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Warning: This site contains images and graphic descriptions of extreme violence and/or its effects. It's not as bad as it could be, but is meant to be shocking. Readers should be 18+ or a mature 17 or so. There is also some foul language occasionally, and potential for general upsetting of comforting conventional wisdom. Please view with discretion.
Showing posts with label SNC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SNC. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 24, 2019

"Mr. Pesticide" Part 3: On CW Crimes of Ba'athist Leaders

Mr. Pesticide, Gen. Asaad Al-Zoubi
Part three of four:
2018-19 Comments on CW Crimes of Ba'athist Leaders
September 24, 2019

< Back to Part 2
< part 1

3a) Blessing Saddam's Soul for Halabjah?
As part 2 explained, FSA General Asaad al-Zoubi's made a lot of fairly loony public claims in 2016 comments, during his term heading the negotiating team for the whole Syria opposition in Geneva. Perhaps the most controversial among his comments were those about the Kurdish people, their military forces and statehood aspirations, as covered in part 2. Some of these spurred the Kurdish contingent within the HNC to quit the project just two weeks into talks.

But those weren't his first or last words on the subject. A recent re-iteration of the theme in a twitter message of 16 August, 2019, caused a new stir. As one twitter response put it: “Asaad Alzoubi, one of the Syrian opposition's leader praising Saddam Hussein, because he was killing Kurds by using a chemical gases. Today, Zoubi wants to play the same role by commiting chemical attacks against Syrian Kurds... # example of Syrian negotiator_”

Another criticism doesn't mention anything chemical, but includes a re-tweet of Al-Zoubi's exact words. But that original tweet was "unavailable" before I saw it. Well before. On 17 August (the day after the tweet) someone asked "Has he deleted the tweet or shut down his account?" Presumably, he deleted it in embarrassment by then, with or without a friend's advice. At the time I checked (around 27 August), most of the other tweets at his account were still visible, but that one was gone.

It caused him trouble anyway - his account had already been suspended, as someone noticed on 22 August. I didn't know about that when I first looked a few days later. It must have been down just briefly before he had the decision repealed. But just checking now, it seems he's suspended again (as of Sept. 11, and still on Sept. 24). That's presumably for the same thing, which is probably the Kurd-bashing comments possibly praising CW-genocide. He was banned more firmly, maybe permanently, we might note after more time to review the complaints and his reasons for the brief repeal.

He used to be charged with helping shape the future of a nation - what could stop the fighting, who needs released from jail, who cannot be president, etc. That might have played into the initial repeal ("I was at Geneva, you oafs!"). Now he's not even allowed to air his thoughts on Twitter, a platform often criticized as too lax on hate speech and the like.

Wow. That must have been some misstep I should have a look at it if possible. I asked the resourceful Michael Kobs, who found an archived copy of the tweet (at a link that almost instantly expired on my end). The screen grabs he sent are below with details, original text, and an auto-translation to English. (Kobs tweet)

LBD = PYD, etc. an Arabic-speaking friend helped check the nuances and gave the same gist but no word-for-word, so this is a guessed refinement of the auto-translation. Anything it misses that's significant, someone let me know (comments).
Whenever we uncover the truth about the character of the Kurdish terrorist organization the PYD, it reveals many animals (donkeys who are tired, howling dogs, cockroaches, tints [sounds like some tiny insect?], cockroaches, and many worms). There is no need to use pesticides for these insects.
God bless his soul.

(It's pesticide enough?) for these insects to say the name Saddam, and they quickly disappear. So their appearance always makes us have mercy on Saddam.
God bless his soul.

Halabjah 1988. Al-Zoubi: "God bless (Saddam's) soul"
He might have seen this as lighthearted, proposing as it does NOT gassing people; even if it might seem warranted, to deal with the subhuman pests of the PYD "there is no need to use pesticides for these insects." Simply remind them how Saddam (Hussein?) did that once (Halabja 1988?), and ...the pests will go away? He seems onto something ugly, if not logical.

Following an "attack on social media" Al-Zoubi explained himself in an interview for Arabic-language Zaitun Agency. He says it was a misunderstanding. As he clarifies, Kurdish people in general are brother Syrians, but the PYD militant group - at least - "coordinates with the Syrian regime to thwart the people's revolution. They exploited the revolution of the Syrian people and called for an independent entity ...and committed the crimes of genocide and forced components of the core of our people [meaning some (Arab) Sunni Muslims?]" apparently, to lose their homes (translation is unclear).

Forced relocation in areas PYD and other Kurdish forces take over is credibly reported by Human Rights Watch in Iraq (Nov. 2016), and also in Syria, as reported by The Nation, Feb. 2017. It's considered an act of genocide, which is a continuum, obviously.

The claims were variously denied by Kurdish officials, or explained as a counter-terror measure, and they might point – in Iraq anyway - to forced Arabization of historically Kurdish areas, acts of genocide they were just just “correcting” (so corrective genocide?). The Kurds are no angels, and I'm no expert, but I noted in 2013 some clues their leaders in Iraq at least took advantage of the ISIS situation, perhaps even helping to create it, to enable their Iraqi Kurdistan; they would let some land be shaken from Baghdad's control, blame them for being too sectarian and causing ISIS, then as possible take the land back and keep it. Consider from the HRW report a commander of Kurdish forces in Iraq, reportedly declaring upon conquests in Nineveh governorate “These territories are Kurdistan's now. We will not give them back to the Iraqi army or anybody else.”

Their cause is not that crucial, but they're selectively boosted in the West because, I guess, they can cause grief for to the Syrian and Iraqi governments, because they want their own country, not a caliphate or an emirate. Little wonder there's a long attraction, but this Islamist takeover is quite a sinister thing for the Kurds and their external sponsors to be taking advantage of. They should stand with the nations they're in, and talk degrees of autonomy later. First both ISIS and all those others the HNC had under its umbrella would need to be defeated.

So Al-Zoubi may have a point, or just a pointless, hate-inspired gripe with a near-explanation available. But he never did explain the references to “Saddam” and "pesticide" use, and why that event can be glibly invoked against just the PYD when the attack itself was against primarily civilians. He offered no explanation and also deleted that tweet as if it simply could not be explained – at least within civil bounds. Now, this is/was a professional political operative, heading negotiations on issues of war and peace, justice and morality, etc. - by record of tweets anyway, he says little, and it will be relatively guarded and careful. This kind of comment could mark the edges - things he wouldn't normally say, has to un-say if he slips. I mean, he's not talking about Alawi or Shia people here, but the widely-championed Kurds. we can wonder how wide and deep is the pool of uglier thoughts he's even more careful with?

I can partly endorse the efforts of some French Kurds' effort to sue Gen. Al-Zoubi over this comment. They hope to have him tried in French courts for "apology for war crimes and genocide," punishable by up to five years in prison." (Le-Point) For anyone in the world? As someone who's been accused of apologizing for war crimes, this raises questions for me. But I'd be denying the crime, not smiling about it and waving it in peoples' faces. Their lawyer, Antonin Péchard, found the deleted tweet counted as "provocation to violence." That's debatable, but he cites "a direct and unambiguous allusion to the crimes committed in Iraq in 1988, recognized as genocide before the court in The Hague.” As he decodes it, “the menagerie” - or what I have as “many animals” - “is the Kurdish people.” He actually specifies PYD, not the Kurds at large. But then “Saddam, of course, is Saddam Hussein and "the insecticide is the poison of his chemical weapons," most famously used at Halabjah against a lot of Kurdish people at large, so the meaning of “menagerie” IS pretty dubious.

On a side-note, Saddam Hussein also gassed a lot of Shi'ites in Iran in 1988 and earlier, some background information for Al-Zoubi and other hardcore Sunni fanboys of that Ba'ath party leader. Considering all this and how it plays into the following, I've given al-Zoubi the nickname “Mr. Pesticide.”

3b) Damning Assad's Soul over Douma
So there's some worry about Al-Zoubi's rehtoric inspiring future acts of violence, perhaps even chemical violence. Just from what's seen, that's a stretch. But either way, some of his allies need no encouragement.

The Jaish al-Islam (Army of Islam) of his fellow HNC bargainer Mohammed Alloush is epic in its criminality. They're behind killing off all sort of opponents and critics and the sectarian-based kidnapping of hundreds of civilians at once in December, 2013 at Adra (teamed with Jabhat al-Nusra). They've arrested thousands more from Adra and elsewhere across East Ghouta, military and civilian alike, including women and children. They subjected prisoners to harsh conditions and torture, starvation and slave labor, besides other crimes known and still-unknown.

Some possible JaI crimes involve chemical weapons allegations, two of which we now consider, starting with the Douma incident of 7 April, 2018. This was easily blamed on the Syrian government, triggering the second of two yearly April missile strikes led by US president Trump. Al-Zoubi firmly credits Assad with the attack and considers the attack criminal, not laudable. So he's for all CW attacks, and not even for all those blamed on Ba'ath party leaders. He's more selective than that. The Douma attack was said to kill random Sunni Arabs, not Kurdish or PYD "terrorists." And Assad, for what it's worth, is not a Sunni Muslim like Saddam Hussein was, and gets aid from Iranians instead of gassing them. For whatever mix of reasons, Al-Zoubi does not ask for Assad's soul to be blessed, but labors instead to expand the case for its damnation.

In the 18 months since the Douma incident, serious study has shown the opposition's claims to be fraudulent on every level. The physical evidence is clear to OPCW's suppressed experts, Russia's experts, and independent researchers who show their work: someone manually planted two barely dented chlorine gas cylinders at or beneath unrelated damage from explosive weapons. There are troubling signs the 35 seen victims – mostly women and children - were captives of Jaish Al-Islam, mass-murdered so they could plant some bodies underneath one of those forged scenes and blame Assad. It seem s they were intentionally killed in a gas chamber using an unusual method that left ugly clues still being unraveled. Al-Zoubi's Islamist buddies piled the bodies near water faucets so the residues could be washed off their faces and hair just minutes before the first video – leaving behind dingy rags and one of the respirator masks they probably wore to protect against the fumes still coming off these people during transport (likely in Jaish Al-Islam's fabled tunnel system – a confined space). Visuals below, from my own tweet.

Yes, this was almost surely a false-flag managed massacre by JaI as they finally lost their home base in Douma, and saw their last chance to gas any hostages they'd rather not free, and last chance to have a lot of bodies at once to blame on Assad. They had promised to release some 3,000 detainees as part of the surrender deal, but a lamentable 200 or so ever emerged (AFP). Quite likely some of the missing thousands wound up piled in those photos.

It took a while to see all that, but just one day after, on 8 April, 2018, as most of us were rather hazy, Gen. Asaad al-Zoubi gave an interview to Turkey-based SMART News where he's described only as “a political and military analyst,” revealing a stunning inside view; as the headline sums it up, "Opposition general reveals that Russia and Syrian government prepared toxic gas month before Douma massacre." Considering my interest in the details of the Douma incident, his full explanation is worth some detailed analysis in another post (part 4, forthcoming). But it's worth relating in brief here, for comparison.

