure, so the chemicals can be released with a minimal opening charge - some blast is needed to expel and spread out the payload, but too much of a blast would destroy most agents.

I'm pretty sure I read about that somewhere, but I can't relocate where at the moment. And I've seen it.  Even the improvised "Volcano" rockets used in 2013's Ghouta attack, for example, had a huge, undivided, bulk-fill payload tank made of long panels the just peel away upon impact (best example: see entry for Daraya, 1-4-2013 here or cropped at right - I later learned the scene is even earlier, Dec. 26, 2012). The apparent vapor here could be simple steam from residual impact heat in the winter cold, or might be more relevant, I'm not sure.
https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2017/11/black-sarin.html

In other cases (Adra, Ghouta), we see tankless tubes and crumpled slats laying loose, telling the same story. Here following Ghouta 21-8-13 we see some crumpled at the feet of a UN-OPCW inspection team member collecting samples that would test positive. These rockets aere fired fom nearby rebel-held territory, where Syrian troops had been attacked with sarin just three days after the Ghouta attack.
https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2020/02/mapping-sarin-related-activity-in-jobar.html

Add 3-19: we should note this rocket was apparently not designed AS a chemical weapon; the less controversial alleged uses of them by Syrian military and allied forces is for conventional high explosives or fuel-air weapons. The latter has a similar principle to CW dispersal, using a lightly ejected cloud of fuel
vapor that's then ignited. I'm still no expert here, but I'd say the slat design goes with that idea that could be useful to deliver sarin. Also note the following is just my limited reading, poorly put as it was ("would" instead of "could" etc.)

In the case of the supposed M4000 sarin bomb, the design, apparently, is to break into rectangles like the ones seen, set at nice rounded 10mm intervals, with 180-190-200 being common plate lengths, 80, 120, 140 being other dimensions, based on where the plate seams came relative to bomb features, like fill port caps. This would, in my limited but decent understanding, make the weapon used a chemical munition, if not the M4000 itself.

And of course it's still likely these fragments were planted, perhaps after being recovered from another use with conventional explosives some time ago This would explain the small size, small number, and melted-twisted nature of the recovered fragments, besides their apparent advanced age-related corrosion, far better than the accepted narrative does.

M4000 Distraction, point 3: The Curved Rail

October 20, 2019

An in-progress article on Philip Watson's M4000 Distraction got entirely too bloated. Two compound points - 2 and 3 - having sub-sections to detail a cluster of related bad thinking, so they require their own posts. Point 1 on binary sarin and the M4000 also deserves a post and, being its own issue as well, already got that over here. I'm not going to re-name that, but it serves as the split-off exploration behind what becomes point 1 in the M4000 Distraction's list of 13 points of issue. (and note not all 13 are negative - one is fairly positive and a couple are kind of neutral)

The final will include a link to here and a summary of the following under point 3. This dedicated space also allows for any rebuttal or revisions, etc. that I can also consider for the summary.

3) The curved rail

3a The 45° angle "claim" ...

This is another rather stupid point as he should realize by now, but Watson just said he plans to include this point again in his part 4 "Lataminah: Rails, Caps and the M4000" where he'll argue about five things not lining up, be wrong about 4 and the other is of no importance (prediction). But I'm not entirely sure he will plow ahead with this running claim: Bellingcat founder Eliot Higgins is a fool for "claiming a 45° angle" in a rail of metal "became a 90° curvature after an impact" in this scrap linked to the Latanmah incident. (tweet) An archived copy below (prior account). 

I don't think Higgins ever did answer, which might leave it seeming like a great question. And as Watson notes, this "rail" is not included in Forensic Architecture modeling for Bellingcat (an issue discussed below), so one would have to visualize the issue on their own. Watson did it very poorly.

