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Showing posts with label Idlib. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Idlib. Show all posts

Thursday, November 21, 2019

The Nonsense Gassing of Militants in Saraqeb, February 2018

Re-Considering the IIT's Nine Unsolved CW Cases
The Nonsense Gassing of Militants in Saraqeb, February 2018
November 21, 2019
rough, incomplete,
ongoing edits to ...Nov. 24

On 7 April, 2018, some kind of illogical sarin-chlorine attack was initially blamed for the deaths of 180-200 in Douma, but claims later settled on "more than" a "verified" 42 people killed, and just by chlorine as it turns out (aside from illogically persistent suspicions in some quarters). That was and remains a bizarre record, and even the initial claim of both chlorine and sarin used together is borderline absurd. But it might have helped that there was a recent precedent.

Flash back two months .. someone across the country was announcing "Assad's" sneak peak. He'd been working for a while - allegedly - to sneak some sarin back in under cover of his unpunished chlorine attacks. On the night of 4 February, he had his helicopters drop two barrel bombs - filled with chlorine and somehow-sarin - on a field at the eastern edge of Saraqeb. As reported, the gas they released spread to only one place we heard about - a basement where 8 random men were doing nothing special that night. Luckily the usual heroes with the White Helmets rescued them, caught the signs and alerted the world, so we could be more prepared to accept the coming claims out of Douma. And this precedent comes with an implied (or explicit?) moral - No one showed due alarm and stopped Assad when just men were gassed by the chlorine-sarin bombs and none of them died. But maybe if we had, the nearly 42-187 victims in Douma - including women, children, infants - could have been saved.

Issues:
(in progress)
* Implausibility of mixing sarin and chlorine (the sarin would be weakened or destroyed, and the breakdown products would probably be different than what was found)
* Inconsistent symptoms (miosis noted but absent, eye irritation noted but lacking, "odd behavior" instead of paralysis, no SLUDGE syndrome)
* Militant victims passed off as civilians (at least one and probably all were wearing camouflage fatigues before they were stripped down for the videos)
* Others locals claiming an attack seem related to those militants (2 locals not in the shelter are heard from; one is an apparent father of a shelter victim, and the other is a possible brother of his, judging by their given names) * Spread A - not to the victims (their given location is perpendicular to the gas spread as evidenced by the areas of bleached grass)
* Spread B - to a lot of non-victims we haven't heard from (except those couple who seem related to the militants)
* Unexplained means of sarin dispersal (it would have to be stored and released separately to work at all, and as usual, this trick remains unexplained)
* Strange deformation of cylinders (an extremely even and total indentation of four circles in a cloverleaf pattern appears on both gas cylinders, and never before on any cylinders involved in any other attack)
* ...

Sources:
S/1626/2018
15 May 2018
https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-1626-2018_e_.pdf

Syrian Archive entry: SAR020418
Chemical attack on Saraqib, Idlib on 04 February 2018
https://syrianarchive.org/en/collections/chemical-weapons/database?incident=SAR020418

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/02/syria-witness-testimony-reveals-details-of-illegal-chemical-attack-on-saraqeb/
Syria: Witness testimony reveals details of illegal chemical attack on Saraqeb
6 February 2018, 16:59 UTC

BBC Arabic report w/possibly valuable information
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_TjYLRh5YYc

SNHRreport: http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/Syrian_Regime’s_Chemical_Terrorism_Hits_Syrians_for_the_211th_Time_en.pdf

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/02/14/evidence-february-4th-2018-chlorine-attack-saraqib-idlib/

CNN Arwa Damon report with 2 related videos attached
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/13/middleeast/syria-chemical-attack-survivors-intl/index.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-attack-idUSKBN1FP27K

Syrians for Truth and Justice report (good Edlib media Center images, some Arabic text): https://stj-sy.org/ar/422/
STJ Hears that "12 civilians, including three members of the Civil Defense" were the casualties, while the Saraqeb city council has 6 civilians plus 3 WH (the WH tally of 9), and "the Syrian American Medical Association (SAMS) documented the reception of (11) cases of asphyxia" and no more. If any other locals were affected (some claim to have at least smelled it), this SAMS hospital didn't help them or doesn't vouch for it.

OPCW FFM Findings:
1.4 The FFM determined that chlorine, released from cylinders through mechanical
impact, was likely used as a chemical weapon on 4 February 2018 in the Al Talil
neighbourhood of Saraqib. This conclusion is based on:
(a) the presence of two cylinders, which were determined by the FFM as
previously containing chlorine;
(b) the testimony of witnesses, who identified the cylinders as impacting the
location on 4 February 2018;
(c) environmental analyses, demonstrating the unusual presence of chlorine in the
local environment; and
(d) a number of patients who presented for treatment at medical facilities shortly
after the incident, and showed signs and symptoms of irritation of tissue,
which were consistent with exposure to chlorine and other toxic chemicals.
1.5 The FFM also noted the presence of chemicals that can neither be explained as
occurring naturally in the environment nor as being related to chlorine. Furthermore,
some of the medical signs and symptoms reported were different to those that would
be expected from exposure to pure chlorine. There was insufficient information and
evidence to enable the FFM to draw any further conclusions on these chemicals at this
stage.
4.9 Environmental samples relating to the allegation of 4 February 2018 were collected
by an NGO on 5 February 2018 and were received by the FFM team on
19 February 2018. The samples were prepared for transport and delivered to the
OPCW Laboratory on 27 February 2018.
4 February 2018 – Narrative
5.8 Witnesses described the night of 4 February 2018 as cold with no precipitation and
virtually no wind. There was poor visibility due to low ambient light, and restricted
use of artificial light due to fear of being targeted by aircraft.
5.9 At approximately 21:00, eight men were taking shelter in a basement in the eastern
neighbourhood of Al Talil in the city of Saraqib when they heard a notification via
radio from a spotter that a helicopter had entered the airspace of Saraqib from the
south-east. At approximately 21:15, witnesses reported hearing a helicopter flying
above the city and the sound of two “barrels” falling and impacting in close proximity
to their location. They also indicated not hearing any explosion.

5.10 According to witness statements, two cylinders (or “barrels” according to most
witnesses) fell in an open field surrounded by building structures approximately 200
metres to the south-west of the Agricultural Bank in the eastern part of Saraqib (see
Figure 3 below), and 50 to 100 metres to the south-west of the basement mentioned in
paragraph 5.9 above.
The marks are quite clear in a satellite view on Google Earth handily taken on 6 February, just two days after the attack. The nearest crater (impact #2) is 85 meters from that building's nearest corner. The other is 135 meters away.

Militant victims passed off as civilians
Amnesty International stood up for the victims yet again to report: “Direct attacks on civilians are absolutely prohibited and are war crimes. The fact that the government feels free to flagrantly carry out such attacks using internationally banned chemical weapons reflects the complete impunity enjoyed by those who order war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria.” A rescuer described "Around eight people were barely able to breathe," and rescuers became sick. As they heard, "the casualties, all of whom were men, have since been discharged."

Now, this wouldn't make dropping toxic gas on a whole neighborhood okay, but it should be noted the men were apparently not civilians. That always seemed questionable how 8 guys were just hanging out together to encounter some poison gas, despite evertyone specifying they were civilian or just leaving that open. But there's evidence to support that hunch in the one known video to show the victims early on.

https://syrianarchive.org/en/collections/chemical-weapons/database?incident=SAR020418
Observations (hosted videos): 1 "Injured people due to targeting the town of Saraqib with chlorine" 0:55. On YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=it4YouSkp70

In a night-time, exterior video, a few shirtless men sit on the curb while two others in particular are treated by White Helmets. They seem to be in genuine distress, and not just from the treatment. One of these, seated  on a gurney, is first seen having his jacket removed, and it's a bit green and patchy-looking to be civilian... Was he gearing up to go hunting in the mountains? No, in Syria this usually means a person is a militant. His jacket looks like it matches the one on the fighter on the left, who's helping his apparent comrade remove that evidence, tugging at its sleeve with little help.
And at least one man seated on the curb - older, also with tattoos - seems to wear tan camouflage pants similar to those of the fighter standing near him, and tucked into the boots in a similar and sort of militant manner. Otherwise, the dark pants we see, and the soggy piles of discarded clothing are harder to classify. But these points alone make the issue pretty clear to me.