Like many, he seemed sure it was Assad's deadly sarin nerve agent that killed people in Douma; "Al-Zoubi assured that the forces used a nerve gas that causes immediate asphyxia, and has a stronger effect than chlorine gas." He or SMART News thought the death toll was at least 85 (which is also noted as the death toll for the Khan Sheikhoun sarin attack a year earlier). But that was “at an early count” that actually grew to ~180 and was later claimed to be 187. Mysteriously, only 42 were ever "verified,” and only chlorine turned up at the location where most of the bodies were found. Simple chlorine should have killed close to zero people, not 42, or 85, or 187. Did Al-Zoubi know about that problem in advance? On day 2, he claimed the chlorine dropped along with the nerve agent instantly erased all signs. But as I'll explain in part 4, this is nonsense.

He claimed to know all about the super-deadly agent that's “similar to sarin” (which seems to mean it was sarin – allegedly – but he'd rather leave some wiggle room?). He says it was specifically brewed for the purpose a month earlier, in full violation of Syria's OPCW obligations, and with the help of three particular Russian officers Al-Zoubi could probably name (but didn't), in a pretty audacious and satanic conspiracy. He claimed to know where the poison was made, when it was moved and where to, including to Dumayr airbase, where people said the CWs were loaded onto helicopters for use on 7 April. He probably failed to mention any of that knowledge over the weeks of alleged preparation because it only appeared in his "information" network - fully formed – just a few hours before this interview.

But despite being total nonsense, the Zoubi narrative might be too well-informed to be an innocent guess. His info was likely provided by the true experts who knew inside details like how no sarin would turn up, as they originally planned. Again, the likely perpetrators are Douma-based Jaish Al-Islam, whose state of defeat might cause logistical failures like their sarin supply getting unexpectedly blown up, for example. Because, again, their political leader was one of Zoubi's contacts from the HNC days. And the victims ... not Kurds or probably any other minority, but the largest portion of a named 35 are seemingly related to a military opponent of JaI: An “FSA” faction called Douma Martyr's Brigade led a tragically failed rebellion against the “Army of Islam” in late 2014. That in turn started a few months after its founder – Mohammed Diab Bakriyeh – was killed “in clashes” with government forces, on the same day an apparent civilian brother of his was killed by random government “shelling.” (see here.) Does that reflect the same growing tensions that led to open rebellion soon after? And does it show Commander Bakriyeh's family was fair game to kill and falsely report the cause of death? The answers could both be yes, and if so, it's quite possible that 11 people named Bakriyeh (plus unclear others related by blood and marriage) would get kidnapped over time, held until the end in 2018, and finished off then rather than set free. If so ...the elaborate story Gen. Al-Zoubi passes on would be fake, and he'd be helping conceal a gross war crime by his allies, bt passing it off as yet another Assad crime. To the intelligent, that would be cause to wonder how often that kind of thing happens.

3c) When Jaish Al-Islam Gasses Kurds
Considering his take on Douma, if Gen. Al-Zoubi's Islamist cohorts ever did gas some Kurds, don't be surprised if he weighs in with dubious but specific "information" blaming Syria and implicating Russia, or Iran, or perhaps ISIS or China.

In fact, I had to check with an attack on the Kurdish-majority Sheikh Maqsoud district of Aleppo, on 7 April, 2016. In this little-understood event, I propose the agent used was not the reported chlorine gas. The agent color is wrong (seen on video, too orange-yellow, and also too lightweight), and the smell might be (described as "strange," not bleach-like). It might have been a nerve agent, going by the reported symptoms (including "convulsions, spasms and vomiting"), and its killing a reported 23 people to an expected zero for chlorine. (gathered sources at ACLOS)
7 April, 2016: Al-Zoubi ally's militia launches "pesticide" against Kurds? 23 died?
(color: increased saturation but same hue = not chlorine (yellow-green))
Note: "Yellow phosphorous material" was also cited as the agent, but that should probably be a sort of burning irritant, not likely fatal (based on some research). Also I've seen before where someone mistranslates “organophosphate” this way to describe a likely sarin attack. Three such cases are listed here: Interestingly, twice before in the same district – shortly before in 2016, 9 March (with the same "yellow" description) and in 2013, 13 April, where 3-4 civilians were listed as killed, later revised to 14. the VDC heard early reports of “white phosphoric material and then other sources said it is (Sarin Gas)" which won the contest. (The same odd weapon involved in Sheikh Maqsoud was used in another event 2 weeks later at Saraqeb, that was verified as having sarin inside.) And 2013, 3-24 Adra, Damascus Suburbs, next to Douma and partly occupied by Jaish Al-Islam, where 2 fighters were reportedly killed and several sickened: "Doctors are describing the chemical weapon used as phosphorus" that otherwise fits the bill of a nerve agent. Spasms are seen, and atropine was an effective treatment. ACLOS None of these reports mentions pinpoint pupils, a key indicator, but otherwise ...

In 2016 anyway, this is not chlorine, nor is it mustard gas, nor that mysterious BZ/Agents 15 phoned in a few times. Is it sarin, or something else not yet identified as a CW used in Syria? Either seems plausible to me. More clarity would be nice. Whatever it is, apparently Jaish Al-Islam has it. Further clues a few paragraphs down suggest they share this access with Al-Qaeda franchise Jabhat Al-Nusra.

In what can only be a coincidental twist, that fatal Aleppo attack was exactly two years before the Douma incident we just considered. So both of these 7 April incidents across the country from each other were probably the work of Douma-based Jaish Al-Islam which, as a coalition, also had external branches, including one in Aleppo. It was they who were fingered for the Sheikh Maqsoud chemical attack, and a statement followed that one of their fighters was in trouble for using "prohibited weapons" there. I found no comments by Gen. Al-Zoubi, but he would surely agree with his chief negotiator Mohammed Alloush, who denied the claims - not as part of the HNC but as the political leader of the likely perpetrators. “This is really a big lie, which is laughable.” He swore JaI had no chemical weapons and if they did, would never use them on "our civilians." Rather, To Sputnik news, Alloush "once again accused Syrian President Bashar Assad of using chemical weapons in the country," if not in this particular case. He explained they only fired regular grad rockets at "our civilians" in Sheikh Maqsoud that day, and someone else must have fired in that toxic gas on the Kurds at the same time. He gives no indication who that would be, and implicitly suggests there was no chemical incident at all. I mean, how else could the situation be “laughable” to kind of guy once charged with heading big talks in Geneva? (Global Security.org)

JaI at large has also claimed the public statements about "forbidden weapons" were misread – they never referred to the CW claims they seemed to refer to, but coincidentally made a public show of reprimanding a fighter for unauthorized modification of GRAD rockets. (The Daily Beast) Maybe he modified them to deliver CW, and it actually was authorized, but just caused to much bad PR. Alloush found the ensuing confusion “laughable,” so maybe that big non-admission is the practical joke it kind of seems like. (ACLOS)

Some context: 5 April the deadliest day yet of indiscriminate terrorist shelling of the Sheikh Maqsoud district. "Saad, a pharmacist, described 5 April as “the bloodiest day the neighbourhood had witnessed”. He said that shelling from armed groups continued for nine hours straight. He added: “We counted at least 15 Hamim rockets and more than 100 mortars. The shells were falling everywhere, it was indiscriminate.” (Amnesty International) Two days later came the deadly "pesticide" - as some might put it - launched on the Kurds there by the group led by Zoubi's chief negotiator.

And following on that were reports of an earlier chemical attack: "Lebanese Hezbollah fighters said that they were also attacked by chemical weapons during the night from Sunday to Monday (April 3/4), when terrorists attacked the settlement of al-Yis in the south of Aleppo." Kurdish YPG sources "confirmed" the claims; "According to the militias, dozens of civilians suffered as a result of the attack," which they blame Turkey for. There's no mention of deaths directly caused by the chemicals. (RIA, Russia) The place is not phonetically obvious, but probably Al-Eis on Wikimapia, the only place south of Aleppo I found with a name that could also be transliterated al-Yis. Arabic: العيس Gtrans pronunciation: aleyisu) It's described as Sunni-majority (and not Kurdish?), well southwest of Aleppo city, about halfway to Saraqeb, but still inside Aleppo province. Other Names: Ash Shaykh Isa. Next-door areas labeled Tell Al-Eis and Jabal Al-Eis.

A Reuters report of 6 April said "the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front … last week attacked and captured a town" south of Aleppo, killing 11 Hezbollah fighters and 43 Syrian soldiers, then "shot down a Syrian warplane on Tuesday (the 5th) and captured its pilot" The town is given as Telat al-Eis - probably meaning the Tel Al-Eis (al-Yis) above with the chemical attack during the Aug. 3-4 conquest. On the 6th, the Reuters story related "intense air strikes in the southern Aleppo area," described as "the fiercest government assault in the area since an agreement to ease the fighting came into effect in February."

The HNC's al-Zoubi "told Reuters the truce was “in danger of ending” due to government violations." He referred to the February deal he apparently had nothing to do with, and seems to mean these new strikes – not the 5 April shelling of Aleppo by his allies, or the 3/4 April gassing and takeover of a town near Aleppo. His only and urgent issue was government retaliation against the designated terrorists of al-Nusra Front. The article notes Nusra (then calling itself Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) was never party to the ceasefire, but "its fighters are deployed near rebel groups that are.”

In fact they often share the exact space with and cooperate with such "good-guy" Islamists. The same article cites a fighter of the Sham Revolutionary Brigades who "said his group had taken part in repelling the attack (on al-Eis), and Shi’ite militias fighting with the government had suffered heavy losses." The Sham Revolutionary Brigades probably was party to the cease-fire and off-limits, despite being embedded with al-Nusra. The ceasefire was said to cover basically everyone but Nusra and ISIS, and these guys in particular were one of the "moderate" Islamist groups in Aleppo province who were vetted and given US TOW anti-tank missiles in 2015 (child-beheaders Nouredin al-Zenki were another such sponsored group - news story)

So in context, the HNC head of delegation implied that even Al-Nusra should be allowed to overrun anywhere and do anything from there, so long as they have some exempted “rebels” tagging along as human shields. A failure by Damascus to recognize that protection would destroy the fragile and ever-so-useful dialog in Geneva. Can we see what a scumbag this guy is? Al-Zoubi denounced only the government's responsive portion of this as harmful to peace. On that basis, he threatened yet again to end talks, and encouraged more terrorist attacks (explicitly on the 17th - see part 1). Any further chemical attacks on Kurdish fighters and civilians, like the one that happened the day after his statement about government violations ... “Mr. Pesticide” would see nothing to complain about, anyway, and in private, he might praise some souls over it.

