The "Militarization" of the ZNPP, Part 2: Russian Shelling FROM ZNPP?

September 21, 2022 

last edits 9/26

Earlier, I wrote of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) "Russian forces are accused of militarizing the site by basing forces there (seems undeniably true to some degree) and launching attacks from there (not so sure, but troubling if so - I'll have some to say on this in another post)." This is that post. 

Part one, The Battle of March 4, was originally included with this, but it seemed tedious that way, so I gave that its own post. In summary: Russian tried to force their way into the plant in the early hours of March 4. As a detailed NPR report NPR report put it "On March 3, the nuclear plant was preparing for a fight. A news release posted to its website just hours before the assault described the facility as operating normally, with its assigned Ukrainian military unit ready for combat." In the plant's publicized surveillance video, the defenders shot "missiles" or shells at the first 2 tanks to cross the perimeter, finally hitting and disabling the second one. "That marked the beginning of a fierce firefight that lasted for roughly two hours at the plant," NPR correctly notes. This can't be good for nuclear safety, but the Ukrainian side fired the first shots. And they fired some other shots too.

In review: Russian forces are seen firing tank cannons, RPGs and more in many directions, many times. This shelling damaged and set fire to the training center and administration buildings, damaged electrical lines, and disrupted sensitive systems. The surveillance video shows how it caused unclear damage and fires around the north half of Special Building 1, near reactor 5 or 6, and up on the block/dome of reactor 1 or 2, and the elevated passage to reactor 1 has 2 holes punched in it. I haven't seen visible shooting from any buildings of the plant to explain the repeated shelling of those buildings, but the Russian column did take fire from 4 visible directions, likely alongside other hits that came invisibly from these and other directions:

* from the right, disabling a tank

* left low, hitting far back

* left + fwd + high, hitting far back 

* right + fwd, hitting near 3 tanks in the front.

This resistance stopped the Russian takeover about as much as a peaceful surrender would have. To resist anyway contributed to avoidable risks and could be called reckless. No one complained about how the Ukrainian military unit occupying the nuclear plant acted to endanger it. But along with the Russians came a new and dreadful reality: the ZNPP would be occupied by military units who might put it at risk.

Marching Forth from March 4th: ZNPP is "Militarized" 

Overview map, with explanations below - NOT oriented to true north. It says it's to Sept. 4, but the most recent placed impact (star) is at the inner spray ponds yesterday (9/20 - geolocation tweet) - I added the star but forgot to change the date.

I'll start with Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, 15 September 2022 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (mid.ru): 

"In this hall, there have already been calls for the "demilitarization of the ZNPP" or the creation of a kind of "demilitarized perimeter" around it. These calls are meaningless, as the station has never been militarized." 

Well, definitions vary. On the night of March 3/4, the plant was already occupied - debatably "militarized" - by a Ukrainian "assigned military unit." Russian attacks in and around the plant were in response to attacks by those forces. It was framed as dangerous and unacceptable on the Russian end, and Ukraine could be faulted for nothing. 

Later, the "assigned military unit" would be Russian, not Ukrainian. The place had suddenly been "militarized." They may not be sparking battles inside the plant, like Ukraine's garrison did, but they allegedly launched shelling attacks from there. And then we see and hear about attacks against the plant as the Russians allegedly shelled themselves in response. Clearly, Ukraine could be faulted for nothing in that absurd scenario. 

Russia's explanation for the forces at the plant are reflected in Ambassador Ulyanov's comments (continued):

"Russian law enforcement agencies at the ZNPP are represented only by units of Rosgvardia (an analogue of the French gendarmes and Italian carabinieri) and specialists from the troops of radiation, chemical and biological protection (RCBP). Rosgvardia is needed to ensure the protection of the station. CBRN specialists – to overcome the consequences of possible accidents and radiation emergencies that may result from continuous Ukrainian shelling. There are no heavy weapons and equipment on the territory of the ZNPP. Only equipment for the transportation of Rosgvardia personnel and electronic warfare equipment that helps neutralize Ukrainian drones. There are no ammunition or explosives at ZNPP, the detonation of which could pose a threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant. Thus, there were and are no military targets that could serve as a pretext for justifying Ukrainian shelling and attacks on the station."

But of course Ukrainian sources tell it differently. The New York Times would report on claims from Enerhodar mayor Dmytro Orlov, who was in exile but had contacts at the plant. "[O]ver the past three weeks" since early July, "the Russian military has parked Grad multiple rocket launchers between the reactor buildings, to protect them from retaliatory strikes." 

