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Wednesday, October 21, 2020

COVID 19's Evil Twin, LUMPIN 20

Covid Deaths, Not Lockdown Deaths part 2

COVID 19's Evil Twin, LUMPIN 20 (Long version)*
(slightly rough, over-complete, rev. likely)

October 21, 2020

updated Nov. 23

*(in case there's a short version - probably not - mainly just to say sorry this goes on so long)

U.K. Excess Deaths: Caused by the Virus or the Controls?

The global SARS CoV-2 / COVID 19 * pandemic has witnessed massively elevated mortality, with  often-massive deaths attributed to the virus, and at the same time, large and disputed rise in supposedly non-covid deaths. This was especially high and prolonged in the U.K., as I considered in some detail here. The graphing below is worth including again here for reference. 

* I'm not the only one who's been confused: SARS CoV-2 is the virus named for a syndrome ... similar to the syndrome it causes ... which is called COVID 19 - a syndrome named for that virus, under its alt. name - COronaVIrus Disease (novel in 20)19. Does that make sense? Do I even have the hyphenation right now? Whatever. I'll often use "covid" as shorthand. 


Here the blue bars show average daily deaths in England and Wales (weekly totals divided by 7) as they compare to a 3-year average for each week. Some variance is down to these being "estimates" - apparently real numbers, but reporting and time lags of certain basic sizes are known and guess-corrected for - something like that. Iit didn't work perfectly this year, with some weeks oddly low then high to catch up, etc. I also mark in magenta a low-flu yearly baseline that seems more applicable than the average, and daily COVID 19 deaths (all U.K., before and after a count change in England in red vs. blue), and a timeline of control measures and SARS CoV-2 infections.

All-causes deaths vary on an amazing scale, rising from about 1,000/week below average to massively above it. In week 16, there were an estimated 22,351 deaths in England and Wales, compared to a 9,640 3-year average (or a 10,497 5-year average per ONS). That's 213% to 232% as many as usual. Week 17 was also well above 200%, with weeks 14, 15, and 18 fairly close to it. (also noting: I messed up the dates on which weeks end in the UK's system - weeks 16 would end on April 17, not 19, and so on.)

The steep curve of COVID 19 deaths is a U.K. total, including smaller numbers from Scotland and Northern Ireland, and yet only account for a slight majority of this mortality mountain, which again is just in in England and Wales (England alone is a huge majority of UK pop.). The rest of these deaths - besides whatever excess there was in the rest of the kingdom - require an explanation. 

Only two significant things had been added to the picture - the virus, and the control measures against it, including "lockdown." As soon as it was possible, a debate emerged over which was more to blame for all that death. Many independent and otherwise-sharp minds have pinned most or all of it on the latter. 

For example, some point to deaths rising after lockdown as showing it was to blame. But In fact, as part 1 showed, the pattern of overall deaths - in the UK and just about everywhere - follows the curve of covid ones almost exactly, as seen above and even more clearly in most cases. In 4 major cities and a province that I checked (Madrid, New York, London, Paris, and Guayas, Ecuador), overall excess deaths only pile up badly for about 20 days after lockdown and decline steadily from there. Here: London, with the slowest response of the five, peaking only at day 21. The original analysis conveniently misplaced lockdown markers (red bars) by one week, forcing many deaths preceding it to appear as if they came after it ... as if caused by it, as argued. Huh.


The span I used there - 20-33 days - isn't crucial. It's the way the results line up so close to that 20 end that was so interesting. As noted in part 1, that's the early end of the span I estimate it takes for long-struggling fatalities to die, following on an infection just before lockdown. The median for that should be somewhere in the early middle of 20-33 days, but quite a few earlier, relatively sudden deaths are expected, and would offset the center of this spread - perhaps to just the 18-21 days that kept coming up. 

This consistent pattern alone suggests the lockdown worked, by keeping peak deaths from being higher and later. And in the same stroke, it suggests that the clear bulk of those other-causes deaths were yet more virus deaths that were simply never verified, and classed wrongly as something else. How? 

Besides its immediate pneumonia-like illness, COVID 19 is known to cause damage to the heart and blood vessels, lungs, kidneys, neurological system, and more. Numerous conditions involving these are the same co-morbidities most covid fatalities have (in more detail below). Some will suffocate during the immediate illness, while others will pull thorough that only to die soon after from the new and old damage combined. 

