"Mr. Pesticide" Part 2: The World According to Asaad Al-Zoubi

Gen. Asaad Al-Zoubi, "Mr. Pesticide"
Part two of four: 
The World According to Asaad Al-Zoubi (in 2016)
September 20, 2019

<< Part 1: The Saudis' Man for Scuttling Peace

On searching around now, it seems General Asaad Al-Zoubi made a lot of mainstream news stories during 2016 due to his position as the HNC's head of delegation, compared to none before and very little since. A few more recent statements of interest regarding the Kurds and chemical weapons are covered in parts 3 and 4, but first this overview of 2016 comments. Just in those limelight months, this unhinged conspiracy theorist promoted at least the following dubious, false, and troubling claims to support his and the HNC's tough anti-Assad bargaining stance.

* March: The Assad government was using "fatally dangerous" North Korean mercenaries to crush the Syrian peoples' movement. (UPI, Anadolu Al-Arabiya)

* October: “Brigadier Asaad Al Zoubi” said in an interview with Sky News Arabia in Riyadh: "There are 2 types of soldiers who are now blocking the city of Allepo. First is the Assad Shia regime forces, and the second is a mercenary army consisting of the Russian military, Iranian Shia, Palestinian mercenaries and Nujaba militia from Iraq," He then explained how it was the latter group of foreign “mercenaries” and not the Syrian Arab Army as claimed, leading the re-conquest of eastern Aleppo city. This suggests, as opposition hacks often do, that Syria's Sunnis majority does not support the government, except via fighting under compulsion with the "Shia regime" in the SAA. (translated from EraMuslim, Indonesia, October 2016)

It should be noted president Assad is an Alawite, said to lead an “Alawite regime” he and most Syrians would just call Syrian. Oh, and secular. Further, while Alawism is an offshoot of Shi'ism, Alwaites have tried to avoid the Shi'ite label and forge their own identity. This common display by certain Sunnis of "seeing through that ruse" and calling it Shia suggests they're keyed into a troublingly widespread mindset – they see a global satanic conspiracy by the Shi'ite infidels - the enemy within Islam and increasingly seen as the only enemy that matters. If this is how the man speaks publicly when he's being careful, then in private he might buy into such hateful thinking full-tilt.

* May: Unable to contain the rebellious Sunni majority, Assad was planning an Alawite state apart from Syria. (Asharq al-Awsat - (Saudi-owned, I think) He was allegedly planning this from the start in 2011, initially as a desperate escape from a Syria in revolt. It would be the Alawite-majority coastal districts to break away, presumably. The plans kept seeming imminent, but even in 2019, never came close to materializing. How do these people get such faulty predictive powers? Aren't they supposed to be the most cutting-edge in their grasp of reality everyone else is out-of-touch with?

But in this different plot al-Zoubi relates … In more detail but via Peoples' Mojahedin of Iran, for an idea of who gobbles this kind of story: “al-Zoubi confirmed that based on a Russian plan, which is getting Russian-Iranian collaboration, mayhem will be sparked at the core of Syria in the upcoming few hours. The campaign will launch on the premise of annihilating all signs of revolution and will set the foundations to Syria shifting to federalism. ... The eventual aim of the plot is to provide Alawites a northern state. However, a part of the western side of Aleppo is expected to be handed down to the Kurds.” The Alawite state would be named "Handy Syria" (?) and basically run across the Turkish border (Afrin and Khamsi are given as bounds of the area). I didn't map this out, but I don't think it has any Alawite-majority areas, just Kurdish and Sunni Arab, with a lot of enclaves. So the Alawite part of "Handy Syria" would include previously Sunni areas. Was ethnic cleansing planned? The Russians wanted it on the Turkish border in order to cut off all the "Syrian people" in the heartland from any support from the friendly Turks. The Kurds and the Alawites could be trusted guarding the twin gates in this nefarious plot. And again, the plot was set to unfold starting in the next “few hours.” Was there some chaos unleashed? Did any moves that way happen? Here we are, some 66,000 hours later by my quick count ... Maybe they gave up on the plan after Zoubi outed them? Just didn't want to show him right?

So in contrast to earlier Alawite state alleged plots, the breakaway state would stay allied with a Syria still under Assad's rule (and the Kurdish one would be controlled by Russia). So ... why make it separate? Just because this kind of "federalism" is such a bad thing to him? The kind of thing terrorist Kurds and terrorist Alawites do? Or because it leads to implications of further acts of genocide that would be required? And that's more reason to be all stern and stuff when you go back to Geneva next time? If so … do they let these guys brew up their own methamphetamines too?

* April: Assad cooperated with ISIS is a staged re-capture of Palmyra, suggesting the Islamic State movement is not truly a Sunni Muslim force to support (as with all other Sunni extremists, including Al-Nusra). (Qantara.de) Al-Zoubi might feel, as many do, that ISIS is rather a part of the satanic Shi'ite conspiracy against them. He seriously might believe just that.

* September: “(Al-Zoubi) added that the Arab League abandoned Syria in favour of taking the UN Security Council’s lead and did not hand Syria’s seat at the league to the opposition, a move which he described as supporting the Syrian regime. He also claimed that the Arab League did not support Syrians in overthrowing the regime that killed them and sold away their homeland to Iranians and Russians, according to his statement.” (Middle East Monitor) Is the Arab League in on the conspiracy? He seems to be wondering that, threatening to wonder more if they don't play by his rules.

* March: "There is an international conspiracy and a cover-up of Russian massacres and a cover-up for (president) Bashar," said Zoubi, who is chief negotiator for the High Negotiations Committee (HNC)." International conspiracy, huh? Is it the Jews? No, probably not. The Shi'ites! They run everything! (Reuters, March 10, 2016)

* May: Hezbollah killed its own military commander Mustafa Badreddine during clashes in Syria. Why? Maybe just to make the Sunni "revolutionaries" look bad? So Zoubi understands false-flag logic, as long as it's by the Shi'ite conspiracy side. (Al-Jazeera, reaction tweet)

* March 30: "Syrian Kurds are pressuring the Syrian opposition to resign Asaad al-Zoubi, the head of the Syrian opposition delegation to Geneva talks, after he suggested Kurds were “bandits and “mercenaries throughout history”. " (ARA News). The HNC initially had Kurdish representatives included, but they resigned from the effort on March 29, likely after less-public requests to the same effect were rebuffed. (Wikipedia - HNC) Al-Zoubi stayed at HNC. The Kurds are generally Sunni Muslim, not Shi'ite, but a bit secular-minded. Perhaps for this reason – and for being part of the HNC's broad membership, Al-Zoubi had to cut them some guarded slack, but be extra-annoyed when even they seem to get in the way of the really Sunni Arab freedom fighter-types (plus Chechens, Uighurs, etc.) ...

* September: Zoubi complains The U.S. "preferred to work with Kurdish ‘terrorist’ groups such as the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Peshmerga forces and Yezidis, “while refusing to deal with the FSA that effectively fought against ISIS in Northern Aleppo, and recently in Jarabulus.” Furthermore, he says Kurdish (and perhaps Yezidi) forces are "terrorists," unlike "FSA," and their ilk, including Jabhat al-Nusra.  (ARA News, tweet)

Sunni Muslim women used as human shield by Kurdish terrorists … no, wait...

Jaish al-Islam for example is super-cool by him despite the horrific reality, including killing and mass kidnapping of civilians just because of their religion (see again my best overview here). It's not as clear if he lumps these popular groups into the broad conspiracy along with ISIS (whom the Kurds and Yezidis were fighting, sometimes desperately) and of course thence with the other terrorists like Hezbollah and the "Assad Shi'ite regime." But that sounds like his kind of thinking.

My Semi-Informed Observations

There's an ugly sectarian thinking that's grown in the last decades and drives Sunnis of the extremist, takfiri persuasion from across the globe to come and kill Shi'ites in Iraq, and now Alawites in Syria, besides in other battlefronts across the globe against various regional infidels. These supposed villains, as the impressionable hear it, are killing Sunni Muslim babies for sport, a global satanic conspiracy by the Shi'ite infidels - the enemy within Islam and increasingly seen as the only enemy that matters.

The public words of Al-Zoubi, just as seen in this short sampling, give reason to suspect he susbscribes to such views. He's far from unique in that regard, unfortunately. I don't know how especially he needs to be called out over it; he just happened to seem extra interesting to me in light of his later comments on the Douma chemical attack in 2018 (see part 3, and later part 4), and then seeing his scrap with the Kurds and Twitter (see part 3).

In Syria at least those riled up to fight the Satanic conspiracy get all sorts of outside assistance and enabling, and usually get paid to kill – by design, better than Syria can afford to pay its own soldiers. Of course, sources in the Persian Gulf tyrannies supplying most of the money. But to Saudi-sponsored Al-Zoubi, only those supporting the government side, and especially Shi'ite forces, - the ones legally invited to help, by the legal and popular government of Syria – are spitefully dismissed as “mercenaries.” Whereas on the opposition side, he'll call everyone but ISIS just “rebels” at worst, since even he can't pretend they're all “Syrian freedom fighters.” Naturally, he would ignore or tacitly approve of any crimes they committed in the pursuit of the divine mission.