But the visual record can only support a single Grad launcher between the outer spray ponds. A July 22 video from the Main Intelligence Agency of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry shows a likely MLRS unit, BM21 Grad, as it's attacked by a kamikaze drone to no visible effect (below left, after it was hit). A graphic in the IAEA's September report (PDF) credited a launcher as stationed there, amid the pools, in a Maxar satellite view of August 29 (below, right, in a slightly different spot - and it's not clear what the July spot was). It's not clear if the IAEA saw it there during their visit on September 1 and 2, or if their staff who remained has seen it since.

StopFake called out "Russian propagandists" for claiming Ukraine had shelled the plant in this attack. That was "fake" because they targeted Russian equipment, not the plant, and the attack "did not take place in the immediate territory of the ZNPP." 

This launcher is on the ZNPP grounds, by most definitions, but near the eastern perimeter. There's a decent case for minimizing attacks there. It's 460m from the nearest reactor and ~600m from spent fuel storage. Spray ponds hold used water with just trace radioactivity that is by design sprayed into the air so it can cool before re-use. There's probably no danger in some of this spraying wider than usual. I marked this area yellow in the map above, for "mild" danger, and that may even exaggerate the risk. 

But if it's a fine spot to attack, it's also a fine spot to station weapons that might need attacked.

Wall Street Journal, July 5: Russian Army Turns Ukraine’s Largest Nuclear Plant Into a Military Base (archived) Russian forces at the plant "have in recent weeks deployed heavy artillery batteries and laid anti-personnel mines along the shores of the reservoir whose water cools its six reactors, according to workers, residents, Ukrainian officials, and diplomats. ... Russian forces deployed a Smerch artillery vehicle last month in the shadow of the 5.7 gigawatt complex’s striped chimneys, adding to the grad rocket launchers, tanks and personnel carriers." But there were no link or supports for the Smerch claim, and I haven't seen anything else in support. 

But a photo with the article shows "A Russian tank outside Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in a picture released mid-March." It's parked and covered, but present. Number 120 on the turret, when I hear Russia painted over its numbers. Maybe not in this case. We know at least one Russian tank was disabled very near the spot it's parked (A on the map above). It doesn't look damaged, but is it the same one? Was it there past March? Were there others? Were they used or just parked there?

Interfax reported "a kamikaze drone" was used in the July 20 attack, to hit "a car with anti-aircraft guns and a BM-21 Grad," and no other military equipment they could name. I haven't seen any more detail on this car that might have been there just to shoot down such drones that attack inside the nuclear plant.

Otherwise, satellite and drone views show just armored personnel carriers (APCs) and supply trucks, and a military tent camp that was attacked on July 20 (video) or the 19th by other reports (CNN), in the area marked C on the top map. The July 22 video linked above was mainly about the attack on the encampment, as was the Interfax report: "The Ukrainian military, with a precise strike by a kamikaze drone, destroyed a tent camp of Russian invaders near the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant," starting a fire that "could not be extinguished for a long time." As a result, Ukrainian intelligence reported, "three invaders were killed and 12 wounded," 

Below is the moment of detonation as seen in the video (black box). There's no fire afterwards, but in the end all 3 surrounding tents burned down, probably after unseen strikes following this. Dozens of people run out after this blast. It's not visibly clear if they're all soldiers or if they might include civilian specialists or others. Location:  just south of the spray ponds, not far from the Grad launcher, and some 300m from reactor 1.

A detailed NPR report provided before and after images of the site. On July 3, were a couple of supply trucks in the same area and 4 big tents, 3 of which burned down. A nearby a vehicle area was also vacated (area D above). It had included several supply trucks, some busses, and maybe a few APCs. No attacks here were shown, and the signs aren't clear, but there's a possible crater and ejected soil at the lot's north end,

Where did those vehicles go? Secret video in August (thedrive.com) and public IAEA images in September (PDF - image at right) agree that V-marked Russian military SUPPLY trucks were parked inside the blast-proof turbine hall of nuclear reactors 1 and 2. 

Ukrainian drone video from The Insider (on Twitter Aug. 6) shows several supply trucks driving into the cavernous hall of reactor 1. Add 9/26: One report I found traces a likely connection: "Russia on Wednesday (20 July) accused Ukraine of targetting a nuclear power station in the Zaporizhzhia region using drones. ... Energoatom alleged that Russian forces were demanding access to the machine halls of three reactors for storing tanks and equipment there, reported Reuters. However, the company also did not comment on the drone attack by Ukrainian forces." Good patriots, those.

