Sergei Korotkikh and the Massacres at Bucha and Mariupol

File under No Nazis in Ukraine, Nazis in Russia, False-Flag

August 24, 2025

(rough, incomplete)

A Wayward Neo-Nazi Finds his Home

Sergei/Serhiy Korotkikh/Korotkykh (Сергій Коротких) aka Boatsman/Boatswain («Боцман») is a Belorussian neo-Nazi who operated in Russia, where, around 2002, as a Declassified UK investigation finds, "he founded a Russian neo-Nazi group – the National Socialist Society. It spread fear in Moscow by targeting darker-skinned guest workers from the Caucasus and central Asia. The group was banned and its members convicted of dozens of racist murders."

Continuing: "Korotkikh is alleged to have killed two migrants in 2007, beheading one of the victims – Shamil Odamanov – on camera beneath a swastika flag. He denies the allegations, which featured in the multi-award winning documentary Credit for Murder by Israeli director Vlady Antonevicz." [1] I have a screen-grab with no gore, but a swastika flag, proper Nazi-era style, stretched between two trees in the woods where they have the bound men kneeling. He can deny that was him under the mask, but he can hardly deny founding the xenophobic neo-Nazi group that took credit.

That documentary came out in 2015, but somehow, Korotkikh was never formally charged in Russia until 2021, reports Declassified UK. He had already fled or left Russia, moving to Ukraine around the time of the Maidan "revolution" in 2014, maybe understanding it was a good place for Nazis to be. As it so happens, he was warmly accepted by Ukraine's new government, granted citizenship in a public ceremony by president Poroshenko (pic), and given a position in the new Azov Battalion. [2] As explained below, he would command Azov's reconnaissance unit, operating from Mariupol, Ukraine's occupied capitol for the occupied parts of Donetsk oblast. 

Keep in mind that, as Declassified UK put it, Azov was "a neo-Nazi militia founded by Ukrainian far-right activist Andriy Biletsky to fight against pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas. Biletsky reportedly once said he wanted to “lead the white races of the world in a final crusade…against Semite-led Untermenschen [subhumans].” [3]

For a guy who supposedly never committed those murders in Russia, Korotkikh has a way of knowing all about high-profile murders now in Ukraine. In 2021 he was talking about the mysterious death of Belarusian Vitaliy Shyshov in Ukraine." [4] Already in 2019 he was saying "the Poroshenko regime is hiding details of the investigation into high-profile murders." [5] 

After the Russian invasion of 2022, Korotkikh and his specialized skills were set to work defending the fatherland. He was pictured with a large cache of weapons to on February 26 (pic). [6] He also published a video where he vowed to play football with the severed heads of "Chechen" fighters. [7] Surely just a figure of speech? On March 22 he gave an interview about the far right in Ukraine and the Donbas conflict, 2014 vs. now, complaining about "certain restrictions on the use of combat skills" compared to the old days (we'll come back to that). [8] 

Korotkikh and the Bucha Massacre

A new unit he formed - "the Boatsman boys" - would be deployed in various places, including Bucha, the site of the supposed massacre by Russian forces. Perhaps Korotkikh's most famous moment came on April 2, a few days after the Russian withdrawal, when he posted a video from his boys in Bucha that included an apparent order to execute captured men. As The Gray Zone summarized, "A clip of the reported “clean-up operation” published by Sergey Korotkikh, a notorious neo-Nazi Azov member, shows one member of his unit asking another if he can shoot “guys without blue armbands,” referring to those without the marking worn by Ukrainian military forces. The militant stridently responds, “f*** yeah!”" [9]

Only burned out Russian tanks on Vokzalnaya street are actually shown, but the discussion comes through on the commander's radio as he films them. I note that he speaks so casually he could be ignoring the question and just commenting on the two tanks left in a sort of mating position. But I don't suppose that would hold any weight in, for example, a future war crimes trial.

There were claims Korotkikh was the man filming the scene, but he clarified that his men fighting in Bucha had sent him the video [10] while he was on a mission near the Belarus border (we'll come back to near-border stuff below). Many reported that the video was deleted, but it was there on Telegram when I checked (although it doesn't come up now). The text description included (translated) "BOATSMAN BOYS work in Bucha. Actually, there is nothing to do there." There may have been suspected collaborators to execute, as the audio suggests, but if so it's lumped in with everything else and rounded down to "nothing." [11]

Vox Ukraine published a supposed debunk of running claims, pointing to some video postings with extra sounds added. In the original, it says, "there are no loud shots-like sounds at the end of the recording ... At the end of the recording, you can clearly hear “please" but further words cannot be deciphered." [12] The version I heard then didn't feature anything like gunshots, and the voices weren't clear at all. So they're probably right that some versions were faked up. But the sources I cite here mention none of these added sounds, though others apparently did. Everyone agrees there's an audible "please" in the background, with indistinct voices most likely (from context) pleading for their lives, and no one denies there is an apparent request and approval for the execution of captured, presumably civilian men, who were probably shot, even if we don't hear that. A few exaggerations do not alter these facts. And keep in mind, that's just from this one short video, aside from whatever else happened off-camera. 

The Vox Ukraine article further notes "the bodies of the dead civilians were already lying on the streets when the Ukrainian military entered the city." [13] This is true, in contrast to lazy claims that Ukrainian forces were responsible for the presumed executions, citing how these bodies were not mentioned or seen in earlier views or reports filed from totally different streets. I had a deep look into Bucha and found it a very mixed bag, with the balance of blame left mostly unclear. The evidence shows most of the bodies later seen in videos were killed by Russian forces, especially in their 2nd invasion on March 5. Most seem to have died by tank fire in murky "traffic incidents" as opposed to executions. Many other bodies were reported to contain a type of shrapnel common in Ukrainian shells, while some bodies lay next to the impacts of artillery from the Ukrainian-held southeast. Other seen cases were murkier, and perhaps hundreds of reported deaths and their circumstances are left completely unseen. 

A group of 8 men were clearly taken prisoner by Russian forces, as seen on surveillance video, and marched to the spot they would later be seen, apparently executed. These were called civilians, then admitted to be 7 illegal, ununiformed fighters with Ukraine's new "Territorial Defense Forces" (TDF) and the civilian man found sheltering them in his house. Apparently, the legality of this move is actually debatable, but I for one don't support it. Another group of executed men found in a basement at a former Russian base, including one with a white armband, may have been executed there after the "liberation" (fresh-seeming blood, debatable rigor mortis clues), or before that as alleged, with mixed clues as to their allegiance. 3 other men that appeared executed seem to be more TDF fighters killed by a Russian shell from the north long before one of the bodies was staged as if executed - clean white cloth was used to tie his hands after rolling the body from an earlier position, seemingly held during at least one heavy rain). [14] 

So it's hard to say how much of the "Bucha massacre" was committed by Korotkikh's men or other "liberators," but it seems likely at least a few suspected collaborators were executed, especially given this casually publicized ADMISSION TO SUCH ORDERS. 

Korotkikh and the Mariupol Market Massacre

I recognized the name Sergei Korotkikh, more or less, from an earlier massacre in Ukraine. His face rang the same bell, but I had the name wrong (or was it given differently?) as Korotkov. This leads into my addition to the file: he already seemed like a mega-creep likely involved in a January 24, 2015 false-flag rocket attack in Mariupol I studied in some detail at the time.[15] 

Some 30 locals were killed and 100 injured when about 100 Grad rockets pelted the Vostochniy district in the span of 30 seconds (as reported). These were generally thought to be fired by separatist forces moving in on Mariupol, presumably on accident as they aimed for a Ukrainian military checkpoint on the district's northern outskirts. Either way, the allegations seem to have stalled separatist progress until the Minsk II accords froze the conflict, ending such moves on the city until the Russians came in 2022, leading to epic destruction and mass casualties amid circumstances few understand. [16]

This "Mariupol market attack" is where I first learned reliable ballistic analysis under varying conditions, analyzing dozens of geolocated impacts and, copying some unverified dots from someone else's map, set all the red dots on the map attached below. To my credit as no propagandist, while I wanted to show how Kyiv's forces did this, I read the ballistic evidence much like the OSCE observers did - the rockets came mainly from the rebel-held east and northeast, but also from the contested SE and perhaps south, where Ukraine had just taken control. In nearly all such cases I've studied since then, the fire comes from Ukrainian areas plain as day. But this case was different. 

Out of some 100 rocket impacts ostensibly aimed at the checkpoint (see map w/notes below), none came close to hitting that target. The closest one missed by some 500m and the furthest by about 2km. To achieve this terrible effect, 3+ firing directions had to make the relevant mistakes (various combinations of overshooting and targeting far to the left) with no mistake on the perfect synchronization. This is beyond unlikely and so this was probably no accident. 