So he paint a simplified picture of heroic Jihadists vs. regime villainy he calls it “Shi'ite” at almost every chance. And there's some broader global conspiracy involved, trying to obscure Assad's and Putin's crimes in Syria. This might help show how it's not just Shi'ites as people here but something broader and insidious working through them and others - like Satan, maybe, pulling a great many strings as he would, so one's God could seem more awesome compared to the challenge. I don't need to read the full version to know the plot includes Russia and Syria, of course, plus Iran, and North Korea. It's it's not clear who else - probably China? Yes, Satan is big on commies, and generally on Russians, besides Shi'ites. Non-state parties he'd include: Hezbollah, Shi'ite forces or forceful voices anywhere, various media outlets and reporters, other parties to be decided as he feels the need to exert leverage here or there. (e.g. September example above: suggesting maybe the Arab League has been swayed to the dark side too - not explicitly here, but if the friction grew over time, I bet he could talk himself into that corner.)

He seems alarmed at this pro-Assad conspiracy, maybe because it was so sneaky as to get a shitload of factual truth behind it, or to simply get reality itself bought off? No, he wouldn't want to put it like that. But yes, that has to aggravate the man. Anyway, he could calm his panic, if he wanted to, by noting how the Western world, the Gulf tyrannies, and half the rest of the world's media and leaders seem totally immune to their plot. They remain staunchly anti-Assad, and open to nearly any propaganda claim against him, no matter how absurd. Nonetheless, the faith might have been waning, skepticism growing. So, blame a conspiracy.

He keeps fairly mum about the Alawites, suggesting he has nothing but venom for them. The exception is his urgent warning of the plot for Alawite and Kurdish states “Handy Syria” set to begin within hours. A lot of Sunni Arabs might have to be forced out or killed to facilitate that plan. He might expect gleeful Alawite militias would help with the rape and rounding up of the people in the way of their new homes.

As noted above, the secular-leaning Kurds might be guardedly tolerated by Gen. Zoubi, as fellow Sunnis, until they get in the way, then he's instantly ugly about the treachery, and stays that way. He's cool sitting with Christian George Sabra, because George echoes the opposition line. He doesn't represent Syria's Christians, who tend to support Assad and thus to Al-Zoubi, any of them who takes up arms would classify as terrorists, like most or all Kurdish forces anywhere, and perhaps the Yezidi (sort of Christian) forces in Iraq.

Another suggestion of his comments: no Sunnis who rise up to fight the government class as terrorists – he might agree in form about Al-Nusra Front, but then take every chance to cover for them anyway. Only Islamic State / ISIS / ISIL / Daesh classes as terrorist for him, but he seems to think they're part of the Shi'ite conspiracy, so ... he seems to be delusional.

Al-Zoubi's flippant, or flipped-from-correct, use of the “terrorist” label comes a matching penchant for moralistic exaggeration, with phrases like “annihilating all signs of revolution.” The basic gist of his firm stance is deep certainty – no mere suspicion – that Assad is the only real problem in Syria, and his victory would “bring destruction to the whole country.” Heck, it might usher in an epic genocide of all the Sunnis, and threaten the whole world. To the great moral philosopher Asaad Al-Zoubi, the foreign-backed “rebels” from FSA to Jaish al-Islam and the “Syrian people” they represent are pure as snow. Again except for all the parts of it they managed to sweep under that ISIS (Persian!) rug.

So not only is he wrong and delusional, he insists on being extreme about it. But he was the right kind of wrong, and the right kind of certain – to some influential minds. So it shouldn't be surprising that this FSA general was selected by the Saudi royal family, along with a leader of a sectarian terrorist group they sponsored, to head up deciding the entire opposition's demands for the Geneva III stall-a-thon. That alone would suggest a rather bad apple, but it surely helps to have such a peek inside the parts of his brain he shows the world. That peek continues and goes deeper in part 3. Again, all this above was just from 2016, in his polished showing under the limelights at Geneva. Afterwards, it gets more scant but less sanitized.

"Mr. Pesticide" Part 1: Scuttling Peace

Gen. Asaad Al-Zoubi "Mr. Pesticide"
Part one of four: The Saudis' Man for Scuttling Peace
September 18, 2019
edits Sept. 20, 21

Note: this is a decent-size part of a huge bottlenecked and delayed project I'll do in four parts, with parts 2 and 3 expected to fall in place quicker, and part 4 a bit later. There was a lot of related details I didn't know and had to do lookups, ranging from quick to fairly deep, and wanted to relate most of it in one place. Or. I was thinking two, but the first one had to be split, and in three works best. All-told, I'll explain: the Saudis' Man for scuttling peace, peddling lies, and promoting genocide.

General Asaad Al-Zoubi ( أسعد الزعبي ), born 1956, has a long history in the Syrian military from the 1970s, reaching the rank brigadier-general before he defected to the opposition side during the current conflict. It was reportedly in mid-2012, but a bit unclear, when he fled Syria and joined the opposition SNC and FSA, where he was given the rank of general. As of 2019 he holds a leadership position with US-backed, Jordan-based Southern Front, a coalition with both Islamist and secular units, allied with - but not including - Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and al-Qaeda offshoot Jabhat al-Nusra ("sometimes"). The southern Front promises to not be defined by its Islamist tendencies, and is vocally and/or militarily opposed of ISIS (Islamic State, ISIL, Daesh), and sometimes opposed to al-Nusra. (Wikipedia) His lack of a beard might suggest he's no Saudi-style Islamist. But with the mustache and leather jacket, he looks to me more like a Turkish Islamist, which he seems to act like. (Photo source: Geneva, Switzerland, April 19, 2016. REUTERS/Denis Balibouse)

Al-Zoubi was born in Daraa province, where his clan is large and prominent (FWIW the family name translates "doubtful"). It's spawned a previous prime minister of Syria, and their current information minister, besides this SNC-FSA sellout. The Daraa Zoubis were targeted early on in the uprising. In one case, a reported 16 of that name, aged 17-75, were the largest sector among 52 men and boys killed in a late-April, 2011 "Saida massacre." One of them was the famous 12-year-old Hamza al-Khatib. The lodged story of that event has been thoroughly disproven, by the way. (See my 2016 report - and the eldest Al-Zoubi got to be the first entry in the “Caesar photos” file.) Asaad al-Zoubi may have bought into the claims of a massacre of his kin at Saida, but it took a while before he defected sometime the following year. It's not clear what he did for the next 3+ years prior to January, 2016, when he was chosen for an important job.

Defected Syrian prime minister Riad Hijab was selected in December 2015 to head the Supreme Negotiations Committee (aka High/Higher Negotiations Committee, hereafter HNC) being formed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (Wikipedia) This was to be a broadest-yet umbrella of opposition groups, ranging from moderate Islamist to extremist, but excluding designated terrorist groups, including some ostensible secular voices, at least one prominent Christian, and even a Kurdish contingent was involved, briefly. The HNC was given the power to select the opposition delegates for the upcoming peace-oriented, talk-related process called Geneva III, or the 3rd Geneva conference on "the future of Syria." Hijab selected Gen. Al-Zoubi as the "head of delegation" for the HNC but had him working with two others:

* "chief negotiator" on the team: Mohammed Alloush, acting political leader of the extremist, sectarian terrorist group Jaish al-Islam, and a relative of genocide-minded JaI founder Zahran (or Mohammed Zahran?) Alloush. Zahran's father was a salafist cleric long-ago exiled to Saudi Arabia for criminal extremism. Riyadh sent strong support to his son's JaI in Douma, so by 2016 they were holding half the Damascus suburbs hostage and  able to hit the capitol on command, besides fielding franchises throughout Syria. So Mohammed Alloush was a natural choice to head up some tough "negotiations." His marketing-heavy education and fairly polished style (well-trimmed beard, etc.) were definite recommending features as well. (some prior work on JaI bringing Hell to E. Ghouta while sending Alloush to Geneva.)

* The “we're not Islamists” guy on the team: George Sabra, an anti-Assad CHRISTIAN! apologist for terrorism and total puppet (NCSROF until 2018 anyway). He's also a writer for the Arabic version of Sesame Street, so he gets how muppets and puppets have their words written for them. (Wikipedia)

Image: HNC tweet "Head of the negotiating team Asaad Al-Zoubi and chief negotiator Mohammed Alloush arrive in #Geneva for #SyriaTalks March 2016" Sabra was off-frame somewhere, perhaps making them grilled cheeses sandwiches.

Syria, Russia, Iran, and Egypt opposed the HNC's decision to have members of terrorist groups (by their formal, legal definitions) have a leading say in "the future of Syria." They referred to Alloush's Jaish Al-Islam and to Ahrar Al-Sham, who also had at least one member involved. (Al-Masdar News) But that formula was forced through, causing visible problems from the start.