The trucks got their access. Also shown entering are perhaps two "tanks," in that they're on treads. But lacking cannons, they're probably just APCs. 

Russia already stood accused of leaving "armoured personnel carriers parked recklessly near the reactors" (Daily Mail) before they tried parking them inside the houses the reactors lived in. This is all reckless because ... the things are known to spontaneously combust? No. This great crime prevented Ukrainian attacks on these particular supply trucks and APCs. Or it required much heavier weapons to actually destroy them and start fires inside the reactor housing. Maybe thinking ahead, mayor-in-exile Orlov complained to the Times "The vehicles block a fire access route ... posing a hazard to the entire plant."

Or - here's an idea - they could just leave these trucks and APCs alone. 

Alleged Attacks from the Russian-Occupied ZNPP

Back on March 4, terrible questions were raised in some minds. Would the Russians blow up the nuclear plant now that no one could stop them? Or might they attack military or civilian targets from its grounds, requiring dangerous defensive fire back into the plant? 

From my quick review, it doesn't seem they did either, even allegedly, for over 4 months. However occupied it was, the plant was allowed run with its existing Ukrainian staff, and to keep providing electricity to citizens on both sides of the line with no meltdown. 

But that didn't make the Russians look evil or insane.  Obviously, something would have to change, and it suddenly did in the middle of July. The New York Times would report "The Russians have been firing from the cover of the Zaporizhzhia station since mid-July, Ukrainian military and civilian officials said, sending rockets over the river at Nikopol and other targets." The reason seems to be the increasing use of long-range HIMARS missiles that made other firing spots too vulnerable. 

It was on July 16 that Petro Kotin, the President of “Energoatom” (the utility that runs the ZNPP) reported "The Russians have been controlling Zaporizhzhia NPP since the beginning of March. Now the occupiers are using the NPP as a bridgehead to deploy new military equipment. ... Missile complexes are brought there, from which the other side of the Dnipro is shelled – this is the territory of Nikopol.” 

This may be the one grad launcher noted above, or something wider and also real. But even if a lot of serious weapons were parked there, their mere presence is weak reason to launch dangerous attacks. What goes beyond is the claim of external attacks launched from the site or with those weapons. True or not, these claims helped justify the July 20 drone attack on a military encampment that killed 3 and wounded 12. 

Just one video that I've noticed even claims to corroborate these claims, emerging more than 6 weeks after the claims did. "Russian MLRS firing from the territory of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant " The Insider, September 18. - video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jSQw35mJrA. One "expert" on Russian evils, Luke Harding, advertised the video & report as "showing a #Russian multiple rocket launcher firing from the territory of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. It confirms what Kyiv has long alleged: that #Moscow is using the station for offensive military strikes across the Dnipro river"

The video was reportedly filmed the night of September 2/3, from the north, facing south across the Dnieper River. It clearly shows the smokestacks of the Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant on the left. A ways west of there (to the right), rapid rocket fire angles up like a string of pearls, directed further west or maybe northwest (roughly perpendicular to the line of sight). 

The Insider wasn't so clear on what all is shown, but they asked "the Experts of the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) to study the video" and the Bellingcat-types at CIT added "to the west of the TPP is the territory of the nuclear power plant itself, but whether rockets are really launched from the territory of the station, it is impossible to establish exactly." And so they decided "the footage shows that the MLRS are located in the immediate vicinity of the power unit." 

That struck me as lazy. At best they ccould set a line of sight, not a specific area, and that only if it were set up in more detail. So I had a try at doing it right, suspecting the Insider and CIT could be shown wrong.

I started with Michael Kobs LoS analysis with compared views. My own mapping including reactors (yellow box/line) is below. The plant's six reactors are visible on the horizon, spaced so we can see each one's tallest part pretty distinctly (so they're seen neither from the side nor face-on, but more at a 45-degree angle). The firing spot lines up roughly the same width (yellow line re-done in orange) off to the left. Electric towers may be visible  - 2 faint lines marked in green - but it works better with the left-hand option, roughly lining up with the launches. This plus the stack-building lineup at the TPP (blue) suggests filming from western Dobra Nadiia, looking a bit from the left of the comparison view, and a rocket launch from ... exactly where that BM21 was seen?

That still doesn't show an area of firing but a line of sight to it - the firing is somewhere on that red line, or close to it. The firing could be just outside the grounds nearly 1km from reactor 6, or just inside the grounds south of that, or off the grounds to the north or the south. But it also passes exactly over the IAEA report's "probable BM21 Multiple Launch Rocket (MLR)" seen a few days before (Aug. 29) among the spray ponds (black circle). 