Friday, September 20, 2019

"Mr. Pesticide" Part 2: The World According to Asaad Al-Zoubi

Gen. Asaad Al-Zoubi, "Mr. Pesticide"
Part two of four: 
The World According to Asaad Al-Zoubi (in 2016)
September 20, 2019

<< Part 1: The Saudis' Man for Scuttling Peace

On searching around now, it seems General Asaad Al-Zoubi made a lot of mainstream news stories during 2016 due to his position as the HNC's head of delegation, compared to none before and very little since. A few more recent statements of interest regarding the Kurds and chemical weapons are covered in parts 3 and 4, but first this overview of 2016 comments. Just in those limelight months, this unhinged conspiracy theorist promoted at least the following dubious, false, and troubling claims to support his and the HNC's tough anti-Assad bargaining stance.

* March: The Assad government was using "fatally dangerous" North Korean mercenaries to crush the Syrian peoples' movement. (UPI, Anadolu Al-Arabiya)

* October: “Brigadier Asaad Al Zoubi” said in an interview with Sky News Arabia in Riyadh: "There are 2 types of soldiers who are now blocking the city of Allepo. First is the Assad Shia regime forces, and the second is a mercenary army consisting of the Russian military, Iranian Shia, Palestinian mercenaries and Nujaba militia from Iraq," He then explained how it was the latter group of foreign “mercenaries” and not the Syrian Arab Army as claimed, leading the re-conquest of eastern Aleppo city. This suggests, as opposition hacks often do, that Syria's Sunnis majority does not support the government, except via fighting under compulsion with the "Shia regime" in the SAA. (translated from EraMuslim, Indonesia, October 2016)

It should be noted president Assad is an Alawite, said to lead an “Alawite regime” he and most Syrians would just call Syrian. Oh, and secular. Further, while Alawism is an offshoot of Shi'ism, Alwaites have tried to avoid the Shi'ite label and forge their own identity. This common display by certain Sunnis of "seeing through that ruse" and calling it Shia suggests they're keyed into a troublingly widespread mindset – they see a global satanic conspiracy by the Shi'ite infidels - the enemy within Islam and increasingly seen as the only enemy that matters. If this is how the man speaks publicly when he's being careful, then in private he might buy into such hateful thinking full-tilt.

* May: Unable to contain the rebellious Sunni majority, Assad was planning an Alawite state apart from Syria. (Asharq al-Awsat - (Saudi-owned, I think) He was allegedly planning this from the start in 2011, initially as a desperate escape from a Syria in revolt. It would be the Alawite-majority coastal districts to break away, presumably. The plans kept seeming imminent, but even in 2019, never came close to materializing. How do these people get such faulty predictive powers? Aren't they supposed to be the most cutting-edge in their grasp of reality everyone else is out-of-touch with?

But in this different plot al-Zoubi relates … In more detail but via Peoples' Mojahedin of Iran, for an idea of who gobbles this kind of story: “al-Zoubi confirmed that based on a Russian plan, which is getting Russian-Iranian collaboration, mayhem will be sparked at the core of Syria in the upcoming few hours. The campaign will launch on the premise of annihilating all signs of revolution and will set the foundations to Syria shifting to federalism. ... The eventual aim of the plot is to provide Alawites a northern state. However, a part of the western side of Aleppo is expected to be handed down to the Kurds.” The Alawite state would be named "Handy Syria" (?) and basically run across the Turkish border (Afrin and Khamsi are given as bounds of the area). I didn't map this out, but I don't think it has any Alawite-majority areas, just Kurdish and Sunni Arab, with a lot of enclaves. So the Alawite part of "Handy Syria" would include previously Sunni areas. Was ethnic cleansing planned? The Russians wanted it on the Turkish border in order to cut off all the "Syrian people" in the heartland from any support from the friendly Turks. The Kurds and the Alawites could be trusted guarding the twin gates in this nefarious plot. And again, the plot was set to unfold starting in the next “few hours.” Was there some chaos unleashed? Did any moves that way happen? Here we are, some 66,000 hours later by my quick count ... Maybe they gave up on the plan after Zoubi outed them? Just didn't want to show him right?

So in contrast to earlier Alawite state alleged plots, the breakaway state would stay allied with a Syria still under Assad's rule (and the Kurdish one would be controlled by Russia). So ... why make it separate? Just because this kind of "federalism" is such a bad thing to him? The kind of thing terrorist Kurds and terrorist Alawites do? Or because it leads to implications of further acts of genocide that would be required? And that's more reason to be all stern and stuff when you go back to Geneva next time? If so … do they let these guys brew up their own methamphetamines too?

* April: Assad cooperated with ISIS is a staged re-capture of Palmyra, suggesting the Islamic State movement is not truly a Sunni Muslim force to support (as with all other Sunni extremists, including Al-Nusra). (Qantara.de) Al-Zoubi might feel, as many do, that ISIS is rather a part of the satanic Shi'ite conspiracy against them. He seriously might believe just that.

* September: “(Al-Zoubi) added that the Arab League abandoned Syria in favour of taking the UN Security Council’s lead and did not hand Syria’s seat at the league to the opposition, a move which he described as supporting the Syrian regime. He also claimed that the Arab League did not support Syrians in overthrowing the regime that killed them and sold away their homeland to Iranians and Russians, according to his statement.” (Middle East Monitor) Is the Arab League in on the conspiracy? He seems to be wondering that, threatening to wonder more if they don't play by his rules.

* March: "There is an international conspiracy and a cover-up of Russian massacres and a cover-up for (president) Bashar," said Zoubi, who is chief negotiator for the High Negotiations Committee (HNC)." International conspiracy, huh? Is it the Jews? No, probably not. The Shi'ites! They run everything! (Reuters, March 10, 2016)

* May: Hezbollah killed its own military commander Mustafa Badreddine during clashes in Syria. Why? Maybe just to make the Sunni "revolutionaries" look bad? So Zoubi understands false-flag logic, as long as it's by the Shi'ite conspiracy side. (Al-Jazeera, reaction tweet)

* March 30: "Syrian Kurds are pressuring the Syrian opposition to resign Asaad al-Zoubi, the head of the Syrian opposition delegation to Geneva talks, after he suggested Kurds were “bandits and “mercenaries throughout history”. " (ARA News). The HNC initially had Kurdish representatives included, but they resigned from the effort on March 29, likely after less-public requests to the same effect were rebuffed. (Wikipedia - HNC) Al-Zoubi stayed at HNC. The Kurds are generally Sunni Muslim, not Shi'ite, but a bit secular-minded. Perhaps for this reason – and for being part of the HNC's broad membership, Al-Zoubi had to cut them some guarded slack, but be extra-annoyed when even they seem to get in the way of the really Sunni Arab freedom fighter-types (plus Chechens, Uighurs, etc.) ...

* September: Zoubi complains The U.S. "preferred to work with Kurdish ‘terrorist’ groups such as the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Peshmerga forces and Yezidis, “while refusing to deal with the FSA that effectively fought against ISIS in Northern Aleppo, and recently in Jarabulus.” Furthermore, he says Kurdish (and perhaps Yezidi) forces are "terrorists," unlike "FSA," and their ilk, including Jabhat al-Nusra.  (ARA News, tweet)

Sunni Muslim women used as human shield by Kurdish terrorists … no, wait...
Jaish al-Islam for example is super-cool by him despite the horrific reality, including killing and mass kidnapping of civilians just because of their religion (see again my best overview here). It's not as clear if he lumps these popular groups into the broad conspiracy along with ISIS (whom the Kurds and Yezidis were fighting, sometimes desperately) and of course thence with the other terrorists like Hezbollah and the "Assad Shi'ite regime." But that sounds like his kind of thinking.

My Semi-Informed Observations

There's an ugly sectarian thinking that's grown in the last decades and drives Sunnis of the extremist, takfiri persuasion from across the globe to come and kill Shi'ites in Iraq, and now Alawites in Syria, besides in other battlefronts across the globe against various regional infidels. These supposed villains, as the impressionable hear it, are killing Sunni Muslim babies for sport, a global satanic conspiracy by the Shi'ite infidels - the enemy within Islam and increasingly seen as the only enemy that matters.

The public words of Al-Zoubi, just as seen in this short sampling, give reason to suspect he susbscribes to such views. He's far from unique in that regard, unfortunately. I don't know how especially he needs to be called out over it; he just happened to seem extra interesting to me in light of his later comments on the Douma chemical attack in 2018 (see part 3, and later part 4), and then seeing his scrap with the Kurds and Twitter (see part 3).

In Syria at least those riled up to fight the Satanic conspiracy get all sorts of outside assistance and enabling, and usually get paid to kill – by design, better than Syria can afford to pay its own soldiers. Of course, sources in the Persian Gulf tyrannies supplying most of the money. But to Saudi-sponsored Al-Zoubi, only those supporting the government side, and especially Shi'ite forces, - the ones legally invited to help, by the legal and popular government of Syria – are spitefully dismissed as “mercenaries.” Whereas on the opposition side, he'll call everyone but ISIS just “rebels” at worst, since even he can't pretend they're all “Syrian freedom fighters.” Naturally, he would ignore or tacitly approve of any crimes they committed in the pursuit of the divine mission.

So he paint a simplified picture of heroic Jihadists vs. regime villainy he calls it “Shi'ite” at almost every chance. And there's some broader global conspiracy involved, trying to obscure Assad's and Putin's crimes in Syria. This might help show how it's not just Shi'ites as people here but something broader and insidious working through them and others - like Satan, maybe, pulling a great many strings as he would, so one's God could seem more awesome compared to the challenge. I don't need to read the full version to know the plot includes Russia and Syria, of course, plus Iran, and North Korea. It's it's not clear who else - probably China? Yes, Satan is big on commies, and generally on Russians, besides Shi'ites. Non-state parties he'd include: Hezbollah, Shi'ite forces or forceful voices anywhere, various media outlets and reporters, other parties to be decided as he feels the need to exert leverage here or there. (e.g. September example above: suggesting maybe the Arab League has been swayed to the dark side too - not explicitly here, but if the friction grew over time, I bet he could talk himself into that corner.)

He seems alarmed at this pro-Assad conspiracy, maybe because it was so sneaky as to get a shitload of factual truth behind it, or to simply get reality itself bought off? No, he wouldn't want to put it like that. But yes, that has to aggravate the man. Anyway, he could calm his panic, if he wanted to, by noting how the Western world, the Gulf tyrannies, and half the rest of the world's media and leaders seem totally immune to their plot. They remain staunchly anti-Assad, and open to nearly any propaganda claim against him, no matter how absurd. Nonetheless, the faith might have been waning, skepticism growing. So, blame a conspiracy.

He keeps fairly mum about the Alawites, suggesting he has nothing but venom for them. The exception is his urgent warning of the plot for Alawite and Kurdish states “Handy Syria” set to begin within hours. A lot of Sunni Arabs might have to be forced out or killed to facilitate that plan. He might expect gleeful Alawite militias would help with the rape and rounding up of the people in the way of their new homes.