The older seated man looks quite a bit like surviving civilian Fayiz Khatab, "age 46", who spoke to CNN about how his family fled recently while he stayed behind to protect the house. And so he was in a shelter with 8 other totally civilian men (9 total) … and look at these clothes! Urkle alert! How civilian can you get? This is surely the same man here on the left, and probably the extra-dazed tattooed fighter on the right, with a face that still doesn't seem to be working right.


Further clues may be in these videos featuring the victims:

SMART News: "11 civilians were suffocated" The men acting dazed in their underwear at the clinic, some interviews
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhG7elxN7B4

Sham News Network "11 injured civilians" - interviews at the hospital
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pTCLrhZgYog

Orient News - "A regime helicopter targets Saraqib city with chlorine gas" - different footage of washing scene, interviews
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nyxhvACJGfs

"Civil Defense Idlib" on Facebook - video shows how 12 civilians had been injured, including three members of the Civil Defense
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1563457233753327

SNHR report explains after the targeting of civilian homes with the gas barrels, "8 civilians were injured." Media activist Motea Jalal specifies "the injured were all civilians." And the report gives the names, ages, and professions (true or not) of all 11 who were injured. The names are tedious to type (at the moment) and may be fake, but the first three are all aged 20, "civil defense member at Saraqeb center" and junior ones. The other 8, aged mostly in their 20s but up to 53, are all in this line of work: "civilian." Real professionals at it too!

Furthermore one of the 8 "civilian" men who survived the gassing - apparently the oldest one, Haithan Amad Kafrtouni, age 53 - was killed just "days later" in a Syrian airstrike, according to his ostensible son Mahmoud, speaking to CNN. We're to understand that was not a strike on militants engaged in violent or terrorist acts, but on civilians stacking sacks of grain in a truck, as part of Assad's food embargo. But it seems these men were militants, and that just might play into his being involved in a staged gas attack, and his violent death shortly after that.

Obsered Symptoms
An Orient TV video claims to show one of the injured for a few seconds, breathing from a nebulizer. His eyes are white, suggesting no irritant exposure (crop at right).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zom3EgcQgmI

In the treatment video discussed above, the two men getting special washdown seem to be in genuine distress, and not just from the treatment. One thin man is seated on the ground, heavily sprayed, and later seen doubled-over as if vomiting or trying to.


A tattooed man (I couldn't make out any of the tattoos) is seated on a gurney, and seems quite unhappy and disoriented. He has yellow stains across each cheek, as if he puked up something yellow recently. In both cases it's too hard to say if the whites of their eyes are at all reddened, but it seems like they are. By video's end both men have been walked off - unsteadily - towards (the hospital?).

The tattooed man, apparently, is seen in the SMART News video holding his hands in the air as if he's planning to conduct a symphony but still trying to decide what the music will be (note a possible tattoo on inner left forearm is visible in the clinic image). And as noted, that may be him above seated to the right of Fayez.

OPCW FFM report gives the reported symptoms, tending to all be totally shared by all 11 patients, thought it's said 2 were worse off than the others: "Physicians described, from memory, nine ambulatory patients presenting with mild signs and symptoms of exposure, while two other patients presented with moderate signs and symptoms, displaying an altered mental state that required them to be assisted." That's probably the same ones that we see - the tattooed conductor and the thin guy. They also required extended treatment; "approximately two hours of treatment and observation before being discharged." The other nine were out the door long before that.

"5.21 ... Patients displayed nausea, eye irritation, and excessive secretions. They also presented with shortness of breath, coughing, wheezing, and crepitus during auscultation." (audible wheezing or popping in the lungs)
"5.22 ... No secondary exposure was reported."

Props to Michael Kobs for noting the visual conflict with the reports (my 'remix' of his graphic is below). This man is one of the 11, and he does not have the constricted pupils to show sarin, when it was reported for all 11. The others probably don't display it either, but there aren't many views this good. It should be noted that miosis tends to last a long time after the event - usually a couple of days, as I hear, even in moderate cases. He's in the SAMS clinic, just got the toxins washed off. His hair is still wet, yet that observed miosis has already faded? Not likely.

As noted, if this were a chlorine-sarin attack, the sarin would likely be "diminished" so it would be less effective as a weapon, or not effective at all. But there is some possible wiggle-room in the neutralization; it won't be total and instant, but will take place over some moments, and maybe some molecules of the sarin will escape totally intact. So it might be possible to have diminished symptoms instead of none, and then limited secondary contamination - if the wind blew this mixture your way. Could that also explain the lack of miosis? Possibly, but then why were medics noting miosis that wasn't there? Just to help clarify the picture for us? In the interest of truth? Not likely. More likely that's due to the lack of the right wind and/or the right chemicals.

"5.34 No chest X-rays were performed on any of the casualties." This is why "crepitus during auscultation" is mentioned instead - that's crackles audible when listening to the chest with a stethoscope. (originally I just saw "crepitus" and wondered why sarin OR chlorine would cause popping air bubbles in their joints). This probably doesn't matter, but ...

"5.36 No biomedical samples were taken." They would be hard to verify anyway, but conveniently, they didn't even have to have these guys do the token dose routine. Just have sarin turn up at the site, and have someone say "miosis" and viola - you're a sarin victim. Not that the OPCW's people were willing to fully sign on with that, but it's worked for a lot of other people, who'll be pulling the OPCW along, pressuring them to make the science agree too.

Other victim issues
SNHR report gives the "civilian" men as:
Haithan Amad Kafrtouni, age 53
Omar AbdulKarim Kafrtouni, 20
Hasan Manhal Haj Hussein, 22
Hasan Hussein al Safar, 24
Fayez Ahmad Khattab, 45
Hussein Zuhair Bakir, 32
Eyad Maher Kafrtouni, 20
Dammar Hasan Haj Hussein, 36

Somehow these 8 have relatives all over who were also the only other locals who reported a gas release: Manhal Haj Hussein, one of the residents who was exposed to the poisonous gases from the latest attack, spoke to Syrians for truth and justice: “At about 9 pm, while I was sitting and my family at home, we heard a helicopter approaching the place, and only a few minutes until we started smelling a strange smell inside the house. Then, I fainted, and then the civil defense teams arrived and took me to the hospital...” But he's not one of these 11 patients, so must have gone to a different hospital? He does specify "one of the medical points adjacent to the city." Huh. And as it happens, his apparent son, by name - Hasan Manhal Haj Hussein, age 22 - happened to be in the fateful shelter along with an apparent cousin, a son of Hasan Haj Hussein.

And yet another relative, a possible brother of Manhal, is among the very few to get on the record here: "Ali Hajj Hussein and his family" did not flee, CNN's Arwa Damon heard. "He was at home with his pregnant wife and two children when they heard helicopters overhead just after 10 p.m. They heard the sound of something falling, and then the screams began." It sounds like none of them suffered serious effects and never had to seek treatment.

So implicitly, this gas moves against its own flow (see next point) to find the only militants around (considering everyone thought it was zero) - and also flows wherever is needed to find the relatives of two of these, in two separate homes in the area? And all this while avoiding - as far as we can tell - the home or shelter of anybody else in this town? What will the OPCW and IIT's intrepid investigators find to make sense of this?

And in another oddity, Assad's attacks seek out the victims to finish off later; Mahmoud Kafratoune, age 20, told CNN's Damon "We had left the neighborhood, but my father stayed because of the house and his work." And so he "was among those affected by the chemical attack," the report continues, "only to be killed days later in the same area by another strike as he was stacking sacks of grain in a truck." The list gives Haithan Amad Kafrtouni, age 53, as the apparent father. And it lists two possible nephews of his (sons of Maher and AbdulKarim) that stayed with him and became gas victims, but did not get blown up later, as far as we know. And again, everyone is clear none of those three men nor any of the other 3-6 hanging out with them were militants who might get blown up during an effort to kill soldiers or kidnap their fellow citizens, for example. If they're gassed or blown-up, it's only while protecting their home, rescuing or helping to feed people. Obviously.

I checked VDC killed database … Only person of this name killed in the right span is Firas Kafrtouni, civilian, photo. Aside from the sacks (of food?) he's shown next to, not an evident match. Not the father of a 20-year-old man, at age 28, but from Saraqib. It says he died 13 march, 2018 "Due to his wounds sustained by the regime forces artillery shelling on the city"

No one else of that name appears in the relevant span (anytime since 4-Feb., prior to that report and to now). The best I can find is a civilian (they says) called "Abo Ziad" - from Idlib, somewhere. Died Feb. 10 from IED explosion, no details, no one blamed. That's from a list of five men from Idlib called Abu something killed that day. Turns out the rest died in clashes and such, not the same event. The other 4 "Abu" guys are all non-civilians. I bet this was one also was, and this "Abu Ziad" was one of the men who took part in that staged chemical attack.

