What Happened April 26 in Barzeh?

The First Bodies Tossed Across Obama's Red Line 
Part 7: What Happened April 26 in Barzeh?
December 13, 2017
edits 12-21

This little-noted alleged incident was noted at the time at ACLOS (still mainly on the talk page), and nothing was ever added. I can't even find any more information now, and all the original citation links are now dead. But it was cited thoroughly, and with expanding context, it's worth a review at least. I've already included it under possible sarin attacks in my big events list.

 

The reports I found in 2013 were two in number, both citing Syrian (normal, pro-government Syrian) newspaper Al-Watan (the Nation - website). I never did try or find the original report. It would be Arabic, and used to not even try that much. One of my two sources was in Arabic, and after translating that, I guess I called it good enough. The Al-Watan report may still exist on the internet, but I haven't found it yet in a few searches. If any reader can find it, let me know in comments, please.

Cited sources:
The effects of “Free Army” using chemical weapons in Barzeh (translated from Arabic title). Breaking News.sy, April 28, 2013 http://breakingnews.sy/en/article/16423.html (no longer comes up, can't be found)   

"Symptoms of chemical gas occur in some Syrian soldiers: report." Xinhua News English (China), April 28, 2013 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-04/28/c_132347695.htm (no longer comes up, can't be found)

The Xinhua report is easier to read, but contains less detail. Mainly I'll cite Breakingnews.sy, improving on my first auto-translation preserved at ACLOS.

Incident and Background

"Many victims from the ranks of the Syrian Arab Army" were brought to Hamish hospital on Friday, the 26th, "including martyrs, who have died due to inhalation of chemical gases." The soldiers were reportedly gassed in the course of clashes in Barzeh al-Balad neighborhood "between Syrian Arab Army and the entrenched armed terrorist groups in the neighborhood for many months." "Paramedics at the site reported that a shell landed, fired from inside the Barzeh at the Syrian Arab army forces based in the outskirts of Barzeh," which released the poison.

I'm not familiar with the situtation then, but a Wikipedia article on the area battles notes for this day:

On 26 April, government forces continued with their offensive by pushing into the Damascus districts of Jobar and Barzeh, which have a high rebel presence. Troops were encountering heavy rebel resistance as they advanced with air and artillery support. Rebel positions in the nearby Qaboun district were also bombarded with mortars and multiple rocket launchers.

Barzeh Al-Balad on Wikimapia (and see below): a good-sized northern district, at the edge of Damascus proper and the start of Islamist-dominated East Ghouta. Military and intelligence facilities are just south of it and Tishreen Military Hospital to the north, Bazrah orchards, Douma, Harasta to the east, and Qaboun and Jobar south, and a couple other Barza sub-areas to the west.

The cited hospital is probably Ahmad Hamish Hospital, further into Barzeh proper - in fact in Bazreh Hamish district, per the label. So the government push should be to the east from this area, and the incident should be near the border between districts (rough lines here, per Wikimapia), in or near the orange area. They would probably be fired on from further east or maybe north. That's all we can say for the moment.   

CW Effects  and Type: Sarin?
The chemical weapon caused, among other symptoms, a "white substance from their noses and mouths," with emphasis on its exuding or "trickling" out. This is presumably what they usually call foaming at the mouth, from fluid in the airways, an effect common to many poisons, especially those that damage the airways - including our nasty, impure sarin and/or foul irritant package as used in Syria. We can say they'll also be suffering from difficult breathing, which must have killed a couple. Xinhua's report used the words "suffocation." 
<add 12-21>Of course sarin specifically interferes with breathing by shutting down the muscles needed - it's more paralysis than anything, and a severe case won't even move enough air to form the bubbles that make that "foam." Sarin nwill cause vomiting, increased secretions (saliva, mucous), so they'll have liquid, foamy or not. So that's one breathing problem, and cautic impurities also damage the airways, adding to problem.<end 12/21>

Importantly, the agent cause secondary contamination, as sarin (among other things) will do. Breakingnews.sy:

“Upon arrival of the affected people to the emergency room in the hospital and medical personnel start dealing with the injuries, the medical staff suffered severe nausea followed by cases of fainting, but it was a lighter than the affected people from the frontline. This caused the injured to be sent to another hospital in Damascus."