As noted above, the secular-leaning Kurds might be guardedly tolerated by Gen. Zoubi, as fellow Sunnis, until they get in the way, then he's instantly ugly about the treachery, and stays that way. He's cool sitting with Christian George Sabra, because George echoes the opposition line. He doesn't represent Syria's Christians, who tend to support Assad and thus to Al-Zoubi, any of them who takes up arms would classify as terrorists, like most or all Kurdish forces anywhere, and perhaps the Yezidi (sort of Christian) forces in Iraq.

Another suggestion of his comments: no Sunnis who rise up to fight the government class as terrorists – he might agree in form about Al-Nusra Front, but then take every chance to cover for them anyway. Only Islamic State / ISIS / ISIL / Daesh classes as terrorist for him, but he seems to think they're part of the Shi'ite conspiracy, so ... he seems to be delusional.

Al-Zoubi's flippant, or flipped-from-correct, use of the “terrorist” label comes a matching penchant for moralistic exaggeration, with phrases like “annihilating all signs of revolution.” The basic gist of his firm stance is deep certainty – no mere suspicion – that Assad is the only real problem in Syria, and his victory would “bring destruction to the whole country.” Heck, it might usher in an epic genocide of all the Sunnis, and threaten the whole world. To the great moral philosopher Asaad Al-Zoubi, the foreign-backed “rebels” from FSA to Jaish al-Islam and the “Syrian people” they represent are pure as snow. Again except for all the parts of it they managed to sweep under that ISIS (Persian!) rug.

So not only is he wrong and delusional, he insists on being extreme about it. But he was the right kind of wrong, and the right kind of certain – to some influential minds. So it shouldn't be surprising that this FSA general was selected by the Saudi royal family, along with a leader of a sectarian terrorist group they sponsored, to head up deciding the entire opposition's demands for the Geneva III stall-a-thon. That alone would suggest a rather bad apple, but it surely helps to have such a peek inside the parts of his brain he shows the world. That peek continues and goes deeper in part 3. Again, all this above was just from 2016, in his polished showing under the limelights at Geneva. Afterwards, it gets more scant but less sanitized.

Friday, September 13, 2019

"Mr. Pesticide" Part 1: Scuttling Peace

Gen. Asaad Al-Zoubi "Mr. Pesticide"
Part one of four: The Saudis' Man for Scuttling Peace
September 18, 2019
edits Sept. 20, 21

Note: this is a decent-size part of a huge bottlenecked and delayed project I'll do in four parts, with parts 2 and 3 expected to fall in place quicker, and part 4 a bit later. There was a lot of related details I didn't know and had to do lookups, ranging from quick to fairly deep, and wanted to relate most of it in one place. Or. I was thinking two, but the first one had to be split, and in three works best. All-told, I'll explain: the Saudis' Man for scuttling peace, peddling lies, and promoting genocide.

General Asaad Al-Zoubi ( أسعد الزعبي ), born 1956, has a long history in the Syrian military from the 1970s, reaching the rank brigadier-general before he defected to the opposition side during the current conflict. It was reportedly in mid-2012, but a bit unclear, when he fled Syria and joined the opposition SNC and FSA, where he was given the rank of general. As of 2019 he holds a leadership position with US-backed, Jordan-based Southern Front, a coalition with both Islamist and secular units, allied with - but not including - Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and al-Qaeda offshoot Jabhat al-Nusra ("sometimes"). The southern Front promises to not be defined by its Islamist tendencies, and is vocally and/or militarily opposed of ISIS (Islamic State, ISIL, Daesh), and sometimes opposed to al-Nusra. (Wikipedia) His lack of a beard might suggest he's no Saudi-style Islamist. But with the mustache and leather jacket, he looks to me more like a Turkish Islamist, which he seems to act like. (Photo source: Geneva, Switzerland, April 19, 2016. REUTERS/Denis Balibouse)

Al-Zoubi was born in Daraa province, where his clan is large and prominent (FWIW the family name translates "doubtful"). It's spawned a previous prime minister of Syria, and their current information minister, besides this SNC-FSA sellout. The Daraa Zoubis were targeted early on in the uprising. In one case, a reported 16 of that name, aged 17-75, were the largest sector among 52 men and boys killed in a late-April, 2011 "Saida massacre." One of them was the famous 12-year-old Hamza al-Khatib. The lodged story of that event has been thoroughly disproven, by the way. (See my 2016 report - and the eldest Al-Zoubi got to be the first entry in the “Caesar photos” file.) Asaad al-Zoubi may have bought into the claims of a massacre of his kin at Saida, but it took a while before he defected sometime the following year. It's not clear what he did for the next 3+ years prior to January, 2016, when he was chosen for an important job.

Defected Syrian prime minister Riad Hijab was selected in December 2015 to head the Supreme Negotiations Committee (aka High/Higher Negotiations Committee, hereafter HNC) being formed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (Wikipedia) This was to be a broadest-yet umbrella of opposition groups, ranging from moderate Islamist to extremist, but excluding designated terrorist groups, including some ostensible secular voices, at least one prominent Christian, and even a Kurdish contingent was involved, briefly. The HNC was given the power to select the opposition delegates for the upcoming peace-oriented, talk-related process called Geneva III, or the 3rd Geneva conference on "the future of Syria." Hijab selected Gen. Al-Zoubi as the "head of delegation" for the HNC but had him working with two others:

* "chief negotiator" on the team: Mohammed Alloush, acting political leader of the extremist, sectarian terrorist group Jaish al-Islam, and a relative of genocide-minded JaI founder Zahran (or Mohammed Zahran?) Alloush. Zahran's father was a salafist cleric long-ago exiled to Saudi Arabia for criminal extremism. Riyadh sent strong support to his son's JaI in Douma, so by 2016 they were holding half the Damascus suburbs hostage and  able to hit the capitol on command, besides fielding franchises throughout Syria. So Mohammed Alloush was a natural choice to head up some tough "negotiations." His marketing-heavy education and fairly polished style (well-trimmed beard, etc.) were definite recommending features as well. (some prior work on JaI bringing Hell to E. Ghouta while sending Alloush to Geneva.)

* The “we're not Islamists” guy on the team: George Sabra, an anti-Assad CHRISTIAN! apologist for terrorism and total puppet (NCSROF until 2018 anyway). He's also a writer for the Arabic version of Sesame Street, so he gets how muppets and puppets have their words written for them. (Wikipedia)

Image: HNC tweet "Head of the negotiating team Asaad Al-Zoubi and chief negotiator Mohammed Alloush arrive in #Geneva for #SyriaTalks March 2016" Sabra was off-frame somewhere, perhaps making them grilled cheeses sandwiches.

Syria, Russia, Iran, and Egypt opposed the HNC's decision to have members of terrorist groups (by their formal, legal definitions) have a leading say in "the future of Syria." They referred to Alloush's Jaish Al-Islam and to Ahrar Al-Sham, who also had at least one member involved. (Al-Masdar News) But that formula was forced through, causing visible problems from the start.

Before January was out, U.N. special envoy Staffan De Mistura complained the HNC was trying to make itself "THE opposition delegation" - a position supported by the U.S. Obama administration. As the same Al-Masdar article put it: "According to UN special envoy, Staffan de Mistura, Saudi Arabia is attempting to complicate his efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the war in Syria." In context, they were using the HNC as a tool to that end, and Gen. al-Zoubi was picked as one of its trusted operators. As De Mistura said, the core issue involved the HNC's "seriousness about the process," which was needed to "give a meaning to a peace conference.” This is the bouncing ball to follow in the following paragraphs.

It seems there was a lot of pre-dialog before any meetings in Geneva began in March. At the start of February, Reuters reported, “Bashar al-Jaafari, head of the government delegation, said on Sunday Damascus was considering options such as ceasefires, humanitarian corridors and prisoner releases ... as a result of the talks, not as a condition to begin them." But "the opposition High Negotiations Committee indicated it would leave Geneva unless peace moves were implemented (first)." Likelihood of progress: minimal. Still, an early ceasefire was agreed to by the U.S. and Russia in late February. It was the first one ever agreed on such a scale, per a Wikipedia article on them that fails to even mention the HNC. This ceasefire held with “hiccups” and fragility, through July, by most accounts, with both sides blaming each other for the all the failures.

With first meetings in Geneva planned for March 12, a March 10 Reuters report has Al-Zoubi threatening to pull the HNC out at the last moment because of “massacres” and a "conspiracy." "The head of the Syrian opposition's negotiating team said on Thursday it was not optimistic about peace talks getting under way in Geneva, and has still not confirmed if it will attend the U.N.-backed negotiations." Al-Zoubi is cited as telling Al Arabiya and/or al Hadath TV (both Saudi-run) "There is no optimism ... there is an international conspiracy and a cover-up of Russian massacres and a cover-up for (president) Bashar."

On March 12, however, they did arrive in Geneva, ready to blame the other side from a closer distance. (HNC tweet)

Add Sept. 21: A Reuters report of 6 April said "the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front … last week attacked and captured" the town of Telat al-Eis south of Aleppo, killing 11 Hezbollah fighters and 43 Syrian soldiers in the process, then "shot down a Syrian warplane on Tuesday (the 5th) and captured its pilot." This triggered, on the 6th, "intense air strikes in the southern Aleppo area," described as "the fiercest government assault in the area since an agreement to ease the fighting came into effect in February." The HNC's al-Zoubi was quoted on this story: he "told Reuters the truce was “in danger of ending” due to government violations." He referred to the February deal he apparently had nothing to do with, and seems to mean these new strikes against the designated terrorists of al-Nusra Front, who were never party to the ceasefire (although some covered "moderate" forces were working with Nusra and coming under attack). More on this issue in part 3.

By April 13, the HNC had lost its Kurdish portion (see part 2), and talks at Geneva had reached a likely related “deadlock,” and taken a recess (time frame unclear). Thing were just resuming when al-Zoubi declared, as a DW.com article puts it: "President Bashar al-Assad is the problem and Syria can only start to heal once he's gone." Or as an AP report translated his day's comments, Al-Zoubi said president Assad is a "disease" and Russia is "not serious" about the obvious cure of removal from power, the only hope for Syria's future. (Associated Press)

Syria's Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad said a transitional government as proposed amounts to a coup d'etat and "will never be accepted". He noted how most of the world except Saudi Arabia and Turkey have given up on pushing for Assad's removal. Mekdad explained "if we have to proceed" with talks, "then we need to forget or we need others to forget the dreams they had for the last five years." (Belfast Telegraph) But Zoubi knew it was destiny, not a dream. Parliamentary elections in Syria began at the same time, but he said, also on the 13th, “These elections do not mean anything.” Because they don't require Assad to step down, they were "theater for the sake of procrastination" – that is, putting off the inevitable. (Reuters) Basis for expecting progress: slim.