Before January was out, U.N. special envoy Staffan De Mistura complained the HNC was trying to make itself "THE opposition delegation" - a position supported by the U.S. Obama administration. As the same Al-Masdar article put it: "According to UN special envoy, Staffan de Mistura, Saudi Arabia is attempting to complicate his efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the war in Syria." In context, they were using the HNC as a tool to that end, and Gen. al-Zoubi was picked as one of its trusted operators. As De Mistura said, the core issue involved the HNC's "seriousness about the process," which was needed to "give a meaning to a peace conference.” This is the bouncing ball to follow in the following paragraphs.

It seems there was a lot of pre-dialog before any meetings in Geneva began in March. At the start of February, Reuters reported, “Bashar al-Jaafari, head of the government delegation, said on Sunday Damascus was considering options such as ceasefires, humanitarian corridors and prisoner releases ... as a result of the talks, not as a condition to begin them." But "the opposition High Negotiations Committee indicated it would leave Geneva unless peace moves were implemented (first)." Likelihood of progress: minimal. Still, an early ceasefire was agreed to by the U.S. and Russia in late February. It was the first one ever agreed on such a scale, per a Wikipedia article on them that fails to even mention the HNC. This ceasefire held with “hiccups” and fragility, through July, by most accounts, with both sides blaming each other for the all the failures.

With first meetings in Geneva planned for March 12, a March 10 Reuters report has Al-Zoubi threatening to pull the HNC out at the last moment because of “massacres” and a "conspiracy." "The head of the Syrian opposition's negotiating team said on Thursday it was not optimistic about peace talks getting under way in Geneva, and has still not confirmed if it will attend the U.N.-backed negotiations." Al-Zoubi is cited as telling Al Arabiya and/or al Hadath TV (both Saudi-run) "There is no optimism ... there is an international conspiracy and a cover-up of Russian massacres and a cover-up for (president) Bashar."

On March 12, however, they did arrive in Geneva, ready to blame the other side from a closer distance. (HNC tweet)

Add Sept. 21: A Reuters report of 6 April said "the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front … last week attacked and captured" the town of Telat al-Eis south of Aleppo, killing 11 Hezbollah fighters and 43 Syrian soldiers in the process, then "shot down a Syrian warplane on Tuesday (the 5th) and captured its pilot." This triggered, on the 6th, "intense air strikes in the southern Aleppo area," described as "the fiercest government assault in the area since an agreement to ease the fighting came into effect in February." The HNC's al-Zoubi was quoted on this story: he "told Reuters the truce was “in danger of ending” due to government violations." He referred to the February deal he apparently had nothing to do with, and seems to mean these new strikes against the designated terrorists of al-Nusra Front, who were never party to the ceasefire (although some covered "moderate" forces were working with Nusra and coming under attack). More on this issue in part 3.

By April 13, the HNC had lost its Kurdish portion (see part 2), and talks at Geneva had reached a likely related “deadlock,” and taken a recess (time frame unclear). Thing were just resuming when al-Zoubi declared, as a DW.com article puts it: "President Bashar al-Assad is the problem and Syria can only start to heal once he's gone." Or as an AP report translated his day's comments, Al-Zoubi said president Assad is a "disease" and Russia is "not serious" about the obvious cure of removal from power, the only hope for Syria's future. (Associated Press)

Syria's Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad said a transitional government as proposed amounts to a coup d'etat and "will never be accepted". He noted how most of the world except Saudi Arabia and Turkey have given up on pushing for Assad's removal. Mekdad explained "if we have to proceed" with talks, "then we need to forget or we need others to forget the dreams they had for the last five years." (Belfast Telegraph) But Zoubi knew it was destiny, not a dream. Parliamentary elections in Syria began at the same time, but he said, also on the 13th, “These elections do not mean anything.” Because they don't require Assad to step down, they were "theater for the sake of procrastination" – that is, putting off the inevitable. (Reuters) Basis for expecting progress: slim.

Two days later, Zoubi used fresh alleged attacks on Aleppo to declare “the regime ... sends a strong message that it doesn’t want a political solution, but a military solution that will bring destruction to the whole country.” He added that same-day administrative moves showed Damascus was “not serious about the political solution” and “divorced from reality.” (Reuters 15 April). Back in reality, 17 April, "Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will remain in power for just four months longer, until a transitional government takes control of the war-torn country" according to HNC's Mohammed Alloush. The form of it wasn't agreed yet; "another HNC source" (al-Zoubi?) outlined a proposal for a new government they recently heard, but rejected: "Effectively, Assad would stay in a ceremonial position. But we categorically rejected the proposal," the source added. (The New Arab - 17 April) They're way too 'in touch with reality' to settle for that. A "disease" has to be wiped out, not compromised with or left as a figurehead. They preferred the deal they had (?) where Assad would be out of power in four months time.

Also on 17 April, al-Zoubi paused his confident peace-talking and transition plans to send out word to the fighters: “We will not stay for long negotiating.. .In the event a missile targets them (rebels), they have to retaliate with ten missiles,” … rebels “must gain control of as many areas as possible, they must take advantage of the ceasefire as the regime has done”. (Reuters)

It must be noted, and here seems good: it's not always clear even now what exactly the “criminal Assad regime” has really done as opposed to just been accused of. We can suppose the Syrian military were killing and weakening the militants, and perhaps this alone was cause to demand a halt to attacks. But it's the alleged criminal targeting of homes and hospitals, etc. that's put forth as the reason. These allegations are never proven, usually dubious, and often disproven (a good example in a moment...) On the basis of  crimes that might be entirely fictional, the “transitional government” could only exclude the current government ("Assad or any ruling group"). (Sputnik News)

So the terrorist-linked panel insisted on the regime's agreeing to suicide, basically, while green-lighting militant attacks on government-held areas and civilians. Then on April 21 when the government still insisted on fighting instead, and was still getting blamed for atrocities, the HNC really promised to walk out, calling talk pointless until the military situation changed - but NOT in the government's favor. (Reuters)

Six days later (27 April) came an allegation they didn't comment on (that I saw) but a great example of the kind: Al-Quds Hospital in Aleppo, allegedly bombed by Assad forces, killing 55 civilians. But the hospital was clearly not “reduced to rubble” as reported by MSF, and almost certainly not hit from the air at all (no damage to the roof or any external wall). Some internal explosions are seen, but these are provable from 4+ distinct bombs placed in different spots and triggered simultaneously to mimic an airstrike – an inside job. It did injure and kill some people, mainly in the emergency room (number there unclear, but 55 dead seems strangely extreme). And the most famous death of the “last pediatrician in Aleppo” Dr. Maaz likely didn't happen. Some clues suggest he coordinated the inside job, and a shady video edit might cover him leaving the ER prior to the blast there he might know just how to avoid. THIS is the kind of fake crimes people like Al-Zoubi eagerly pass on as true, never wanting to ask questions, perhaps knowing how fragile the illusions really are.

But it took that, everything before, and another month's worth of allegations before finally, on 29 May, the HNC started delivering on its promises. Chief negotiator Mohammed Allosuh resigned that post over the lack of progress in removing Assad or halting the allegations against him. About four months he pouted and threatened to run away from Geneva and the HNC before he finally did. Meanwhile, as DW reported, “the head of the main Syrian opposition delegation Asaad al-Zoubi also told the Saudi al Hadath TV channel that he too wanted to be relieved of his post, but did not confirm he had taken a similar step."(DW) Al-Zoubi was still called the leader of the HNC in articles as late as October 8, 2016. (Reuters) But the HNC delegation was led by a Naser al-Hariri when it participated in the new Geneva peace talks that commenced in February, 2017. (Wikipedia – HNC)

I didn't dig much past that, but it apparently didn't go well at Geneva IV in 2017 either. In February, the HNC rejected moves by the UN's Staffan de Mistura to re-exert control over delegate selection for the talks, and insisted the Kurdish PYD could not sit under its umbrella. (as they had non-Islamist George Sabra explain: "should the (PYD) want to take part, it has to do so on the regime side.”) (Rudaw) By mid-November, the HNC still existed when its founder, Riad Hijab, was among a dozen opposition figures who "resigned, apparently in protest of others being too willing to accept the continued rule of a man (Assad) they view as a discredited tyrant." (Sarah El Deeb and Philip Issa, Associated Press, 22 Nov.)

Who were these other people worth resigning over? They sound more correct. It could better be said the tyrants in Turkey and Saudi Arabia were discredited by Syria's continued defiance. In fact the tyrants were starting to acknowledge it themselves, even as some more zealous agents held out; the same AP article explains “Aides told local papers that Hijab, in his resignation Monday, was protesting Saudi Arabia giving up on calls for Assad to step down. Media reports suggested Saudi Arabia didn't invite HNC to the 2017 Riyadh meeting." A lack of invitation sounds like a lack of favor. In fact, Hijab's Wikipedia entry states “in 2017 he resigned as head of the (HNC) group following Saudi pressure.” (Wikipedia – Hijab)

It seems the HNC was dissolved after this, dropping off the radar. Nothing past 2017 is mentioned in the relevant Wikipedia entry. Even the visionary Saudis were "out of touch with reality" so the HNC's people retreated to their shrinking kingdom of truth. It might take longer than those four months, but the diehards seemed to maintain faith in the inevitable forced end of Assad's rule, even if the whole world procrastinated over it.