The report gives no details on the nature of the gas, like its color or smell, just "inhalation of a strange gas” causing these effects. But a decent guess is: yellowish and foul-smelling, and pretty irritating to the eyes and airways. The effects sound a lot like sarin, although it's far from conclusive:
- labored breathing ("suffocation") and foaming from the mouth/nose, consistent but general 
- loss of consciousness, is more indicative, but also general
- nausea is less common, consistent with sarin 
- death (plural "martyrs", not clear if two or more): only so many thing will cause actual death - even sarin attacks in Syria only causes a few or none, usually.
- secondary contamination causing similar effects in people touching the victims: this is a pretty strong indicator of something like sarin.   

Furthermore, the time and area suggest it's quite likely (see below).

Notes on the Lack of Note

No Western news stories reported this, and in fact the few sources who did reported two days later, and no longer have the stories up. Three days later (a day after those low-key news reports) another regime sarin attack would be reported loudly in Saraqeb, yielding the clearest sarin traces yet, from a Jabhat Al-Nusra-linked hand grenade, said to be dropped from a regime helicopter. 

But this day, nothing chemical made the news, except for Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird saying, as CTV News summarized: "There is no reason to doubt reports of chemical weapons being used in Syria." "We would like to see a full investigation by the United Nations," Baird is quoted saying. But in the meantime, as he saw it, "there's no reason to discount or doubt what Israel and the U.S. are reporting." He was referring to statements from both nations that the Syrian government, and not rebels, had used sarin on at least two occasions so far.  "We suspect it's the government, we don't know it's the government," he said." One of those two incidents used the same helicopter-grenade scheme that would be repeated in a few days.

That UN-OPCW probe Baird called for had recently been stalled and denied entry, due to Syria's refusal to accept the unacceptable demands placed on their request for the probe (see here for that twisted tale). In the meantime, as CTV added, "Syrian officials denied Friday that government forces have used chemical weapons against rebels, marking Damascus's first response to the U.S. assertions."

"In the Syrian capital, a government official said President Bashar Assad's military "did not and will not use chemical weapons even if it had them." He instead accused opposition forces of using them in a March attack on the village of Khan al-Assad [sic]outside of the northern city of Aleppo."

That attack, in Khan al-Assal of course, is what sparked their request for the probe that no one could agree on at that time. It still looks like a terrorist attack, probably by Jabhat Al-Nusra, and it's now verified to have been done with sarin. They make no mention of a same-day attack right there in the Damascus area. Officials probably hadn't heard about this Barzeh incident yet, if it had even happened (time of day is one of the many things that remains unclear, but statements tend to come in the first half of the day, I think...). The cited articles are only from two days later.  

This incident really would help underline their case (probably, depending on details). Yet it doesn't seem they pushed for OPCW verification. This incident is not among those listed in letters from the Syrian government as reproduced in later reports. It could be they just don't bother reporting every incident for some reason - maybe some cases have embarrassing details the OPCW might latch onto (they often seem to focus on possible discrepancies to cast doubt on Syria's claims). And maybe they have reported it, but the OPCW just didn't share that. 

This apparent lack of follow-up on the government's part should be seen as a mark against the veracity of these reports. But it shouldn't be seen as much of one.

It wouldn't be unusual if sarin were used on April 26. All through mid-2013 in and around the East Ghouta area, civilians, rebel fighters, soldiers, and animals too were frequently poisoned and killed in attacks said to involve sarin, usually with consistent symptoms, and sometimes verified, somewhat, by non-professionals, like Le Monde journalists, using supplied urine samples, but in no cases by the OPCW (see especially part 6, Forthcoming). These findings clearly don't prove anything, but they might reflect real sarin use like in Khan al-Assal. It seems they had quite a bit of it to toss around, whoever that was, and this may well be one of those cases.

In almost every case involving soldiers through the years now, it's like this; they're on the offensive, have some Islamists cornered, then from that corner comes the foul-smelling poison gas... Considering the reports of pitched fighting, April 26 in Barzeh al-Balad is just the kind of time and place for this to happen.  

So the reports seem realistic and credible. There probably was another CW attack by foreign-backed terrorists that day, against young Syrian men, drafted into the Syrian army to defend their country. Can you imagine the outrage if this happened in any of our countries just once? But this is just one of dozens we know about. And these are just a sliver of the suffering willfully imposed on the people of Syria in this long and shameful campaign. 

Did the Saudis Order a 3-City CW Attack in March, 2013?

November 2, 2017
(rough, incomplete)
edits Nov. 3, 11

March 18's Saudi-Commanded Attacks 
The Intercept recently published a leaked NSA document from March, 2013 showing Saudi royal family orchestration of military events in Syria: NSA Document Says Saudi Prince Directly Ordered Coordinated Attack By Syrian Rebels On Damascus (by Murtaza Hussain, October 24 2017, 7:30 a.m.)