Two days later, Zoubi used fresh alleged attacks on Aleppo to declare “the regime ... sends a strong message that it doesn’t want a political solution, but a military solution that will bring destruction to the whole country.” He added that same-day administrative moves showed Damascus was “not serious about the political solution” and “divorced from reality.” (Reuters 15 April). Back in reality, 17 April, "Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will remain in power for just four months longer, until a transitional government takes control of the war-torn country" according to HNC's Mohammed Alloush. The form of it wasn't agreed yet; "another HNC source" (al-Zoubi?) outlined a proposal for a new government they recently heard, but rejected: "Effectively, Assad would stay in a ceremonial position. But we categorically rejected the proposal," the source added. (The New Arab - 17 April) They're way too 'in touch with reality' to settle for that. A "disease" has to be wiped out, not compromised with or left as a figurehead. They preferred the deal they had (?) where Assad would be out of power in four months time.

Also on 17 April, al-Zoubi paused his confident peace-talking and transition plans to send out word to the fighters: “We will not stay for long negotiating.. .In the event a missile targets them (rebels), they have to retaliate with ten missiles,” … rebels “must gain control of as many areas as possible, they must take advantage of the ceasefire as the regime has done”. (Reuters)

It must be noted, and here seems good: it's not always clear even now what exactly the “criminal Assad regime” has really done as opposed to just been accused of. We can suppose the Syrian military were killing and weakening the militants, and perhaps this alone was cause to demand a halt to attacks. But it's the alleged criminal targeting of homes and hospitals, etc. that's put forth as the reason. These allegations are never proven, usually dubious, and often disproven (a good example in a moment...) On the basis of  crimes that might be entirely fictional, the “transitional government” could only exclude the current government ("Assad or any ruling group"). (Sputnik News)

So the terrorist-linked panel insisted on the regime's agreeing to suicide, basically, while green-lighting militant attacks on government-held areas and civilians. Then on April 21 when the government still insisted on fighting instead, and was still getting blamed for atrocities, the HNC really promised to walk out, calling talk pointless until the military situation changed - but NOT in the government's favor. (Reuters)

Six days later (27 April) came an allegation they didn't comment on (that I saw) but a great example of the kind: Al-Quds Hospital in Aleppo, allegedly bombed by Assad forces, killing 55 civilians. But the hospital was clearly not “reduced to rubble” as reported by MSF, and almost certainly not hit from the air at all (no damage to the roof or any external wall). Some internal explosions are seen, but these are provable from 4+ distinct bombs placed in different spots and triggered simultaneously to mimic an airstrike – an inside job. It did injure and kill some people, mainly in the emergency room (number there unclear, but 55 dead seems strangely extreme). And the most famous death of the “last pediatrician in Aleppo” Dr. Maaz likely didn't happen. Some clues suggest he coordinated the inside job, and a shady video edit might cover him leaving the ER prior to the blast there he might know just how to avoid. THIS is the kind of fake crimes people like Al-Zoubi eagerly pass on as true, never wanting to ask questions, perhaps knowing how fragile the illusions really are.

But it took that, everything before, and another month's worth of allegations before finally, on 29 May, the HNC started delivering on its promises. Chief negotiator Mohammed Allosuh resigned that post over the lack of progress in removing Assad or halting the allegations against him. About four months he pouted and threatened to run away from Geneva and the HNC before he finally did. Meanwhile, as DW reported, “the head of the main Syrian opposition delegation Asaad al-Zoubi also told the Saudi al Hadath TV channel that he too wanted to be relieved of his post, but did not confirm he had taken a similar step."(DW) Al-Zoubi was still called the leader of the HNC in articles as late as October 8, 2016. (Reuters) But the HNC delegation was led by a Naser al-Hariri when it participated in the new Geneva peace talks that commenced in February, 2017. (Wikipedia – HNC)

I didn't dig much past that, but it apparently didn't go well at Geneva IV in 2017 either. In February, the HNC rejected moves by the UN's Staffan de Mistura to re-exert control over delegate selection for the talks, and insisted the Kurdish PYD could not sit under its umbrella. (as they had non-Islamist George Sabra explain: "should the (PYD) want to take part, it has to do so on the regime side.”) (Rudaw) By mid-November, the HNC still existed when its founder, Riad Hijab, was among a dozen opposition figures who "resigned, apparently in protest of others being too willing to accept the continued rule of a man (Assad) they view as a discredited tyrant." (Sarah El Deeb and Philip Issa, Associated Press, 22 Nov.)

Who were these other people worth resigning over? They sound more correct. It could better be said the tyrants in Turkey and Saudi Arabia were discredited by Syria's continued defiance. In fact the tyrants were starting to acknowledge it themselves, even as some more zealous agents held out; the same AP article explains “Aides told local papers that Hijab, in his resignation Monday, was protesting Saudi Arabia giving up on calls for Assad to step down. Media reports suggested Saudi Arabia didn't invite HNC to the 2017 Riyadh meeting." A lack of invitation sounds like a lack of favor. In fact, Hijab's Wikipedia entry states “in 2017 he resigned as head of the (HNC) group following Saudi pressure.” (Wikipedia – Hijab)

It seems the HNC was dissolved after this, dropping off the radar. Nothing past 2017 is mentioned in the relevant Wikipedia entry. Even the visionary Saudis were "out of touch with reality" so the HNC's people retreated to their shrinking kingdom of truth. It might take longer than those four months, but the diehards seemed to maintain faith in the inevitable forced end of Assad's rule, even if the whole world procrastinated over it.

The approach taken by the High Negotiations Committee was never likely to advance a peaceful settlement. But they took that approach anyway, maybe because they planned to fail and blame the other side. It could be said - as Staffan De Mistura suspected early on - that they were never serious about the peace process. Instead, it seems they were engaged in an unstated and criminal process to pursue the Saudis' preferred military non-solution.

Since outright regime change was becoming unlikelier by 2016, it seems they adopted a policy of regime-bleed; delay the inevitable resolution so Syria can remain embattled, demonized, sanctioned and suffering until its will was broken, or as weakened and wounded as possible. The end goal isn't clear to me - perhaps as simple as having one less or one weaker ally for Iran in some big war against them planned down the road. Most likely it's a cluster of reasons mostly related to that regional struggle, including competing oil pipeline schemes and the like. But there can hardly be a morally straight reason for this kind of deceitful and murderous policy.

---
On to part 2

Sunday, December 6, 2015

FSA-ISIS Teamwork in the Latakia Massacres?

FSA-ISIS Teamwork in the Latakia Massacres?
Started November 1, 2015  
total re-write posted, December 6

Introduction
With Syria's ruling government long ago deemed illegitimate and unacceptable, those competing to fill the supposed vacuum include the Free Syrian Army (hereafter FSA), largely mythical but "moderate," except parts of disputed size that are kind of Islamist. On another end of the opposition spectrum is the ridiculously barbaric Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL or, hereafter, the Arabic acronym/slur "Daesh"). Among non-Kurdish opposition, the space between Daesh and FSA is filled by a gaggle of hard-to-decipher Jihadist groups, the most famous of which is Jabhat al-Nusra, the official branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria. These, like the FSA and the rest appear to many as relatively moderate - compared to Daesh.

Recently there's been much protest at how Russian bombs now join Syria's in being aimed at anti-government fighters that, we often learn with shock, are not members of Daesh. The targets are said by the West to be Turkey-supported and CIA-trained "moderate" rebels, whom the Syrians and Russians still call terrorists. And activists say their strikes are mainly hitting civilian targets anyway, which the same West condemns. So Russia is aiming for moderates and killing innocents, as the US, Turkey and its allies push their single-minded war against Daesh, and, even more so, against Syria's government, which they claim somehow caused Daesh (a claim I partially address here).

Now the well-funded Daesh has downed a Russian jetliner, shot hundreds in Paris, and launched other attacks from Lebanon to Mali to (perhaps) San Bernadino just in the last month, on top of their previous atrocities inside Syria, Iraq, Libya, and beyond. Now the world scrambles to destroy the menace, in competing campaigns now shooting at each other at the risk of general global war.

Now more than ever we could use a more careful consideration, by minds on all sides of this debate, of the differences, the similarities, and the relationship between these groups, the opportunity provided to all of them by the regime change campaign, and the growing cost to humanity inside and outside the targeted area of that ongoing campaign.

Many minds are working on this in an honest way. They know the different groups from Daesh to the FSA are neither one-and-the-same, nor are they necessarily much different from each other. But to help solidify that point, I've done this review of a chillingly relevant case, not quite ignored but strangely muted: the early August, 2013 cluster of massacres in rural Latakia province. From August 4-18 rebels pushed a heralded “Operation to Liberate the Coast” - a united opposition effort to shake up the insulated Alawi (Alawite) community and terrorize a base of support for the government of Alawi president Assad. (see the “moderate” backdrop).

The attackers set out from the rebel-held Sunni village of Salma and on the first day, August 4, several villages were overrun. At least 225 women and children were taken prisoner as over 200 non-combatants were executed, many literally slaughtered or beheaded. These included women (some raped and killed), babies and children, and the elderly and infirm, but it was mostly a genocidal sweep of the all fighting age men they could find. These villages witnessed incredible brutality in the worst-yet accepted rebel massacre of Alawi civilians. Most readers could use at least a refresher on the horror of this incident before we examine just who the "rebels" were in this case. See top link for a longer event summary and links to the sub-posts including this one)

The rebels' 2013 Latakia offensive, which ended in defeat and Syrian recapture of all towns, was fought by various mainly Islamist factions working in tandem. There were at least 20 different but allied groups including Jabhat al-Nusra and a relatively new one called Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham as well as groups calling themselves part of a “Free Syrian Army.” The agreements and teamwork, if and how the Islamists and the "moderate" FSA shared the fighting, the killing, and the secrets, is what will be considered here. It's a long piece that took me over a month to re-write after the first quick draft. It's much shorter to read, but still not necessary to read end-to-end. But here it is.

Involved: Islamists Beyond FSA Control
HRW: Five Central Groups
Lebanese channel Al-Mayadeen made a powerful documentary about the offensive and massacres called From Earth - Latakia (video in Arabic, partial translation with commentary). This describes the scene as they entered the village of Balouta with the Syrian Arab Army weeks later: "Various banners and scrawled messages are around indicating which gangs of terrorists were in this village. ... “Jabhat al Nusra”, “Dawat al Islam”, “Katibet Soukour al-Iz”, “The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham” and “Haraqat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyyah” .... More foodstuffs are found. The packaging is written in Turkish." (at right, a still: weaponry and flags – Ahrar al-Sham (right) modified Deash partly visible, upper center.)

Dawat al-Islam (meaning dawn of Islam) may refer to a little-known group, or to a Daesh recruitment song of that name, current in late 2013, a more nebulous movement (some said there were “51 different races in Dawat Al-Islam,” The Muslim Issue, November 2013) or and/or Daesh itself (same link: “my brother from Dawat Al-Islam,” turns out to be a Daesh fighter.)