The approach taken by the High Negotiations Committee was never likely to advance a peaceful settlement. But they took that approach anyway, maybe because they planned to fail and blame the other side. It could be said - as Staffan De Mistura suspected early on - that they were never serious about the peace process. Instead, it seems they were engaged in an unstated and criminal process to pursue the Saudis' preferred military non-solution.

Since outright regime change was becoming unlikelier by 2016, it seems they adopted a policy of regime-bleed; delay the inevitable resolution so Syria can remain embattled, demonized, sanctioned and suffering until its will was broken, or as weakened and wounded as possible. The end goal isn't clear to me - perhaps as simple as having one less or one weaker ally for Iran in some big war against them planned down the road. Most likely it's a cluster of reasons mostly related to that regional struggle, including competing oil pipeline schemes and the like. But there can hardly be a morally straight reason for this kind of deceitful and murderous policy.

---
On to part 2

Swept Under the Rug, Part 1

Swept Under the Rug
The Plot to Delay the OPCW Douma Probe and Manipulate the Evidence

Part 1: Delaying the Probe
July 28/29, 2018
update Aug. 5

The Douma Incident and Probe Creation
Some 12km northeast of central Damascus, Douma was by April, 2018, the last opposition-held area in the capitol's East Ghouta suburbs. It too was squeezed to partial surrender by April 7, when a Syrian government helicopter allegedly dropped two chlorine bombs on two buildings, killing at least 43 civilians.

The last of the occupying Islamist opposition forces surrendered the following day, either "to save lives" as they claimed, or because they finally had no choice. Militants and civilians who opted to would be allowed to leave for rebel-held territory in Idlib, and already were before the final surrender. But most residents chose to remain, and some former residents started trying to return.

Under the surrender agreement, Russian military police - not the Syrian Arab Army - would run security in Douma. Russian troops visited the sites of the alleged chemical attack on the afternoon of April 9th, claiming to find no signs of a chemical attack, and sharing some video of their investigation (right: arriving at the site with 35 bodies). This clearly fed into the following accusations that the Russians tampered with the site to erase signs of their allies' crime.

That same day, an urgent investigation was formed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with everyone - including the Syrian and Russian governments - agreeing. The OPCW's Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) investigators got organized, and were ready to set out by the 13th. They were in Syria and ready to work on Saturday the 14th. So all this explains the first week of delay following the attack - nothing unreasonable, and nothing yet that can be blamed on Syria or Russia.

On that same day, April 14, the U.S., U.K., and France showed confidence in their own pre-investigation findings by launching missile strikes on suspected chemical weapons sites in Syria. These powers then gave it a full two days before they started crying foul over the delay in an investigation they weren't waiting for anyway.

Note: the widely-noted reports from medics, the boy Hassan Diab, many other locals, as passed on by Robert Fisk and many others, are valid evidence against an open, widespread gas release with the 500 alleged patients. That's evidence, not proof (I personally accept their version, but obviously not everyone does). Their version is disputed by other residents, but not in a convincing and consistent manner. The "no attack" witnesses clearly win, in my opinion. But even if their claims are true, and even considering the apparent staging and fake claims lodged by the opposition, consider this: only two sites were reportedly stricken, one of which had almost everyone inside allegedly die. These reports from around Douma and in clinics can't prove there was no limited release inside such a place - the gas wouldn't spread much or at all past those walls, and few if any inhabitants would be rushing the clinics, as they mainly dropped dead (allegedly).

So the option of a chemical attack would remain open, neither proven nor disproven, and not even firmly challenged by the valid but limited views of the residents we've heard from. Here we focus on just these two sites with the chlorine gas cylinders allegedly dropped from the air, and primarily on the famous one that had some 35 dead civilians found inside (as I count them: 12 girls, 10 women, 6 boys, 5 men, 2 infants (perhaps both girls)).

On July 6, the OPCW issued an interim report (S/1645/2018 - PDF link) that gives some new insights into the delays in their investigation of the April 7 incident, and oddities with the evidence that might be linked to that. This will be frequently cited in this article as 'the OPCW interim report.'

The Case for Tampering
New York Times, April 16:

Chemical arms inspectors were blocked on Monday [the 16th] from the site ... raising Western suspicions that Syria and its Russian ally were scrubbing the stricken area of evidence.
The inspectors, who wanted to take samples and interview people, “are currently being prevented from doing so by the regime and the Russians,” Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain said in Parliament."

May "accused Syria and Russia of blocking access and attempting to cover up the attack," the Guardian reported on April 16, as "the UK’s OPCW delegation urged "Russia & Syria must cooperate." The suggestion is they were not cooperating for some pretty evident reason, and required pressure.

The French Foreign Ministry said they believed it was "highly likely that evidence and essential elements disappeared from the site, which is completely controlled by the Russian and Syrian armies." (DW)

The U.S. ambassador to the OPCW, Kenneth Ward, said since "the Russians may have visited the attack site," there was "concern" that "they may have tampered with it with the intent of thwarting the efforts of the OPCW fact-finding mission to conduct an effective investigation.” This was said at a closed-door OPCW meeting, but was swiftly made public on the 16th, presumably to increase the pressure on the stonewalling villain states. (Washington Post)

U.S. State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert followed up on the 17th, reiterating Ward's comments and adding: "We've seen that the Russian government and the Syrian government - their whole goal in this is to try to cover up. Their goal is to try to deflect attention." However, when pressed, she explained "in terms of what exactly is happening on the ground to prevent (the OPCW team) from getting there in a quicker time frame is not something that I can discuss or get into." For some reason, she refuses to explicitly blame them; as if she knew there was another cause.

Non-Issues on Both Sides
One issue Nauert and others labored to refute was part of that "deflection" by the Syrian government; on the 17th SANA, Syrian state TV, reported that the OPCW's FFM investigators actually had entered Douma. But that seems more like an error by SANA: As the Daily Sabah report noted: "Syrian state media reported Tuesday that inspectors ... had entered Douma, but the Syrian government later said that only a U.N. advance security team had entered."

That would be a pretty dumb and short-lived lie. Luckily it was thoroughly debunked. Scott Lucas, EA Worldwview: "The Assad regime continued to stall ...even resorting to the lie that the (FFM) had reached Douma. State news agency SANA put out the false information, which was circulated by many mainstream outlets. … Finally, the Assad regime’s UN ambassador Bashar al-Ja’afari walked back the line.." or corrected the error, depending. "Finally" is later that day. Baseless gripes move fast.

The Russians seem to have some baseless charges too. a Reuters report stated "Moscow denied the charge and blamed delays on retaliatory U.S.-led missile strikes on Syria on Saturday." This rebuttal seems like a red herring; it's apparently based on an impression that the site to be visited was under bombardment in the strikes on April 14. The Guardian's report added this explanation by the Russian deputy envoy at the UN, Dmitry Polyanskiy: “If you go to a site which was just bombed I imagine you might have certain logistic problems."

This was just as the FFM arrived, but didn't continue, and struck areas entirely outside of Douma (though one major target was fairly nearby). The same explanation was repeated recently (Sputnik News), and then again (TASS): Georgy Kalamanov, Russia's head delegate to the OPCW said of the Western coalition attacks "their missiles were about to hit the OPCW mission." But it doesn't seem that's the reason for the small delay.

Fake Security Concerns?

Amid the accusations from some governments, it's unsettling that the departing director general of the OPCW himself voiced concerns, as early as April 16, that the Russians and Syrians were stalling them on purpose. Or, at least, his comments were widely read that way. As The Guardian reported:

Russia and Syria had cited “pending security issues” before inspectors could deploy to the town outside Damascus, said Ahmet Üzümcü, the director general of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), at a meeting of its executive council.
Syrian authorities were offering 22 people to interview as witnesses instead, he said, adding that he hoped “all necessary arrangements will be made … to allow the team to deploy to Douma as soon as possible”.

That Uzumcu has to "hope" they aren't stalling suggests he thinks they are, as they seem to offer alternatives "instead" of allowing access. The implication is the security problem was fake, just an excuse to delay. Most media reports passed it on in that context, scare quotes included. (original statement hard to find - NPR article links to a broken e-mailed PDF link. I didn't locate it anywhere else yet.)

Note: Uzumcu has just now stepped down in a planned retirement. Having headed the OPCW since 2010, he's been at the helm the whole time Syria has been blamed for CW attacks on often dubious evidence. (one important but little-noted example - another) He's from Turkey, has previously been Turkey's ambassador to NATO, and to Israel - not the best qualifications to be an impartial agent in a campaign against a common enemy in the Syrian government.