But who would have the motive to do this on purpose? Separatists would have the locals' support in this ethnic Russian district, and would have no reason to terrorize them ahead of liberation, and no reason to do so from their own areas, in their own name, in front of the whole world. Ukraine's occupying forces, headed up by the anti-Russian neo-Nazis of the Azov Battalion, on the other hand ... they might see value in basically shooting some of their hostages, to do it from the enemy's area and in their name, to frame the liberators and complicate their advance, even threatening to shoot more hostages if they dare approach Mariupol again. That may be just what happened here. 

Experts on the scene suspected as much. A Voice of America report noted "in spite of the evidence, many [locals] continue to believe that the government was responsible, though they are too afraid to say so openly." [17] They understand the motive lies with Azov so clearly that we're forced to consider if they could be to blame after all. The fire came mainly from separatist areas, yes, but to achieve that, Kyiv's forces would only require 2-3 positions snuck in along a porous border and established behind enemy lines, as stealthy as needed until the moment of attack. Then they would be exposed for 30 seconds of coordinated firing before packing up quick and running back home before they could be caught. That's not really implausible at all, and I propose that's just what happened. 

Anyone paying enough attention might suspect this was no accident, but I noticed the smug certainty of one "Serhiy Korotkov" (as I took it down), who was then "The Azov Battalion's RECONNISSANCE UNIT COMMANDER," sent into Vostochniy on January 24 to document the damage. A short edit of his video report (now private - screen grab below) has the "Boatsman" explaining: "anybody can check for oneself that this is not an accidental hit. There is no Ukrainian military here, and never have been. In this area, as graffiti on some walls shows, some fans of the Russian World live. Those who want the Russian World - see, here you got it." Earlier in the video he reported from Kievskaya street; "what's noteworthy is that over here we have "Left Sector" (opponents of Kiev-allied fascist group Right Sector). The Communiaki (derogatory term for Communists) received what they wanted." He alternates between smiling with amusement, and trying somewhat not to. His argument here is that, in "the Russian world," they like to deliberately kill their own. Anti-Russian neo-Nazis likely Korotkikh love to see the "Communiaki" die, but they don't have to fire a shot as their enemies kill themselves out of some self-destructive and perhaps subhuman instinct. Who wouldn't be happy amid carnage like that?

It might matter that his job was head of reconnaissance, the group tasked not so much with investigating attack sites in the occupied capitol city as with things like ... SNEAKING BEHIND ENEMY LINES, which is where those rockets had just come from. His certainty it was a deliberate Russian-on-Russian attack, in itself, suggests that he might have overseen this deliberate attack on Russians. Shortly after the attack, the recon chief was gloating at the attack site and, as the only relevant expert into what happened, setting the blame for us. But where was he, or where were his men, shortly before and during the attack? 

A known Neo-Nazi organizer with a past of likely murder and even beheading - a potential genocidal terrorist in the wrong circumstances - was put in charge of this aspect of running Mariupol, Ukraine's eastern capitol city of hostages; he was likely allowed to commit a false-flag massacre of ethnic Russians in order to halt the separatist advance. It would then be little surprise if his men later sent to Bucha would execute some other locals seen as supporting "the Russian world" and to then blame the same "Russian world" for their slayings. And it would be no surprise if the claims were widely accepted by a sleepwalking global public.    

P.S. 4/25 And this likely committer of false-flag artillery massacres reportedly got 5 British rocket launchers for his adventures.  Phil Miller May 17 2023 https://x.com/pmillerinfo/status/1658768315014078464

I've been looking at where British rocket launchers for Ukraine have ended up. 

Five were obtained by Sergei Korotkikh, who founded Russia's National Socialist Society and is accused of beheading a migrant - he's been fighting for Ukraine since 2014.  

Sources:

[1] https://www.declassifieduk.org/revealed-russian-neo-nazi-leader-obtained-uk-missiles-in-ukraine/

[2, 3] ibid.

[4] https://twitter.com/HromadskeUA/status/1430232622773547016

[5] https://x.com/informator_news/status/1108415835528445953

[6] https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1497690688363900929

[7] https://twitter.com/Viaches50993743/status/1497453248021770242

[8] https://aspi.com.ua/news/kiiv/teroborona-kieva-mae-stati-pidrozdilom-zsu-komandir-batalonu-tro-korotkikh-foto-video#gsc.tab=0

[9] https://thegrayzone.com/2022/04/03/testimony-mariupol-hospital-ukrainian-deceptions-media-malpractice/

[10] https://meduza.io/amp/feature/2022/04/06/kak-ubivali-lyudey-v-buche

[11] Original posting:  Apr 2 at 13:33 = 11:33 PM in Ukraine https://t.me/botsmanua/16178

an active copy: https://x.com/antiwar_soldier/status/1511163378110287874

another: https://x.com/RWApodcast/status/1510635133627514881

[12] https://voxukraine.org/en/false-video-of-serhiy-korotkykh-boatsman-proves-that-ukrainian-military-killed-civilians-in-bucha/

[13] Ibid.

[14] details mostly in various blog posts of mine under this label - sorry, got lazy here https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/search/label/Bucha%20Massacre

[15] some related links: https://twitter.com/CL4Syr/status/1510931185337180163

https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/03/who-is-really-flattening-mariupol.html

https://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Talk:Mariupol_market_shelling

[16] https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/03/who-is-really-flattening-mariupol.html

[17] http://www.voanews.com/content/ukrainian-authorities-struggle-to-secure-a-divided-mariupol/2668416.html

A Russian War on Ukrainian Civilians?

March 16, 2025

(rough, incomplete)

As a 2023 Human Right Watch report put it, "Russia unleashed a full-scale invasion, bringing death and suffering to millions of Ukrainian civilians" with its invasion of Ukraine the previous year. Since then, it says, "Russian forces have killed, raped, tortured, deported, or forcibly transferred civilians to Russia or Russian-occupied areas."  

In this article, we'll consider only the "killed" part, with an emphasis on civilians. I'm not as focused on injuries, important and terrible as they can be, but broadly speaking, the pattern I see (at least for civilians) is close to 2 injured for every fatality. So multiplying any deaths total by 3 should give you an idea of total casualties including wounded.

Following Russia's 2022 invasion, estimates of civilian deaths very widely between 12,600 (verified minimum from a recent OHCHR report) and, by tallying regional totals from Wikipedia, between 20,000 and 35,000, with Mariupol being the biggest variable (estimates there range from 10-20,000 in most sources, with over 25,000 killed per this list, citing other credible media reports).

Military losses, estimates, per https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War 

Ukrainian Forces: 60,000-120,000 killed

Russian forces: 167,000-234,700 killed. 

Peoples' Republics forces (Russian-supported separatists): 21,000-23,500

Total military deaths since 2022: 260,000-413,200

So comparing 12.6k-35k civilians to the above, we get a death ratio somewhere between 0.03 civilians for each militant (0.03:1 or 3:100) to 0.14 civilians per (0.14:1 / 14/100). As we'll see, either number is remarkably low by world standards. 

Now let's consider the war's first phase, before Russia undeniably entered the field, the 2014-2019 "Anti-Terror Operation" in the Donbas and the 2015-2021"ceasefires" period following the Mink Accords (note the years of crossover) 

Estimated total killed: 14,000-14,300 

- 6,500 fighters of the Donetsk and Lugansk Peoples' Republics 

- 4,400 Ukrainian fighters, 

- 3,100-3,400 civilians 

(3100-3400) civilian deaths vs. 10,900 military ones = 0.3 civilians for each militant. That's 2-10x as bad as during Russia's invasion. And as I'll explain below, that's probably >80% killed by Ukraine.

Some prior estimates of civ:mil death ratios in select conflicts, all of them outside Europe, suggests a global double-standard (citing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilian_casualty_ratio):

US -> Korea 3:1

US -> Vietnam 2:1

US -> Iraq: 3:1 down to 0.5:1 (counts vary widely)

US -> Afghanistan: 0.4:1 (may be higher) 

Israel -> Lebanon 1982: 4:1 or even 6:1

Gaza 2023-now: Probably at least 4:1 (counts vary widely)

Even Ukraine's brutal attacks on the Donbas (see below) yield a better rate than any of these, at 0.3 civilians for each militant, with the separatist side causing some of the deaths. Russia's invasion and Ukraine's response cuts the civilian deaths in half, to 0.14:1 or even lower.  And even of this small number, Ukraine contributes much of it - and probably most of it, directly with ongoing shelling of the Donbass, and indirectly as in occupied Mariupol. 