As far as I can see, Higgins and/or a graphics assembler at Bellingcat "claimed" the angle became a curve with a box drawn on a graphic. As I'll explain, this never did indicate a straight or angled object. No one ever "said" that in any form. Watson misread a graphic as saying this, and nothing more. He presumed the diagram meant to indicate a long beam along the bottom including the marked bend (roughly in the bent green box in my graphic). But logically, they meant to indicate a circular member (yellow box) that's only indicated at its end (because there its thickness or cross-section is drawn in?). Below, right, a crude drawing tries to over-illustrate the point. See also a 3-D modeled view below.

In case anyone still wonders, it also makes no sense to have a bolted seam along the underside of the chemical tank. That should be welded sealed at all points.

Bellingcat had always described the thing better than that graphic showed it; "metal supports run the circumference of the bomb casing [not the length of it - ed], and one of these metal supports was recovered at Al-Lataminah," shown as the partly circular item in question. He probably saw that, and just dismissed as not their REAL claim, which he already confused himself into ferreting out. Furthermore, researcher Michael Kobs brought it up right away when the issue was first raised in 2018: "This piece is meant to be a ring of the 1.44m circumference..." But Watson rejected that as NOT Higgins' claim or meaning, so not relevant. Then I mentioned it again after seeing this bad reading still used a good clue in his new project. That was almost a year later, but I quoted that "circumference" part as a refresher. He replied "I've no idea of your point Adam, sorry." tweet).
3b ...that trumps all other claims...
When I asked Watson if anyone had tried to explain this before, he acknowledged "They have said it was many things. First Higgins claimed it was a "cross section" to connect the payload body to nose cone. Then Robert Trafford of Forensic Architecture rubbish that saying it was a connecting brace for tail fin. Now it's something else." I'm not sure what "else" it was now, but the prior 2 things are actually, as far as I can tell, two of 3 things it could be, if it's even part of this bomb:

1) the circular band connecting the nose assembly (the square-ish gray shape inside the red indicated corner is a cross-section of that band.) Said to be Higgins claim.

2) the same thing but at the back of the payload tank, attaching the tail assembly, as modeled to pretty convincing effect, IMO. Said to be FA/Trafford view, also shown in Bellingcat graphic

3) and this is intriguing - it could be the middle ring that's meant to hold the dividing plate when one is using the M4000 in its designed, binary mode. I imagine it goes in the slot formed by the ring's unusual shape, as I show here with a red line.

That's not very many things really, when we recall that the 4th "claim" of the bent rail that trumps them all is totally imagined. I consider all three of these possible, and would even add a 4th category for other (but not a bent rail - let's keep at it no one claiming this ever). Watson might find that self-contradictory to consider 4 options, considering how he took options 1 and 2 as exclusive and contradictory answers from a regime-change camp in total disarray.

Back to option 3. If the bomb is re-purposed for unitary fill, be it chemical or conventional explosives, I reason, this divider can also be skipped and its anchoring ring ignored (just like the mixing arm, and whichever of the two fill ports is less convenient). I've been going over this with Michael Kobs, who favors that view, and has leads on the shape of the object seen suggesting it's this middle ring, not one from either end. (so via Kobs or however, that might be the "something else" it's been called). I like where he's is going, and he has a good record. I plan to catch up on that soon.

I had some further thoughts premised on no broken bolts or none torn free. Then I noticed (with the FFM's help) some holes are bit distorted, 3 seem to have broken bolts inside. S/2017/931, Note by the (OPCW) Technical Secretariat, 6 Nov. 2017 (PDF):
"12SDS is similar to a metal rail, approximately 550 mm long, with a square shaped cross section.  It is heavily corroded with eight equally distributed holes visible on one side and traces of grey colour.  Some of the holes still contain broken bolts inside." Indeed, the 3 inside the curve are intact. Such weak bolts (are they even metal?) could be why we see none tearing of the rail.