The Russians offered an alternate reason for the delay; it was the United Nations stalling, but over valid security concerns. This was swiftly rebutted and made to look like a lie by people speaking for the supposedly neutral UN. New York Times, April 16:

Russia — which has questioned whether the Douma attack even happened — ridiculed the Western accusation, asserting that the United Nations had exercised its authority to delay the inspectors for security reasons. 

The United Nations disputed the Russian explanation, saying it had no security issues and wanted the inspectors to reach the site quickly. … a spokesman for the United Nations, Stéphane Dujarric, said the United Nations had given the inspectors “all the necessary clearances.”

But this doesn't seem to be true.

The UN agency that would have security issues - the one he should be referring to - is called the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). It's they who would be responsible for the safety of any OPCW mission. Immediately on deployment, the UNDSS set to assessing the obviously complex situation in Douma, as it emerged from six years of occupation by foreign-backed Islamists. As the OPCW report states:

6.1 ... According to Syrian Arab Republic and Russian Military Police representatives, there were a number of unacceptable risks to the team, including mines and explosives that still needed to be cleared, a risk of explosions, and sleeper cells still suspected of being active in Douma. This assessment was shared by the representative of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). 

So it wasn't a fake concern, as suggested publicly, but a real one the UN's security people shared. Jason Ditz was correct to note at Antiwar.com "Though British officials blamed Russia for the delay, it is now clear that the UNDSS is driving the scheduling." They were delaying work over security concerns, just like the Russians said, and Mr. Dujarric is looking dishonest in disputing that.

In a April 16 meeting under intense pressure, the UNDSS came to an agreement with the Syrian and Russian authorities on accessing the attack sites. As the OPCW interim report explains, the Russian Military Police then in charge could run "security within Douma," while the Syrian government would be in charge everywhere else. (point 6.3) And another small delay was added - by the UN security team. An OPCW statement of April 18 explains "the UNDSS preferred to first conduct a reconnaissance visit to the sites." This was planned for the 17th, with hopes of FFM site inspections by the 18th if the advance mission went well. Russia and Syria agreed to facilitate this. That's the progress on the probe-stalling for the 16th of April, the day the OPCW were reportedly "blocked from the site."

An especially flawed New York Times video report says (at 0:38) "the regime went to great lengths to conceal the evidence." On-screen, a Russian military vehicle is shown driving across the camera's line of sight. Well, it seems we just examined those "great lengths," and there's nothing at all to prove that bold claim. Even a deliberate delay is unproven, let alone active concealment. As we'll see, to propose anything more substantial would require a "conspiracy theory," as they call it.

"The Incident"

The next day, that plan was implemented. DW:

Syria's UN ambassador told the United Nations Security Council Tuesday (the 17th) that a UN security team traveled to the town of Douma, outside the capital Damascus, to ascertain whether it was safe for global chemical weapons experts to visit the site of a suspected chemical weapons attack last week that killed dozens.
Bashar Ja'afari said if the team decides "the situation is sound," the fact-finding mission from the international chemical weapons watchdog — Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons — will start work there Wednesday. 

The situation was not sound. As the OPCW report passes on the details:

"During the reconnaissance visit by UNDSS on 18 April 2018 to assess the first two locations planned to be visited the following day, the security detail was confronted by a hostile crowd and came under fire from small arms and a hand grenade that exploded" This "reportedly resulted in two fatalities and an injury to a Russian soldier."

Whose reports they're relying on isn't mentioned, and it's not explained who was killed. As it turns out, most of those details are wrong. Ambassador Jaafari and all others agree the mission this incident came amid was on the 17th, not the 18th. There were two incidents, not one (one had a crowd, the other had violence). And a Syrian officer, not a Russian one, was wounded. No one else mentions fatalities but still, that part might not be an error.

Sputnik News reports on a statement by the Russian center for Syrian reconciliation, an informed source:

According to the statement released by the Russian center for Syrian reconciliation, which has been observing the ceasefire in the Arab Republic, an exchange of fire between Syrian security officers and unidentified assailants took place in Douma on April 17.
"As a result of the shootout, a Syrian security officer was slightly injured. There were no Russian servicemen at the site of the incident," the statement said.
The Syrian officers have been providing security for UN personnel on a reconnaissance mission to Douma.

The Russian Defense Ministry is cited for a supporting claim that no Russian military personnel were present or involved. The plan was to have the Russians run security, but as Syrian Oberver, reported April 17 report notes "Russian military police have withdrawn from Douma" rather suddenly, in favor of Syrian army troops. This had sparked fears of a massacre, as the Oberver heard (none was ever reported). This little-noted last-minute switch may be the cause of that confusion.

Who, if anyone, died, is also unexplained here. It might well be the attacking militants, or no one, in another reporting error. But it's less likely to report two deaths in error than it is to just not mention it in most reports. Some possible story twists of great significance remain over this issue. (I checked the VDC records for good measure, and they don't seem to list any such victims, unless it's that guy from Dumair.)

OPCW DG Üzümcü's reaction at the time agrees the report's date is wrong. Daily Sabah, April 18: "The head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said Wednesday [April 18] that a U.N. security team doing reconnaissance in Douma, Syria came under gunfire a day earlier, sources told Reuters." He was said to acknowledge this was a real attack, and what some would call "pending security issues" would delay the FFM's work, after seeming to scoff at the notion recently. As his same-day statement says:

… At present, we do not know when the FFM team can be deployed to Douma. Of course, I shall only consider such deployment following approval by the UNDSS, and provided that our team can have unhindered access to the sites. … This incident again highlights the highly volatile environment in which the FFM is having to work ...

There's no mention of Uzumcu suggesting which side was behind the disruption or what their motive would be. But Al Jazeera's Zeina Khodr noted the accusations of regime stalling, and added "what we understand is that Douma is under the control of the Russian military and the Syrian government. Both of them claimed just a few days ago that the area had been 'fully liberated from terrorists'." Maybe they really had cleansed the place good in just a few days, so that anyone shooting now must be with the government's approval or even on their orders. Maybe the regime admits they have total control, but then makes up lies about "sleeper cells" to delay things … and then maybe they get people to stage sleeper cell violence with real weapons, to make the lies seem true and stall further.

Some people seem sure of this. Hadi al-Bahra of the Saudi-backed High Negotiations Committee, in a tweet, called the shooting incident "a criminal act and efforts for concealment of evidence, in an area where all armed groups have left and handed over completely, as per terms of agreement." He's sure all Saudi-backed Islamists disarmed and left, honoring their pledge like good Saudi-backed Islamists would clearly do. But neither the Russians, the Syians, or the UNDSS was so sure about this, considering "sleeper cells" of them to be a potential danger. That could be who was behind the attack, knowing that anything can be blamed on Syria and Russia, no matter the evidence.

The OPCW's statement of April 18 (PDF link) agrees the incident "took place yesterday," and explains it as having two parts:

On arrival at Site 1, a large crowd gathered and the advice provided by the UNDSS was that the reconnaissance team should withdraw. At Site 2, the team came under small arms fire and an explosive was detonated. The reconnaissance team returned to Damascus. .

It's worth noting the crowd that became an issue at the first site was, on its surface, there to protest the Western-power airstrikes the OPCW is seen as in league with (and not without reason). So most likely they were pro-government people, not anti. The Independent: "An official close to the Syrian government said the UN security team had been met by protesters demonstrating against the US-led strikes. “It was a message from the people,” said the official..."  But that doesn't prove anyone sent them. There's no mention of their being a clear threat anyway, just a presence the team retreated from in caution.

At site 2, no clues are given about the assailants except they were armed and launched a small attack. There's no mention here of any fatalities or even injuries.

So, the Russian-Syrian coverup plot ... there must be some clues of it in there. Did they trick the UNDSS into believing a fake terrorist threat in its first days? Did they launch a false-flag attack against their own security detail on the 17th, wounding a Syrian officer and perhaps losing two of their own attackers to defensive fire? All just to stall the probe in a deniable way, and get another few days of evidence-scrubbing done? 

The Final Delay and Tally of Time Lost
This shooting incident on the 17th shows, ten days after the incident, it wasn't clearly Russia and Syria but mystery militants in Douma blocking the work. OPCW report:

Following the incident, the planned deployment of the FFM team was postponed until the security situation could be reassessed... New routes of access to the locations of interest were identified and modifications to the initial FFM deployment plans were formulated...

This took a few more days, but the investigators were at the sites and collecting samples on the 21st, according to news reports (Reuters) and the later OPCW interim report.

April 7 to 21 is two weeks, the total time lost before first on-site investigation. Half of that time was lost in forming the mission prior to arrival. Once Syria was hosting them, two precious days were lost to setting up the details of a visit, perhaps too rushed for the security situation. A day was spent with the needed pre-mission that encountered violence and other problems, and in recovering from this before reporting it the next day. Then four even more precious days were lost planning it over and getting the FFM actually to the sites.