Impacts and gas spread
Videos with site imagery - some images forthcoming:

* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8WAcv2YIzO0
SMART news agency - footage from impact sites, especially #2 (on the slope) up close on 5 Feb. 3:16
* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZC4yM8oq4uU
At the scene, 5 Feb. panning across bleached grass and crater at impact 1 (in the road) 1:52

Directional impact clues? From the northwest perhaps? Or from straight above? analysis f/c...
...

The following on gas spread is just from the OPCW report's images compared to satellite views from Google Earth. Wind GUESS in the report: 4 km/h from SE, TO NW. To the northeast is needed to blow it to the basement the casualties were said to be in.  But that's a worldweatheronline prediction. A better indicator might be the visible areas of bleached grass.



Feb. 6, 2018 image shows fresh impacts since last image (Aug. 9,
2017), and the one bleached area quite clearly (suggesting it is a pretty recent event, probably on the reported day).  The bleached area in the north (1) is very unclear here - maybe it continued browning and dying to reveal bare earth over the next 2 days. It does seem to be the hollow, that soaked up a lot of gas.

Also, something was burned in the pit NEAR area marked purple since then - smaller hole dug there too, but unfilled? catches the light. Same appearance over following images, 5-9-18 buried over with a large mound of earth. This is just a few meters from the sort of hollow they dragged cylinder 1over to prior to sampling.

1. depression, pooled in all directions w/little spread
2. on a slope, spread largely downhill to the road

So it seems wind mattered fairly little, and topography was the main mover here. 4km/h might be right, I don't know - it's slow. Direction: In both cases but especially impact 1, The bleaching effect at the west and north parts get fuzzier - that could be wind spread, which comes along with dispersion. So the same basic northwest that was predicted (lucky break).

The side towards the basement where wheezing was allegedly induced - a sharper cutoff probably marking the contour of the hollow it filled. This shows there was hardly any flow at all towards "basement." It's possible enough would spread peripherally to smell or even be felt, depending on its strength. but not very likely, and not likely to lead to any severe exposure.

Note: this is a good image below, but there are some reports of locals besides these men saying they at least smelt the gas and/or felt some effects (more review f/c). Those stories could be true or not; that spread looks real, but screened witnesses may not be. But no one else is reported as being patients at the hospital we heard from - just the 6-8-9 men at that place perpendicular to the wind, and who were also militants. They just have a natural magnetic effect, from being so amazingly "civilian."? No there are hidden factors here - like these militant were involved in a CW false-flag operation by their militant allies that went awry, or according to plan, depending.



Since no explosion was heard, one occupant exited the basement a few minutes after
impact to assess the situation. He returned to basement and reported an odour of
chlorine. Shortly afterwards, he lost consciousness. The remaining occupants in the
basement shelter reported a pungent odour and immediately developed shortness of
breath, nausea, and a burning sensation in the eyes. Some of them reported losing
consciousness.

The implausibility of mixing sarin and chlorine
It seems the acidic properties of chlorine gas would probably attack and break don any sarin it came in contact with. Considering that chlorine-related compounds like sodium hypochlorite are used for decontamination of nerve agents like sarin. I haven't gone through all the details to be sure, so this area still deserves a better assessment, maybe by a trained chemistry expert. But here are a couple of sources that provide some of the details one could check:
* "The Chlorine-catalyzed Hydrolysis of Isopropyl Methylphosphonofluoridate (Sarin) in Aqueous Solution" Joseph EpsteinVirginia E. BauerMelvin SaxeMary M. Demek. J. Am. Chem. Soc. 1956, 78, 16, 4068-4071 http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/ja01597a056?journalCode=jacsat&
* "As a decontaminant agent, sodium hypochlorite has been used and tested specifically to neutralize or remove traces of blister or nerve agents on skin, military equipment, or in soils" NIH.gov

Seymour Hersh mixes some erred thinking with genuine-seeming insights to claim the U.S. military "tested, in the Fifties, they tested chlorine with nerve agent to see how – whether the chlorine would supe [sic] it up. In fact what the chlorine did is it grabbed all the hydrogen molecules and diminished it. There's just no way you can use sarin and chlorine, as was written about all the time. I'm just talking about facts." https://al-bab.com/blog/2018/06/seymour-hersh-syria-theres-no-such-thing-chlorine-bomb

Of course one could mix them. The question is just what happens next - is it an effective weapon? What happens to the sarin? It will break down quicker, but there's reason to think it would also turn to different chemicals than usual - chlorinated forms of the standard breakdown products. As the WGSPM noted in a briefing note:
"If the sources quoted above are correct, the finding of chlorinated organic molecules and unchlorinated sarin breakdown products in the same samples suggests that the sarin breakdown products may have been added later. … We can find no published studies of the effect of dry chlorine on organophosphate nerve agents. If the conditions for chlorination (which include exposure to light or presence of impurities that could act as catalysts) were sufficently favourable for other organic molecules to undergo chlorination, we might expect that sarin or its breakdown products would undergo chlorination. If the sources quoted above are correct, the finding of chlorinated organic molecules and unchlorinated sarin breakdown products in the same samples suggests that the sarin breakdown products may have been added later. This casts further doubt on the integrity of the process by which these samples were provided to the Fact-Finding Mission." http://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/briefing-note-the-alleged-chemical-attack-in-douma-on-7-april-2018-and-other-alleged-chlorine-attacks-in-syria-since-2014

So even our best minds can only reason that there probably should be chlorinated DIMP, IMPA, etc. instead of the usual forms that appeared. But the reasoning sounds good and this question should be raised.

And we could note the FFM was apparently unable to find a way to make it all work, or they would have explained this chlorine-sarin bomb and its expected traces, and set the blame up far better than they did. Instead, upon noting sarin-related compounds, they described them vaguely as "chemicals that can neither be explained as occurring naturally in the environment nor as being related to chlorine." Even after noting that they also caused non-chlorine medical symptoms (i.e. allegedly mattered), they could only conclude "there was insufficient information and evidence to enable the FFM to draw any further conclusions on these chemicals at this stage." Maybe because they didn't make scientific sense - just yet? Apparently someone hopes the IIT can set a different stage and find a "correct" answer to this riddle.

Newborn Babies Involved?
A video on Twitter shows two tiny babies screaming on a gurney in a hospital that actually appears to be filled with thick greenish gas, although that could be a video effect. However, I don't think so. Even between the camera and the gurney it's thick enough visible shifting gas can be seen. Over the edge, it's a fog. Someone's feet five feet away are only half visible. The cameraman and the guy with the hazy feet seem to turn and walk away and leave them there. The date is 4 Feb. 2018 and the text with it translates: "#Urgent 3 cases of suffocation in Saraqib city due to targeting the city with chlorine gas Helicopters belonging to the Assad regime threw explosive barrels loaded with chlorine gas on the city of Saraqeb." Which 3 people would that be? There were the 6-8 men and here, shown, 2 tiny babies... https://twitter.com/Ali13919578/status/960291259746324481

"The Syrian regime hit Idlib countryside again with chlorine gas" comes with an image of a WH rescuer with a tiny baby in a blanket, dead external link. https://twitter.com/newsemaratyah/status/960404919776829440

Another shows a tiny baby at the very start, being wheeled out, others evacuated, apparently in connection with "Russian and Syrian forces claim the lives of dozens of civilians, including children and women, by targeting two hospitals in Maarat al-Numan, and hit chlorine gas on the city of Saraqeb" The SNHR report claimed the hospital there was targeted just prior to the chemical attack in Saraqeb. CNN's Arwa Damon also heard about hospital attacks in Maarat Numan and perhaps in Saraqeb itself … CNN report with 2 related videos attached "During that period, six medical facilities were targeted in airstrikes in Idlib province alone, including one of the key remaining hospitals that has a maternity ward. When it was bombed, teams had to evacuate staff and patients as well as premature babies, who were removed from their incubators, wrapped in blankets and sent away in ambulances in the hopes they would arrive at another medical facility before they died."