The two end rings have to be bolted to the nose and tail assemblies for the thing to fall right, or even look right. The middle ring may stay bolt-free if it's in unitary mode and no plate needs held. But that's not certain, and those are the thoughts going forward, where I so far hold any 3 of those is possible, besides for good measure "other."
3c ...and better explains the straight part anyway...
Forensic Architecture responded to Watson's approach about this curved rail they didn't model. One of them even made special slides to illustrate the point for him. One shows how the ring (outlined in light orange) would attach at the back end, which he uses as a banner on his "deception" articles, and which I show below.

He took the images with thanks but contested the assessment; "that piece of metal shows no signs of having ever been the circular shape FA were suggesting it was." Except of course for now, when there's that "almost perfect 90° curvature" he found so laughable, since previously it was straight. Or actually it was straight-ish, but with kind of wiggly edges he maybe didn't notice (below: the green lines are straight and the red ones aren't).

Helpfully, Watson reminds the reader: "a circle has no straight edges," while this piece does have a (fairly) straight section, and he thinks it was that way to begin with; "Had this piece originally been circular then you would expect to see signs of stress on the metal as it was forcibly reshaped." He saw none in a detailed photo from a certain angle, but we can also see it's not really straight (but then the curve isn't really perfect either). And if it had originally been straight but got drastically curved, wouldn't that leave stress marks?
Well, I'm no expert, but maybe stress marks just aren't always that obvious. Or maybe he proposes this was originally a mixed "J" shape like that, for use on something unidentified, and just got mildly warped all around? It's not clear where he intended to go with that.

They also show this alternate view of ostensibly the same item from another angle that really looks different. I don't see just how this correlates with the other views, but 12 SDS is said to be just one piece, not 2 similar ones, and this is a view of it, and it's got the same look at the held, curved end, so … I guess this is his perfectly straight original stretch after all, and it really makes my point about this not being the original shape.

Philip Watson has been informed of his confusion several times, but refuses to heed, and continues to paint this bend-to-curve "claim" as the official and only one from the regime-blame camp that matters. As luck would have it, it's the one reading that's flat ridiculous, and he gets to have an extended giggle-fest over it. They lie very illogically, or so Watson has himself convinced. Or so he just has his reader convinced? Anyone?

3d … and that keeps being "improved on."
Watson expanded on the theme, tweeting "When Eliot Higgins goes full Monty Python" you might see him claiming three such long bent rails ran end-to-end down the bomb's length, each one 550mm long, in a bomb that's only 1470mm in total length. He concludes: "When Eliot meets mathematics it's the mathematics that's wrong." (and that might be worded better.)

But considering my reading above, it seems Higgins was highlighting the three rings (again, one at each end and one around the middle of the central tank), each one indicated with a box of pink dots at the top AND the bottom (so 3 dot-boxes along the top and 3 along the bottom) with each vertical pair indicating one of three "straps used to hold the bomb together." To illustrate, he shows what I'm pretty sure is a different kind of item in the Khan Sheikhoun crater, a thin "strap" I'd say with empty bolt-holes in it (see 35:25 in this video)

Watson saw .... whatever, exactly. But it seems Higgins referred to the 3 support rings, each of which would have a circumference even greater - about 1446mm. What we see in 12 SDS is less than half a ring. Now 3 of these, all straightened back out, would make 4,337mm of railing! How could that all fit in a bomb 1/3 that length in total? Well, it could fit in a 3-D manner that it helps to be able to grasp.

For the aspiring researchers out there, there's a valuable lesson here. If you keep finding clues every ten minutes that no one else has ever run with, and you find your opponents making such patently absurd statements … it's worth pausing to check if YOU'RE not the one who's confused, before you proceed to try running a race with both feet in your mouth.

M4000 Distraction, point 2: The Blown-Off Tail Section

October 19, 2019

An in-progress article on "Philip Watson's M4000 Distraction" got entirely too bloated trying to include an entire 13 points in detail on one page. The compound points 2 and 3 deserving their own posts, this one especially due to ramblings that seemed too informative to delete. Point 1 on binary sarin and the M4000 also deserves its own post and, being its own issue with other peoples' confusion also involved, it already got that over here.