As I see it from middling study (on average - high in spots, low in others), there are 5 sets of circumstances allowing for some Ukrainian hand in killing civilians, even or especially where the Russians had invaded and were doing their own killing: 

1) Russian-occupied Donbass, Crimea, etc.: ethnic Russian in Russian-occupied lands killed in Ukrainian shelling, bombing & missile attacks. See below for some highlights of the first 8 months of the "Anti-Terror Operation" in 2014. This eventually mellowed, but the same kind of scale returned in 2022. 

2) Ukraine-occupied Donbass (occupied ethnic Russians, expendable in some minds = human shields, especially when the Russians are close to liberating an area) - est. 2,958 killed since 2022 in Donetsk oblast, both sides included, but excluding Mariupol and Volnovakha (Ukrainian occupied)

3) Mariupol (same as above but in a major, coastal, strategic city that served as the capitol of occupied Donetsk - Mariupol wound up flattened and massacred as a severe example - an area I studied in some detail: https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/03/who-is-really-flattening-mariupol.html and should revisit, considering it may account for 10,000 to 25,000 or around 50-70% of all civilian deaths. Mainly, Ukraine weaponized the city to kill Russians, firing from every building, getting them wrecked in response, with little or even negative regard to civilian harm. My research suggests the Azov Brigade, not the Russians, blew up the drama theater on March 16, killing perhaps just a few dozen people they chose not to evacuate, for their own murky reasons, rather than the 1,200 widely reported. The very high counts might include this bigger number and might thus inflate the death toll there. Monitor on Massacre Marketing: Mariupol Theater Bombing, 3/16/2022

4) Bucha circumstances / parts of Kyiv Oblast were the 2nd deadliest after Donetsk, 1,569 civilians killed - occupied by Russia but partly sympathetic - massive violence used, killing innocents with heavy shelling, with likely execution of suspected collaborators after liberation -Many posts here: https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/search/label/Bucha%20Massacre - ignore all purple-shaded maps - another important issue to revisit. It was a mixed bag, with some definite Russian crimes, like executing 7 captive TDF fighters and the man sheltering them, and other brutality, if it often seems accidental.

5 The rest that was briefly occupied by Russia but I know less about (maybe like Bucha but varied, usually less severe?)

In Kyiv, there were only some 200 deaths total, probably most of these from missiles Ukraine shot down over the city to prevent another hit to their soldiers. This isn't a major factor, and it applies on the other side as well. One of the deadliest attack on Donetsk, on March 14, 2022, saw 23 civilians killed in a single, unusual attack with a Tochka-U missile and cluster bomblets, after it was shot down by DPR forces right over downtown, complicating the blame for what happened.

More Deaths on the Russian Side

"On 17 February 2023, the Ukrainian prosecutor general announced that at least 461 children had been killed since the start of the invasion, with a further 923 wounded.[153] Most of these child victims were from the Donetsk region.[153]"

"Russia does not allow monitoring in territories it controls, where civilian deaths are thought to be highest." 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War

May 28, 2024: 282 children have been killed and 733 injured, just in the DPR, over the full 10 years of the conflict. It would be higher if many of children and young mothers had not been moved further back or even to Russia for their safety. (TASS)

Most civilian casualties - 85-90% - between 2014 and 2016 were from "indiscriminate shelling of residential areas," an OHCHR report found, but this is not broken down into deaths on each side.  

From 2017-2020 OSCE found 2.4 shelling casualties (injured or killed) in the PRs for every one on the other side. (657 vs.270). Just Donetsk: 513 vs. 223. Just Lugansk: 144 vs. 47. (OSCE report) From 2018-2021 A UN study found FIVE shelling casualties in the PRs for each one on the other side. (310 vs. 62). (UN report) There's an argument that the OSCE routinely undercounted attacks and casualties, especially in the PRs, to the tune of about half of them missed. (Donbass Insider) That's supported by the above (2.4 vs. 5), and the UN numbers are preferrable. This means, barring false-flags and ignoring short-shot misfires by either side, Ukrainian forces killed 5 times as many civilians as the other side did.

Amnesty International, November 6, 2014

"The large majority of the [civilian] deaths were in separatist-held territory in Donetsk, and were likely caused by Ukrainian government forces, but separatist forces appeared responsible for several deaths in Avdiivka and Debaltseve, areas under government control. The organization’s research strongly suggests that separatist forces fired from these neighbourhoods, and Ukrainian government forces fired into them. In at least one instance, government forces placed an artillery position in a residential area." 

Separatist weapon placement in residential areas was "strongly suggest[ed]" while Ukraine's was apparently proven and stated as a fact. And yet, there were few civilian casualties on the Ukrainian side, and far heavier ones on the other side. The Ukrainians kill so many civilians, it doesn't seem they even aimed for military targets to begin with. It could be all the talk of indiscriminate weapons with poor aim misses the main point that these hits were probably no accident, but rather intentional state-sponsored terrorism.

Otherwise, the record is least clear in 2014, when it was likely higher rate of deaths in the PRs than in later years, applied to a much higher death toll. Probably at least 6:1 on around 1,786 civilian deaths = at least 1,531 civilians killed by Ukraine vs. at most 255 by the Peoples' Republics, from April to December. Civilian deaths per year:

2014: 2,084 (1,786 + 298 on MH17)

2015: 955

2016: 112

2017: 117

2018-2021: 58, 27, 26, and 25, at the end mostly from unexploded ordinances. (UN report)  especially in 2021 as the ceasefires was mainly held to, as it turns out, while Ukraine prepared to violate the Minsk accords with a publicly threatened reconquest of Crimea (March, 2021) and subsequent force buildup in the Donbas and then shelling of civilian homes and infrastructure, starting in November 21 and accelerating in January and February, before Russian forces finally entered the war for real, 8 years into it. (see here)

2014 Disputed Attacks (a few examples)

So 2014 is the big question regarding civilian casualties prior to Russia's invasion. Both sides blamed each other for everything that happened, and it was a lot. I can help us get some idea which side was lying. 

June and July: Deadly Airstrikes 

For the most part, the attacks used artillery shells, rockets and missiles fired from the ground. I often call all of this "shelling," and I think that's technically correct. But at first, Ukraine was more bold and used fighter jets only they had to attack civilian targets on the ground. 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Donbas

On 2 June, eight people were killed and more than 20 wounded by a series of explosions hitting the occupied RSA building in Luhansk city.[185] Separatists blamed the incident on a government airstrike, while Ukrainian officials denied this, and claimed that the explosions were caused by a stray surface-to-air missile fired by insurgents.[186] The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) published a report on the next day, stating that based on "limited observation", they believed that the explosion was caused by an airstrike, supporting separatist claims.[187]

A CNN investigation found clear evidence that the attack came from the air and the pattern of the craters suggested use of standard equipment on the Su-25, a ground-attack fighter, and the Su-27 – both combat aircraft operated by Ukraine.[185] Radio Liberty also concluded that "Despite Denials, All Evidence For Deadly Explosion Points To Kyiv".[188] CNN said that it was the first time that civilians had been killed in an attack by the Ukrainian air force during the 2014 pro-Russian unrest in the Donbas.[185] The next day, Luhansk People's Republic declared a three-day mourning in the city.[189]

More here at the ACLOS wiki I helped start. Note that one of those killed, here at the government's HQ, was the LPR's Minister of Agriculture, killed along with another woman she was talking with outside the building. One of the women (I'm not sure which) was seen alive in a terrifying aftermath video, her lower body shredded, pleading for someone to help find her phone so she could call someone.

A month later: BBC July 15 "Rockets struck the town of Snizhne in Donetsk region around 07:00 (04:00 GMT), hitting a block of flats and a tax office. The rebels blamed the attack on Ukraine's air force - a claim denied by Ukrainian sources. ... Ukrainian officials said 11 people had been killed and eight injured, including a child. Earlier, they had put the toll at four while rebels spoke of around 10 civilians being killed." When Ukraine denies and downplays at the same time, it's troubling. 

The BBC report shared a video of the apartment building with entire floors in the middle reduced to rubble - rescuers dig through it by hand for survivors. Why would Kyiv do this? No one seemed to care much or for long. 

It was in this same town of Snizhne, just two days later, that separatists supposedly smuggled in a Russian BUK air defense system, as if to prevent another such attack there. By the video record, it was stationed in the fields south of town (ACLOS), from which it purportedly shot down Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17 that same afternoon, killing 298. Interpretations of this incident vary widely, and I have complex thoughts but no firm theory, and also barely followed case developments since 2014. But the basic suggestion I see as likely enough is that the separatists made a terrible mistake as they tried to defend themselves from Ukraine's denied terrorism. But it just sharpened what "terrorists" Ukraine was up against At right: President Poroshenko, July 21: the whole world is either "with the terrorists" or "with the civilized world." And does he even need to specify which is which? Just days after MH-17, no. 