The other four names are among five core groups implicated by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in a report they issued in October after a field study in Latakia: "You can still see their blood" - Executions, indiscriminate shooting, and hostage taking by opposition forces in Latakia countryside. PDF, 113 pages. Researched and written by Lama Fakih, Human Rights Watch, October 11, 2013. Read or download page. This will be heavily cited from here on.

The investigation "found that at least 20 distinct armed opposition groups participated in the operation," listing at least 17 with supporting details, most of them gathered from open social media sources (that is, they were pretty open about it). It wasn't clear who all was present on the 4th when the worst of the killings happened, but HRW identified five groups "who were the key fundraisers, organizers, planners, and executors of the attacks" and "were clearly present from the outset..."

The following is a list with perhaps too much detail, optional reading/reference (for even more info, see longer-entry list with correlated fatalities here) Two of these are the well-known al-Qaeda offshoots  should need no introduction, but briefly:

1) Jabhat al-Nusra (Nusra/Victory Front) - a leading group, involved in hostage-taking, executions, including of sheikh Badreddin Ghazal. 3 fighters killed on the 4th.

2) Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS/ISIL/Islamic State or, herein, the Arabic acronym/slur Daesh) a leading group, just before taking Raqqah as their capitol, involved in hostage-taking and executions, had a commander, Abu Jaafar al-Libi, serve as first deputy commander of the overall operation (see Joint Command?). Graffiti on a school in Aubin declared “Headquarters of the Islamic State.” They lost at least 4 fighters, got to hold 120 hostages.

3) Ahrar al-Sham "Islamic Movement of the Free Men of al-Sham (greater Syria/Levant) -Wikipedia page. Islamist coalition that "cooperates with the Free Syrian Army and other secular rebel groups; however, it does not maintain ties with the Syrian National Council," HRW heard that Ahrar al-Sham was a leading group in the offensive, and its local leader Abu Taha was the deputy responsible for the finances. They “fought” in at least five villages, and lost 3 fighters,  all on the 4th and all Moroccans – likely overflow from Sham al-Islam on loan. They initially held no hostages, but in September "assumed responsibility for the hostages taken during the offensive,” somehow secured from JMA and Daesh. In October, 2013, they had their “political office in Raqqa," which was taken by Daesh as their capitol in mid-August, just as this Latakia offensive was ending. So this suggests Ahrar al-Sham were working with the Islamic State at that time (the Wikipedia entry doesn't mention any alliance or breaking of it, as it does with the next two listed groups).

4) Suqour al-Izz: Wikipedia This is a group of primarily Saudi jihadists, initially cooperated with both Daesh and Jabhat al-Nusra, but rejected the former and joined with Nusra early, in in January, 2014. HRW adds: "Sheikh Saqr, the leader of Suquor al-Izz (seems to be) the person responsible for the finances for the operation,” "referring to himself as a “poor slave.”” and dispersing money collected from “private Gulf based donors” via his deputy, Abu Taha from Ahrar al-Sham. A large body of nine Suqour al-Izz fighters died, hailing from Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and unknown.

5) Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA) Army of Emigrants and Supporters), Wikipedia page Largely Chechen-based, JMA was "briefly affiliated” with the Daesh, using their flag and so on, “but after changes in leadership it took an increasingly hostile stance against it.” But only in September 2015, did JMA officially side with Al-Nusra in its anti-ISIS fight. A leading group in Latakia, JMA commander Abu Jaafar al-Libi was identified as the leader of the operation (see below, joint command?). HRW learned of 10 JMA fighters killed, “many of them Tunisian and Libyan nationals." A JMA commander or “emir”, Abu Suhaib, was reported killed, but seemingly in error (see here). Abu Walid al-Shishani (a Chechen), is also identified as participating.

HRW: 12 Other Groups
According to the HRW report, the following 12 further groups have some evidence of involvement in the massacre towns and/or times, but full involvement is unclear. Some are units of the FSA, but apparently not under Idriss command. Order as given, almost seems to be by degree of connection to FSA, starting with the most linked.

6 Ahrar al-Sahel Brigade – FSA unit in name (see below, non-command FSA), claims involvement on the 4th in Isterbeh, Abu Makkah, Hamboushia, Beit Shakouhi. The Assad Allah Hamza battalion is a sub-unit. Commander Abu Talal was injured and Amer al-Haddad killed in Esterbeh.

7 Farouq Brigades: Wikipedia. This is definitely a unit of FSA (see below, non-command FSA), but involvement here is not very clear; a distance video, a graffiti mention in Abu Makkeh. No losses mentioned. 

8 The Hassan al-Azhari Battalion: Led by Abu Taha from Latakia (different from Ahrar al-Sham's), HRW's activist said this “Abu Taha protected Alawite women from the foreigners [other fighters] who wanted to kill them.” No mention of protecting the men.  Claimed presence in Nbeiteh, Barouda. At least two fighters killed in Abu Makkeh, both on or by August 6.

HRW photo: FSA unit "to the genocide of Alawites"
9 The Heroes of Khirbet al-Jawz: A nominal FSA unit (see below). Graffiti seen in Abu Makkeh: “The heroes of Khirbet al-Jawz to the genocide of Alawites.” Sub-unit Oussama Bin Zeid Battalion also left marks in Abu Makkeh. No losses mentioned.

10 Saif Allah al-Masloul, al-Ansar: HRW reports this group bragged on the 7th how on “August 5 they raided Blouta killing all the shabiha” (a day late?) A video shows them raiding Abu Makkah on the 5th.” They claim to part of “Al-Ansar.” Little else seems to be known. They report one fighter died from his injuries on August 7.

11 Sham al-Islam: Harakat Sham al-Islam (HSI - Wikipedia article)  "Islamic Movement of al-Sham ) is composed of primarily Moroccans. "The group was founded in August 2013 by three Moroccan detainees who had been released from the Guantanamo Bay detention camp,” only announced their formation as the operation ended, with a video on August 18. HSI later joined Jabhat Ansar al-Din, which in September, 2015 formally joined with al-Nusra, who claim to oppose Daesh. 5 killed, 2-3 at least Moroccans, may have provided Ahrar al-Sham's 3 dead Moroccans.

12 Sheikh Qahtan Battalion (formerly Al-Tawhid), Ansar al-Sham: “The Sheikh Qahtan Battalion, formerly al-Tawhid (distinct from the FSA group), operating under the umbrella of Ansar al-Sham, a member of the Syrian Islamic Front.” It was renamed during the August operation after its commander, Sheikh Qahtan Haj Mohamed, also a deputy commander of the operation (see Joint Command?), was killed on the 4th, and they renamed it after him.

13 Suqour al-Sham: Associated with Jabhat Tahrir Suriya, little said.. A video “shows Suquor al-Sham clashing with the Syrian army during the offense on Barouda tower on August 4,” and “graffiti identifying Suquor al-Sham was also left in Obeen village.”

14 Sons of al-Qadisiyya: This was formed around Feb. 2013, in Latakia, “composed of various battalions including al-Farouq and al-Ansar” with a mission to link the brigades with financial supporters and donors, “in coordination with the Free Syrian Army abroad.” Aside from that, no sign of FSA/SNC control. A video from August 5 or earlier shows Sons of al-Qadisiyya fighters shelling the villages.

15/16/17 Thuwar al-Haffeh, Ibrahim Khalil, Al-Shaheed Sino Rebels Battalion: These last three are implicated by graffiti, with limited background information, and no specifics on anything but where their graffiti was seen.

One More: Front for Authenticity and Development
FAD fighter, graffiti, logo, in Kaharata
Front for Authenticity and Development (FAD) is a U.S.-backed, Saudi-funded, "moderate Islamist" force, using FSA colors and cooperating with them, but not a part of FSA or answerable to the SNC (see ACLOS). Co-founded in 2011 by defectors including Farouq's Abdulrazaq Tlass, they maintain a low profile, appearing neither secular nor overtly Jihadist. They have controlled territory, if limited to sectors of some cities and no swathes of land (once with sectors of Aleppo, Deraa, and Douma, decreasing from there, but in 2015 granted a prized share in Jis al-Shughour). Graffiti saying "Allahu Akbar, first brigade, Western front, of front for authenticity and development" was seen in a video of theirs, on the wall of a checkpoint (see right). That was at the entrance to the village of Kharata, population 37, suggesting they were in charge there at filming time, on the 9th. Some reports (like HRW's) don't mention fatalities there at all, but some say everyone in Kharata died, or only 10 survived. The FAD is reasonably implicated in the massacre.

Joint Command?
Before even addressing the evidence for FSA involvement, let's skip ahead to what can be seen of the command structure for the “Operation to Liberate the Coast,” at least as HRW could see through open sources. The FSA was apparently not running the show, anyway.

Whoever fought under whatever banner, there were many fighters to manage in the Latakia offensive - a reported 20,000 of them, from at least 20 groups. Christof Lehman at NSNBC International, in his response to the HRW report, pointed to his analysis of the 2013 Ghouta alleged sarin attack, saying it "clearly demonstrated that a joint command structure exists" there, likely connected to the US and Saudi Arabia. I haven't assessed that claim, but it could be. And as he notes, with that occurring less than 2 days after the Latakia offensive ended, “it is unlikely that the 20 jihadi groups and their battalions which took part in the Liberate the Coast offensive did not have a joint command structure.” 

I'm not a military expert and can't really say if there had to be a joint command, but it makes sense. They at least needed some agreement to provide a little structure, a basic plan agreed by everyone. But Lehman is sure there must be an overall command, perhaps with an operations room, and says “HRW fails to mention this with as much as one word in the report,” an omission he finds odd in “an otherwise well documented report,” taking it as "a clear and unmistakable sign of strong, intentional bias.”

Leading: JMA, Daesh, Tawhid
However, an even clearer sign of pro-rebel bias would be to simply never release such a report. And, although it isn't clearly spelled out that I see, the report includes at least these passages saying there was an overall leader within the operation, and a command center supplied by his group, the Daesh-linked Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA). 

JMA's Abu Suhaib (as IDd) w/hostages, app. in September
JMA's local forces were co-commanded by two Libyans; Abu Jaafar al-Libi and Abu Suhaib al-Libi. The latter is the “ISIS emir” who was reported killed on the 18th, seemingly in error. “According to the opposition activist that spoke to Human Rights Watch,” the report states, these two leaders from JMA are the ones “that commanded the Latakia offensive against the villages” - maybe just the JMA part, or all of it. Further, ''On August 13, Sheikh Saqr, the commander of Saquor al-Izz, tweeted that Abu Jaafar al-Libi from Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar was the leader of the operation and that his deputies were Abu Jaafar from ISIS and Sheikh Qahtan from al-Tawhid.” Qahtan is separately described as “a deputy commander of the operation,” and Abu Jaafar was "identified as the first deputy commander of the operation.” The leader picks as deputies a guy in ISIS who's got a son with the same name (and thus they have the same fighter name), and the leader of a smaller local Islamist group for Syrian flavor. This makes sense.