In cases where the virus kills without being confirmed, adequately suspected, etc. to be identified, the person might be listed as dying from a mysterious pneumonia, or have the known and relevant co-morbidity get the entire blame. If that happened to any serious degree, you would see unusual elevations of those death causes, roughly corresponding with deaths from the virus. And as I'll begin to show in this article, this is just what's seen in the UKI've already shown it in the United States, overall and more clearly in some hard-hit states. Widespread and often fatal organ damage has been noted widely already, and in time it will be known as a heavy cost of the pandemic we were slow to recognize. 

The U.K. Office of National Statistics (ONS) has now issued two reports on "non-COVID 19" deaths in the UK (mainly England and Wales): early August overview  - old version from June. These were able to make a solid case based on data that quite a few virus deaths went misdiagnosed as other causes, which are notable elevated in just the patterns to suggest that. For example, they explain:

"Deaths involving COVID-19 could have been recorded as non-COVID-19 deaths if the person had a severe underlying condition that was exacerbated by COVID-19. This could include deaths due to conditions such as chronic lower respiratory disease, dementia and Alzheimer disease and "symptoms, signs and ill-defined conditions", possibly where pneumonia has been mentioned as a contributory factor on the death certificate because of the similarity."

They suggest a "severe underlying condition," but I don't see why the same couldn't happen with a moderate or mild one, or none at all, where the virus has the main or exclusive part. All a condition needs to be blamed is to be listed, with it partner in crime left undetected. And ONS stats agree the 4th most common class of co-morbidity for COVID 19 (see below) is "No pre-existing condition" - in some cases it's unknown or simply doesn't exist.

The ONS reports also notes that, while some deaths will be "related to undiagnosed COVID-19," others "could suggest a delay in care for these conditions," - much service was disrupted and curtailed "as the healthcare system adapts to ensure it has capacity to treat COVID-19 patients."  

A fuller picture will take longer for some deaths with delayed reporting to come in, but all considered, they found as of early May:

"There is not enough evidence to suggest the other theories investigated can explain much of the increase in non-COVID-19 death registrations; these other explanations were reduced hospital capacity and increases in deaths caused by stress-related conditions."

More on these reports and this subject below. First, I found these ONS reports via critic who argued against that conclusion, blaming denied medical care and murkier causes combined, all essentially blamed on a disastrous U.K. lockdown.

Anti-Fascist Resistance?

With his website "In This Together," Englishman Iain Davis claims to fight for the infected and the susceptible alike against what might be the biggest plot ever. "So-called western democracies have copied the Chinese model of technocracy to create a single biosecurity State" or, as he also puts it, an emergent "global fascist dictatorship." 

Davis seems to share in a widespread impression that the virus is a harmless part of nature's balance, while human measures will be sinister, almost by definition. His reading has led him to feel "COVID 19 is not a high impact infectious disease, it has low mortality rates and is absolutely comparable to influenza. It isn’t even clear that is can be identified as a disease at all." ( Covid World - Resist! ) So why else do the corrupt authorities all claim otherwise? There must be an ulterior motive, right? 

All considered, I think Davis is a genuine good guy at heart. But he's not the clearest thinker, and is currently mired in some deep confusion that's not to his credit. So I'll just be brutally blunt about that.

It's implied that nearly all world governments, including staunch enemies like China and the United States, Russia and the UK, Israel and Iran, and all their relevant doctors and health experts and responsible officials at every level of government have been co-opted somehow into acting on this huge plot. Or perhaps in ignorance they help exaggerate the viral threat as a pretext to re-make society. From Wuhan to Tehran and London, from Bergamo to the Bronx, Madrid to Moscow, Washington, Caracas and Copenhagen, Helsinki and Havana, Riyadh and Tel Aviv, etc. ... the parasitic global elites all started killing their people right off with their business closures and ruthless stay-at-home orders, to be followed with behavior-modifying mask orders

My main focus here is Davis' June 13 article "Lockdown Regime Deaths and the True Cost of LOKIN-20" (In This Togetherre-published at Off-Guardian), regarding the British experience. Elevated deaths in the United Kingdom "correspond with the lockdown regime," he notes, before exploring some other details and finally assuring his readers "there is no doubt that the Lockdown regime has resulted in the unnecessary deaths" of  what he ultimately claims to be more than half of all above-average and Covid deaths up to June.  