July Grad Rocket Attacks in Donetsk

HRW report, July 24, 2014

Just focusing on attacks with grad rockets, HRW reported 13 people, including 2 children, were killed in two attacks on July 12, and another 3 were killed in an attack on the 21st, with 2 non-fatal attacks in between. 

"Although Ukrainian government officials and the press service of the National Guard have denied using Grad rockets in Donetsk, a Human Rights Watch investigation on the ground strongly indicates that Ukrainian government forces were responsible for the attacks that occurred between July 12 and 21."

The four attacks took place close to the front line ... In all four cases, the angle and shape of the craters, and the fact that they were on the side of buildings facing the front line, strongly suggests that the rockets came from the direction of Ukrainian government forces or pro-Kiev armed groups.

The direction isn't specified, but most likely northwest. That's usually the case. Here's an apartment building with at least 2 apartments seemingly hit with 2 shells (no details past Donetsk, 2014 - from a video) - high sun suggests midday in summer, so the impacted side faces at least partly to the north. (A video compilation of building damage from 2014 shelling, on RUTUBE)

 

Starting in August, missiles fired on Donetsk in large numbers scattered cluster munitions far and wide, killing and injuring then and into the future. But we'll discuss this below with HRW analysis including further attacks in October. 

On September 5, a ceasefire was agreed. According to DPR officials, the ceasefire was violated by Ukraine many times, ten times in just one day, September 20, damaging homes and killing 4 civilians in the Peoples' Republics. (Sputnik Globe)

October 1 Rocket Attacks on School & City Bus 

On October 1, the ceasefire was broken again with 10 killed in Donetsk, 4 at school on the first day of classes. and 6 in another hit on a city bus.

France 24: "A source in Donetsk city hall told AFP that the strike happened right after the school's 70 pupils lined up for an assembly to mark the first day of class -- held nationally on September 1 but pushed back by rebel authorities because of the conflict."

"The children were taken to the basement; they are still there," the source said.

The pro-Kiev regional government of Donetsk, which is now based in the government-controlled city of Mariupol, accused pro-Russian separatists of the self-declared "Donetsk People's Republic" of shelling the school.

"The Donetsk People's Republic used rocket launchers to shoot at a school... the shell exploded five metres away from the building," the regional administration said in a statement.

Six more people died when another shell struck a public minibus in Donetsk, the regional authorities said, making Wednesday's casualty figures the highest civilian death toll in a single day since a ceasefire was struck.

As it happens, I already checked this one, a couple years go, mainly the bus but also the school impact. The pro-Kyiv crowd cited the bus attack as evidence the separatists were to blame, for this if not everything. Reason: the rocket was fired from the southwest, not the northwest as usual. "For those not from #Donetsk: the projectile on Poligraficheskaya, which killed 8 people, came from the side of the city, not the airport (see diagram)." At least 2 others did their own analysis to similar effect - origin to the southwest. Tacit acknowledgement: other attacks HAVE come from the airport direction (NW).

I checked and the readings are correct enough, for the bus and the school. The bus rocket tube points SW, which most read as the direction. It might be, but these can bend on the final stop, just after the detonation, as this one might have. The splash pattern of fragmentation marks on the pavement is the best indicator. It's not totally visible, but the shape to me suggests an origin closer to due south. My red line below runs due south, which may be too literal. It could be a bit either way, more likely SW, or anywhere in the range marked by white lines. Lower right shows the approximate front line at the time. 

The school damage wasn't as clear or easy to read, but especially so close to the damaged south facade, that shell to seemingly came from the south in almost the same way, but with less indication of SW, more likely due south (see post for details).

Smerch rockets used - If that means BM-30 (Wikipedia), it can fire different rockets with different ranges up to 100 and even 200km, and other models with shorter ranges, so it's hard for me to say. The front line is less than 20km to the SW, down to a Ukrainian-held are to the due south about 35-40km out and spanning to 60 km. 20-40km is needed, depending. so that could be a long-range, pretty normal or maybe even short-range use, depending on the exact rocket used. 

"DPR deputy leader Andrei Purgin told Russian TV that Ukrainian rocket launchers had targeted residential areas from as far as 40km (25 miles) away." (BBC) It could be from the edge of that area about 40km due south. It could also be a closer attack from a more SW direction, or any distance after sneaking east behind enemy lines is entirely possible. And the DPR doing it is entirely possible. So this case is inconclusive, and it's the top example to suggest DPR/Russian false-flag terrorism in the first year (I found 3 people on Twitter pushing this one, no one pushing any others, at least in English). 

But as I showed, a south or southwest angle is also not nearly as conclusive as these people made it seem. In fact, the next day, Human Rights Watch would use the same basic angle to prove it was Ukraine shelling Donetsk, now with cluster munitions.

August-October Cluster Munitions on Donetsk

August to October: cluster munitions fired on Donetsk and other towns, both before and after the September ceasefire. Human Rights Watch, October 20, 2014:

"Ukrainian government forces used cluster munitions in populated areas in Donetsk city in early October 2014, Human Rights Watch said today. The use of cluster munitions in populated areas violates the laws of war due to the indiscriminate nature of the weapon and may amount to war crimes."

In the 12 incidents documented by Human Rights Watch, cluster munitions killed at least 6 people and injured dozens." There were others they didn't investigate. Their analysis found "the cluster munitions came from the direction of government-controlled areas southwest of Donetsk." 

"The government of Ukraine has neither confirmed nor denied using cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine. It has not responded to a letter sent by the Cluster Munition Coalition in July or a letter sent by Human Rights Watch on October 13."

On October 2, 3 rockets were used on areas southwest of Universitetskaya street in central Donetsk, each one scattering submunitions over a wide area. One of the rockets hit at a supermarket that had a Red Cross center attached. "Thirty-eight-year-old Laurent DuPasquier, a Swiss employee with the International Committee of the Red Cross ... was killed during the attack in which cluster munition rockets were used." "Also on October 2, submunitions from another Uragan cluster munition rocket struck the building of the Mountain Rescue Service, at 157 Artem street in Donetsk." Red Cross and rescue people were targeted. 

"Submunition impact craters close to buildings in the three sites make it unlikely that the cluster munition came from the west, north, or east. The large crater in the second location indicated that the rocket had come from the southwest. This is the only direction consistent with all the impact craters, and therefore points to use by Ukrainian forces."

Then on October 5, "at least two Uragan cluster munition rockets struck the fifth subdistrict of the Kyivskyi district in central Donetsk.  ... A video of a rocket remnant lodged in the ground near 22 Kosiora street indicates that the cluster munitions were fired from the southwest. Supporting this finding, a local resident in Novomykhailivka, southwest of Donetsk, told a New York Times journalist that he had seen rockets launched from a position south of village in the morning of October 5."

In Makiivka, just east of Donetsk, HRW heard that "cluster munitions had killed two people on August 19 and 20 near a train station" while "a second cluster munition attack took place near a rebel checkpoint northeast of the town, suggesting a government attack." There was a third attack as well, but no directions are given for any of them. 

Starobesheve, southeast of Donetsk, was contested on August 24, with separatists in control of some areas and soon the whole town, when cluster munitions struck near the local administration building, killing 3 civilians and injuring 17. 

"The rocket tail section stuck in the ground in front of the local administration building shows that the rocket came from the southeast. With a maximum range of 70 kilometers and the Ukraine-Russia border 30 kilometers away, the cluster munitions could have been fired from Ukrainian territory southeast of Starobesheve, which was controlled by Ukrainian government forces at the time, or from Russian territory. The press center for the Ukrainian authorities’ counterterrorist operation claimed at the time that the cluster munitions had been fired from Russian territory. Human Rights Watch was not able to conclusively attribute responsibility for this attack."

Well, what does the reader think? 

November 5 Attack on Kids Playing Football

BBC November 5 "Two teenagers died and four were wounded when an artillery shell hit a school playing field as they played football in eastern Ukraine." A report of the OSCE special monitoring mission (SMM) heard  It was at 3:30 pm that 2 artillery shells impacted at School No. 63 on Stepanenko Street in Donetsk, with one hitting the football field.  A witness heard eight explosions. "According to him the first two occurred in quick succession. The other six occurred within five minutes of the first." "2 shells hit where children were playing at School No. 63 on Stepanenko Street, Donetsk," probably the first 2 quick hits. "The SMM saw human remains scattered around the pitch, including bone fragments, blood and internal organs. Blood-stained clothing was also visible, which appeared to have been torn by shrapnel."