By the (apparent) dates in the Evidence Reference Numbers (in the interim report), the first visit was April 21, and they made several collection trips up to at least the 27th. The report states crowds and gunmen were kept at a distance, and no further security incidents occurred in this time.

After the rush: the team flies back to Europe, logs details and files paperwork. 29 samples are tested in OPCW-certified labs, with results on May 22. Some statements and such precede the interim report published July 6, 1.5 months after results were available, 3 months after the incident. The bulk of testing and a final report will take some more time...

There was a point when the process seemed much more urgent. Of course, this was when the relevant chemicals were breaking down naturally, if not being scrubbed. In fact the plotters could just hold the probe off until the clues had broken down to nothing (the time frame for that is considered in part 2). No doubt time is a serious issue for the science.

But this was also when it helped score cheap points against the Syrian and Russian governments for allegedly daring to stall the probe. We can see dishonest and misleading statements to the effect of scoring such points, so I suppose this was the main motive. For all anyone knew, what the FFM found might wind up embarrassingly absurd or incriminating the local Islamists. The OPCW and others could try to spin it, but might fail, and have to drop the issue.

As part 2 explores a bit, and as most readers already know, no nerve agent turned up in the environment or in the supposed victims' blood. It's not universally noted, but that's absurd and embarrassing. The media coverage of these OPCW findings are not covered as enthusiastically as Russia was denounced for delaying the findings.

Luckily, there was a ready widely-sown explanation for anything amiss - the presumed cleanup the villain states would have done with that bought time. In part 2, we'll consider what the OPCW should and shouldn't have found,  did and didn't find, what that might mean, and who might have tampered with what evidence.

Aug. 5: Part 2 is now online

Five Years of the Houla Massacre Lie

By Adam Larson (aka Caustic Logic)
May 21, 2017 
(last edits June 5)

some of the horizontal "army shelling" of homes in Taldou

On the afternoon and evening of May 25, 2012, in the village of Taldou, in the Houla region of Homs province, occurred a hideous crime that must never be forgotten. Well over 100 civilians of a few targeted families were slaughtered with guns and bladed weapons, among them over 50 children, some of those just babies.

It was widely denounced as a crime of the Syrian government and its affiliated "Shabiha" militia. It was seen as unprecedented brutality with sectarian motives - the killers were Alawites (the creed of president Assad) and the victims were all randomly-chosen Sunnis. Diplomatic and other sanctions against Syria followed, and military and other aid to the opposition increased in response. The peace plan of UN envoy Kofi Annan was destroyed, leaving only further fighting as an option. (Add 5/24: And it didn't take long to find that out - Annan visited Syria two days later, as planned, and found both sides unwilling to make deals with the murderers behind the Houla Massacre)

murdered child (blurred) used to send the opposition message

But however it was accepted, the Houla Massacre is the gold standard of "massacre marketing" by the Sunni extremist militants in Syria. It was they who wanted escalation, intervention, and regime change, not a Kofi Annan peace plan, and this incident delivered. The best evidence - the video record and reports that agree with it - is clear they were responsible for the act of brutal mass murder. They earned their reward from the "international community" themselves, rather than having the "Assad regime" hand it to them. That their illogical and unsupported narrative is retained to this day by the powers that be in Western and allied government, the mass media, and "human rights" organizations is a sad shame, and an outrage.

I've marked each anniversary in some way.

* Year zero, 2012: upon news of the massacre, I was infuriated and started studying it and other Syria events, soon co-founded A Closer Look On Syria in June with CE and Petri Krohn, focused on a Houla Massacre page and sub-pages. We worked together and got the case pretty well solved by year's end, with research-based articles by me up by early July, 2012 (star witness re-considered).

* Year one, 2013: report: Official Truth, Real Truth, and Impunity in the Syrian Houla Massacre - compiles research-based articles of special value into one informative report (authors: Ronda Hauben, Alfredo Embed, Marinella Corregia, myself). The promotional article was widely-read.

* Year two, 2014: report: The Battle for the Houla Massacre: the video evidence explained, and the rest re-considered - Direct PDF read/download link - central in the visual material below. At the same time, I started the Taldou.Truth. site to issue debate-challenge requests like this to Eliot Higgins. I didn't try as hard as I should have otherwise, and no takers yet. They suspect I'm right, cannot argue the case as well as I can, and can't be seen agreeing with me  either, so they dodge the whole thing, because of supposed time constraints. They'd have plenty to debunk some nonsense blaming the FSA and Al-Qaeda for the Houla Massacre... (the whole site never went far, so I bring this installment over to the main site. Will also re-issue the general debate challenge here where it's more visible.)

* Year three, 2015: Three Years After Houla: Lessons Remembered, Forgotten, and Never Known - a decent review article, but not the best marker, and made available the gruesome 2014 morgue photos of most victims including (alleged) family details (they were posted on Facebook, and stayed up even longer than they should have, given the rules against gory images).

* Year four, 2016: Instead of Houla, I focused on the same-day 5-year anniversary of the alleged famous death of 13-year-old Hamza al-Khatib (at right - remember that kid? article, later report) By the best evidence, he was actually aged 12, about a week shy of turning 13, when he was probably killed and mutilated on April 29, 2011, by terrorists occupying the area around a military housing complex they were trying to break into. After the attackers were chased away, the army found some 29 bodies of men and boys left behind, including Hamza's. Activists would say he and many other were arrested from the peaceful protest, and his brutal treatment clarified a "turning point" where armed resistance could only increase.

It was nearly a month before the government finally found the right family to hand Hamza's body back to on May 24, and the next day, allegations emerged he was just killed on the 25th after a month of torture. But the visuals prove that wrong; his body displays green and black patches to prove weeks of slow, refrigerated decay. Other victims shown off with the same story also have green patches and other signs of the same kind of decay, starting around April 29. But the dimwitted opposition activists had stories anyway: people who saw the impossible torture of the living boy and some of the other victims, long after they were dead. These patently false claims were widely believed at the time, and lacking any apparent care, they just sit there stupidly as accepted truth to this day. So it's a lot like the Houla Massacre, that wound up marking the one-year anniversary of Hamza's alleged death.

* Year five, back to Houla. After two years of little to nothing, I should do something powerful. I don't know what yet, but this atrocity should never be forgotten. Accepting ideas here in comments, or elsewhere. Others could help spread the word - especially the 2014 report. Write an article, submit a comment on the upcoming 5-years-never-forget articles that will still blame Assad. The best-evidence version of May 25, 2012 will have to be crowd-forced into being addressed and finally accepted as the kind of precedent it truly is.

I'll offer two related mini-articles here, starting with a sort of a photo essay. Recall the accepted story: Al-Houla was a "rebel-held village" that suffered "army shelling" May 25 after noon prayers and/or a protest or a small clash rebels gave up on. This shelling battered Taldou especially, forcing FSA defenders to withdraw, leaving the way open for Alawite and Shi'ite "Shabiha" militias to invade the the town and massacre Sunni families.

In reality, the incidents all relate to Taldou, the southernmost town of the 3-town Al-Houla region. Two towns were fully under rebel control by then, but Taldou alone was still half-secured by five army posts, up to the morning of May 25. As of the 26th, Rebels were somehow in control of all Taldou, and international action helped seal that control as permanent, so that ever since then, the whole Houla region has been rebel-held. But when the "army shelling" in Taldou began around 1 pm, it wasn't quite...

I) A summary of the "army shelling" and "Shabiha massacre" in Houla, 
in 12 pictures and some of the consistent reported details

1) Some of the "army shelling" seen on video: These attackers, of the Houla-based Arabad Bin Souriyeh battalion, fire towards the clocktower (aka roundabout) army post and/or Baath Party headquarters in central Taldou (see map below), from the northwest, at about 1:25 pm* by sunlight angles.  The one doing the "army shelling" here takes return fire from the army, hitting him in the belly, and he's carried away.  (see 2014 report, exhibit A.3)
* Note: times given in the 2014 report were calculated wrong, given as one hour ahead, so this is said to be 2:25 pm. Apologies.

A pro-government witness says terrorists fired on those posts from the northwest at around 1 or 2 pm with a mortar and then heavy machine guns, in what seems a distraction to allow "Shabiha" to move down Satto Saad road (see map). Rebels claim the Shabiha used the army shelling as cover to march up Satto Saad road from the south and maybe from the north, and began their killings around 3 pm. (corrections May 26)

This video was posted weeks later, but fits that story perfectly, and is described as from the battalion's "battle to liberate freedom circle" (the roundabout army post), so it's almost certainly May 25, the only known time that was "liberated." (see 2014 report, the June Videos issue.)

2) An "army shelling" perpetrator seen close-up with his RPG launcher after launching the clearest "army shelling" of the day. This is hours later than the above scene (about 6:11 PM +/- 5 minutes - report says 7:11), on Satto Saad road, just south of the overrun or bypassed roundabout army post.