But another possible limit plays in. Noting the flares of each rocket appear dimly at the horizon and are never seen against the horizon - whatever the highest elevation is, the firing may be from the south of that.

Google Maps shows little variation in topography. The thermal plant and the nuclear plant seem to sit on artificially raised ground, but otherwise the most marked rise is the tree-lined crest before the fileds, well south of the plant. The firing may be from south of that line. 

But that would be an odd coincidence how well it lines up with the known launcher. I'm not so into coincidences, and it seems more likely than not this is the weapon and the spot used, and some closer elevation difference hides its origin. 

In Context

So Russian firing from the sensitive plant is surprisingly well illustrated on this occasion, if not quite proven. And if it happened once, it's likely enough in other cases - although it has only been documented the once that I've seen. It's far from ideal, to say the least. Even if this were rare and well-deserved retaliatory fire, it drags the nuclear plant into the fighting in a way the Russians acknowledge shouldn't be done (they take pains to deny it). 

But then, as noted above, this is just in the spray ponds area, and opinions vary if this even counts as part of the plant. When the rockets are flying, the Insider complains it's not just on the plant grounds but from "the immediate vicinity of the power unit" - just the kind of thing that makes it "impossible" for the Ukrainians to respond, as they frequently say. But when they have attacked that very spot in the past, StopFake got to point out how it was "not ... in the immediate territory of the ZNPP" at all. 

Ukrainian response to this and other alleged attacks from around the ZNPP: allegedly nothing past the July 19 attack they acknowledge, and a few they have barely denied. Otherwise Kiev says they were just watching, in terrified awe, as the Russians launched attacks from the plant and then shelled themselves in return, over and over. 

Looking into at least seven incidents with published details and images, rockets, drones and shells have hit the Russian-occupied plant in areas far from that launcher and right among the reactors, sometimes where AFVs were parked, and other times where minor damage could just keep tensions high. Impact spots I know of are marked with black stars on the top map. These have been mostly blamed on the Russians, but that's always been illogical, and the evidence seems to disagree; some attacks were done by kamikaze drone like in that July attack, and some were by artillery or rockets shown as fired from Ukrainian areas, despite Ukrainian claims (August 6 from the northwest, August 27 from the northwest or north). Some other attack analysis is pending (Sept. 1, 4, 20, maybe others).

As the statement by Mikhail Ulyanov claims: 

"According to the Ministry of Defense of Russia, since July 18, 2022, Ukrainian armed formations have shelled the territory of the ZNPP and its infrastructure more than 30 times, firing more than 120 artillery shells and using at least 16 kamikaze drones." 

"The satellite city of ZNPP Enerhodar, where the station's employees and their families live, was shelled more than 70 times during the same period (10 times from drones and more than 60 times from barrel artillery and multiple launch rocket systems). As a result of these attacks, there are casualties and injuries among the employees of the nuclear power plant and residents of the city."

International Atomic Energy Agency chief Rafael Grossi would say on September 9. "This is an unsustainable situation and is becoming increasingly precarious. Enerhodar has gone dark. The power plant has no offsite power. And we have seen that once infrastructure is repaired, it is damaged once again," Grossi called for "the immediate cessation of all shelling in the entire area."  (Reuters) 

Attack reports did fall off or even stop at this time, as the final reactor 6 was switched off for safety. but on the 20th, Russian-affiliated sources reported another attack. Photos show a ruptured pipe in the inner splash ponds, just 140m from special building 1, which was also reportedly damaged, along with the occupied cafeteria. Then that night, according to Ukrainian officials, Russian shelling damaged the communication equipment of reactor 6 and cut the power supply, requiring an emergency switch to diesel generators.  with the open switchgear of the ZNPP. Due to power loss, two diesel generators of the safety system for cooling the reactor were started in an emergency (hromadske.ua)

Grossi knows but cannot say who needs to stop and still hasn't. It's Kiev, not Moscow, that benefits from a situation "that cannot stand." It underline the need for change, like Russia agreeing to surrender the plant to Ukrainian militarization. Both sides claim they want the shelling to stop, but the perpetrators keep shelling while blaming the other side, probably based on a rational motive. Logically and according to much direct evidence, Ukraine is the perpetrator of this shelling. But for the Western-dominated "world community," Ukraine can do no wrong in its war with Russia, while Russia can do no right, so holding the guilty to account won't be an option for them. It was already clear that words aren't enough to stop the shelling. So far, it might be that Russian artillery and rockets - wherever they're fired from - are the only tools willing and able to stop the attacks, if only for a moment.