This could explain the mentioned imagery, except maybe the green gas image with Saraqeb specified and 3 cases of suffocation spoken of. This is worth a little digging. ...
Tweets Timeline
People tell me Twitter always displays the local time. Bullcrap. The times I see here are clearly hours off, I think the standard (10 hour?) diff. between my time zone and Syria's. Timeanddate.com gives a current 10 hour offset. So I add half a day (switch AM and PM), then subtract two hours for the following tweets. The one with the spooky video - https://twitter.com/Ali13919578/status/960291259746324481 - time 3:17 PM on my end = 1:17 AM on Feb 5. Again, the incident was said to be about around 9:20-9:30 PM.
* 9:44PM One person only had tweeted the exact same text about 3 suffocating, but with no video, hours earlier, at 9:44 pm. Nawras Ghazal @eg_nawras https://twitter.com/eg_nawras/status/960237607061016576. This is the earliest of all in 4 Feb. a timeline with Arabic tweets including suffocation + Saraqeb. A few repeat the 3 part in between, but mostly the record shifts like so - very quickly:
* 9:47 dropping the 3, "#Urgent Cases of suffocation..." https://twitter.com/6kdP26eXrjQ55Lj/status/960238510547619840
* 9:47 # Urgent Cases of civilian suffocation (now they're talking about the militant guys?) https://twitter.com/HalabTodayTV/status/960238521306042369
* 9:47 "9 civilians" (and that's the basic number - either an extra civilian or the WH total including themselves, also called civilian) https://twitter.com/Fr_faham/status/960238672443531264
From here the same things get repeated - no one has images, specifics or much for explanatory links. So one with an image stands out:
* 11:54 "9 cases of asphyxiation in Saraqeb city of Edlib countryside due to targeting with chlorine gas, delivered by helicopter" and about 7 or 8, maybe 9 wrapped infants are shown. Some of them look ill, injured.
https://twitter.com/alepman1/status/960240139996925953

* 12:24 Syrian Coalition tweet: "3 people suffocated with chlorine gas in Saraqeb..." https://twitter.com/SyrianCoalition/status/960247733947977735
* 12:24 More than 9 cases of suffocation among civilians https://twitter.com/alhamwi_10/status/960247692839538690
* 12:45 the Civil Defense reported 9 cases of poisoning with toxic chlorine gas in Saraqeb town (probably by now the WH tally: 6 "civilian" men and 3 of their own guys) https://twitter.com/Fouadhallak89/status/960253053466300416
* 1:55 pm an oddity: "Five civilians suffocated ..." https://twitter.com/raialyoum1/status/960270536348663809
A linked article explains in this case, the SOHR is cited - they might have their own source for at five locals - possibly even genuine - who reported to them. The fact that an usual five is cited supports this. But perhaps they got a slightly different report about the same 6-8 "civilians." "According to the Observatory, an unpleasant smell was reported after Syrian Army helicopters targeted several areas in Saraqeb city in Idlib governorate, causing five cases of suffocation among civilians."

In review No one else posted the spooky newborns video that took hours to appear ... A quick review of tweets by Ali13919578 suggests he's not usually privy to insider videos. He might well have dug it up from somewhere else (where?) and tacked it onto his retweet of an hours-old claim. But then the video might relate - maybe something he saw in other channels going with a message both he and Ghazal copied, one with the video and one without. If so, we could put that scene as earlier than the rest of the reports, before the "3 cases" switched to "cases" and then 9 "civilians." So this is inconclusive so far, not a solid lead. But the possibility remains so it might be worth more looking into.
,
--- unsorted
They headed to the rooftop of an adjacent building. On the
way upstairs, a few of them lost consciousness and others struggled to reach the roof.
They reported helping each other climb the stairs and using cloths to cover their
mouth and nose. They also reported calling for rescue via a hand-held radio.
The first team of three SCD rescuers arrived at the site. The first rescuer stepped out
of the vehicle felt a strange smell and immediately covered his nose and mouth with a
paper mask; but had difficulty breathing and lost consciousness. While en route to the
medical point, other team members reported developing similar symptoms.
two other patients
presented with moderate signs and symptoms, displaying an altered mental state that
required them to be assisted.
3 SCD, the 8 men, 11 patients total.
No chest X-rays were performed on any of the casualties.
5.35 Nine casualties were discharged within two hours of arrival, while two others needed
approximately two hours of treatment and observation before being discharged.
5.36 No biomedical samples were taken.

"crepitus during auscultation" (listening to the chest)

Some early casualty figures gave 6 men initially affected instead of 8, or gave a total of "9 cases of suffocation, including 3 injured Civil Defense Volunteers."

Tuesday, August 20, 2019

4-21-2014 CW Incident: Victim Questions

August 20, 2019

I've gathered some general information and analysis on this subject, first at ACLOS long ago, then recently in more detail here, including strange symptoms and chemical findings, and unusually sharp forensic questions. But that post is already sprawling, and these further victim details deserve their own post with room to breathe. Here I mainly draw on details from this 2016 report of the Syrian-American Medical Society (SAMS):

A New Normal: Ongoing Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria, February, 2016
https://www.sams-usa.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/A-New-Normal_Ongoing-Chemical-Weapons-Attacks-in-Syria.compressed.pdf


On the cover - bottom: Binnish, Idlib, March 23, 2015. That's not chlorine, as reported: it's too light, too green = prob. special effects colored smoke. Good start...

The top image is described "Bab Al Hawa Hospital, Idlib, April 21, 2014."

I was slow to connect that image (or a similar one shown below) to the alleged chlorine attack in Talmenes, Idlib, on that day, but finally did some time ago. (Such mainstream news photos were rare, not something I watched for - most visual clues come from "activist" videos and photos) As it was reported at the time:

"A Reuters photograph of another young boy who had been transferred to a hospital closer to the Turkish border showed him lying dead on a stretcher with blood around his mouth. Medics said he had been exposed to chlorine gas at Telminnes." (via Business Insider).

Well, it doesn't look like his eyes were exposed much, if at all. But his airways, apparently so. It's never good when one and not the other is affected. It's not normal, requires an explanation. (or so I think - a non-expert. If one squeezes their eyes shut on first sting, redness could be kept minimal. It's debatable if this is too minimal)


This was perhaps the best-illustrated and most widely-accepted of four deadly attacks in the Hama-Idlib border area during April-May 2014 (small tolls adding up to about 10 killed in total). It's the only one of the four where the fatalities were not listed as "displaced" from other towns. In three of four cases they were reported as strangers. At right is the map of where people from wound up dying in these shady chlorine events. It always seemed possible that "displaced" was a sort of code for captives kidnapped - as some 80 Alawi civilians were in February, from nearby Ma'an (besides from other places and times). The people taken from Ma'an (white circle at right) were mostly women and children. The IDPs listed as killed were almost entirely women and children too, a pattern that does carry over here in Talmenes. But it seems less suspicious in having hometown victims and no red arrows pointing to it. Odd that it was also the one with Reuters photo, and the best general reception, despite half its barrel bomb impacts being ruled fake by the OPCW's own experts.

But the SAMS report adds details that raise serious questions.

Background, from SAMS report
Of some 350 affected people, the report explains, 19 cases required "more advanced medical care, which they received at Medical Facility A" (one of two unnamed facilities "at the Syrian-Turkish border" that handled patients for this incident). Prior to this, many or all came to Alsiddiq field hospital, one of whose medics described the following symptoms:

* irritation
* seizure (one case)
* vomiting,
* bluish skin,
* redness of the skin with itching,
* redness of the eyes,
* hyper secretion of saliva,
* dyspnea / difficulty breathing
* pupil contraction 
* epiphora [watering eyes],
* cough,
* abdominal pain,
* loss of consciousness

Others mentioned in case details include:
* tachycardia [over-fast heartbeat]
* sweating
* dilated pupils [contraction noted in general - a contradiction?]
* crackles in both lungs areas [meaning damage evident in x-rays?]
* pink foamy secretions

These signs/symptoms are a strange mix of consistent with chlorine, inconsistent, and debatable. "Constricted" pupils were common in this attack, That's mentioned as a sign for sarin, but the only mention on an individual level is for the Al-Hashash boy, with dilated pupils - which is rightly connected to BZ or Agent 15 (see page 32). Chlorine causes neither, just irritation of the whole eye surface. This and loss of consciousness in particular suggest something other chlorine is (allegedly) at work. BZ-Agent 15 is also uniquely suggested by irritation, abdominal pain, but contra-indicated by sweating and salivation. If any one class of chemicals can explain all this, it doesn't seem SAMS has a category for it. They have four categories:
* sarin/nerve agent
* chlorine/choking agent
* mustard gas/blister agent
* BZ or Agent 15/psychotomimetic agent

The 21 April attack reportedly killed people of two families at two nearby locations - not one family as I had first read it. OPCW Fact-Finding Mission report S/1230/2014 (Dec. 18 2014 - PDF link) relates the narrative of two devices dropped by helicopter in quick succession at around 10:30 to 10:45 am. The released chlorine gas reportedly affected 350 people, and caused fatalities in two homes in Talmines about 100 meters apart. The associated names are redacted and never given, but the FFM agrees with all other sources that three died - a young boy and teenage girl in one home, an older woman in the other.