The document in question seems to be a bullet-point slide (presented with the article, shown below) describing a particular opposition military attack of March 18, 2013, with several rockets fired into central Damascus. As Hussain describes it, "The attack was a brazen show of force by rebels under the banner of the Free Syrian Army, targeting the presidential palace, Damascus International Airport, and a government security compound. It sent a chilling message to the regime about its increasingly shaky hold on the country, two years after an uprising against its rule began."

Aaron Lund told Hussain, based on video analysis, several rebel groups were involved in the attack, "all identifying themselves as different factions of the ‘Free Syrian Army,’ and all apparently linking back to the same sponsor.”  That would be Saudi Arabia, specifically now-king (Crown Prince Mohamed Bin) Salman (oops), then running Saudi Arabia's operations in Syria. As the article puts the main point:

Behind the attacks, the influence of a foreign power loomed. According to a top-secret National Security Agency document provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden, the March 2013 rocket attacks were directly ordered by a member of the Saudi royal family, Prince Salman bin Sultan, to help mark the second anniversary of the Syrian revolution. Salman had provided 120 tons of explosives and other weaponry to opposition forces, giving them instructions to “light up Damascus” and “flatten” the airport, the document, produced by U.S. government surveillance on Syrian opposition factions, shows.

Here's the slide in question, as shared in the article. Note: The U.S. was warned three days in advance (that is, on the anniversary on the 15th - the attack didn't mark it exactly.)

It sounded good, but apparently didn't cause much thunder. Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya could only report "A statement posted on an opposition Facebook page said rebels groups had fired “a number of 120 mm heavy caliber mortars... in a joint operation coordinated with battalions operating in Damascus.” To mark two years of "revolution of freedom and dignity against the despotic regime of the criminal Bashar al-Assad." They claimed to hit the airport and the presidential palace, but that wasn't confirmed. State TV and the SOHR agreed at least five shells landed, but no deaths or even injuries were immediately reported. 

The NSA noted "Saudis "very pleased" with outcome" of the attack.  But it seems fairly weak considering the occasion and the large investment. It's worth wondering if there was a second motive involved. 

As for the rest of the article, it's standard fare. Hussain follows the revelation with a lot of ill-informed context about the Syrian government's supposed brutal crackdown on dissent, etc. Unwisely, he chooses to highlight  salafist defector and FSA godfather Hussein Harmoush "who had denounced the Syrian dictator after a wave of massacres in 2011." It seems Harmoush personally led the bloodiest massacre yet, in June, 2011, against more than 100 "refusenik soldiers" in Jisr al-Shughour. Some of the executed soldiers were beheaded. It was done with Turkish assistance and oversight. Harmoush was apparently kidnapped and sent back to Syria, by his own Turkish intelligence case officer who was sickened by the crime. That officer was arrested for treason, but is said to have escaped later. Harmoush was probably executed by firing squad, but it was never announced and rumors of other deaths or still being alive persist. I sense no injustice in this case, except that the guy maybe got off too light. (see on-site profile, for Harmoush).

But the main point is this leaked NSA document that adds some intrigue among those battling the brutal dictator. Qatari former Prime Minister Hamad al-Thani, who oversaw Qatar's Syria operations until 2013, recently revealed in an interview how his nation worked with the Saudis and the US. As Zero Hedge explains it, Al-Thani says Qatar was placed in overall charge of which Islamists to arm, and was later left holding the bag as it were, as Saudi Arabia now blames Qatar alone for supporting terrorists in Syria, and maybe of doing it in collusion with Iran and Al-Shaytan himself. But some things were run by the Saudis themselves, like this March 18 attack.

This detail was a little late coming; Julian Assange notes on Twitter the Intercept have been sitting on this information since late 2013, raising questions about the 4-year delay in publishing it. But now we have one more glimpse at the reality behind the desperate peoples' uprising. And I'd like to add a interesting feature that pops out to me, and would have on first  at any time. So I'm asking this question about 4 years later than I might have.

The Following Day's CW Plot and Attacks

On seeing Saudi-directed actions on 3-18-13, it clicks that on the following morning there was an unusually bold chemical attack - no, there were two - no, there were apparently three attacks planned, for one in each of Syria's three main cities: Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. Wouldn't that sound like some epic, out-sized revenge for an attack on the president's Palace and his possible escape route at the airport? It would cross Obama's red line in a big way, and might require a "no fly zone" over all three cities and everything between.