Amnesty International declared: “Today’s shocking attack in Donetsk must by fully investigated. If it is found to constitute a war crime, those responsible must be brought to justice.”

Pro-Kyiv UNIAN would argue "Shell that hit school in Donetsk ‘fired from militant-controlled Makiivka’" Someone named Perebyinis (app. Yevhen Perebyinis, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine) is cited saying "The shell that hit the school and killed [those] children in Donetsk was fired from territory controlled by the terrorists. We have photo evidence of it," he tweeted. "Perebyinis posted photos that he said proved that the militants were to blame for shelling the school. According to these photos, the shelling was carried out by insurgents from the occupied town of Makiivka, which is located to the east of Donetsk." 

No photos are shown, just a satellite view with a red line pointing almost due east, and a wider map showing a range of possible directions from the east. "The red line on the Google map shown above indicates the shell trajectory, as calculated by analysts at the ukraine@war blog." (site apparently defunct now) A video explaining the point was attached, but is no longer present. 

Update: found the tweet and linked page "Rocket that hit School No63 did not come from Peski." He doesn't seem to know what he's doing. "It is clear that the shell bent the fence and not the explosion, because the right part of the fence is not bent at all where the explosion hit." No, that's because this is the back direction where the force is directed down into the ground rather than up into the fence. (see below) 

I found some photos of the field impact and tried my own best reading: impact near NW corner, right at the north fence, blasting a narrow, deep crater there, tearing the fence up to the east (and up = forward), with curling inward = force from the west, near parallel with fence but a bit from the outside (north) - scorching from the ignition fireball spreads east (= forward on trajectory) - low frag marks appear a ways back, stop on a line running SW, and behind that the turf peels back with even lower force (and low = back). All this says arrival from northwest, not the east. I use the orange arc differently here, to include the low marks on the side and scorching ahead, as the splash pattern behind seems interrupted by the concrete and fence pole, winds up peeling turf instead. It is a bit hard to read, perhaps giving Perebyinis some excuse to read it almost backwards. 

(photos: https://tass.com/russia/758729 - https://ria.ru/20141106/1031957968.html - Google image search

Ukraine@War reading, upper left - my reading right - both mapped - I don't know the range, or length of the white line, just the direction. It could be from Pisky, further out, or closer in, but very little space for any DPR false-flag, and nothing but the flawed east origin was ever said to suggest that. Pisky or Peski is exactly where Perebyinis said the shell did NOT come from, so I suppose that's just where it came from, roughly.

The observers of the supposedly neutral but seemingly Ukraine-biased OSCE had to contradict Kyiv here, probably due to the evidence rather than any pro-Russian bias. Report

"The SMM also noted a crater in the playground, near the eastern wall" besides "three craters near a damaged apartment building," and "three other craters on nearby Myrhorodska Street. The SMM observed damage to a number of houses near these craters."

"All craters seen by the SMM were about one metre in diameter and the depths varied. The SMM’s analysis indicates that at least four of the craters were caused by 120mm mortar shells and two others were the result of 122mm artillery rounds." Probably the 2 bigger shells were used to kill the kids playing soccer. 

"In the SMM’s assessment, all of these were fired from a location north-west of the football pitch and were the result of high-angle fire." High angle, I think, means relatively short range. That would make for an extra vertical impact, which I think fits the damage. 

"At 09:25, the shelling obliged the SMM to leave the area. The SMM heard loud explosions about two kilometres away to the south-west."

Conclusion

A November 14 speech by President Poroshenko might have referred to these repeated school attacks when he assured people in Odessa they took the right path in rejecting the "terrorism." because "Our children will go to kindergartens and schools, theirs will be sitting in cellars. [bomb shelters] Because they can't do anything! That’s how we are going to win this war." When their whole lives are disrupted Ukraine wins. Suffering is the goal? Or is it when the "terrorists" finally die or flee to Russia, leaving the land to Ukraine? It also helps to win that they don't have to take credit for imposing this life on their enemies; according to the post-2014 weapon-state of Ukraine, the kids in Donbas were hiding exclusively from Russian or separatist fire, as a civilized state like Ukrainian would never do such a thing as target innocent civilians, even if they were "Russian terrorists." 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUp-sh1oaOU

Attacks of September 4/5

Ukraine's Systematic Shelling of the ZNPP: Attacks of September 4/5

September 26, 2022 (rough, incomplete) 

last edits 9/27

Clashing Reports

In the IAEA's September report (PDF), they relate how:

• On 4 September, Ukraine reported further shelling impacting the top of Special Building 1, the railway/road in front of Reactor Building 2, and an elevated walkway for personnel between Buildings 2 and 3.

I can't find any public announcement to this effect on the 4th, but that might be reported to IAEA on the 4th, or it's some kind of time zone issue. "On Sunday (4 Sept.), Russia’s Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov announced that Russian forces thwarted an attempt by the Ukrainian army to attack the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which remains in normal condition, with eight drones." (IPE Club) But that's a different story. "Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that approached the nuclear plant were “blocked by Russian electronic warfare equipment,” Konashenkov specified, adding that Ukrainian forces also launched homing grenades at the facility." 

As for the successful attack with the described damage, others say it happened on the 5th. Sources with these details and photos to match (see below) appeared only on the afternoon of the 5th, although they were initially unclear as to just when the event happened. 

Vladimir Rogov, a member of the Russian-affiliated local administration in Energodar, wrote on his Telegram channel the earliest mention I've found with the right details: Telegram: Contact @vrogov 7:32 AM here - 5:32 PM in Ukraine. 

"The consequences of artillery shelling by militants of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of the Zaporizhzhya NPP. Artillery strikes were recorded in the following places: special building of the nuclear power plant, communication overlap to the right of the special buildings, concrete fence. A container with distilled water was damaged in the immediate vicinity of the second power unit. There were no casualties."

Telegram: Contact @rian_ru 7:34 = 5:34: "A new Ukrainian strike hit a special building of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, and a tank with distilled water was also damaged in the immediate vicinity of the second power unit, local authorities said." This is the earliest post I've seen to include photos, four of them - the first 4 shown below. Zaporijie24 posting (link f/c) adds at least one other photo of the water tank leaking (5th photo below).

Other sources with the photos and the "Russian" story: life.ru Sept. 5 - topwar.ru Sept. 5 - southfront.org Sept. 5, adding "One of the power units of the Zaporozhye NPP is working at 80% as a result of the shelling by the AFU." 

The solar elevation for the roof photo is about 27 deg. = 4:27 PM on Sept. 5, give or take a few minutes. ESRL Global Monitoring Laboratory - Global Radiation and Aerosols (noaa.gov) That's about an hour before that first posting, which makes sense. The damage could be from minutes before this, or the day before, etc. But it can't come any later. Same goes for the photo: it might have been taken the day before. But soon before posting makes the most sense.

Add 9/27: It's not crucial but interesting, and I wanted to check the time better: a straight ellipse may not capture the perspective. So ...

I took the wide photo atop a Maxar satellite view, perspective skewed and scaled it until the clear edge, start of green patches, and bases of the 3 nearest pipes all matched the flat view. The structure near us also lines up pretty well. It got fuzzy, but now that shadow - or any of the 3 - can be read like a sun dial. 

shadow is 47° from building north (47° from vertical here) 

building north is 21° clockwise from true 

combined: shadow runs 68° from north.

Inverted = solar azimuth 248° (sun in that direction)

NOAA solar calculator says that that would happen at 4:24 PM. Damn. 

Neither of these is totally exact, but there's the spread: 

4:24-4:27, give or take 2 minutes on each end = 4:22 to 4:29 for sure. (end 9/27)

Soon after that first posting, the same photos appeared as proof of a Russian attack that occurred "literally half an hour ago" or about an hour after the photos of the damage were taken. ТРУХ English, 5:50: "It is reported that literally half an hour ago the invaders again fired at the ZNPP." Guessing 12 minutes before first posting (?), that would be about 5:20. Post includes one photo, another in a reply. - https://twitter.com/TpyxaNews/status/1566800948546228225

5:55 PM, XD DNEPR (454,224 subscribers): "Literally half an hour ago, the occupiers again shelled the ZNPP." Damage is cited as "local "authorities" reported." - https://t.me/hyevuy_dnepr/35355

This post was cited, along with the photos, by others like Ukrainian News24 the same minute ("The Russians continue to engage in nuclear terrorism" "literally half an hour ago"), and Euromaidan Press hours later ("Russian forces continue attacks" on the plant, citing XD DNEPR).