Five specific, detailed cases
The SAMS report describes five serious cases, 3 of them fatal, one unclear. Below I'll consider these in the order given, each with summarized report details, then other sources and notes.

First Case: Mohammad Abdul-Razzak Alhashash, age 6. "He was getting prepared to go to school when he was exposed to a yellow toxic gas. He was unable to breathe and lost consciousness." He arrived at the hospital at 1:30 pm, about three hours after the reported attack, already "intubated under mechanical ventilation," but he died anyway at 2:00 pm. As the one boy aged 6/7 to die, this is clearly the one in photographs. It's not clear if he was also transferred "closer to the Turkish border" (as mentioned above) in that short time, or after death, or at all. Clinical signs: "redness in the face, pink foamy secretions, pupil dilation, diffused crackles in both lungs areas." No mention of oxygen levels, as there is with the others.

VDC lists Mahmoud Abdul Razaq Hashash "Nawas" child-male, age 7, died 4-21 "Martyred due to exposure to Chlorine gas which was contained in a barrel bomb shelled on his house, delivered by the government helicopter" Mohammad vs. Mahmoud could just be a typo - very similar. Either could be accurate, but more likely Mohammad.

FFM heard about and saw medical records for "a seven-year-old boy, who died within a few hours of exposure." He was only "some 15 m from the point of impact of the barrel bomb" yet "there were no signs of physical trauma on his body" - important to prove it was the chemical part, not the dropped bomb blowing up that killed him. From suffocation, the boy "developed cyanosis and, as explained by interviewees, “turned blue in colour”." A bit in the lips, but otherwise, not really. I'd say he displays about normal lividity, suggesting his suffocation was not that prolonged. In fact, it seems very doubtful he struggled with death anywhere near as long as the claimed 3 hours before arriving at the clinic. All that blood means serious internal damage, which is more likely to cause a swift death.

On the cover, an extra-wide view shows a blue catheter tube attached to his groin with lots of tape. I don't think that's normal. A contact with more medical insights had a few guesses what this tube could be. None were related to chlorine response, all tending to respond to existing medical conditions and to happen in a hospital, not at home, likely not even at any facility in Talmines. This is a serious clue of something wrong with the lodged story.

Second Case: Khadejah Barakat, 65-year-old female, was at home when the bomb landed and "yellow gas started to spread and she experienced difficulty breathing and asphyxia." She arrived to the hospital at 2:30 pm (about 4 hours after the reported attack), awake and alert but "with symptoms of dyspnea, tachycardia, sweating, irritation, extensive cough, crackles in both lungs areas." She was immediately put on a ventilator, by a more specific "2:40" pm. A starting O2 saturation of 70% dropped to 60% before 7:00 the next morning (April 22) when she was "transferred to Turkey for advanced medical care."

The entry in the SAMS report ends there, but she's one of two delayed deaths in Turkey, both listed by the VDC on April 25: Khadiga Mohammad Barkat, A-F, Telmenes, died in Turkey, on (or was listed on) April 25, "Martyred with due to exposure to Chlorine gas which was contained in a barrel bomb delivered by the government helicopter on a house on 21-04-2014." OPCW FFM clarifies it's not just listing: "In the second house ... the matriarch of this family died as a result of this exposure on 25 April 2014, in a hospital outside the Syrian Arab Republic."

Third case: Marwa Hashash, 15-year-old girl, was at home (same one her brother was at, presumably, prior to 1:30 pm) but not preparing for school. She was, after all, a girl in "liberated" Syria. "The toxic material container hit" at the same time it did for Mohammad/Mahmoud, but it was some 5-6 hours before she "arrived to the hospital at 7:00 pm." After all that time, she was "awake and oriented" with the usual listed symptoms up to crackles, "and O2 saturation of 60%." That's bad, where Khadija got before transfer and death. But Marwa would be much younger and more resilient. Along with Mrs. Barakat and others, "she was transferred to Turkey for advanced medical care at 7:00 am on April 22, 2014."

As with Mrs. Barakat, the story ends there, but the VDC doesn't list anyone of this name as dying. The OPCW report just lists three fatalities, with the girl presumably being her sister of similar name and similar-contested-age (?) listed under "fifth case." So implicitly, this one survived despite the ominous story given.

Fourth case: Ahmad Barakat, 64-year-old male, was at home (pres. with Khadija, but not explained) "when the toxic material container hit." He arrived to the hospital at the same rounded-off 2:30 pm, with the same status: "awake and oriented" with the same symptoms but for "O2 saturation of 80% on room air," reaching "90% with the oxygen mask," even upon arrival. This increased to 95% before he was released after 48 hours on April 23. His chest x-ray shown, barring a mix-up - it's dated 4-23 in writing, image stamped 4-24, the day after his discharge.

"The patient reported his testimony about the attack and his injury, and it matched all the other testimonies previously mentioned." This might be one of those "miracle survivors" and storytellers who clarifies regime blame, and who may not be who he claims to be. Unlike some, he has a medical case, allegedly ... but it's not much of one. A serious faker might easily volunteer for mild exposure as evidenced here.

Fifth case: Marioumeh Alhashash, 19-year-old woman, at home, with her brother Mohammad, other sister. arrived to the hospital at 2:30 pm, an hour later, but 4.5 hours earlier than sister Marwa - "She was at home" when the "yellow gas started to spread, and she experienced difficulty breathing and asphyxia. Upon arrival, the patient was unconscious" (again unusually), with the usual list of symptoms, and "O2 saturation of 45%." That's worse than Marwa had, and makes unconsciousness more plausible.

It sounds like she wasn't transferred to Turkey like her sister and Mrs. Barakat, whose stories end there with no further details. Marioumeh apparently stayed closer to the people reporting details. "After observation on mechanical ventilation for 72 hours, O2 saturation did not surpass 92%. The patient was transferred to ICU and died on April 25, 2014 of respiratory deterioration and noncardiac lung edema." The report explains how images below show "the patient’s situation and CXR 24 hours after the attack," noting "The first name on the X-Ray is inaccurate by mistake." Also, it's not shown - there's a readout of vital signs, then a view of another machine displaying some other readings. the only x-ray shown is for Mr, Barakat.

But Maryomeh Abdul Razak al-Hashash "Nawas", is listed by the VDC as girl, age 14 (not adult age 19), from Telmenes, "Martyred with her brother due to exposure to Chlorine gas ..." and as dying on April 25 in Turkey, not the local ICU. By that, she strangely died after the same 4 day wait as Mrs. Barakat. FFM report nearly agrees: "The family living in the first house lost a seven-year-old boy, who died within a few hours of exposure, and a teenage girl, who died on the third day after exposure," which should be the 24th. "Teenage" is more consistent with 14 than 19, but both do contain "teen." The other girl in the SAMS report, Marwa, was a very similar age of 15. Considering the vagueness with Mohamed's age of 6 or 7, 14 or 15 sounds kind of like one person's age, not two.

arrival timeline:
(of course the universally rounded-off times are noteworthy in their vagueness)
* attack at 10:30 to 10:45 am
* 1:30 pm, Mohammad arrives, about 3 hours after
* 2:00 Mohammad dies (only death of the day)
* 2:30 Marioumeh and both Barakats arrive
* 2:40 Khadeeja Barakat put on ventilation
* 7:00 Marwa arrives, at least 8 hours after the alleged attack.

It's not clear how this adds up, and that's the problem.

A female patient, not clear who, from the report:

Another, heavier and older female patient. Possibly Mrs. Barakat? Odd yellow-brown discoloration on her cheek but not forehead, faintly on upper arm and hand, not on the very pale underside. She does look bad off, somehow...


Locations
The FFM report gives the coordinates provided with videos of the alleged attack sites.

Courtyard (staged) "impact" loc. 1 in the northeast of town (unverified), Barakat home - N36.7426167° E35.6408333° - on Wikimapia

The crater caused when the barrel bomb landed - even the FFM couldn't buy that.