He was wearing a white headscarf at first, and doesn't seem to notice it fell off, he's so dazed by the confined recoil that just bowled him over. It's not always clear in the "shelling" videos just who's firing at who and from where, but here we see who fired, if not where to. He walks by the cameraman with his launcher, ambles off-frame to the south, and fires another round, loudly, off frame. It's said this video shows shells "crashing down" on the area, but rather it shows them flying sideways out of it. (video posted on May 25) (see 2014 report, exhibit B.1) See also a great but little-seen video I made for this scene. (correction May 26)

3) More of the fierce "army shelling" of Taldou, as caught on video. Around sunset (7:15-7:30 pm, not 8:15-8:30). A group of Arabad Bin Souriyeh battalion fighters, clean-cut and Western-dressed as usual, runs down side streets (THIS is Satto road - 5/26). One fighter runs out on main street, pointing his RPG launcher south towards a mobile army checkpoint at the arches military intelligence headquarters (I got rusty).  He fires and seems to cheer a hit as he runs back for cover.

This video has the same later posting issue as image 1. Perhaps they didn't want to confuse the story line early on with much of this footage of their undated "battle to liberate freedom circle." Better to wait until after minds are made up...) (report, exhibit C.1) (note 5/26: Other, more restrained groups, posted no video at all of their likely involvement in the undated battle that must be on May 25.)

4) The central clocktower/ roundabout army post that was damaged by the "army shelling" and that the UN investigation acknowledges was overrun by opposition fighters that day, during the "Shabiha invasion" following the "retreat" of all rebel forces "from" the area. (or as they called it, the rebel offensive into government-held turf, possibly planned in advance). The damage is light, higher up, and clearer in other views - mostly bullet holes below the rooftop gun nests. This just shows what it was they overpowered; this was no couple of kids with bb guns seizing a post like this. (composite view, from Channel 4 news video, on Alex Thomson's visit a few days later  - shown as part of "rebel-held al-Houla," when it had been government-held on may 24.) (report, exhibit H.1)

Pro-government witnesses say this post was attacked once around 1 pm, and again more forcefully around 7, when it was overrun. Smoke rises from this area around 7:19 pm (shortly before sunset), on a distance video posted May 25.  (exhibit H.3 C.3 in the 2014 report, saying app. 8:19) One of the families massacred that day is said to live in this same overrun block. Named Abbara and perhaps other names, they were apparently intermarried with the core targets, the extended Abdulrazaq family, but a confused record seems to try and conceal that (as sort-of explained here) (and recall the opposition story denies specific family targeting - random Sunnis were chosen, not a particular clan - note and correction, 5/26).

5) A military intelligence center on Main Street damaged by the "army shelling" that UN investigators acknowledge as "likely overrun" by opposition fighters in their offensive of that day. This panorama view is from a later video, but it looked the same on May 26. The graffiti is glimpsed in a UN monitors video (this hasn't been well-read yet - it mentions Bashar Assad and his father Hafez, in an apparently negative way, as well as some "prince"). The armored vehicle's tires are still burning in ANNA news video.  (exhibit H.3) Smoke rises from this area  by sunset on the 25th, as visible in a distance video. (exhibit C.3)

6) Map of all five security posts operating on May 25: This includes two the UN investigators say were overrun by militants in their planned offensive of this day (white) and three others (orange) they decided held out against the "army shelling," leaving the army still in control and hence, responsible for the following "Shabiha" massacres, in the red-pink areas shown (plus some unclear other spots, including some al-Sayeds and Abdulrazaqs in the rebel-held north of town, and Abdulrazaq-related Abbaras near the overrun clocktower/roundabout post). We can see this makes close to zero logical sense. Good thing it's "proven," or accepted by an "impartial United Nations investigation," huh? (yellow-green letters refer to video exhibits in the 2014 report, with some mentioned above)

7) Some of the many soldiers and a militiaman (aka "Shabiha" - singular "shabih") allegedly killed by the "army shelling" and/or "Shabiha invasion" of May 25 (pro-government ANNA News (Abkhazian, Russian-ish) filming in Taldou, May 26, panoramic view from video).

(Unseen) It's said one soldier had his throat slit and was tossed from a window of the hospital, apparently for changing religions. Another soldier was reportedly burned alive, while (Sunni) others were captured and given a chance to "defect" and join the FSA, or die. A soldier on leave with a broken leg was among the targeted massacre victims. His eyes were gouged out, as he was killed alongside his father and little sister All sides agree this al-Sayed family was pro-government, with much military and police service. (note May 26: the killed father was a retired policeman) They lived across the street from the National Hospital, by the way.

8) Smoke from the National Hospital as it was burned during the "Shabiha invasion." In a sunset battle video on main street, some billowing black smoke can be traced to the hospital, suggesting it was on fire by then. The time is 7:40 +/- 8 minutes, making it the latest video seen, perhaps after full sunset. (exhibit E.3) The hospital was apparently was not burning yet in early videos of "army shelling," which left trails of smoke like RPG exhaust in the hospital's basic area. (exhibits E.1, E.2).

Pro-government witnesses say rebels sacked the hospital, perhaps after circumventing the arches post using a side road instead of overrunning it from the north. What happened is unclear, but it seems they killed a wounded soldier there at least, looted the place, and set it on fire. The UN investigation denies this quite clearly, as they question why the government-run hospital never bothered helping the massacre victims, leaving rebels to do all the body-handling. It doesn't seem they noticed or mapped out this smoke plume, so maybe that decision was premature.

9) Sunni extremist rebels of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on a ridge above Taldou at sunset, as smoke rises from at least two spots across the town. They shout Allahu Akbar, seeming to cheer the "army shelling" and/or "Shabiha massacre" below. This is the same Arabad Bin Souriyeh Battalion with the other videos linked to May 25 but posted later. This was posted later yet, and not claimed as related to the liberation battle. Instead, this is claimed to follow some victorious battle in Taldou in revenge for the "Tremseh massacre" in rural Hama in mid-July However, no sources that report daily events mentions any kind of battle or any issues, aside from a small shelling incident, in Taldou or Houla at this time. The last big thing to cheer was on May 25, when they "liberated freedom circle," leaving a smoking town at sunset, and lots of dead bodies trucked away to show the world. This is probably just what they're Allahu-akbarking about. (2014 report, exhibit G.1)

10) Totally or mostly unseen "Shabiha": The FSA's infamous Farouk Brigade was reportedly involved but unseen, more camera shy than the guys we keep seeing. Reportedly, since-disgraced commander Abdulrazaq Tlass headed operations, and apparently lost an uncle in this battle for the Houla Massacre an fighting related to earlier Houla Massacre where the boy with pro-government wrsitband was killed, back in early April 4 of 2012 (again, I got rusty). A local criminal named Nidal Bakour led another "FSA" group, while Haitham al-Hallak led another "FSA" group that focused on the al-Sayed family homes. Opposition records say Hallak, a defected policeman from Rastan, was killed in the battle, but some seem to list him as Haitham al-Fuzo (video still).

Also little-seen are the many black-clad foreigners fighting with an unclear force considered to be basically al-Qaeda. Pro-government witnesses describe these among the 6-800 attackers, including Libyans. One unplaced video of "army shelling" of Houla, seemingly early afternoon, may show a black-clad militant in front of the burning house. (2014 report, p. 31) (side-note: I've found just one possible match for this, and while I haven't written on it, it's so interesting, I open this to geolocation folks. Can you find a good spot other than mine? (no leading except to say check both in and near Taldou). If we can get a good match on this, it might tie in to further proving the terrorist nature of this event.)

Already the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate later called Jabhat al-Nusra (now I like Jabhat al-Namechange) was on the scene (announced in January, 2012, by this source). Then working the shadows and including eventual ISIS types, an August DIA cable seems to mention them as being called Jaish al-Nusra. In this first part of 2012, they were growing in size and capability, as if they had just scored some secret victory and attracted new recruits - hmm.

Jaish al-Nusra likely took part in the Houla Massacre, perhaps after a new batch of its fighters crossed from Turkey, hijacking a bus full of Lebanese Shia pilgrims near the border, famously on May 22. Those were handed to local rebel groups and later released after negotiations, but in the meantime the Nusra force may have used that bus to get themselves to Houla, where the driver and a slain Syrian family (mother and 4 kids, probably Alawites) were dumped near Masyaf, not far from Houla, on May 24. (see May 22 bus hijacking - Houla massacre link?) That's a possible wrinkle I stumbled on along the way. (note 5-26: and with the apparent Aqrab connection to the Houla Massacre, Masyaf is almost a last stop before the big crime scene-to-be.)