The three locales are mapped at right. The middle one in Homs apparently didn't come together right and was barely even reported, but the other two seemingly-synchronized attacks  are known and studied, and each claimed Syrian lives (~20 in Aleppo, 7 in Ateibah). Was this Assad's revenge? Done by Scud missile perhaps, from Damascus, risking bad aim as far out as Aleppo? (Syria was daily accused of random scud attacks in these days).

Or was it something else? Of the deadly two attacks, one was small-scale and dubious, and the deadliest one looked kind of like an obvious attack by anti-government forces.

This is explained in fuller detail in this post, but here in some review to re-consider what I've learned in light of this new information and the possibility the Saudis may have ordered this next-day "revenge" campaign as well.

Aleppo Attack in Review

The Aleppo attack is somewhat well-known. The Syrian government announced it first, claiming outrage that terrorists had launched toxic gas into a government-held area near an Army checkpoint, sickening and killing soldiers and civilians alike. This was in Khan Al-Assal, as Alex Thomson of UK Channel 4 News reported, a Shia-majority district rebels had overrun and been pushed back out. Thomson reported Khan al-Assal was “in government hands since 17 March.” They were gassed there around 7:00 or more likely 7:30 am on the 19th. Civilians were just starting to return.

Bashair 3 rocket (non-CW, pres.), fired in Feb. 2013

According to Syrian officials, the attackers – reportedly with Jabhat al-Nusra, although no one claimed responsibility - were about 5km to the north, in Kafr Dael. They used a certain rocket, locally made and dubbed Bashair-3, loaded with chemicals. It landed about 300 meters from an SAA checkpoint, with a deadly plume drifting on the wind into nearby homes to the south, as UN investigators found.

The death toll has been reported differently, but it seems only one soldier died along with a total of 19 civilians, as a UN report issued in December found, with another 124 people seriously effected. (see UN report and ACLOS page for more details and sources)

Syria demanded a UN investigation, but this was complicated and stalled by Western powers (see here) so the work was only done by the December report. In the interim, Rebels overran Khan al-Assal all over again in June and committed a massacre of soldiers and civilians, perhaps emphasizing witnesses to the CW attack, and complicating any visit by UN-OPCW inspectors. Khan al-Assal remains rebel-held into 2017. Also in the meantime, Russian scientific tests showed sarin was used in the Khan al-Assal attack, a "cottage industry" kind, in line with the delivery method. 

Rebels still held somewhat-nearby positions, like the police academy, and the US and allies are clear Syrian military hit themselves on accident while aiming for those fighters. Rebel activists said this at the time, with some claiming to witness a scud missile attack, and others seeing a fighter jet fire a missile or drop a bomb. Do we really buy this?

Noting the issues with blaming Syria for this incident, I earlier wrote "most importantly, Khan al-Assal was not the only alleged attack of the day. It was, and was perhaps meant as, just one part of a bigger picture. And in that bigger picture we might see a more workable logic to the the allegation." In fact, it seems the original plan was three attacks.

Damascus area, Ateibah

fighters recover from and describe the Ateibah attack

One other CW incident on the morning of March 19 is known: Al-Ateibah (alt. Otaybah, etc. - Arabic: العتيبة ) is a ways east of the capitol, at the southeast corner of East Ghouta. It's quite near the airport stricken on the 18th, for what that's worth. It was then occupied by opposition forces, some of whom were affected, they say, when a government rocket or missile landed near their position. It emitted “something like water, but it was dark. It emitted a very foul smell,” and caused serious medical problems. One "martyr" is seen in this clinic, apparently a fighter. (see new ACLOS page).

US-based "Syrian Support Group" claimed early on this and the Aleppo attack both were by the regime, using  pesticide-related Echothiophate, in scud missiles fired from Damascus (one with not very far to fly and the other missing its target). (statement via Twitter) But the US quickly clarified they saw no signs of scuds being fired at the time. (CNN). I forget if I've ever seen a revised version of what happened here. As for Khan Al-Assal, opposition claims shifted onto a regime fighter jet dropping a sarin bomb.

Opposition records eventually reflected seven people killed: the man who looks like a fighter, five civilian men, and an infant boy. Records suggest two of the civilian men men were teenage brothers, and the other three men were also brothers or relatives, with a rare, Aramaic name, suggesting they were from a Christian family. The baby, listed late, seems unrelated, but is said to be from an internally displaced (IDP) family from Harasta.