Kitchen "impact" loc. 2 just SW of that ("verified"), al-Hashash home - N35.6405500° E36.7418833° - on Wikimapia

Barakat details
Barakat is a very common name, probably too common to reveal telling patterns in a VDC search. But note the SAMS report describes a man and a woman of this name and same basic age (64 and 65) as patients who both arrived at 2:30. Logically, they're from the same home and related. To be cohabiting at that age, Ahmad and Khadeeja should be a married couple. But to have the same last name suggests it was a non-Muslim marriage; they would most likely be Christians, or perhaps Druze, Atheist, or just less-observant Muslims. That doesn't prove anything, but it's noteworthy.

Someone labeled on Wikimapia (in Arabic) a library owned or founded by Fateh Barakat Abu Abdo ( فاتح بركات ابو عبدو ) from Beirut, and/or Mohamed Barakat Ascot ( محمد بركات اسكوت ), here in the northeast of town, just 80-90 m west of the staged location # 1. That might well be related. I wasn't able to quickly dig up any further information about this person.


Al-Hashash - Al-Nawas details
Al-Hasash - (ar: الحشاش ) - VDC has only 63 fatalities named Hashash, with no obvious and relevant patterns. A man and boy of the name, from Aleppo's Fardous district, died the day before the Talmenes attack. That's statistically unusual, but not clearly related to suggest family targeting.
Wikimpaia gives for a spot in the south of town (Google translated): "peace upon you Geologist Riad Hashash, Telmens southern neighborhood, is currently resident in Saudi Arabia and work in the Center for soil testing."

The VDC gives both Hashash children the added "Nawas" (or Al-Nawas - Arabic: النعواص ). I'm not sure how that connects - another name they might go by, mother's name, something. It's not a common name - VDC has it only on these two fatalities. And Wikimapia lists it only once, in their same town: a home of Mustafa Al-Nawas also in the south of Talemenes - in fact just a bit south of the Hawash label. "Mustafa al-Nawas' sons work in grain trading And some of them in education" So per these labels anyway, the names Hashash and Nawas belong here, just like Barakat. As yet I'm not sure the names really go with the victims, or give any clue as to why they would be singled-out to die (that victims are picked at random from a helicopter is not a fact but a point of faith, and it's one I don't accept.).

So at the first house, a boy and two older sisters are reported (barring a mix-up), with other family possible but not mentioned.

Add 8-22: Or other family members are generally not mentioned. Just a week after the attack, a claim I haven't seen repeated or clarified: April 29, 2014, Ruth Sherlock, the Telegraph: "... in the village of Talmenes, another attack saw hundreds wounded and a family destroyed as two of the children died and the pregnant mother was taken into intensive care." No one else mentions that or explains what happened with her, or anything about a father or other relatives. Except ...

Syrian Government account - an unreported victim
But the OPCW's FFM heard another story - they had a protecting father who was killed. FFM report s-2016-738, Annex IV, Point # 20 explains how the Syrian government "provided the name of the owner of the house that had been targeted" and it was accurate: "The name corresponds to the name of the owner of the house at location #2. The Government had stated that this person had died in the attack" The name given isn't shared, but is said to match (whose?) records. If it's Al-Hashash, or perhaps Nawas, that supports the other reports. If the name doesn't match...

Elsewhere the report says this man "and his child" were killed, for a total of two fatalities. The singular form could refer to the boy or the girl, depending on their sources. They might not deny but just didn't hear about a sibling or the Barakat woman dying as well.

But the FFM was determined not to believe that story; "however, this person was interviewed by the FFM several months after the attack" or, as point 51 clarifies "a witness interviewed by the FFM later identified himself as this person (i.e., the owner of the house and father of the child that died in the attack)." It's possible he wasn't really that man. But they ignore that possibility, and wind up with reason to reject the government's story. But we can't ignore it, and are left with the possibility of another and un-reported death.

I have to re-visit the previous day's al-Hashash deaths, seeming to be a man and his child. The 4-20 deaths clicked out from this list and re-loaded with /ar turned to /en give:
Mohammad Hashash, adult-male, age 37
Sohaib Hashash child-male, age 6

Logically the latter is the son of the former, but it's not specified or certain. Both from Ferdaws, Aleppo (seeming to refer to a district in the middle of the city). Presumably they died there, and not in a home he also owned in Talmenes? They died on April 20 from "Warplane shelling" - a rather ambiguous category, especially given the notes: "Several people martyred in a massacre due to the regime air forces' shelling with explosive barrels, Documented through the forensic office"

For what it's worth, a man named Mohamed is unlikely to have a son name Mohamed, as the 6/7-year-old boy who died in Talmenes was. His middle name was given as Abdulrazaq, and should be shared by both sisters, reflecting their father's name. But it seems plausible that, if other details lined up, a 6-year-old Sohaib Mohammed Hashash was could be re-branded in this way, as his father was not, and his sister(s) were added in the same way.

For good measure, the basic story this was part of, from the same FFM report, Annex IV, point 11: "[the Syrian government's story was that] an armed opposition group fired a projectile from Ma’ar Shamarin (south of Talmenes) that fell in the centre of the village, close to a residential house which is one of the residential properties mentioned in paragraph 10 above. The impact caused substantial damage and two people died."

The only mention of a chemical aspect was this: "One witness said to have heard the explosion and smelled an odour like “rotten eggs”, but did not see any injured people." That's definitely not the smell of chlorine, and not likely to be confused with it.

With the basic locations set, videos for geolocation and damage assessment, it's possible to check the trajectory of any projectile. From the south supports the government story. From any other direction but straight down (as from a helicopter) would support no one's story. This goes on my to-do list.

Saturday, May 5, 2018

Did Liwa al-Dawoud Kidnap James Foley?

May 5/6, 2018
(rough, incomplete)


We all know the harrowing video released by Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) showing the beheading of American freelance journalist James Foley, by a London ISIS Jihadist, in Syria. This was one of the signature moments announcing, to a befuddled global public, the emergence of an ugly new threat.

But before he was killed, he was kidnapped, a separate crime that occurred late in 2012, before ISIS existed (formally, only in April, 2013). And over five years later, there's still no clear answer as to who first took away Foley's liberty and eventually handed him over to ISIS.

Here's quite a conspiracy theory posed as the answer to just my question: Before James Foley Was Killed, He Was Kidnapped. Who Did It And Why?  Melik Kaylan, contributed, Forbes.com, Aug 28, 2014. This hears Foley was first arrested near Binnish, Idlib province (see map below) on Thanksgiving day, Nov. 22, 2012.  An apparent "jihadi" of foreign origin (unusually dark skin) among others in a Hyundai van forced them to stop, hauled them away. He remained imprisoned from that point until his death 21 months later. Kaylan explains rebel groups were "not known" at the time to do kidnappings, but the Syrian government was definitely known for it, and did it regularly. But as background:
A checkerwork of rebel militias ran various chunks of Idlib at the time, and many areas of Binnish itself were under the control of a relatively moderate militia affiliated with the FSA entitled Liwaa Dawud. They, Liwaa Dawud, later defected to ISIS in 2014 with some 1000 fighters, along with trucks and tanks. Rebel alignments have kept chopping and changing according to who deploys the most force and funds but experts will tell you that Liwaa Dawud’s changeover of allegiance came suddenly and unexpectedly probably as a result of ISIS’s inexorable power surge.
So this Liwa al-Dawoud is "relatively moderate," the kind of guys who join ISIS, but only under pressure of the group's undeniable "power surge." They're not evil people to suspect, and Kaylan doesn't suspect them.

He thinks a rogue group, someone outside LD's control, must have snuck this kidnapping in under their noses. Rival Sunni Islamists? Hardly ... He also thinks Foley and Stephen Sotloff had been transported by ISIS to Iraq before their killings, which he thinks is unlikely unless Syrian government checkpoints were complicit. That's not remotely true, and most believe they remained and died in Syria, in the ISIS capitol of Raqqah (I think). But either way, Kaylan deduces the taxi was tagged on its murky second visit to the internet café (because the driver forgot his phone there?). Then as it headed north a second time, 
Either the car was tagged with a bug or the taxi driver’s celphone was tracked. This kind of co-ordinated electronic surveillance was, and probably still is, beyond the capability of Syria’s rebel groups or even of ISIS. It is, however, exactly what Iran-Syria-Hezbollah is known to do very effectively.
So it might be the Syrian regime, or the Iranians. Some kind of Shi'ites, Alawites, secularists, atheists, Jews (non-Israeli), Illuminati / Freemasons, Christians, Buddhists for sure, lukewarm Sunnis, traitors... 99.5% of the world's population are all agents of Satan ultimately, to the type of Islamists running the Binnish area. They tend to lodge sectarian-based claims a lot like Kaylan's here, as we'll see.