"Sadly, it appears the UK State are intent upon continuing their Lockdown regime. In all likelihood this policy has already led to the premature deaths of more than 34,000 British people. Unfortunately that figure is set to rise."

That was Davis's warning in mid-June. In fact overall fatalities were falling and near average as he wrote. They fell to below average shortly thereafter, and stayed there for weeks, even for a while after lockdown was ended and the pubs re-opened on 4 July. Above we can see from weeks 25 to 32 is where it's low (again, subtract 2 days on the timeline). The first part of this span, to week 28, is the second half of the "lockdown regime," where virus, the controls, and all else combined anti-kill, compared to usual. I've seen lockdown critics puzzle over this anomaly, suspecting the numbers are fake, and another sign of a mass deception. But this time sees Covid confirmed deaths dipping to 0-9 per day, alongside relaxed controls. Lockdown, strictly defined, was over. 

Then as many refused to have their behavior "modified" by wearing a "useless" mask, infected people were able to spread the mild, flu-like virus wider than they would. Maybe in a coincidence, all-causes deaths crept back to and above average, as barely shown above, hitting significant excess again in weeks 33-37 and nearing it again in weeks 39-40. COVID 19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths had climbed slowly over this time as well, getting a bit ominous by mid-September. 

Only then was was a second round of lockdown threatened and even implemented in places. Now in mid October there are 100-125 deaths per day and rising, from infections 2-3 weeks go. Higher deaths will come from the current 1,000 hospitalizations/day, and rising. Higher yet is promised by current confirmed cases, risen to to about 20,000 per day. Unconfirmed infections ... unclear but surely massive, despite more widespread testing now. All-causes mortality, non-covid and past-28d covid: expected to swell again. (my post on that, FWIW - not that good so far, if ever - needs updated)

Davis and his ilk will probably dispute these new deaths as caused by the lockdown. So let's have a look at how that was argued the first time. 

How Lockdown is Said to Kill


Naturally, any shift on such a huge scale, with enforceable stay-at-home orders, massive closures, and so on is likely to cause some deaths that wouldn't happen otherwise. Depending how it's done, it might cause others it was never bound to cause. Such deaths definitely exist, proportion unclear but well worth considering, as I will in another post, took a quick stab at with this graphic and tweet, and will consider briefly now. 

So yes, lockdowns and related measures have very high costs - primarily economic, sometimes immediately fatal. There can be little doubt an excess of idleness, isolation, and depression would lead to increased fatalities from suicide, and from drug and alcohol abuse. And domestic violence, fatal and not, seems to have increased. But the scale of these deaths should be quite small, proportionally. For example in the gun-toting, car-crashing USA, natural causes still account for at least 90% of all deaths, even in a normal year (it's far higher in 2020, including COVID 19 and unexplained elevation of several top killers like heart diseases, Alzheimer's, and cerebrovascular disease). Less than 10% of deaths are from traffic and other accidents, domestic and other violence, starvation, drowning, suffocation, etc. combined. Even a 100% increase in one of these categories hardly makes a difference, statistically speaking.

And the detested control measures are also bound to prevent at least some deaths that would otherwise happen.  Davis and his ilk tend to gloss over that as possible, banishing balance from their assessments. But it's obvious on reflection that, if measures had been lesser or later, there might have been tens of thousands - possibly even hundreds of thousands - of further confirmed COVID 19 deaths. And there might have been around 40-80% as many unconfirmed ones along the way. Whatever excess or imbalance may exist in these policies, the solution would require a clear-eyed assessments of the threat posed by SARS CoV-2. 

Davis's analysis didn't get hung up on the possible lives saved by U.K. lockdown, nor on the smaller-scale costs like increased overdose deaths. He stuck to the costs only, and wisely focused on the larger - and more disputable - effects one might expect from diminished hospital care. He pointed to the ONS report from June (as linked above) and its suggestion of covid death mixed into the non-covid ones. For that I have him to thank - I hadn't noticed the report before. But he was critical of that notion, instead focusing on and magnifying the report's consideration of lockdown and related measures likely contributing to the death toll as well.