Saudi Backed Liwa al-Islam, based in the Damascus suburb of Douma but expanding its power over all of East Ghouta, would likely be behind it. They're suspects in two earlier low-key CW attacks in November 2012. These were reportedly in JaI turf and each killed one person, a displaced child from Douma in both cases. 3-19's displaced baby was from Harasta, next to Douma. The dark possibility is these families fled Islamist control in Douma/Harasta, only to have it expand and catch up with them in other areas. Along with the Aramaic name, these odd details support the possibility all these people were  hostages of the Islamists.

Liwa Al-Islam would wind up well-implicated in the August 2013 Ghouta massacre, where there's evidence they fired the associated rockets, and where the victims appear to be several hundred hostages gassed in confined spaces, at several locations across the area dominated by the group. (best sources...) Under their new name Jaish al-Islam, the same group is known to have been behind the genocidal December, 2013 Adra Massacre and mass abduction (ACLOS). They later opened branches outside Damascus, one of which in Aleppo in 2016 admitted some of its weaponized chlorine gas was used (without authorization, charges pending) against Kurdish fighters, killing several. (ACLOS)

Note: Liwa/Jaish Al-Islam (banner, then army of Islam) was founded by Zahran Alloush, who openly espoused stern Saudi-style Islamism, and genocidal rhetoric against Syrians of the Shia and Alawi faith. He was the son of an exiled Salafi preacher living in Saudi Arabia, and enjoyed support from the kingdom. They of all groups would be the ones to approach for any secret plans like this. (Zahran Alloush was later killed in a later Syrian airstrike, but his brother Mohamed Alloush remains the group's political leader and was even chosen to run the Saudi-backed opposition side for "peace talks" in Geneva.)

Homs, Baba Amr

So we have two likely coordinated chemical attacks in one day. The missing link that makes it both bigger and clearer, unfortunately, is not very clear. At an unknown time on the 19th, a third CW allegation was lodged, this time in in the central city of Homs. This has subsequently been missed or ignored by everyone, but was caught and noted here at ACLOS at the time.

The opposition Local Coordinating Committees (LCC) reported for March 19: “Homs: Several cases of asphyxia were reported in Baba Amr due to releasing toxic gases by the regime’s forces on the neighborhood." No further details were given. This could be the same poison as in one or both of the other cases, or not, by the vague description. No one else ever reported any more that I know of.  

The Baba Amr district, at the southwest corner of the city, was the prime rebel hotbed in Homs, but under heavy attack and about to fall. Reports were already calling it a ghost town by March 11. By the 19^th, soldiers would have been holding some areas, and rebels others, so both sides were present and either side could have been the targets here. This is somewhat similar to the Khan al-Assal situation.

A same-day Debkafile report cited "extensive preparations" for more chemical use by the Syrian army in Homs city. They cited "Western intelligence agencies" for telling them about a boosted military presence, with forces "issued in the last few hours with chemical warfare gear." These “preparations” quite likely came after the incident reported by the LCC. There's no mention of that from Debka, but this “gear” is quite likely gas masks. The SAA might have just been taking precautions against more terrorist incidents like the one in Aleppo, or that plus an actual gas release in Homs. There were no further toxic gas releases reported, once these "extensive preparations" were in place. There's still only the one faint report from just before...

Otherwise that I've seen, there's no report mentioning such an incident in Homs on this day, either in the following weeks or in the intervening years. It's not clear why it was briefly reported and then never repeated. Quite possibly, something went wrong with this false-flag plan, or with some other plan it was a part of.

Side-stuff to cover elsewhere: fleeing rebels and CW allegations in Baba Amr, rebel retreat and discovery of massacres around Abel to the south ... raising questions if those people had been meant to die in the CW attacks back in Baba Amr, but they couldn't swing that... this exact pattern plays out twice, in the Feb. 2012 and March 2013 government offensives to re-take Baba Amr. The CW link is new to me (2012 claims I didn't know brings this together and raises the possibility of a cennection in 2013 as well). The similarities even carry over to that, with extremely unclear or failed CW allegations in both cases.

The 3-19 Incidents In Review
Where: in or near each of Syria's 3 main cities, as each entry is listed below for simplicity: Aleppo, Damascus, Homs (in order of incident clarity)

When
Aleppo: ~7-7:30 am (UN report  0700, Syrian government says 0730 in same report. Both sound rounded-off. 7:30 is preferable).
Damascus: ~7:30-8:00 am? (first videos appear at 8:11 am).
Homs: unclear.