Aside from "shelling" and "artillery" the exact weapon used is not clear in the local reports or the uninformed pro-Kiev recycling of those reports.

Cameras Not Lying

The Rashists once again fired at the #ZNPP and published their own pictures. 10 Stupid things a military does during a war: 1. Attack the largest nuclear power plant in Europe...

https://twitter.com/NeilHawker2/status/1566819807940452353

There were five photographs gathered from various sources and replaced with higher resolutions as I went - presented here in my own order of numbered impacts or areas 1-4

Impact 1) the top of Special Building 1 - area and detail views - this Special or specialized building w - (SB1 of 2) - as I follow - handles radioactive waste and houses water treatment plants, equipment repair shops and waste management facilities for the nearby reactors.

The roof impact fits right in with those of Aug. 28, which attack was done with Warmate drones. Here's from a satellite view of Sept. 21 showing two of the 8/29 impacts repaired and one remaining, with the new one near it in red. It seems a bit more limited than the southern 2, which raises the question: what's even weaker than a Warmate? FWIW, it also has a similar angled damage pattern, with a flight path perpendicular, so from the northeast around Illinka, I think, or perhaps from the southwest (the pattern isn't that obvious to me). The vent pipe with a cap knocked off is to the south. The first reports said artillery, but if this is a drone impact, that probably won't reveal its point of origin. 

Impact 2) - "an elevated walkway for personnel between Buildings 2 and 3." I think all of these passages also hold water pipes that connect the reactors to the Special Buildings - the damage here is quite similar to the drone strikes we've seen nearby. It will surely have damaged pipes inside.

However, I'm not clear on the location, angle of view, and/time of day for this scene - the other photos seem to be afternoon - the one timed around 4:30 - so this should be facing NW - the foreground looks just like the elevated walkway's roof as seen in an IAEA photo (see below, where this damage would probably be just off-frame to the right, if it had existed then). 

But what that is at an angle is unclear. It doesn't seem like the crossing passages to the reactors look like that (it would be the one visible at right in the photo below). There's nothing else I'd expect to see in there with a lip and ladder like this. It's a better fit with SB2 roof, seen from atop the crossing passage in the morning, except that would take sunlight from the north you don't usually see in the northern hemisphere.

Either way, the damage is roughly perpendicular to this walkway, for a similar incoming angle roughly parallel with the walkway and the edge of SB1 - from northeast or the southwest. 

A dark linear patch seems to appear on the later satellite view in just one spot - right where it should be if that crossing passage is what we see, looking NW, just off the right edge in the above photo, and right where I had already guessed it must be. So confusion aside, I marked that green in the graphic below. 

Impact 3) "the railway/road in front of Reactor Building 2" 

This fits best with a photo of a mid-sized crater under the walkways, I think at a juncture, facing northwest to reactor block 2. Visually, it's not clear which reactor, except the distant water tank (next photo) has a number starting with 2 (the walkway markings 2/6 & 3/6 not making immediate sense), and Reactor 2 is the only one anything is said to happen in front of. In the near distance is the rail line that passes and connects into each reactor (see "3D" view below).

This crater impact looks different, more powerfully explosive. The crater and ejecta might suggest a trajectory from the west, somewhat alongside this nearest pillar. and somewhat into it. The fragmentation marks on the low pipe nearby supports that it's a fragmentation warhead on such a trajectory (forward fragments spread higher). That could be an exact direction to an artillery o rocket firing spot, or an unreadable final trajectory for a drone or guided missile from anywhere.

Impact/Area 4) Probably connected to the IAEA report's impact 3, local authorities also cited "a tank with distilled water was also damaged in the immediate vicinity of the second power unit." 

A fifth photograph from a different source shows this tank numbered 2TB something, probably 40B62 as seen in the above photo. The tank isn't damaged visibly, but it and/or a downed pipe are leaking water all over. This could connect to impact 3 if I read that wrong, or there might be some other impact not shown or mentioned. It's too far to connect with impacts 1 or 2.

Rogov also mentioned damage to "communication overlap to the right of the special buildings" but I'm not sure what this refers to.

All photographed mapped on satellite image said to be from September 21 (via: https://twitter.com/gbrumfiel/status/1572623372856578051) This shows one pre-existing roof impact (northern pink box), incurred Aug. 28, along with 2 other impacts - apparently of UAF-fielded Warmate drones - and the crash of a Warmate that was shot down. The southern impacts are repaired by this time. The 9/4 impact is still there (1, red), looking similar to the previous one nearby. As noted, a dark line appears for impact 2, green. Nothing is visible to support impact 3 or to confirm its location, but that's about where it seems to be.

Here is a big 3D view of the ground-level stuff, using an August drone video of trucks being moved into reactor 1's turbine housing). Rail lines in green, mostly hidden by the elevated passages (white) - at each reactor, bulk stuff can be brought in and out by a rail spur to a gate (gold boxes). Each reactor has 2 big water reservoirs.

Conclusion

This attack, as I've seen it, is not the clearest in revealing just what happened or when or how. But it fits the general pattern of sustained tension that Kiev constantly exploits, to demonize and complicate Russia's control of the plant, Ukraine's systematic shelling of the ZNPP.

In a statement on the 5th, President Zelenskyy would speak of the plant's situation. "the last power transmission line connecting the plant to the energy system of Ukraine was damaged due to another Russian provocative shelling. Again - this is the second time - due to Russian provocation, the Zaporizhzhia plant is one step away from a radiation disaster." 

He was referring to incident the day before (the plant's last dedicated power line was down due to attack, but it was still supplying power through a reserve line - IAEA - and their report lists that separately on the 3rd). He made no specific comment there, or probably anywhere since, on the attacks considered here that, unlike the others, had photographs to go with them. But he would probably take it as fitting the same pattern and making the same case, which Zelenskyy  described so:

"I consider the fact that Russia is doing this right now, right on the eve of the IAEA conclusions, very eloquent. Shelling the territory of the ZNPP means that the terrorist state does not care what the IAEA says, it does not care what the international community decides. ..." 

He also noted "by the way, the conclusions of the mission are to be presented tomorrow. I hope they will be objective." But he feared they might be "pro-Russian propagandists" like Amnesty International and half the world, especially since the IAEA mission was Russia's idea to start with, while Kiev and their plant managers initially "argued any visit would legitimise Russia's presence there." (BBC)

Showing his deep understanding of the cartoon program he was cast as the hero of, Zelenskyy continued:

Russia is interested only in keeping the situation the worst for the longest time possible.

This can be corrected only by strengthening sanctions, only by officially recognizing Russia as a terrorist state - at all levels.

Ukraine has a very clear, transparent and honest position: while we controlled the plant, there was no threat of a radiation disaster. As soon as Russia came, the worst scenario imaginable immediately became possible. This requires an international response - from the UN to every normal state.

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/obstril-teritoriyi-zaes-oznachaye-sho-rosiyi-bajduzhe-sho-sk-77533

There you have it. Russia is evil and wants bad things because they are bad. They cannot just allow the plant to be run smoothly to their or anyone's benefit, because nuclear tension is bad so they desire it. They thrive on creating needless and constant danger, and reaping the outsized waves of negative opinions that elicits. Those "orcs" even take chances like the eve of an IAEA report to "provoke" and remind the world again how mindlessly spiteful Russians are. Because the world forgets, Zelenskyy thinks, he again reminds us how the Russians remind us of their own subhuman status, with actions like this shelling of the ZNPP that poses a real (if overstated) danger to people far and wide, who will have to take notice. 

I mean, wouldn't you want that if you were Russia? To turn as much of the world as possible against you? Keeping in mind that being Russia would entail being mindlessly evil and self-destructive like that?  Many folks are aggressively keeping that nonsense in mind.

But of course, according to the non-cartoon evidence, these attacks are largely or totally carried out by the Ukrainian side. Like the real world tends to do, that makes direct but terrible sense. And part of what makes realities like this so terrible is how they're allowed to thrive and deepen their rot under a lack of accountability. 

The "Militarization" of the ZNPP, Part 2: Russian Shelling FROM ZNPP?

September 21, 2022 

last edits 9/26

Earlier, I wrote of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) "Russian forces are accused of militarizing the site by basing forces there (seems undeniably true to some degree) and launching attacks from there (not so sure, but troubling if so - I'll have some to say on this in another post)." This is that post. 