I've heard many lockdown opponents claim UK policy forced COVID 19 patients from empty hospitals into nursing homes where they spread it and killed many. That might be, and/or refusing to accept patients - I still haven't looked much into the details of that. But either way, the ONS reports confirm all kinds of admissions, treatments, and deaths occurred far less in hospitals as they spiked badly in care homes and private homes. That seems to start at week 15 ending April 10, just before the peak of covid deaths. The first report noted the same issue as well, with a bland and likely incomplete explanation: "As the healthcare system adapts to ensure it has capacity to treat COVID-19 patients, some facilities may be less available because of COVID-19 and care for other diseases may be reduced."

I'd need to look into this a bit more to say, but this could be a genuine dark side similar to disturbing euthanasia policies in Sweden, at least (I've heard lockdown opponents claim similar happened in Madrid and in New York as well). Some people were just given up on, given some morphine and left to die. But in general, something like this is more likely to be a decision of grim necessity, maybe carried too far in some cases. If so ... in Sweden alone the necessity was invited by government policy and, if Tegnell et al. are to be believed, some gross lack of foresight. 

Anyway, wherever such a course is taken, many infected people would be left to die with no help. However, it may be the vast majority of them couldn't be saved; priority might've been given to those with the best odds, as the Swedes were clear in doing. To do much past that - in England - might continue the terrible overload of the hospital system, and infect even more of the crucial medical staff along the way. In fact, between NHS staff, paramedics, and social care workers, more than 620 reportedly died from COVID 19 by August, most of them in the early days before this controversial policy, when hospitals were swamped with infectious patients and running out of protective gear. (The Independent). 

Davis points to a drastic drop in admissions to the hospital emergency room (A&E) in this time; "both general A&E presentations and those for heart attacks were down by half." This might ignore how admissions were down 50% from an unsustainable 220% of the norm in the days before that, as thousands of paramedics, nurses and doctors were infected in the process, hundreds of them bound to die. He also noted slowed ambulance response as likely adding to the death toll. 

Perhaps more relevant: "crucial surgery and diagnostic tests, for a range of other serious conditions, have been delayed in huge numbers," Davis accurately points out. Exact details aside, he might be right that "treatment and essential screening has effectively been withheld" for all five of the U.K.'s five top killers (aside from a novel virus this year). As cited and generally agreed, these are: 

* Dementia and Alzheimer’s disease

* Ischaemic heart diseases

* Cerebrovascular diseases

* Chronic lower respiratory diseases

* Influenza and pneumonia 

We'll come back to these and other co-morbidities below and, as we'll see, the bulk of officially "non-covid" deaths are listed as dying primarily from these same causes as they claimed far more lives than usual. Davis had that fact ready, and the denied treatment and screening cause explained, yet he made little use of it. Maybe he realized that wouldn't make much sense to explain so many deaths in such short order. Maybe it even struck him that they might wind up weakening his case against lockdowns, or even flipping that case upside-down by suggesting SARS CoV-2 was to blame.

Only one of these causes is specified as elevated: "Cardiovascular disease kills nearly 170,000 people every year in the UK. With an average mortality of 460 deaths per day, a 50% drop in presentations, over the nearly three months long Lockdown regime period, has and will significantly increase mortality from cardiovascular disease." Here he specifies lockdown already "has" increased cardiovascular deaths caused by reduced care, but he doesn't give any kind of estimated figure. But as an ONS table below shows, the leading part of that (ischaemic heart diseases) was increasing before any lockdown or changes in medical service, just about as covid deaths were rising, and then peaked and declined at about the same time as them. The continuing deaths projected over the months have yet to materialize.


The second ONS report's figure 10 shows numerous "Conditions which can quickly become fatal if not treated in time" rising dramatically in weeks 11-18, and that some "have continued to appear above five-year average levels during Weeks 19 to 28." In particular, "symptoms signs and ill-defined conditions," diabetes, and hypertensive diseases remained well above average. No causes are worse then they had been - all had the greatest deaths during the time of massive covid deaths (known and unknown), so it remains hard to untangle the excessive demand aspect from the limited supply aspect. All those shown had improved in the following weeks. Dementia-Alzheimer's in particular - likely the far-and-away top contributor by numbers - had deaths fall  to almost exactly average from 140-145% over in w11-18. 