11) Star witness Ali al-Sayed: the 8-11-year-old gave several interviews. He reported no al-Nusra fighters nor any FSA offensive, instead describing the "army shelling" all day. He knows Shabiha when he sees them kill his whole family (he played dead after a hand scratch), and knows what the "international community" should be doing about the massacre. But cannot remember the order of events, the names of his closest family members, or when and how they were killed, how he escaped, etc. He's clearly a poorly-coached hand-puppet of a false witness, yet because he's so cute and blames Assad, everyone scrambled to write credulous news reports copying down one or another version of the malleable story he told. (see here)

12) The Victims gathered: after the "rebels withdrew" from their own beloved Taldou, the "Shabiha" invaded and killed over 100 civilians in their overrun homes. Luckily for the cause of "justice," even as Syria denied the massacre, the "Shabiha" then walked away and left the bodies behind for "rebels" to find when they returned later that night. These were wrapped and brought to their main mosque and buried in a mass grave the next day. The activists found no family contacts, even extended ones, to hand the bodies back to for regular burial in family plots. Or anyway, they decided to just do it all themselves, burying what was in fact evidence of their own grave and massive crime against Humanity in one big trench.

And that's the kind of evidence for crimes against humanity provided by these hate-filled monsters. They keep just 'finding' dead Syrians and all-knowing "survivors," and handing non-stop allegations to the wealthy elites sponsoring them, just to punish and bleed Syria, weaken Iran, ensure a "new American Century" of global leadership, etc. The blood spilled in Houla is just one of those awkward parts of an otherwise profitable or widely-supported program to "stop the killing" and "bring peace to Syria."

II) How We Can Know "Freedom" Isn't Free

Unlike little Ali, the witnesses in the mass grave are the people the international community really let down, failed to protect, and still disgraces by blaming their overrun defenders for their brutal murders. Unlike little Ali and other liars, the massacre victims can't tell her own story, and have the "activists" of "liberated al-Houla" lodging one for them in their absence.

What they suffered is hard to fathom, as a safe late spring Tuesday turned into a living hell, with murderous fanatics kicking their doors in or blowing right through the living room walls. The killers did avoid beheading, and used gouged eyes, burning alive, and throat-slicing (reportedly) only with captured soldiers. Many female victims were likely raped, but this isn't known. But they hacked open several children's skulls, tore their jaws open, shot them in the face, and more. "Since it's going to demonize their hated Alawite regime," they might have reasoned, "why not pull all the stops? Just avoid the most obviously Islamist methods, y'know, for good measure."

Yasmeen, stolen family photo

Consider Yasmeen Adel Abdulrazaq, age 9, constituting about 2% of the children murdered that day.  She was gonna be something, all smiles and faintly wacky styles, seeming to favor summery yellow and peach combinations, which she was wearing again on her last day. Yasmeen's lifeless body was shown by terrorists with her skull deeply sliced open, seemingly by a sword, and a frozen look of astonished disappointment on her little face. I considered showing that right here, but on the advice of Vanessa Beeley, I decided those poor people have been shown off too much already by their killers, and it's not my readers who need that further shock (nor the depressing description and general subject matter, but ...).

According to terrorist records Yasmeen was killed by "Shabiha" alongside sister Nour (8), brother Yaser (10), baby brother Mohamed, and mother Abeer, and may have seen some of that happen. It's not clear where their father Adel was. The Adel Abdulrazaq family were among some 80+ members of the extended Abdulrazaq clan, the core victims killed (more than the 65 generally acknowledged, including intermarriages, etc. - see here). They mostly lived down Saad road, which the UN investigators acknowledge was open to militants for the whole day (at least, after the roundabout post was bypassed around 1:30).

By the most reliable reports available, it seems the Abdulrazaqs were targeted for supporting the government and rejecting the rebellion, and/or converting from Sunni to Shia Islam. Opposition sources are clear all victims - and every resident of Houla - was a Sunni Muslim. It was a 100% Sunni "town," they said, and if someone else moved in, or someone converted... that's unexplained. Perhaps they wouldn't get to continue living there. And these folks didn't get to live there past May 25. So maybe rebels lie about the non-conversion? (the remaining victims were mainly of two Al-Sayed families, who everyone agrees remained Sunni but supported the government anyway).

saved by the armed groups and speaking freely?

Some survivors were apparently abducted and made to blame Shabiha on video, as their blood was being poured in large jugs, like a grim stopwatch. Maybe it was a donation to help the injured, but... "Rasha Abdulrazaq" and her unnamed mother have almost filled a coffee can each as Rasha rushes through the talking points. At right, she complains about the government lies blaming the armed groups now hosting and caring for her. They ask and she thanks them profusely on the video for saving her after she somehow survived the massacre. Her living baby niece is nearby, also draining blood from her abdomen. The mother blames "Alawite pigs" for killing all the Sunnis.

Incidentally, different rebels to the south launched a raid, later on the night of the 25th, against the Alawite village of al-Shumariyeh, south of Lake Homs. They claimed to launch a few shells, in revenge for the Houla Massacre hours earlier. But Syrian state media says they attacked and looted at least two homes, killing ten civilians, including children, and showed some of the left-behind bodies (ACLOS, Shumariyeh Massacre). (This is almost surely the cause of the mixed-up claim that an Alawite family named Shomaliya was killed in Taldou that night).

This infamous and misunderstood Houla Massacre is how the whole 3-village al-Houla area finally came under complete opposition control, back on May 25, 2012. Rastan terrorists with helpers from all over swarmed over it, killed the defenders, and massacred their local non-supporters by the family. Then, they blamed the government and had that trick work, starting the first demands for the army to leave Houla alone. It may have seemed indefensible anyway, and the state ceded the area for the time being.

That began what's now five years of "liberation" as a purely Sunni, Salafist area of "Free Syria," protected by the Turks and the Saudis and their powerful allies from Tel Aviv to Paris to Canberra. To this day, the Houla-Rastan pocket is one of the protected areas under the new deescalation agreement, immune to attack, and meant as part of a permanent - but so-far discontinuous - non-ISIS opposition state you could call "Free Syria." In all areas, it's almost completely dominated by Jabhat al-Namechange, the good-cop Al-Qaeda spinoff, or someone just about as nasty.

Since then, there have been less government supporters or minorities in the towns of al-Houla to massacre, but often they could be fetched from elsewhere to keep the accusations alive. Just six months after the Houla Massacre, Aqrab's Alawite district just to the north was raided by 'rebels' from Rastan and Houla, in early December, 2012. (note May 26: It's also noteworthy that some of the Houla Massacre victims were actually from, or even killed in, Aqrab, apparently for intermarrying with the Abdulrazaqs - see here). They massacred many, chased half the people away, and kidnapped those remaining. Of about 1,500 residents, no one remained free and alive. Their homes were given to pro-opposition Sunnis, and Aqrab was added to the purified areas under full terrorist control to the present day.

After the Aqrab raid, about 500 civilians wound up crammed into a house militants had surrounded, suffering a week of harsh treatment, deprived of food and forced to breathe smoke from burning tires. On December 9, about half the hostages were released in exchange for militants held by the government. But then rebels reported the government had blown up the remaining Alawite civilians, as some Shabiha among the captives also killed their own family members with bombs or hand grenades. Of 200+ people, they reported at least 125 were dead. It might take a while to dig through the rubble of a house blown up from the inside, then hit by artillery, then bombed by jets.

Aqrab hostage house, intact but full of smoke (Channel 4)

As it turns out the house was not blown up, according to an on-site report by Channel 4's Alex Thomson, speaking to released hostages a few days afterwards. It was however leaking smoke from some of its blacked-out windows. So how many were killed in the Aqrab Massacre remains unclear now, nearly five years later, with about 230 people publicly unaccounted for. Some smoke-stained survivors were taken to Al-Houla to blame "Shabiha" for the alleged massacre, on video and under clear pressure. A smoke-stained girl, dead with a sword-sliced skull, appeared in Houla as a random Sunni shelling victim there. Human Rights watch's people called the episode "murky," and they apparently never investigated. ACLOS did, and Alex Thomson said our work "seems to bear out what I reported from Aqrab at the time." (Tweet, CIWCL archive)

Whatever happened to each of them - displaced, murdered, bereaved, or even enslaved and sold for a fundraiser - the roughly 1,500 inhabitants of Aqrab's Alawite district were some of the first victims of the "liberation" of Al-Houla. It was imposed on them by a deeply caring "international community," like little Ali had asked, and it cost them dearly. (ACLOS, Aqrab Massacre)

(note 5/26: I wonder where they get all these swords? Are they locally made? Sent by Saudi Arabia and smuggled in through Jordan?)

And now, five years after the Houla Massacre, that appalling and obvious lie remains standing as a blood libel against the secular, inclusive, and demonized Syrian government. It's an affront to Humanity. How many more years will the truth of the matter remain swept under the rug? How long will it remain an example to cite when accepting yet more Terrorist accusations oozing out of "Free Syria"?

Many believe these lies because various influential and corporate-sponsored voices keep repeating and echoing each other that it's all true. That's just abysmal stenography of Terrorist claims. It needs challenged again by honest and rigorous minds, and seen widely to fail. The Houla Massacre must be understood and never forgotten.  For that matter, the Shumariyeh one too, and Aqrab, and a bunch of others....'

Add June 5:

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