So note Damascus was likely after Aleppo incident, but not by much, or better yet - they came at about the same time. The vague range so far allows they could be up to an hour apart, but even then "within minutes" is accurate enough, and they might have been coordinated to the minute, say 7:35. Is this a Coincidence? No. Both events will require some planning. The planners will be on the same side, whichever that is.

what (the poison):
Aleppo: impure sarin. Damascus: unclear, likely the same. Homs: unclear, possibly the same. In more detail:

Aleppo: "The  munition  released gas on its impact. The air stood still and witnesses described a yellowish-green mist in the air and a pungent and strong sulfur-like smell." (see UN report) By reports, some people dropped dead or paralyzed instantly, while other suffered difficult breathing, heart problems, foaming at the mouth, confusion, pupil constriction and vision problems, and loss of consciousness, besides a strange itching.

 

Damascus: “something like water, but it was dark. It emitted a very foul smell,” and caused serious breathing problems, and others listed by James Miller as "bradycardia, vasodilation, nausea and vomiting, and bronchoconstriction." It seems likely the civilian fatalities were not killed by the rocket that affected those fighters, but instead gassed separately at the same time with  an unclear poison. One man has yellow fluid from the mouth, and possible cyanosis. The fighter seems to have yellow fluid as well. It's been reported or implied that biomedical or environmental samples from the Ateibah incident tested positive for sarin, but the details remain a little unclear, and any number of shell games are possible.

Homs: it caused suffocation is the only related detail we've found so far (could stand more digging, especially in Arabic-language reports, from years ago now...)

The UN "independent commission of inquiry" lists the Aleppo incident as entry #1 here, where the chemical agent "bore same unique hallmarks as in AlGhouta" - which they acknowledge was sarin (so they confirm the Russians in that regard), but from the Syrian military CW stockpile. By extension, the same was perhaps used in Ateibah (same source has no info, but lists it as incident #2 blamed on the government). Ghouta sarin is also linked to Khan Sheikhoun's sarin, and that to Saraqeb's sarin. It all seems the same: nasty, impure (60% purity, France says), with a foul organic decay-like odor, that burns the lungs and eyes ... it tends to be a dark or even black fluid (seen in Ateibah, in later attacks in Adra, and at least the 3-30 and 4-4 attacks this year), but the gas it puts off tends to be pale yellow or yellow-green, maybe appearing white, or usually not noticed (this part seems less clear). It also tends to have hexamine as some fixate on. 

Western experts first verified this sarin as killing someone in Saraqeb, weeks later on April 29. In that case it was neither a scud nor a jet, but some Jabhat al-Namechange hand grenades full of this stuff ... dropped from a regime helicopter, in glowing cinderblocks - or so the videos and reports claimed. This is what was in the Bashair 3 rocket fired on likely Shia civilians and SAA soldiers on March 19. This is what they mean by the stuff used in 2017 matching with the kind Syria has used before, and not with the kind actually known to be made by the government.  

How (delivery): 
Aleppo: locally made Bashair 3 rocket (vs. scud missile, jet bombing). Damascus: rocket/missile (not scud or anything that shows on radar). Homs: unclear.

Who (if not the regime side as alleged in each case):
Aleppo: Jabhat al-Nusra (Syria blames them)
Damascus: Jaish Al-Islam (educated guess)
Homs: unclear, perhaps Jabhat AL-Nusra, unless the Saudis have a special contact in Homs akin to Alloush on the Damascus front.

This all seems like a unified plan, with different sub-contracted actors using varied means based on their local situation.

Could That Be More Saudi Orders?

Chemical rockets on Damascus and Aleppo, and maybe Homs, just to to blame the regime for crossing the red line on a  nationwide scale - it's got some appeal as a plan. If this was all one plan, it wasn't a very good one, on the implementation end. In fact, it wound up a twisted flop. Opposition supporters has managed to use this, but barely. The US and others claim Syria deployed Sarin on two fronts this day, but it's not their proudest or clearest claim.

But it seems pretty likely, if not proven, this was all one plan. At least the core of incidents that did happen already strain the possibility of a coincidence. That unusual report that bubbled out of Homs just adds to it. It was som eone's badly executed plan. Not-so-good plans are the kinds the Saudis hatch up. "remember that "red line" thing? Yeah. Use the chemicals Turkey will be forwarding..." 