I'd wager most of these rates only improved further after this, and have only worsened again in recent weeks, amid the second wave of COVID 19 infections.

The first ONS report says the effects of diminished treatment "might be most apparent in long-term serious diseases where delayed treatment increases mortality within a period of weeks, including renal failure and cancers with a moderate rate of survival." Just the two relevant death causes are mentioned - neither in the top 5. The report's figure 15 shows how both have overall level increases at week 14,  and from there on they have less hospital deaths, and increased ones at care homes and private homes. 

The cancers will include a few kinds, so it's hard to say if the virus might amplify these deaths. And their overall levels seem barely affected, despite the alarming rise seen outside hospitals. We see only a tiny rise at week 14 and forward, possibly due just to decreased care. But renal failure is especially high, passing well over 200% normal outside hospitals, and peaking - for 3 weeks in a row - at about 140% above average altogether. And this might well be elevated by COVID 19; kidney damage has been noted following known infections, should do the same for unknown ones, and of course the time-frame is consistent.

There's more on this aspect, but I moved it below. First, a bit on what else Davis does to try and assign more blame to lockdown and less to the virus.

LUMPIN 20 And Re-Branding the Dead

"Unless there is some unknown pathogen ravaging the nation," Davis wrote in June, "what remains are excess deaths which correspond precisely with the Lockdown regime period."  We know what caused that, after causing widespread confirmed infections and associated deaths, and the high case-fatality ratios between these. We know it also caused enormous unknown infections, driving down the actual infection-fatality ratio (IFR), as generally calculated. 

And we should suspect it caused at least moderate unknown deaths along the way (an important factor, then, to set a real IFR). That would be the "unknown pathogen" ruining his "unless there is" construct. But Davis rules that out from the start, and declares "we don’t have any other explanation for this loss of life," and since "all deaths occurred during the Lockdown," he decided "We will call this LOKIN 20 mortality." 

"We" is a group not including me. His "LOKIN 20" ... syndrome is it? ... is by name an inversion of COVID 19, where "LOcK-IN" somehow kills even more than the virus. I'll be talking about this quite a bit, but we'll call it LUMPIN 20: he makes some specific arguments to move as many fatalities as possible into his category of possible lockdown deaths. But as I'll show, it's an ill-defined catch-all for any deaths caused by lockdown-related policies, and any others - including covid deaths - he can raise any specific questions about. The questions don't even need to be good ones. All this simply LUMPed IN is what Davis proudly puts a very big number on, and pretends that means something. 

While counts vary some, Davis used a figure recently publicized by the BBC of 63,708 above-average deaths in the UK up to then. "With 50,107 deaths allegedly attributed to COVID 19," (as it was then reported - revised down since), he explains "the BBC report 13,601 LOKIN 20 deaths." Here Lokin = excess deaths of all non-covid causes. As we've seen, these primarily happened in weeks 13-17, early in the lockdown. The later revision removed nearly 5,400 deaths past 28 days in England, arguably giving Davis the same number he could add as lumpin, by that same token. He could now claim almost 19,000 - but only by adding people who had COVID 19 and died quite soon after - mainly within 60 days - and so were statistically unlikely to be killed by anything much but the virus. So LUMPIN 20 would include 5,400 almost certain covid deaths. It already includes far more than this, so why not?

Next, he turned to the deaths "allegedly attributed to COVID 19." He finds, reasonably enough, that "approximately 95% of COVID 19 decedents have at least one other serious comorbidity," as if this is new or matters. Another "9,510 were identified by symptoms alone" and/or compelling context, so "it is not clear how many of these deaths can legitimately be attributed to COVID 19." The numbers he considers writing off  are immense. But in particular, he found a few more specific questions he used to re-brand nearly half of these as ambiguous enough to claim as more fatalities of the "lockdown regime". So LUMPIN 20 also means COVID 19 plus some debatable ambiguities.