Others have placed great confidence in claims to the same effect, using more local intermediaries: the mythical "Shabiha" militias, really Popular Committees soon re-formed as the more capable Syrian Defense Forces: armed block watch for citizens to defend themselves against Sunni terrorists - or Alawite death squads, depending who you ask.

https://sg.news.yahoo.com/us-reporter-believed-held-syrian-intelligence-152512481.html
US reporter believed held by Syrian intelligence
Dave Clark, AFP News, 3 May 2013

Foley was on assignment for GlobalPost.
"The co-founder and CEO of the online news network, Phil Balboni, said his company had hired the international security firm Kroll to investigate. “With a high degree of confidence, we now believe that Jim was most likely abducted by a pro-regime militia group, commonly referred to as the Shabiha, and subsequently turned over to Syrian government forces,” Balboni said.
“We have obtained multiple independent reports from very credible confidential sources (WOW!) who have both indirect and direct access that confirm our assessment that Jim is now being held by the Syrian government.”
Balboni added the place they think Foley was remained in government hands, in Damascus, and run by the notorious Air Force Intelligence. He vowed GlobalPost would pressure the government for his release.

But later, he was in ISIS hands up in Raqqah. To some, of course, this proves Addad-ISIS collaboration. Case in point: Paul Woodward, War in Context, August 19, 2014
http://warincontext.org/2014/08/19/why-did-isis-kill-james-foley/
"This strongly suggests that the Assad regime handed Foley and the other hostages over to ISIS. Both the Syrian government and ISIS view journalists as a threat."

But ...
Erin Banco reported for IB Times just after Foley's killing
http://www.ibtimes.com/james-foley-allegedly-used-token-allegiance-group-joined-isis-1664272


Although GlobalPost’s investigation at one point led us to believe that James was being held by the Syrian government, we later were given strong reason to believe he was being held by Islamic militants in Syria," Philip Balboni, GlobalPost CEO and co-founder, said Tuesday."
(we'll return to this report)

In fact they reported the false story, putting as many leading words as possible behind it. They didn't just receive bogus intel, they reported it as emphatically apparent fact, backed with action and pressure against a bad guy regime. But ... when it turns out it was Islamists opponents of Assad instead, they take a different approach, "We withheld this information at the request of the family and on the advice of authorities cooperating in the effort to protect Jim. GlobalPost, working with a private security company, has amassed an enormous amount of information that has not been made public.”
Is this Kroll? They were happy to make a Damascus link to the government public. Now they don't want to say, quite likely because it was a foreign-sponsored "moderate" Islamist faction instead. 

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-21/james-foley-beheading-journalist-whipping-boy-hostages/5686342
Foley, who had previously been detained in Libya, was abducted on November 22, 2012 near the city of Binnish in Syria's Idlib province, as he and his colleagues made their way toward the Turkish border.
In November 2013, Foley's family received its first email message from the journalist's captors" The group is not identified in the article, but implicitly ISIS. So it's suggested, if not certain, he was in their hands by this time.
Phil Balboni, chief executive of GlobalPost, the Boston-based online news publication that employed Foley, said that early on there were strong indications Foley had been transferred to the Syrian capital Damascus. That information later proved incorrect.
He said the first solid information about Foley's condition came nearly a year after his abduction, from a returning European jihadist, or Islamic fighter, who had been with the American journalist in the city of Aleppo.
This person provided confirmation Foley was alive, as well as first-hand details of his captivity and his captors.
Balboni said Foley was moved a number of times and passed through the hands of various captors.

None of those, apparently, was Syrian government, Iranian, Shabiha, or Hezbollah, but Sunni extremists instead.

One might be skeptical of such a conspiracy theories with clear political flavor and that later fall apart on scrutiny - (a related one is considered below). But someone kidnapped James Foley before ISIS even existed. Alternate versions to those failed Assad-handover theories remain under-developed. My summary research on the subject yields exactly one clear suspect group, and no one else in particular. 

Liwa Al-Dawoud?
The guys running the area, whose defenses were pentrated by the forces of Satan... let's come back to them. They're suspects here.

Liwa al-Dawoud, or Dawoud (David) Brigade (logo at right). Basics to be expanded a bit...

Based in: Sarmin, Idlib province. Wikipedia entry. Affiliated with Suqour al-Sham and Liwa Siyoof al-Haq, member of Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, in its 2012-2013 form (WP). This was basically all Islamists not listed by the US as terrorists. Some were under consideration, but only ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra were listed and thus excluded. They branded themselves as moderate alternatives to those blacklisted groups, fit for funding by foreign governments. (I'm not clear on how well this worked, and how much support they received)


Dawoud Brigade's leader in 2013 was Sarmin native Hassan Aboud, a double-amputee following a rocket accident in late 2012. Aboud is seen here on al jazeera , speaking about a joint operation with Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and other groups (in which The SAA lost Taftanaz military airport) Jan. 11, 2013 - not long after he lost his lower legs, almost two months after Foley was kidnapped, three months before ISIS would exist (so his not allying with them this early means nothing). Backdrop: Dawoud logo, that of the Islamic Front, in Saudi Arabian green.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pDFAIgM6Zrs

Liwa al-Dawoud is more ISIS-leaning than perhaps any other local group comprising the more "moderate" Islamist Suqour al-Sham (SaS) coalition. SaS leadership vowed early to oppose ISIS, in January 2014 (as early as anyone - they were only called a crisis this late). But Suqour al-Sham’s top religious leader, Abu Abderrahman al-Sarmini (from Sarmin) defected to ISIS in protest. Whole groups in the coalition split off: Sarmin-based Liwa al-Dawoud, and Liwa Siyoof al-Haq, among others, defected. A weakened Suqour al-Sham soon agreed to a cease-fire, after ISIS pounded the hell out of them in February.
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/525

The Suqour split-offs initially formed a new coalition called Jaysh al-Sham, not joining or fighting ISIS. But then, "In July 2014, the Liwa Dawud unit defected from Jaysh al-Sham to ISIS, bringing with them 1000 men and 10 tanks. Jaysh al-Sham claimed that it had expelled them.[3] The group was disbanded on 28 July 2014, giving the remaining affiliated groups the option to join other groups.[2]"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaysh_al-Sham_(2014)

Did Abbas just have more foresight? Or was he destined for the ISIS track from the start? Was he already gifting James Foley to them before November, 2013?

Some portion of the Dawoud brigade didn't go to Raqqah with ISIS, or they later moved back to the Sarmin area and operated as Jund al-Aqsa. Jund al-Aqsa members freely filmed themselves executing two captured Syrian soldiers in 2016, with White Helmets hero Muawiya Agha Hassan smiling at their pre-murder harassment. image source: Wrongkinfofgreen


C.J. Chivers, in a NYT article about the Dawoud brigade and Aboud notes:  
The brigade has also been accused, without public evidence, of assassinating the leadership of Ahrar al-Sham, and of holding the abducted journalist James Foley before turning him over to ISIS. ...Claims of a Dawood Brigade role in his detention, made in news reports and echoed on social media, do not align with facts known of his case." 
Chivers doesn't explain here which facts those are. The supposed Damascus transfers? So far, I don't see any facts to block this suspicion. (we'll return to this report)

James Foley Allegedly Used As Token Of Allegiance By Group That Joined ISIS
By Erin Banco @ErinBanco
08/20/14 AT 4:33 PM
http://www.ibtimes.com/james-foley-allegedly-used-token-allegiance-group-joined-isis-1664272
According to Syrian sources who have worked previously to locate and rescue kidnapped journalists in Syria, American journalist James Foley, who was beheaded by Islamic State in a video the militant group made public on Tuesday, was most likely used by another guerrilla group as a token of allegiance to ISIS.  
According to those sources, Foley was in the hands of the Dawood Bridgade, a group that was originally aligned with relatively moderate opposition groups such as the Free Syrian Army, but recently pledged allegiance to ISIS.
This sounds like a guess, based on something. they surmise he was given over as a goodwill gesture from Dawoud as they asked to come under the ISIS umbrella. And it doesn't sound that kidnapping was an isolated incident for them.
The Dawood Brigade, which used to be called Jaysh al-Mujahedin (Mujahedin Army), but changed its name in late 2012, was originally under the direction of Abu Mohammed al-Shami al-Absi. The group was rumored to have been responsible for the kidnapping of John Cantlie and Jeroen Oerlemans, who went missing in Syria in 2012, according to the Syrian sources. The two journalists were rescued by another rebel faction, and escaped."
Implicitly: they were kindapped on Dawoud's turf, or there's some other reason to suspect the same kind of "Shabiha" who kidnapped Foley.