There's no direct and conclusive evidence I know of that this plan came from the House of Saud, but I deem them capable, and it seems possible. If so, it was apparently done by a different and non-monitored channels. Either no such orders were intercepted by the NSA - there are still ways to do that - or the intercept wasn't shared at the same level as this one. It's interesting in fact how the were seen conspicuously ordering the 3-18 attacks that might provoke part 2, but not the other part. It could suggest they didn't order the other part, as no orders were intercepted. 

If this were a unified package with each parts ordered separately, we would see the provocation, and that could be seen as reckless, questionable, but not seeing the other part, the main issue would be the escalation by the regime - gassing a few fighters and hundreds of innocents in every major city in response, especially in Homs, where entire families suffocated in their basement shelters?  Well, that part I imagined, but it might have been planned. But the Christian brothers, displaced babies, Syrian soldiers and likely Shia citizens were all killed, some on accident, with various improvised weapons and impure kitchen-grade sarin, all according to somebody's unified plan.

Motive re-considered: As noted, these events came a few days after the 2 year anniversary of the conflict. That was marked in the US, UK, and France by easing restrictions on financing rebels by individuals and nations. An American from Texas (Ghassan Hitto) was on the 18th elected the head of the Syrian National Coalition (Syria's legitimate government, according to the US). As CNN reported the council "said the decision should assuage the Obama administration's concerns about who would lead Syria should President Bashar al-Assad be deposed." Further, the top U.S. military commander in Europe - Adm. James Stavridis - said that NATO was laying out plans for possible military attacks on Syria, if an adequate reason should surface. Of course, president Obama had already offered one clear-sounding path to make this happen. As I noted in the earlier post:

Considering confluence of other people's decisions, it's clear that the morning of March 19 was an especially poor time for Damascus to cross Obama's red line of its own accord. Conversely, it would be a very opportune moment for any rebel provocateurs to do it for them.

I wasn't aware before that the day before had seen such provocative strikes in Damascus that could help explain the planned "revenge," charging across Obama's Red Line into a trap. That this materialized only makes sense, and that Saudi Arabia made it happen is no surprise. So it's worth wondering if they ordered up the fake revenge as well. I can't prove and don't even believe  that all this and the CW incidents are part of one unified package. But suddenly I can see that possibility, it seems plausible and logical, and it seemed worth sharing at least.

What Happened a Little Ways from Douma in November, 2012?

The First Bodies Tossed Across Obama's "Red Line" in Syria, Part 4:
What Happened a Little Ways from Douma in November, 2012?
By Adam Larson aka Caustic Logic,
February 13, 2017
(incomplete)

(...intro red line issue again, gap before this) - then November, two alleged chemical incidents are recorded, quietly - no news at the time, but later claims say each attack killed one child, and apparently no one else. Each child was listed as from a displaced family, both listed as hailing from the suburb of Douma. That's quite interesting, but it's about all we know, except one important visual detail to solidify the questions. Below: how we know this, what it means, and what that visual clue means in context.

Background: Why a little ways from Douma?

    From an unclear time in 2011 and into 2012, a group called Liwa al-Islam ("District of Islam," later to become Jaish al-Islam, or "Army of Islam") was growing in power. - headed by the late Zahran Alloush, a Saudi-backed Islamist son of a Saudi-based exiled cleric, freed from prison is 2011 to mollify protesters. He was reportedly swiftly armed ... by Saudi Arabia. Liwa al-Islam (LiA) took firm hold over their base area of Douma, at the latest, by the summer of 2012, when they orchestrated a bomb assassination of top military officials nearby in Damascus. This earned them much prestige, more recruits and funding, and so LiA started expanding further. 

    Zahran Alloush was, and his group remains, Islamic extremists. Alloush at least, before he was killed in a December, 2015 air strike, was publicly avowed to eliminate Shi'ites, Alawites, or people of Persian (Iranian) ethnicity from their parts of Syria. They're also not keen on government fighters or supporters,  secular-minded Sunnis, Kurds, Christians, Druze, or Atheists. 

Some people would leave Douma under this leadership, and thus become "displaced," or IDPs (internally displaced people - like refugees but without crossing into another country). They might move into Damascus proper, or might try just moving a town or two over and hoping for the best.

    At some point, LiA or allies expanded into each of the  surrounding areas of East Ghouta - Harasta, Jobar, Autaya, etc.  In some cases, they may catch up with people who had fled them in Douma. What happens then?