The final M4000 distraction overview will include a link to here and a summary of the following under point 2. This dedicated space also allows for any rebuttal or revisions, etc. that I can also consider for the summary.

2 The blown-off tail section ...
2a … that's not blown off
In his recent part 3, Watson considers the second M4000 Bellingcat located in a 2014 video. He describes it as "a more retarded (distorted) version with blown off tail section" that was "blown off in, what seems to be, perfect fashion." (that might hold a clue to the nature of any optical error at work here - he doesn't explain the details of his decision, either verbally or visually, except that perfection note - does he see a hacksaw cut but is soft-pedaling it for now?).

To me, that's just baffling. As I'll re-show, the back end is entirely there, minus the ring around the tailfins that are now flattened so the thing looks like fat metal cuttlefish. I showed this to him in a discussion on October 7, with that note to help spur a review. He just slapped the same image back laughing that I was mad to see a tail section there and promising to end the discussion on this note (tweet). I asked him to clarify what he saw instead, but he repeated he was out of time either because the discussion "is degenerating swiftly" (his tweet) or, as I proposed "you don't have time to explain what that image shows. Ok." With that and some more closing provocation on my part (bit 1, bit 2, both to be illustrated in the course of this project), he proceeded to block me.

Well gosh, he should be correct as all hell to take such a firm stand, right?

To be fair, I didn't draw on there what area I meant, as I do in the image below, but it should be evident enough, filling the whole frame he tried to ridicule me with.

I ask all readers, likely including him, what else can be specified as filling that white outlined space with a shadow beneath it? I think probably 98% of humans would recognize it as an extension of the same object, and probably some higher mammals could do the same. Lower invertebrates - aside from maybe cuttlefish - would probably lodge no recognition.

I guess Watson thinks this is a hacksawed part of the middle of the bomb, and the tail should be further out if it were there. But all the parts of that tail except the support ring are in there. The possibly telling shape of the distorted fins in there were first noted (that I know of) by Amin251, who partly traced them in red dots, a good method (cropped image at right. This tries to show (starting at image center and reading to the left) the curled top edge and, then the curving back edge of the one fin holding up all that rope, AND the straight-seeming edge of another fin in shadow below that.

However a problem I was late to notice - Amin's line jumps early (at the sharp angle on the left). The first fin continues further 'til it's invisible under the rope, and the next one starts back there as well. There's a smudge of dirt on the lens here, blurring the view, but we can still see the rusty plane of the lower fin continuing into that corner, if we look close. Add: if we look even closer, the first curving line of dots could run another 2 dots or so to the left, but the second line starts in the right spot. I misread a piece of pavement as the rest of that fin.

Amin humbly suggested the curves traced there might be the same seen in 2013, and I wound up agreeing, as explained in more detail here. (that small error has no bearing on the match) So for what it's worth, this second M4000 from 2014 was actually seen 8 months earlier, and just remained half-buried for the time between. This is a find of some interest we come back to below.

Philip Watson may not even see these details, let alone agree on how to read them. But to his credit, he turns a disadvantage around, and uses that blindness to inform and expand his analysis...

2b ... that was blown-off with a tail impact fuze?
"[T]he video of the M4000 with missing tail section," Watson explained, is exactly the mystery that "made me ask the question if the Syrian military had added a tail fuse to the munition as part of its ‘repurposing’? That would certainly explain the missing tail section." This refers to an impact fuze/fuse (both spellings are used), basically the "button" meant to be pushed on impact, to trigger the detonation of explosives, or whatever that weapon does. And Watson pointed to a certain Russian-made bomb (shown, named as "FAB 250 (M54 variant)." I found the photo at uxoinfo.com (as shown here, a little ways below), with no attached info I found on the model or location. But it had a protrusion in the back Watson decided was an "impact fuse" on the tail. It's probably not the only one in the world with such an attachment, so...