This will take some more research, but it seems like we may have hit the nerve center of journalist kidnappings in Syria. I'll have to review where Sotloff was arrested (not here - see below). And John Cantlie, once detained and released by Dawoud, as people suspect - I didn't know this or forgot it, but his second and final arrest was alongside James Foley on November 22 (in fact, they were working on a film about Cantlie's first arrest). Cantlie was apparently handed over to ISIS as well, and has been reported killed, but his fate remains unclear. He was for a while put forth as an ISIS spokesman, giving their version of things in propaganda videos, ostensibly of his own free will as a converted Muslim.  (Wikipedia). This all came after he was handed over to ISIS, apparently after his second arrest by Liwa al-Dawoud, before ISIS even existed.

Banco, IBTimes continued:

"After their release from captivity, the two journalists (Cantlie and Oerlemans) described their captors, saying that many of them had British accents -- like the man who was seen in the ISIS video killing Foley."  

Now compare to this:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-21/james-foley-beheading-journalist-whipping-boy-hostages/5686342
fellow captive Francois said he had little doubt Foley was under the control of IS or its affiliates the entire time.
"The guy who killed him is the guy who took him from the start," Francois said.

Literally? Was "Jihadi John" included in the original kidnapping? That seems hard to be so sure about, even if the witness suspects it. But ... When did he join ISIS and from who? He didn't come in with these guys, did he? Little clue in the big blank spot in the Wikipedia article for the current likely guy (though others identities have been proposed): Mohammed Emwazi, entered Syria to engage in jihad in 2012 ("after January"), and was then recognized on videos in 2015 as quite likely that guy. He has a strange record prior to that, and the between part is quite vague. Is that just an article needing fill-in, or is the story that unclear? 

Journalist kidnapping nerve center? Oerlemans, Cantlie, Foley, Cantlie (but not Sotloff). Anyone else?

Recall GlobalPost's pressure on Syria's government to release Foley, and consider the same kind of thing was probably done for kidnapped NBC reporter Richard Engel. They might have kept getting denials that just increased their "confidence" the regime had nabbed him. Engel was arrested by - it seems - Sunni extremists  who knew he spoke Arabic. They had him captured alongside some escorting rebels, and then rescued by others of that same group. The folks in between ... they put on a play about being genocidal Shi'ite "Shabiha," praising Assad, planning massacres of Sunnis, raping their women, with crude sectarian graffiti all over the walls - all acting like they thought he didn't know. Engel was soon released and first reported the play's implications as true, but later had the story exposed and admitted it did seem phony. (Huffington Post for one source) This is such a well-known case, called Engelgate by some - that I didn't bother following it closely.

Engel was kidnapped in December, 2012, within weeks at most of Foley's kidnapping, and in the same area: He was led to believe he was in Maarrat Misrin, and was to be moved to the heart of darkness, the Shi'ite village of Foua. (see map) Where they really were seems to be as unknown as who held them.
"The captors attempted to move Engel’s crew from Maarrat Misrin to Foua, a town that was surrounded by Syrian rebels but still receiving supplies by air from the Assad government. Engel described Foua as a Hezbollah stronghold and said he feared the journalists could end up spending years in captivity, perhaps being “helicoptered from there to Beirut or Tehran or Damascus.”

But some of the rebels besieging the town luckily intercepted them and foiled the Shabiha plan. They "rescued" Engel and set him free, as is their way, so he could tell this story. Foley, unable to pull that trick (or did he also understand Arabic?) was not so lucky. But the kidnappers were quite possibly the same exact group some call "Shabiha."

https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/world/middleeast/isis-recruitment-killer-hassan-aboud.html
Behind the Black Flag: The Recruitment of an ISIS Killer, By C. J. Chivers. Dec. 20, 2015


Even as he vaguely dismissed their hand in James Foley's kidnapping, C.J. Chivers provides plenty of reasons in his article to suspect them anyway. Aboud is introduced as a emancing ISIS member, threatening and killing off former allies who weren't Islamic enough. The article notes:
Aboud and one of his brothers fought U.S. forces (in Iraq) in 2004 and 2005, several townspeople said. Some suggested that the pair returned to Syria as a sleeper cell tied to al-Qaida in Iraq, which was founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and after his death in 2006 eventually became the Islamic State.
Foley's brother was in the US Air Force, serving in Iraq, which was said to make his captors single him out for especially rough treatment.

After fighting in Iraq, the jihad broke out back home in Syria. After that, but before there was an ISIS to join:
"As Mr. Aboud gained power his activities sometimes turned sinister. Mr. Aasi said he became involved in the abductions of Alawites, and sought ransoms for their release. Other rebel leaders once intervened to stop the Dawood Brigade from executing civilians near Fuoa, a government-controlled town, Mr. Aasi said; among the detainees were women and a child. “He had a criminal tendency,” he said. “He became a dictator even before we had an ISIS.”"
Just when these incidents happened is unclear, but it's as Aboud and Liwa al-Dawoud "gained power." Someone called "Shabiha" kept abducting journalists on Aboud's turf, at about the time he was considered powerful enough to have on Al-Jazeera touting his recent victories and expanding turf...

Sotloff: apparently not nabbed by Dawoud, being far from their turf. Apparently ISIS took him directly. Sotloff was likely betrayed by his paid fixer, Yosef Abobaker. That's my opinion. CNN didn't think so and aired Abobaker's story, which it's said the FBI never asked him for in the course of its probe (but then, Islamists lie sometimes). CNN, Sept. 16 2014: They heard AboBakr met Sotlof a year earlier, and Sotloff gave him a camera as a birthday present on this last meeting. They crossed from Turkey, headed towards Aleppo. "Then came the real surprise for the two men: about 15 masked ISIS gunmen jumped out of three cars and took them captive." At least one would be surprised.
(add: from Wikipedia: "Sotloff was kidnapped along with his fixer and the fixer's brother and cousins on August 4, 2013, near Aleppo, after crossing the Syrian border from Turkey. The fixer and his family members were released 15 days later.")
To CNN, AboBakr blames Turkish border guards for tipping ISIS off, which is plausible enough. He says he had a gun and tried to pull it, but realized they were outgunned. He (and his relatives) were released, he says, only when ISIS saw that he had been a jihadist fighter in a group they had no beef with (so probably "moderate," right?).
"Abobaker had also been a rebel fighting for four or five months in Syria with the Tawheed brigade, a moderate Islamist faction. He even got married in his combat fatigues in Aleppo, with comrades firing their weapons in celebration, in February 2013. That was six months before his ill-fated encounter with ISIS."
Upon release, he says he was told "You are spy and work with America and CIA and FBI, but we leave you now because you work with (Tawheed), because I have papers.... But if we hear you work with journalist again, we will kill you for sure."

As for moderate: The same day they were arrested, August 4, 2013, Tawhid and ISIS were jointly launching their 2013 Latakia offensive a ways to the west, massacring and kidnapping Alawite civilians in several villages they overran with Turkish assistance (Al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Farouk brigade, and others, some calling themselves FSA, were involved). About 30 soldiers and over 100 men and older boys were executed, along with some women and children who tried to flee, or some women who were raped and killed. About 200 women and children taken prisoner, openly shown on videos as the Islamists' "guests." In fact, as HRW reported, from involved parties: ''Abu Jaafar al-Libi from Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar [a short-lived ISIS twin] was the leader of the operation and that his deputies were Abu Jaafar from ISIS and Sheikh Qahtan from al-Tawhid.” Qahtan is separately described as “a deputy commander of the operation,” and Abu Jaafar was "identified as the first deputy commander of the operation.”  Oddly, Tawhid's leader Qahtan was killed on day 1 of the Latakia offensive, August 4, and had the brigade immediately re-named for him, just as their (former?) member AboBakr was getting arrested by ISIS over near Aleppo.
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/10/10/you-can-still-see-their-blood
http://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2015/11/fsa-isis-teamwork-in-latakia-massacres.html