    So, here's the map that makes me bright this up. The incidents in question (red) happened in Bahariya, 14 km SE of Douma (November 17, to IDPs from Douma) and Rihan, 4 km east of Douma (November 23, to IDPs from Douma). Harasta is in purple - for future precedent, an IDP family from there lost a baby and no one else in the next alleged "Assad" CW attack in the area, Otaybah, on March 19 (but six men also died - see part 1). The IDP babies dying in alleged chemical attacks seems to be quite a regional specialty.

November 17, Bahariya

    Again, no one reported this at the time, but the VDC records a chemical attack from the air that left one boy dead, in the Damascus suburbs, on November 17, 2012. They seem to have noted it at the time, and thought it was a first, but otherwise it went unmentioned.

    This come in the form of a single martyr entry for Odai Haroun, a boy of about 10 (by the photo - age not given). He's listed as from Douma, but with a "martyrdom location" of Damascus Suburbs: Bahariah. The notes explain "he was martyred after suffocating due to poisonous chemical gas dropped from the regime's warplanes on Al-Bahariya town in what appears to be the first time such thing happens". Cause of death: other. After this I guess the VDC created the category for toxic gasses.

    I dug around for reports, using that spelling and the Arabic spelling, and apparently no one reported this to any media at the time. I found nothing except an entry in another opposition database, Syrian Shuhada. This cites the VDC but gives an age of 10 (they seem to offer rounded off guessed ages including 10, 4, etc. - it's not unique info, and matches my own guesstimate.) The notes here, auto-translated, say "You will see the status of suffocation as a result of toxic gases that have been dumped on the town of Al-Bahariyah Damascus countryside."

    Actually, what you'll see, in the blurry photo or video still the VDC provides ... He does appear have died of suffocation, gasping for air but finally failing. But he has no chemical signs, like cyanosis, for example (a blue/purple color shift in the skin). There aren't always evident signs, but ... if one scans for blue skin, one will find it. But it's not the right shade, nor at the right place to be cyanosis. Rather, it seems to form a sort of fresh bruise-colored band around his throat, about the size and shape of two thumbs meeting, to squeeze his windpipe closed.  Poor displaced Odai may well have been manually strangled, perhaps by the Islamists his family had fled in Douma. 

    Side-note: Bahariya would be the site of at least one actual chemical attack, in August, 2013. Right after the Ghouta incident, rebels in the area felt compelled - besides able - to launch at least three serious chemical attacks on Syrian soldiers fighting to reclaim East Ghouta. In Jobar and Ashrafiyah Sahnaya, on the 24th and 25th, they were hit with sarin, but none died. On the 22nd in Bahariya, they were hit with a blue irritant gas, not sarin, and no one died then either.  (see...)

November 23, Rihan

    A week later on November 23, the VDC records, a baby girl, Fatma Mohammad Shalhoub, died in the town of Rihan. There are no images this time. The notes specify "she was reported on 10-5-2013," and indeed, the number is far higher, so added later. Odai was #43,577, and Fatima was #79,338, six months and 36,000 entries later. 

    Continuing, the notes say "she was martyred after her family flee to Rihan area, she is one month old , according the doctor reason of death is the cold, or Inhalation of chemical gases as a result of the bombing. reports to be validated." They allege there was an attack, which might be what killed her and apparently no one else, and it was also cold. It says Date of death: 2012-11-23, so she didn't die after an extended illness, but on that same day. And the VDC's bet is on "Cause of Death: Chemical and toxic gases."     

    Again, I could find no news reports about her or an incident involving Rihan at this time. I didn't look everywhere, just a quick search. I checked Syrian Shuhada, but if they have her added, I couldn't find it. The name search doesn't work anymore. The very large family names list includes a "Shlhob" family from Damascus Countryside (which must be it), with a total of 12 members killed and listed. But the list as linked won't come up. 

Some likely relevant VDC martyr entries named Shalhoub in this early span: 
July 29, 2011 an engineer 'fell' from a roof and had 'regime thugs' throw stones at him, in Douma. This was not an Islamist murder of a man thought to be gay, for example.

2012 6-23 18-year old Tareq Fares Shalhoub was executed in Douma when his home wars raided - they smashed his hand, perhaps cut his throat, and rebels soon had the dead body (video).

Some Shalhoubs are listed as rebels, fighting with "FSA" - one of interest 2012-11-17 a rebel from Damascus Suburbs, Rehebei northeast of Damascus, shot in Daraa - a week before Fatima died. That's probably an unrelated coincidence.


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