In April, 2013, the HRW report states, the JMA had established a “mujahedeen operations room” in the Salma area, and used it to organize with other extremists as the coastal operation was being planned. (“It appears that planning and fundraising for the “Operation to Liberate the Coast” began at this time.”) They then had the center used to organize the August offensive (“This operation room was later used for the “Operation to Liberate the Coast””). Suqour al-Izz leader Sheikh Saqr seems to HRW to be “responsible for the finances of the operation room" and Abu Taha from Ahrar al-Sham was “the deputy responsible for the finances of the operation room.”

On the other hand, this is from an financier of the operation and an activist who organized between the groups, discussing an operation with brutality either might not want to own up to. And JMA and ISIS are natural falls guy to blame, almost seeming like professional villains invented to absorb excess evil. The activist was quite clear that “the Libyans (meaning JMA) did not kill, they slaughtered, even women and elderly.”

But the details are compelling enough this aspect of the joint offensive is most likely true. That is, they're the fall guys to be blamed for the strategically useful “excesses,” but it was actually scripted out that way in real life. Consider how between all the groups, it was somehow decided JMA and Daesh should actually hold all of the hostages, the women and children implicitly threatened with deliberate murder unless some terrorist demands were met.

Everyone Else 
As for other groups' prominence within the campaign - Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, FSA, and the others - all would be followers, if honored and valued followers. But some would lead among them. Several groups lost at least three and as many as ten acknowledged fighters; the more fighters they lost and the earlier, the more likely they were to be in the first wave, which is more likely to have segued right into exterminating civilians. HRW's core five groups are all in that category (Ahar Al-Sham lost 3, ISIS 4 Nusra 3, JMA 10,SaI 8) and at least Sham al-Islam (HSI, with 5 dead) and Tawhid/Qahtan (a commander, on day one) stand out among the other 12. Both also have other outstanding clues; HSI was an ambitious start-up that may have loaned excess fighters to another group, and Tawhid's killed commander Qahtan was one of two listed deputies of the whole genocidal operation, alongside a member of Daesh. 

FSA seems to have lost few fighters: one at least that was non-command, a few others possibly, but it's not clear who they were with. It seems then they were not heavily involved at the bloody outset. Did the FSA even have a man in the operation room? That's also unclear. Later, they suggested not, denying knowledge and disavowing groups with no command linkage to FSA's Supreme Military Council (SMC). Responding to HRW's report (HRW PDF link), the SMC acknowledged a possible massacre, but ignored that it was on or very near their watch, and declared:
“We stress that the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Suqour al-Izz, and Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar, are not a part of the SMC command structure and do not represent the values of the FSA or the Syrian revolution. These extremists have attacked the FSA and have killed numerous FSA officers.”
They point to known fighting between the groups, in other times and places, which has happened. But in the relevant context it just raises puzzling questions. None of those FSA guys were killed during this Ahrar al-Sham-Nusra-Deash-JMA-Suqour al-Izz “liberation” of Alawi civilians. Instead, as we'll see, the FSA praised and maybe assisted in the attack, may have been involved in the planning of it, and knew to stay out of its way on day one (or to appear that way). And, they helped keep the massacres as quiet and ignored as possible.

The Role of FSA
Evidence for FSA Involvement: Inconclusive
Official seal for al-Jaish Al-Souriya al-Hur (FSA)
I've been saying that records show ISIS, al-Nusra, and FSA fighters all died fighting side-by-side to commit this massacre. They definitely did co-operate in the Latakia offensive at large, but not necessarily in the massacre villages at the right time (which HRW takes as simply the 4th, but seems to cover at least a slightly longer span).

The source for that was my usual shortcut, the "martyrs" database of the opposition Violations Documentation Center (VDC), showing dead on the 4th in massacre towns, listed as Nusra, ISIS, and FSA, and no one else. However, as covered separately, a closer look at those records compared to the HRW report shows the VDC only lists a portion of those killed, and does it wrong.

Of the 17 “FSA” fighters they list and HRW also mentions, there's only one from a proper but non-command FSA (Ahrar al-Sahel), and 16 from other groups (1 from Daesh, 1 from al-Nusra, 3 from Ahrar al-Sham, 3 from Suqour al-Izz, 3 from JMA, 3 Moroccans from Sham al-Islam, one from Saif Allah al-Masloul, and a commander from al-Tawhid). For example, Abu Malek al-Azdi (Foreigner, but not known from where), had said Islamic State member when I first saw the entry, recorded at ACLOS. Later, the “rank” (affiliation) was changed to "FSA.” But really (or per HRW's first-hand sources), he was with Suqour al-Izz.

So, all these groups not part of the FSA or beholden to any of their rules or commands, are listed by the VDC under a simplified "FSA" heading. Here, it seems, the label means against Assad, not ISIS, and not even al-Nusra. Except the one guy that was Nusra and the one that was Daesh. Everyone else is under that vague and overrated umbrella. 

Even past labeling issues, the general clues for “FSA” don't necessarily mean much to implicate the command directly in this hideous bloodbath. They are implicated in one or more of active participation, passive allowance, and helping cover up the crime. The exact nature of the mix is still not clear. As the HRW report put it:
In the case of the other groups who participated in the operation, the extent of their involvement in fundraising, planning, and leading it, and direct participation in abuses is not clear. It is also unclear whether their fighters were present and involved in the operation on August 4, the date when Human Rights Watch believes the abuses took place. One of these groups is the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army which is led by Salim Idriss, the Chief of Staff. 
An "opposition activist" who spoke to HRW and "said that (the FSA's) participation did not begin until after August 4 and that it was limited." The report cites an August 9 video that “also allegedly shows FSA fighters in the village of Kharata.” Titled “FSA ... frees the village” it's actually a video of FAD, a different group (see above). Graffiti tags claiming FSA were seen on two houses in Abu Makkeh: “The Free Syrian Army passed through here” “The Free Syrian Army al-Malak al-Ghali Abu Mohamed al-Malak” But these are vague; as the report notes “it is not clear if these fighters are under Idriss’s effective command and control” or, for that matter, what day it was scrawled. 

Non-Command FSA
In fact the report finds the few groups claiming an FSA pedigree seemed to not be answerable to the SMC and Idriss (hereafter, non-command FSA). At least these three groups fit the bill: 

1) The Farouq Brigades, formed back in 2011 as a FSA unit, co-founded in mid-2011 in Homs by early defectors like Abdulrazaq Tlass and Abu Sakkar (genocidal cannibal/scavenger). They co-founded the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, powerful in Homs and Hama in 2012, but sliding in influence by mid-2013. Involvement here is not very clear; a distance video, a graffiti mention in Abu Makkeh. No losses mentioned. HRW's report said "It is not known whether the Independent Omar al-Farouq Brigade operates within the command structure of the Free Syrian Army".


2) Heroes of Khirbet al-Jawz “was formed on June 20, 2012 in Jisr al-Shoghour as a Free Syrian Army unit. There is no indication however that this group is under Salim Idriss’s command and control.” As noted, left graffiti encouraging "genocide against the Alawites." 

3) Ahrar al-Sahel was announed “on May 23, 2012 as a unit operating under the FSA in Latakia.” However, “Based on statements made by the leader of the group, Abu Ahmad, the group does not appear to be under the command and control of Salim Idriss.” Appearances can be deceiving, or accurate. 
But this last, Ahrar al-Sahel, were chosen to host a visit by FSA leader Salem Idriss, on August 12 near the massacre sites. This group is the best fit for Idriss-commanded , or at least worth being seen with. As HRW reported Idriss' contact was Saeed Tarbush, “the commander of the Free Syrian Army battalion Suquor al-Sahel,” apparently a sub-unit (he was injured in the fighting in the villages, and records suggest a relative died). Idriss told Tarbush “I am extending congratulations to you on your heroic achievements in the liberation of the coast,” and promised "we will do our best to meet the needs of this battle and provide everything we have."

Perhaps by “under FSA control” the later statements meant Ahrar al-Sahel and/or the other nominally aligned units. But the VDC definition of "FSA" as considered above might also mean more in this case, like some “vetted” fighters of the Jihadist groups deputized by agreement as adjunct FSA just before the deal. However, that seems unlikely.

The evidence is not conclusive, and it's impossible to prove a negative like no FSA involvement on the 4th. But what I've seen suggests command FSA with even a stated vow to uphold SNC norms, were not there at the time, and perhaps not at all.


FSA Claims: In Control, Offering (Selective) Protection
As HRW noted, “Several statements from (FSA chied Salem) Idriss, days after the beginning of the operation, indicate that fighters under his command were participating in it days after August 4.” In fact, the FSA claims they were there and even in general charge from the day after the worst killings.  But they never claim to be there on the day itself.

The affiliated Syrian National Coalition (SNC) issued their first word on the Latakia offensive on August 5: “The Syrian Coalition applauds Free Syrian Army fighters on the Syrian Coast” as “areas in rural Latakia become liberated.” Noting they were previously used for "artillery strikes on innocent civilians," the SNC gushed at how "the military posts of Inbata, Baruda, and Tela are now under the control of FSA fighters who will now defend and protect civilians in those areas." (all emphasis, as usual, is mine) 

But these areas are towns, not military posts - that's why there were civilians there. An-Nabata and Barouda saw serious killings on the 4th. Was they the FSA in control then? The double use of "now" suggests they meant to leave this question open but leaning towards late arrival. And so their victory story starts out: command FSA was totally absent on the 4th - and thus not involved in the actual “liberation” - but were completely in charge of at least 3 towns the next day.

Of course, that doesn't make much sense. And within days we could start to see why they were saying things that way; credible reports emerged of dozens or even hundreds of civilians massacred, mainly on the 4th, and hundreds abducted. The SNC in Turkey felt compelled to come back on August 9 with another statement to clarify "The FSA … pledge to protect civilians and families in the area, ... they will only target ... Assad’s militia. The statement emphasizes that the role of the FSA is not to target civilians but to protect them from Assad forces.”

Perhaps in return for Idriss' reassurance of commitment to the coast campaign (see below), Saudi-owned al-Arabiya gave the FSA leader a platform to also assure everyone there could be no massacre; "the FSA is fighting against regime troops, not Alawite civilians,” they reported, and “he said that there would be no revenge operations against the coast’s citizens of any sects, adding that the FSA would provide all Alawites with security and protection." At that time, over 200 locals had been dead for a week and again, there was no one left but captives, held by others, for anyone to kill. 