Part one, The Battle of March 4, was originally included with this, but it seemed tedious that way, so I gave that its own post. In summary: Russian tried to force their way into the plant in the early hours of March 4. As a detailed NPR report NPR report put it "On March 3, the nuclear plant was preparing for a fight. A news release posted to its website just hours before the assault described the facility as operating normally, with its assigned Ukrainian military unit ready for combat." In the plant's publicized surveillance video, the defenders shot "missiles" or shells at the first 2 tanks to cross the perimeter, finally hitting and disabling the second one. "That marked the beginning of a fierce firefight that lasted for roughly two hours at the plant," NPR correctly notes. This can't be good for nuclear safety, but the Ukrainian side fired the first shots. And they fired some other shots too.

In review: Russian forces are seen firing tank cannons, RPGs and more in many directions, many times. This shelling damaged and set fire to the training center and administration buildings, damaged electrical lines, and disrupted sensitive systems. The surveillance video shows how it caused unclear damage and fires around the north half of Special Building 1, near reactor 5 or 6, and up on the block/dome of reactor 1 or 2, and the elevated passage to reactor 1 has 2 holes punched in it. I haven't seen visible shooting from any buildings of the plant to explain the repeated shelling of those buildings, but the Russian column did take fire from 4 visible directions, likely alongside other hits that came invisibly from these and other directions:

* from the right, disabling a tank

* left low, hitting far back

* left + fwd + high, hitting far back 

* right + fwd, hitting near 3 tanks in the front.

This resistance stopped the Russian takeover about as much as a peaceful surrender would have. To resist anyway contributed to avoidable risks and could be called reckless. No one complained about how the Ukrainian military unit occupying the nuclear plant acted to endanger it. But along with the Russians came a new and dreadful reality: the ZNPP would be occupied by military units who might put it at risk.

Marching Forth from March 4th: ZNPP is "Militarized" 

Overview map, with explanations below - NOT oriented to true north. It says it's to Sept. 4, but the most recent placed impact (star) is at the inner spray ponds yesterday (9/20 - geolocation tweet) - I added the star but forgot to change the date.

I'll start with Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, 15 September 2022 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (mid.ru): 

"In this hall, there have already been calls for the "demilitarization of the ZNPP" or the creation of a kind of "demilitarized perimeter" around it. These calls are meaningless, as the station has never been militarized." 

Well, definitions vary. On the night of March 3/4, the plant was already occupied - debatably "militarized" - by a Ukrainian "assigned military unit." Russian attacks in and around the plant were in response to attacks by those forces. It was framed as dangerous and unacceptable on the Russian end, and Ukraine could be faulted for nothing. 

Later, the "assigned military unit" would be Russian, not Ukrainian. The place had suddenly been "militarized." They may not be sparking battles inside the plant, like Ukraine's garrison did, but they allegedly launched shelling attacks from there. And then we see and hear about attacks against the plant as the Russians allegedly shelled themselves in response. Clearly, Ukraine could be faulted for nothing in that absurd scenario. 

Russia's explanation for the forces at the plant are reflected in Ambassador Ulyanov's comments (continued):

"Russian law enforcement agencies at the ZNPP are represented only by units of Rosgvardia (an analogue of the French gendarmes and Italian carabinieri) and specialists from the troops of radiation, chemical and biological protection (RCBP). Rosgvardia is needed to ensure the protection of the station. CBRN specialists – to overcome the consequences of possible accidents and radiation emergencies that may result from continuous Ukrainian shelling. There are no heavy weapons and equipment on the territory of the ZNPP. Only equipment for the transportation of Rosgvardia personnel and electronic warfare equipment that helps neutralize Ukrainian drones. There are no ammunition or explosives at ZNPP, the detonation of which could pose a threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant. Thus, there were and are no military targets that could serve as a pretext for justifying Ukrainian shelling and attacks on the station."

But of course Ukrainian sources tell it differently. The New York Times would report on claims from Enerhodar mayor Dmytro Orlov, who was in exile but had contacts at the plant. "[O]ver the past three weeks" since early July, "the Russian military has parked Grad multiple rocket launchers between the reactor buildings, to protect them from retaliatory strikes." 

But the visual record can only support a single Grad launcher between the outer spray ponds. A July 22 video from the Main Intelligence Agency of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry shows a likely MLRS unit, BM21 Grad, as it's attacked by a kamikaze drone to no visible effect (below left, after it was hit). A graphic in the IAEA's September report (PDF) credited a launcher as stationed there, amid the pools, in a Maxar satellite view of August 29 (below, right, in a slightly different spot - and it's not clear what the July spot was). It's not clear if the IAEA saw it there during their visit on September 1 and 2, or if their staff who remained has seen it since.

StopFake called out "Russian propagandists" for claiming Ukraine had shelled the plant in this attack. That was "fake" because they targeted Russian equipment, not the plant, and the attack "did not take place in the immediate territory of the ZNPP." 

This launcher is on the ZNPP grounds, by most definitions, but near the eastern perimeter. There's a decent case for minimizing attacks there. It's 460m from the nearest reactor and ~600m from spent fuel storage. Spray ponds hold used water with just trace radioactivity that is by design sprayed into the air so it can cool before re-use. There's probably no danger in some of this spraying wider than usual. I marked this area yellow in the map above, for "mild" danger, and that may even exaggerate the risk. 

But if it's a fine spot to attack, it's also a fine spot to station weapons that might need attacked.

Wall Street Journal, July 5: Russian Army Turns Ukraine’s Largest Nuclear Plant Into a Military Base (archived) Russian forces at the plant "have in recent weeks deployed heavy artillery batteries and laid anti-personnel mines along the shores of the reservoir whose water cools its six reactors, according to workers, residents, Ukrainian officials, and diplomats. ... Russian forces deployed a Smerch artillery vehicle last month in the shadow of the 5.7 gigawatt complex’s striped chimneys, adding to the grad rocket launchers, tanks and personnel carriers." But there were no link or supports for the Smerch claim, and I haven't seen anything else in support. 

But a photo with the article shows "A Russian tank outside Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in a picture released mid-March." It's parked and covered, but present. Number 120 on the turret, when I hear Russia painted over its numbers. Maybe not in this case. We know at least one Russian tank was disabled very near the spot it's parked (A on the map above). It doesn't look damaged, but is it the same one? Was it there past March? Were there others? Were they used or just parked there?

Interfax reported "a kamikaze drone" was used in the July 20 attack, to hit "a car with anti-aircraft guns and a BM-21 Grad," and no other military equipment they could name. I haven't seen any more detail on this car that might have been there just to shoot down such drones that attack inside the nuclear plant.

Otherwise, satellite and drone views show just armored personnel carriers (APCs) and supply trucks, and a military tent camp that was attacked on July 20 (video) or the 19th by other reports (CNN), in the area marked C on the top map. The July 22 video linked above was mainly about the attack on the encampment, as was the Interfax report: "The Ukrainian military, with a precise strike by a kamikaze drone, destroyed a tent camp of Russian invaders near the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant," starting a fire that "could not be extinguished for a long time." As a result, Ukrainian intelligence reported, "three invaders were killed and 12 wounded," 

Below is the moment of detonation as seen in the video (black box). There's no fire afterwards, but in the end all 3 surrounding tents burned down, probably after unseen strikes following this. Dozens of people run out after this blast. It's not visibly clear if they're all soldiers or if they might include civilian specialists or others. Location:  just south of the spray ponds, not far from the Grad launcher, and some 300m from reactor 1.

A detailed NPR report provided before and after images of the site. On July 3, were a couple of supply trucks in the same area and 4 big tents, 3 of which burned down. A nearby a vehicle area was also vacated (area D above). It had included several supply trucks, some busses, and maybe a few APCs. No attacks here were shown, and the signs aren't clear, but there's a possible crater and ejected soil at the lot's north end,

Where did those vehicles go? Secret video in August (thedrive.com) and public IAEA images in September (PDF - image at right) agree that V-marked Russian military SUPPLY trucks were parked inside the blast-proof turbine hall of nuclear reactors 1 and 2. 

Ukrainian drone video from The Insider (on Twitter Aug. 6) shows several supply trucks driving into the cavernous hall of reactor 1. Add 9/26: One report I found traces a likely connection: "Russia on Wednesday (20 July) accused Ukraine of targetting a nuclear power station in the Zaporizhzhia region using drones. ... Energoatom alleged that Russian forces were demanding access to the machine halls of three reactors for storing tanks and equipment there, reported Reuters. However, the company also did not comment on the drone attack by Ukrainian forces." Good patriots, those.

The trucks got their access. Also shown entering are perhaps two "tanks," in that they're on treads. But lacking cannons, they're probably just APCs. 

Russia already stood accused of leaving "armoured personnel carriers parked recklessly near the reactors" (Daily Mail) before they tried parking them inside the houses the reactors lived in. This is all reckless because ... the things are known to spontaneously combust? No. This great crime prevented Ukrainian attacks on these particular supply trucks and APCs. Or it required much heavier weapons to actually destroy them and start fires inside the reactor housing. Maybe thinking ahead, mayor-in-exile Orlov complained to the Times "The vehicles block a fire access route ... posing a hazard to the entire plant."