"That discovery had got me thinking how much like the schematic design of the M4000 this part of the bomb looked like," Watson explains, referring to what I call a "spindle" sticking out between the tail fins (red box here). That seems to be linked to the mixing arm inside, for breaking the dividing wall and mixing the binary precursors. The Russian bomb he shows has a similar cylindrical object in the same spot. It seems to have a fatter shape, and it should have a different purpose, as OFAB are regular high explosive bombs with nothing inside that needs mixing.

"Then when I saw the video from Bellingcat," Watson continues, "I thought the idea of a tail fuse being added, in place of the mixing arm, to be a plausible concept." He seems to propose an impact fuze on the back (in case it landed tail-first?), and he suspects that's what blew off the back end. Well …

Initially I thought this claim was ludicrous. In general, as the Wikipedia article explains it, a contact fuze - which includes impact and inertia types - is "placed in the nose of a bomb or shell so that it will detonate on contact with a hard surface." No other placements are mentioned, and general bomb design is to fall nose first, always if possible.

Per Wikipedia, an inertia fuze is a variation of the same usual kind that's more sensitive, useful if the impact is too indirect for a conventional device. Maybe it just senses the sudden stop the whole bomb would "feel." Watson concluded the visible nosecone fuze on the 2013 example was an "inertia fuse," with no basis I know of. But it could be. The schematics show a zig-zag wire, perhaps a real thing we don't see on the field examples? Making this a proximity fuze maybe? That uses radar-like signals to sense when it's close to impact. A sarin bomb should have one.

Usually, as the Wikipedia entry suggests, neither kind nor any kind is put on the tail end of the bomb, although logically an inertia fuze might work there.But after some digging I learned something new: Russia's FAB-250 class bombs are described as having "a massive warhead without a fuse socket." (Global Security), and the shown example seems to fit that bill, with just an aerodynamic metal battering ram of a nosecone and no kind of push-able button sticking out of it. And there must be a fuze on there somewhere...

The following does ramble a bit, but goes to say he might be right on calling that a tail fuze, and such a thing might be used wherever, including on re-purposed M4000s in Syria.

On Watson's example model: As this page on FAB-250 explains, the M numbers refer to the basic design or model, while the 250, 150, 500, etc. clearly refer to weight. That helps correlate a chart someone shared here showing different FAB bombs, some with visible fuzes in the nosecone and some without There's an FAB-250 M46 variant shown, that has different structural details (more fins, etc.) but the same plain round nosecone. There may be an inertia fuze in the back, though neither it nor the others has such a thing drawn in at the back. (Two other 250s are shown, labeled with no M number - the plain-old FAB-250 has a nose similar to the M46 and the longer OFAB-250 has a flat nose with an apparent fuze sticking out).

The M54 model at 250 size isn't included in that chart, but an M54 style in the larger FAB-500 size is shown. That has better structural matches to the photo, suggesting M54 is the right style, except it has a nosecone fuze. Other variances: a different kind of ridge behind the nosecone, and 4 fins vs. 6, it seems. Maybe M54 in the 250 size just has those differences. Moving on …

There's nothing else I can think of with my limited knowledge to explain the protrusions we see on the OFAB-250 M54. Possibly some radio guidance transmitter device? I don't see any moving parts on there (fins mainly, to adjust the fall) that could be remotely controlled = no reason to talk to the bomb once it's dropped. So as far as I know, there's nothing else that could be but the speculated tail-end fuze, presumably of the inertia type. But for the M4000, April 2013 case, with the slender object as shown above, I propose the regular designed spindle of the mixing arm.

This was to Watson "only a theory I’m positing," but it might transform to gospel and play into the conclusion that follows; "What the Higgins found videos tell us is that if these munitions are M4000’s then they had indeed been repurposed in 2013 and were being used as conventional weapons." That might well be, but only two points are mentioned to support that view:

1) the very presence of the bomb at a time (2013) when Syria claimed it was dropping M4000 re-purposed for conventional explosives (and that's a good point)

2) the dwelt-on "tail fuse" and "missing tail" nonsense, which seems even more central to showing his point. It should be, as it's all about the visual evidence and - as it turns out - his ridiculously poor comprehension of it.