Now consider: if it were true the FSA were in control or even present in force, and there to protect, but some of their allies started roughing people up, would they pick a fight with the more-numerous Islamist groups? Saying that they protect "from Assad forces" was likely chosen because they didn't see it as their job to interfere with fellow rebel fighters, but rather to help remove the government forces keeping them at bay (in other words, to “defend” the locals from protection, which they may have done).

In fact, it's most likely that only only Islamist FSA fighters sympathetic to the campaign would even be allowed to ride along, to lessen the chance of conflict between the coordinating groups. However, FSA leadership claims to oppose these groups as well, and recognizes the reported incident as a heinous crime by "extremists." After Human Rights Watch issued its report in October, their SMC was given and failed this chance (same HRW PDF) to address the problem. They start out:
In the name of the Free Syrian people and our revolution, the Supreme Military Council (SMC) of the Free Syrian Army wholeheartedly condemns the alleged atrocities committed by extremist groups . ... 
A roadside victim, photo by Utaybi/Al-Azad
How can this massacre remain "alleged" to the them? Why the difficulty in figuring out whether or not a massive bloodbath occurred just one day prior to their alleged period of control, and somewhat into that period? HRW's activist (he organized the groups, was allied with most) says he first entered the villages later in the day on August 4, and told them “the men were free to roam around and slaughter at their leisure…” He would have seen the bullet marks and the pools of blood, bodies along the roads, and mass graves coming together. Weeks later, photos prove, that blood was still visible in some homes even after a good scrubbing, and charred bodies were left laying around. Was there no sign of that over the days between when FSA was “in control?” That seems unlikely. They had to know, and yet even after the HRW report they call it an “alleged” massacre.

And we might notice here the FSA never reported this crime by their supposed enemies on their own, just addressed it poorly once the prominent HRW brought it up. But once it was out there, a crime that's credible, condemnable, and still "alleged" clearly calls for more investigation. But instead, in that slot, the statement said:
The SMC command encourages Human Rights Watch and the international community to focus on the institutional crimes against humanity being committed by Assad’s security apparatus.
They didn't specifically say 'stop investigating this one,' but that's the implication. The SMC has therefore accepted this as a dirty secret they share and protect along with the Islamist extremists. Those are the ones they either chose to fight alongside, or pretended to fight alongside, just to seem relevant. Take your pick. The SNC's statement, to similar effect, calls the massacre “a shameful one-time attack” by no friends of theirs (quoted by Global Post). It was just a fluke, nothing worth even mentioning, let alone investigating further.

FSA Accused of Trying to Not Be There?
After the FSA arrived, they say on 5th, they and the others faced a growing counter-offensive until their defeat on the 18th. In the middle, HRW's report cites an August 9 statement by "the alleged head of the FSA Military Council in the Coast, Mustafa Hashem" that his fighters were running out of ammunition “and needed greater assistance to continue with the operation.” 

Allegedly, this turned into a request taken by some as an attempt to surrender the seized villages. Saudi-directed Asharq al-Awsaat reported on August 10 citing activist Omar Jablawi saying “Members of the FSA contacted commanders of the battalions fighting the regime in Latakia asking them to halt their advance by pulling out of the sites seized in the last few days.” He didn't name the FSA member who made that call, but explained that “arm supplies were halted during the last hours”, prompting those fighters who rejected the FSA’s request to “use the ammunition they seized from regime,” he added. They might also just borrow ammunition from the other groups involved – who would have done all the seizing anyway. 

This might have been a baseless accusation, or it might be a halfhearted effort to withdraw FSA support for the operation. Or maybe it was an obscure and brief show of protest, maybe to point to later. But it came only on the 9th or 10th, well after most or all massacres were done, and only after the government counter-attack was seriously underway and retreat made sense from a purely tactical standpoint. 

Idriss in Latakia, weighing picture far right of center
Either way, the Saudi media complaints seemed to have their effect. On the 11th, Idriss himself was actually in Syria to show his support to “the general of the Suquor Al-Sahel Brigade” on their “heroic achievements,” promising full support. As Iranian-run Press TV quotes him saying, “we are here today to reassure everybody that the... (FSA) General Command is coordinating completely and continuously with the leaders of the coastal front.” HRW quotes “We will continue to work intensively on the coastal front," and he promised to "provide the Syrian revolutionaries with bullets and weapons and all it needs so we can end the killing.”

The day after that (the 12th), Al-Arabiya, also Saudi-directed, mentioned Latakia and setbacks, one of which was, apparently, an actual halt to FSA operations there. But they added as a bright spot "activist groups said on Monday the FSA is resuming its operations in Latakia and Hama provinces, adding that the FSA shelled a regime site near Aleppo’s International Airport." In another week, the last rebel fighters in the seized villages would run for their lives anyway from the Syrian government's counter-offensive. 

Working Together, in Shifts? 
Whoever attacked from a distance, it seems the foreigner-dominated Islamist brigades were the first to set foot in the villages. They had the most fighters killed, probably killed the most soldiers, and most signs say, committed the massacres. While they did this, the moderate command FSA – enemies of these Islamists, as they claim - agreed to hold back and stay out of their way. Who agreed to this recipe for unimpeded slaughter? Within the logical joint command structure or at least mutual agreements, everyone involved agreed to it, one way or another.

It's said FSA came in later, presumably fighting no one from either set of described enemies, as the villages were already “liberated” from one set by the other set, in the first wave of this joint offensive. So why come in at all? That could have tactical reasons, like to assist in the push into more towns, as happened in the days after the 4th. These would likely be, and mainly were, evacuated by then, and less likely to spawn civilian massacres the FSA units might prefer to avoid.

But why would FSA agree to loose much of the glory of the initial liberation? Unless they suspected there was to be a bloody crime?

When they did waltz onto the scene, they would clearly enter as allied guests of the Islamists, maybe to give the rest of the campaign a nice sheen. Wanting or needing to stay on their hosts' good side, or even in direct approval, the FSA failed to mention the hideous massacre as they praised the “liberation” and promised to protect the local Alawi. Note that the Islamist groups hardly bothered promising to spare the infidels – this is a job for the FSA.

And why would the Islamists allow the late-arriving FSA publicly claim control after the 4th and muffle their own glory? Likely to let the blood be on the teflon gloves of the moderates as well, so the whole crime would have to go ignored by the West and its human rights establishment (which HRW is at the pinnacle of). Although it didn't quite work out, they had past precedent to call on suggesting it would.

Houla or Shumariya Massacre, May 2012, slain family and
graffiti saying "Free (Syrian) Army Forever"
From at least early 2012, shadowy men in black and shouting Allahu Akbar would appear, helping local “FSA” rebels conquer some area, in a victory rebels would then deny. But afterwards, murky men in black, described as pro-Assad Alawi “Shabiha” militia, chanting Shi'ite slogans, commit a massacre there – often of Alawi or government-loyalist Sunni families, as it turns out. FSA and related “moderate”activists would come in after, reveal the killings of apolitical Sunnis, and blame Assad for the genocidal crime, utilizing false “survivor testimony.” It usually worked well; outside powers bought that story with, for a prime example, the Houla Massacre of May 25, 2012 (which involved the FSA Farouq Brigades under Abdulrazaq Tlass, and murky Al-Qaeda types, likely an early form of Jabhat al-Nusra). Again and again Syria's enemies have blamed the government for a crime only committed once its own soldiers were overpowered, and responded by increasing the power of rebels to repeat that feat. The stated reason was to stop the killing, but little surprise it skyrocketed instead.

With the slaughter of the Latakia offensive, the government could hardly be blamed. This time, men in black really dominated the rebel victory, committed their killings and abductions, and the FSA and activists just came in after. They didn't mention the massacre, and blamed themselves for an awesome and victimless “liberation.” They simply made sure the tactically useful terrorism was mostly done with before they walked on the scene. Is this what "moderate" means in practice?

The SNC's response (again per Global Post) maximizes this shift division to the point of absurdity; “The incident reported by HRW in today's report does not represent an effort by the true Syrian opposition, but rather a shameful one-time attack by outlier extremist groups that thrive under the hand of [President Bashar al-Assad's] regime.” These were perhaps agents of Assad, killing in his most secure province. But of course, the same SNC had already described the same area as “now under the control of FSA fighters who will now defend and protect civilians in those areas," as we've established, from government protection. And so, Islamist slaughter jackals thrived there during the brief “liberation” from "the hand of the regime." And the SNC continues to promote that kind of “liberation” for all of Syria's people.

Conclusion: The Ongoing Problem of "Moderate" Islamists
In review: it's not clear if command FSA was there at all, but non-command units of FSA-in-name were there in the attack, although it's not clear when. Some clues say FSA units held back on day one as the Islamists, led by Daesh members and affiliates, ran ahead with their massacre. But FSA fighters may have participated in the killings, and both they and FSA command clearly did nothing to stop or expose the crime, but rather helped conceal it, at least. I say this constitutes FSA-Daesh teamwork.

Now, some might complain that even if FSA and the Islamic State worked together way back in mid-2013, times have changed and they're clear enemies now. That could be so, but times were like this, it's interesting to consider why. And more importantly, times could change back if they're allowed to, or directed to. It's not at all implausible, and good to have a preview like this, to help avoid any such shift. 

And of course times don't have to change all the way to renewed FSA-Daesh teamwork for the worries to be real. That was just the simplified concept for a catchy title, and it has 2 main limitations: 

1) The mythical mopderate command FSA barely exists and doesn't really matter. 
2) Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar Al-Sham, JMA, and Suqour al-Izz at least, who do matter, are just as implicated in the Latakia massacres as ISIS ever was. 

In the two years since the Latakia offensive, these “moderate Islamists” have tried various cooperation schemes with the FSA, other “moderates,” and the Turkish military. They started forming these with the exception of Daesh, after they emerged in Iraq too and became a global concern - the ISIS crisis. In fact, the FSA and the “outlier extremist groups” they keep on teaming up with have postured as anti-Daesh, arguing they and the “Assad regime” are two sides of one evil coin that only milder Sunni extremists can counter. They claim it's their very Islamism that drives them to oppose the evil, but the real reason is probably just the obvious script where they become the answer to the engineered Daesh problem. 

Anyway, their posturing is clearly nor out of any major ideological opposition – the difference seems to be a matter of degrees and of style, not nature. One pursues Jihad with actions that scream out they're the enemy of all Humanity, while the other, well... they get to easily look good by comparison, and steadily expand their own area of sharia law and ignored, creeping genocide against trapped minorities.

In a separate post, I'll explain how history has already repeated with offensives in Syria's northwest accompanied by sectarian massacres – the 2014 Latakia offensive, a 2015 Idlib offensive leading to massacres of Alawi and converted Druze nearby, then 2015 U.S. Training of rebels near Salma, Russian attacks on those, Turkish downing of a Russian jet to protect them, etc. Even with the Daesh villain cut out and stood up as the cardboard enemy, the results have only varied from more gentle and nuanced genocide (Kessab, Christians) to about the same (Ishtabraq, where the Alawi were again were spared nothing).