"where and both pneumonia & influenza are also mentioned on the death certificate, it cannot be objectively determined that these deaths were from COVID 19." Davis writes "For weeks 14 to 22 the ONS report that 37.3% of all COVID 19 deaths also mentioned both pneumonia and influenza," maybe in a sense of first guess, second opinion, best-informed diagnosis or confirmed test saying Covid 19. And he thinks "diagnosis is by observation alone" in a lot of those cases, and so he concludes "it is not reasonable to claim these deaths were from COVID 19." ... "While we don’t know the distribution of these deaths between those identified by test results and those identified merely by symptom, we can reasonable state that at least 3,547 of the 9,510 symptom diagnosis were inconclusive." (he doesn't know how many, but it's 9,510?) 

Since it can't be all three, it's probably not the one, or it's inconclusive, anyway. Adding this to "the BBC's" all unexplained excess deaths, he decides "his leaves us with potential LOKIN 20 mortality figure of 17,148." (emphasis mine). 

Finally, "There is a significant problem with claiming that a positive test result for SARS-CoV-2 proves that the patient was suffering from COVID 19," the resultant disease or syndrome. Many of those infected  are asymptomatic, and "this means they have the virus, not necessarily the resultant syndrome of COVID 19." They're at least sometimes contagious, perhaps leading to other peoples' deaths, but "without COVID 19 they don’t have a disease that will impact their health." They don't have any symptoms, suffer no damage, and therefore any sudden turn in their health resulting in a swift death might be some sort of coincidence, and should be fairly rare on the timescale involved. 

It's hard to see how Davis could subtract many covid deaths by discounting infected people who died despite suffering no illness. But he uses some averaging to decide "42.5% of positive test cases" are asymptomatic, and "This means that 17,211 of the claimed 40,497 COVID 19 deaths ... are unlikely to have had COVID 19." (emphasis mine) That's quite a leap. Nearly a third of those people who died after testing positive - falsely or truly - must have not had the disease at all. They died in a massive crush due to some other coincidence  ... that ... hey, just might be from the lockdown, the lumpin, whatever. It was something more contagious or coincidental, and even more symptomatic (deadly) than COVID 19, and targeting people who also tested positive for that, and almost entirely in the early days and weeks of the lockdown "regime," as pre-lockdown infections were still dying. It was LUMPIN 20. 

"Added to the potential 17,148 LOKIN 20 deaths already noted," Davis concluded, "it appears LOKIN 20 accounts for at least 34,359 of the 63,708 deaths reported by the BBC" - and not just potentially - it's apparent now. That's well over half the total excess deaths in the U.K.. He'll suspect others in there also belong, but since he couldn't be quite so rigorous about all of them, it would be hard to set a number and lump them in properly. At least 53.9% of all covid-and-above-average fatalities up to June, killed by that ill-defined cluster of real causes, doubts, and ignorance we call LUMPIN 20. COVID 19 and anything else combined only "legitimately" killed 46.1% of them, at most.

He also makes a tentative case - already amplified into a fact by some - to suggest far less covid deaths and more lumpin ones, but without claiming explicit numbers. As noted above, some 95% of deaths had pre-existing conditions. He expanded on this: "Using ONS data for England and Wales we can calculate an estimate of the likely percentage of deaths that were genuinely attributable to COVID 19. We can then apply these percentages to the figures reported by the BBC to extrapolate estimates for the UK."

Covid patients who actually died from co-morbidities acting alone (??): 24,419

"Genuinely attributable" to COVID 19: 1,318.

The questioned deaths are surely above average expected death rates for every class, and incredibly far above for most of them. "In this together" floats this argument hardly any deaths were "genuinely attributable to COVID 19," belying control measures to "save more lives" when hardly any were really lost - to the virus. But that opens a question that's easy enough to answer; in this roundabout way he blames the same measures for some 95% of those killed (in the sense lockdown = LUMPIN 20 = all disputable deaths) . What a genuinely sick joke of a concept.

But then Davis didn't really go that far, taking a more reasonable course of claiming only the larger half of all excess deaths (at least) based on this basic deniability plus any other question he could find. In review, Iain Davis' LUMIN 20 mortality as of mid-June:

* 20,758 total Covid deaths (officially, and he concedes some might have died from it, it's just inconclusive)

** 17,211 estimated to never have had covid (might admit estimate could be off - estimate makes no sense - how many can have no symptoms and then die of whatever else - that's lockdown-related - on this short a scale?)