As noted, the mixing arm built into the M4000 is inconvenient for Watson's argument the M4000 cannot be used with binary precursors; this device has no other known purpose than to "mix" once-divided precursors. But he might have found a way to erase that problem, if it could be "proven" (hypothesized and then quickly and firmly believed) that another object had filled the "spindle's" spot - especially if it were an impact fuze that would also require a tube of explosive packing to replace the whole mixing arm assembly inside. That would really prove it can't deliver sarin. And the idea he liked was that this device was added "in place of the mixing arm."

So the notion of a tail fuze isn't that implausible, but the whole reason to suspect one was his strangely failing to see something that's really pretty obvious. Puzzling then how he got to the question, but he may be convincing himself right now that this was done, the mixing arm was nixed and the proof of it is that perfectly blown-off tail assembly.

2c The missing tail found, in the year 2013?

Finally, I just confused things when I brought up my recent sighting of the same unit - its supposedly missing tail end anyway - as seen after the supposed bomb drop, on or before 15 July, 2013 - or so I think, and with good reason.

But it was buried so only the tail is visible, and that was bound to confuse the poor guy. As I recall Watson was giggling at my supposed theory they buried the back half here and the front half somewhere else - I guess since he's so certain the two were disconnected he couldn't even fathom that I honestly disagreed with that. In fact he picked this as a strong point to close the discussion with. Another tweet, sorry, that's worth citing:

"Oh I see! So the opposition buried the M4000 body and the tail section, separately, for 8 months hence why it's full of, what you claim, is "dirt"? And whilst arguing you found the rear section you're also arguing it's still on the M400? I'm going to leave it there."

But he also denied that was the back end of any M4000 I had found, on account of the "spindle" (or impact fuze?) looking different (tweet). Somewhere he claimed (tweet deleted) the difference was the early view has a tail fuze attached just like the Russian bomb did, as it were "in place of the mixing arm."

It does look different, comparing the above and below images at right: the detailed tip with a flat-sided bolt seen at the end may be part of the design (unclear from the other example at top). But the lower example looks more bulky, and not just from being off its axis, which it also seems to be. This could be another device swapped in, or just some kind of sleeve bolted over the mixing arm (and it's not off-axis, just loose?) on a unit where that wasn't to be used. Maybe a protective cover most of them have prior to use? That would make the other example the odd one out for missing it.

Well, whatever that is, it seems to be part of the unit Watson already called a probable M4000. As shown above, the fins on that have broken free of the support ring in the same way and display perhaps the same exact bending and curling as the ones seen here more clearly … and as I show below, that wrinkled-edge square-cut hole into the payload tank (main body) is the exact same hole cut into the same part of the same intact 2014 example he already called M4000 (below, cropped images rotated to the same angle and compared). So this clear tail end of - apparently - an M4000 seems to exactly what was inside that white outline above, as it was seen about 8 months earlier.

Watson was proud of being on such a "different level" (as I first put it) from me, Amin, and most others so far who've seen this and lodged a view. As I recall, he protested the 2013 tail section was not M4000 because it had an "impact fuse" instead of the mixing arm spindle, just like the Russian bomb. Of course, he had just been proposing the same thing (a fuze put in the tail of a M4000) as an intriguing lead, so … why pass up a spotting of just that? (I asked here: not the same "Because it has an 'impact fuze' swapped on? "I thought the idea of a tail fuse being added, in place of the mixing arm, to be a plausible concept." Briefly?" - he never answered) Well, it seems he wanted this device to be proven by the blown-off back end. If so, maybe he just didn't want to see it sitting there in the middle of the still-attached back end.

So he picked a course, and kept this unit divorced from itself, taking the separate burial invented reading as his strong point to "leave it there," with no need to venture any further towards, for example, basic visual comprehension.