Or - here's an idea - they could just leave these trucks and APCs alone. 

Alleged Attacks from the Russian-Occupied ZNPP

Back on March 4, terrible questions were raised in some minds. Would the Russians blow up the nuclear plant now that no one could stop them? Or might they attack military or civilian targets from its grounds, requiring dangerous defensive fire back into the plant? 

From my quick review, it doesn't seem they did either, even allegedly, for over 4 months. However occupied it was, the plant was allowed run with its existing Ukrainian staff, and to keep providing electricity to citizens on both sides of the line with no meltdown. 

But that didn't make the Russians look evil or insane.  Obviously, something would have to change, and it suddenly did in the middle of July. The New York Times would report "The Russians have been firing from the cover of the Zaporizhzhia station since mid-July, Ukrainian military and civilian officials said, sending rockets over the river at Nikopol and other targets." The reason seems to be the increasing use of long-range HIMARS missiles that made other firing spots too vulnerable. 

It was on July 16 that Petro Kotin, the President of “Energoatom” (the utility that runs the ZNPP) reported "The Russians have been controlling Zaporizhzhia NPP since the beginning of March. Now the occupiers are using the NPP as a bridgehead to deploy new military equipment. ... Missile complexes are brought there, from which the other side of the Dnipro is shelled – this is the territory of Nikopol.” 

This may be the one grad launcher noted above, or something wider and also real. But even if a lot of serious weapons were parked there, their mere presence is weak reason to launch dangerous attacks. What goes beyond is the claim of external attacks launched from the site or with those weapons. True or not, these claims helped justify the July 20 drone attack on a military encampment that killed 3 and wounded 12. 

Just one video that I've noticed even claims to corroborate these claims, emerging more than 6 weeks after the claims did. "Russian MLRS firing from the territory of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant " The Insider, September 18. - video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jSQw35mJrA. One "expert" on Russian evils, Luke Harding, advertised the video & report as "showing a #Russian multiple rocket launcher firing from the territory of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. It confirms what Kyiv has long alleged: that #Moscow is using the station for offensive military strikes across the Dnipro river"

The video was reportedly filmed the night of September 2/3, from the north, facing south across the Dnieper River. It clearly shows the smokestacks of the Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant on the left. A ways west of there (to the right), rapid rocket fire angles up like a string of pearls, directed further west or maybe northwest (roughly perpendicular to the line of sight). 

The Insider wasn't so clear on what all is shown, but they asked "the Experts of the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) to study the video" and the Bellingcat-types at CIT added "to the west of the TPP is the territory of the nuclear power plant itself, but whether rockets are really launched from the territory of the station, it is impossible to establish exactly." And so they decided "the footage shows that the MLRS are located in the immediate vicinity of the power unit." 

That struck me as lazy. At best they ccould set a line of sight, not a specific area, and that only if it were set up in more detail. So I had a try at doing it right, suspecting the Insider and CIT could be shown wrong.

I started with Michael Kobs LoS analysis with compared views. My own mapping including reactors (yellow box/line) is below. The plant's six reactors are visible on the horizon, spaced so we can see each one's tallest part pretty distinctly (so they're seen neither from the side nor face-on, but more at a 45-degree angle). The firing spot lines up roughly the same width (yellow line re-done in orange) off to the left. Electric towers may be visible  - 2 faint lines marked in green - but it works better with the left-hand option, roughly lining up with the launches. This plus the stack-building lineup at the TPP (blue) suggests filming from western Dobra Nadiia, looking a bit from the left of the comparison view, and a rocket launch from ... exactly where that BM21 was seen?

That still doesn't show an area of firing but a line of sight to it - the firing is somewhere on that red line, or close to it. The firing could be just outside the grounds nearly 1km from reactor 6, or just inside the grounds south of that, or off the grounds to the north or the south. But it also passes exactly over the IAEA report's "probable BM21 Multiple Launch Rocket (MLR)" seen a few days before (Aug. 29) among the spray ponds (black circle). 

But another possible limit plays in. Noting the flares of each rocket appear dimly at the horizon and are never seen against the horizon - whatever the highest elevation is, the firing may be from the south of that.

Google Maps shows little variation in topography. The thermal plant and the nuclear plant seem to sit on artificially raised ground, but otherwise the most marked rise is the tree-lined crest before the fileds, well south of the plant. The firing may be from south of that line. 

But that would be an odd coincidence how well it lines up with the known launcher. I'm not so into coincidences, and it seems more likely than not this is the weapon and the spot used, and some closer elevation difference hides its origin. 

In Context

So Russian firing from the sensitive plant is surprisingly well illustrated on this occasion, if not quite proven. And if it happened once, it's likely enough in other cases - although it has only been documented the once that I've seen. It's far from ideal, to say the least. Even if this were rare and well-deserved retaliatory fire, it drags the nuclear plant into the fighting in a way the Russians acknowledge shouldn't be done (they take pains to deny it). 

But then, as noted above, this is just in the spray ponds area, and opinions vary if this even counts as part of the plant. When the rockets are flying, the Insider complains it's not just on the plant grounds but from "the immediate vicinity of the power unit" - just the kind of thing that makes it "impossible" for the Ukrainians to respond, as they frequently say. But when they have attacked that very spot in the past, StopFake got to point out how it was "not ... in the immediate territory of the ZNPP" at all. 

Ukrainian response to this and other alleged attacks from around the ZNPP: allegedly nothing past the July 19 attack they acknowledge, and a few they have barely denied. Otherwise Kiev says they were just watching, in terrified awe, as the Russians launched attacks from the plant and then shelled themselves in return, over and over. 

Looking into at least seven incidents with published details and images, rockets, drones and shells have hit the Russian-occupied plant in areas far from that launcher and right among the reactors, sometimes where AFVs were parked, and other times where minor damage could just keep tensions high. Impact spots I know of are marked with black stars on the top map. These have been mostly blamed on the Russians, but that's always been illogical, and the evidence seems to disagree; some attacks were done by kamikaze drone like in that July attack, and some were by artillery or rockets shown as fired from Ukrainian areas, despite Ukrainian claims (August 6 from the northwest, August 27 from the northwest or north). Some other attack analysis is pending (Sept. 1, 4, 20, maybe others).

As the statement by Mikhail Ulyanov claims: 

"According to the Ministry of Defense of Russia, since July 18, 2022, Ukrainian armed formations have shelled the territory of the ZNPP and its infrastructure more than 30 times, firing more than 120 artillery shells and using at least 16 kamikaze drones." 

"The satellite city of ZNPP Enerhodar, where the station's employees and their families live, was shelled more than 70 times during the same period (10 times from drones and more than 60 times from barrel artillery and multiple launch rocket systems). As a result of these attacks, there are casualties and injuries among the employees of the nuclear power plant and residents of the city."

International Atomic Energy Agency chief Rafael Grossi would say on September 9. "This is an unsustainable situation and is becoming increasingly precarious. Enerhodar has gone dark. The power plant has no offsite power. And we have seen that once infrastructure is repaired, it is damaged once again," Grossi called for "the immediate cessation of all shelling in the entire area."  (Reuters) 

Attack reports did fall off or even stop at this time, as the final reactor 6 was switched off for safety. but on the 20th, Russian-affiliated sources reported another attack. Photos show a ruptured pipe in the inner splash ponds, just 140m from special building 1, which was also reportedly damaged, along with the occupied cafeteria. Then that night, according to Ukrainian officials, Russian shelling damaged the communication equipment of reactor 6 and cut the power supply, requiring an emergency switch to diesel generators.  with the open switchgear of the ZNPP. Due to power loss, two diesel generators of the safety system for cooling the reactor were started in an emergency (hromadske.ua)

Grossi knows but cannot say who needs to stop and still hasn't. It's Kiev, not Moscow, that benefits from a situation "that cannot stand." It underline the need for change, like Russia agreeing to surrender the plant to Ukrainian militarization. Both sides claim they want the shelling to stop, but the perpetrators keep shelling while blaming the other side, probably based on a rational motive. Logically and according to much direct evidence, Ukraine is the perpetrator of this shelling. But for the Western-dominated "world community," Ukraine can do no wrong in its war with Russia, while Russia can do no right, so holding the guilty to account won't be an option for them. It was already clear that words aren't enough to stop the shelling. So far, it might be that Russian artillery and rockets - wherever they're fired from - are the only tools willing and able to stop the attacks, if only for a moment.