** 3,547 that are inconclusive (might have had it, but I/P also mentioned)

* all 13,601 non-covid excess deaths to June (regardless of cause or details)

= 34,359 total

This will read as reasonable to many poor thinkers in allowing for perhaps half of overall excess deaths to be from COVID 19. But unlike the virus, Davis feared lockdown was set to keep killing for years to come with the unavoidable damage it has unleashed. He probably thinks England has natural herd immunity by now, and always did, and so did everyone, or whatever.

So he doesn't have the best overall thought process. But he's right that lockdown etc. will have caused some deaths, and we still have an enormous number of unexpected deaths caused by something, which I'd like to come back to. 

What Kind of Excess Deaths? 

Timeframe and Age Brackets

No infection picked up during lockdown is likely to explain the accelerating deaths witnessed in its first month, unless one wants to argue it spreads better through walls than through inches of air. A contagious illness that hit them about 2-3 weeks earlier - mainly prior to lockdown - is not just possible but, as I'll show, all but certain. But Davis doesn't suggest that - perhaps because the illness would probably be Covid 19, which he labors to absolve of these deaths.

So the mystery forces behind LUMPIN 20 should no be a contagion. But they worked in the same time-frame; as the graphic above shows, weekly all-causes deaths (in England and Wales) increase from below to far above average just as covid deaths are rising, prior to lockdown. They peak about 3 weeks out from lockdown, about a week after virus deaths peaked, and then fall with them from there. That alone suggests that the solid majority of these deaths were caused by COVID 19.

Further, data from the European Mortality Monitoring project (EUROMOMO) shows the people dying across most of Europe, even beyond those killed by SARS CoV-2, are primarily elderly, just like the virus kills. Those in England include more in the 15-44 bracket than usual (most likely with 95% of those in their 30s and 40s). But other member states - notably Spain - also have more younger deaths than many would expect,. This trend that has gradually increased over the pandemic, and from the way it spreads between age groups, is likely due to the ups and downs of the virus in question and the varied learning curves regarding it. The younger vulnerable people aged under 59 - and especially in the 30s and 40s - often fail to realize the danger and/or simply can't afford to avoid it well enough (they aren't retired, have to jump in the fray going to work every day). And so excess deaths across Europe are increasingly young - especially but not exclusively in England, and especially in the East Midlands of England (see here). 


Public Health England made a switch, back in mid-August, to match the rest of the UK (and just who else I should find out) in counting covid deaths only to 28 days past confirmation. Those who die before then, whatever the cause (including car crash, etc. - likely very few) are listed as virus deaths. But ... when they die even directly from the virus on day 29 or later, they're not listed as covid victims, except on a list where they still are (several tallies are still kept by different agencies). 

With a bit of work, I was able to show how, in England, those with Covid who live past 28 days wind up dying, on average, at several times the usual rate: 8x English average at last view, up to 14x before that, maybe just 4-5x normal by now. Combined deaths have been below normal while the very many covid survivors die well above, so to average out, everyone who's avoided infection fares far better under the lockdown reign of terror. Why does lockdown or whatever target COVID 19 patients so heavily, and give the rest of the populace such a break?

Returning to unconfirmed deaths: ... we do see Covid-linked death causes seeming to kill on their own but at elevated levels, at the same time deaths linked to the virus are the highest. The ONS reports on "non-covid 19" deaths in the UK (mainly England and Wales) - the links again: early August overview - and old version from June cited by Davis.

The older report page now links to the new one as preferred, and that was able to show more of the post-lockdown effect in various ways. For one thing, as figure 3 shows, the non-covid deaths in the span of week 11 to week 18 were of older ages. Among those aged 90 and above, 8,037 people above average died in this span, along with several thousand excess deaths aged 65-89. But there were just 13 over-average non-covid deaths aged 64 and under. (There will likely be a few unknown covid deaths there as well, with lower deaths from other causes concealing them.) 

So we have an oddity: lockdown or whatever causes "non-covid" deaths in the same age brackets most heavily targeted by Covid 19.

That's who dies in weeks 11-18, early in lockdown, as covid infections from before that were resolving fatally, and the smaller number since had shrunk a bit more. After the effect of control measures had fully settled in, the lessons to avoid the virus had been widely learned, and transmission had been low for a while - the same brackets see the greatest below-average deaths, while those under 65 have about the same levels - just above, then just below average. 

This too is lockdown, where the biosecurity technocracy anti-kills in all age brackets, but especially where it HAD been killing the worst. Just what accounts for this massive variability in Lockdown-LUMPIN death rates? The oldest classes' avoidance of covid deaths is remarkably similar to how they quickly evaded ... whatever mysterious force lockdown was killing them with. 

LUMPIN 20 and Covid Comorbidities

And as shown here in part (to be be explored further in another post), "LOKIN 20" also kills them in  the same range of ways, physiologically speaking, and mainly whenever covid is going strong, and especially the first time it hit. as already explained ...reword: damage to the heart and blood vessels, lungs, kidneys, neurological system, and more. Numerous conditions involving these are the co-morbidities most covid fatalities have - it's the same in the United States too.

https://www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/covid19caseshospitalisationsicuadmissionsanddeathsofthosewithnounderlyinghealthconditions

Thanks to Deus Abscondis for finding this (on Twitter). 

From the ONS total Aug. 21 - out of 50,335 "deaths involving COVID-19" just in England and Wales, one is "Fracture of femur" (195 deaths), but the rest seem pretty likely to matter. Top ten:

Main pre-existing condition         Number of deaths

Dementia and Alzheimer's disease 12,869

Ischaemic heart diseases                 5,002

Influenza and pneumonia         4,582

No pre-existing condition         4,476

Chronic lower respiratory diseases 4,061

Symptoms signs and ill-defined conditions 3,428

Cerebrovascular diseases         1,781

Diabetes                                         1,273

Diseases of the urinary system 1,132

Hypertensive diseases                 942

I'll suggest from how common it is, entry 4 "no pre-existing condition" primarily means no KNOWN condition. It might be 99% of fatalities have conditions for all I know. 

A flip-side of lowered hospital admissions right at the covid peak: much case confirmation happens at hospitals, among those coming in very sick, often to die. When they stop taking in as many patients, some number of actual infections will die at home with no help and no confirmation, to have the known condition solely blamed. There's a rise in all these death causes covid is known to partner with. Whatever role limited care had in that, unknown infections probably matter far more, by requiring such a vast degree of often-futile care to begin with.

 Above we looked at deaths from renal failure rising sharply over a class of cancers, and kidney damage is known to result from some infections. Missing treatments are likely enough to be a large factor, but still much of the excess (absolute numbers unclear) probably adds a bit more to the explanation for those 30-40,000 excess deaths left unexplained. A bit over 2% of covid deaths also involved urinary (and kidney) diseases.

I've also mentioned a couple of times how top 5 killers and covid co-morbidities have been on the rise. Now let's look at a couple of these other and larger causes of death in a bit more detail.

An Unseasonable Increase in Respiratory Illness Deaths

"Seeing as COVID 19 is supposed to be a pandemic," Iain Davis reasoned in his lockdown deaths article, "if under diagnosis is an issue, we should see an unseasonable increase in pneumonia deaths within the non COVID19 mortality figures." Influenza and pneumonia are usually combined into an I/P category, which is mainly by bulk a variety of pneumonias, and misdiagnosed covid cases are often listed as "atypical pneumonia." So indeed, if this happened much, we'd likely see a mysterious increase in deaths, probably right alongside covid ones. 

He suggests there was no such rise, but there was. I had already plotted an unseasonable rise in I/P deaths in the United States, including a bulge at the new year responsible for at least 4,000 deaths above natural levels. And the same appears in the U.K. ONS reports: in early 2020, "deaths due to influenza and pneumonia were below the five-year average" while overall, al-causes "mortality levels from the beginning of 2020 were lower than average," in both cases "possibly" or "probably because of the relatively mild winter and low levels of circulating flu." 

This is consistent with my amateur hunch that I/P infections are the main cause of elevated deaths from these other causes every winter - in almost every place I've checked, Alzheimer's and such have a mild seasonal variance. In 2020, most places I've checked had abnormally low levels for I/P and most other relevant casues, until the rise suggesting covid appeared (not that you can always tell when - sometime in later 2019, in most places. - it helps to look so far back you're almost out of this flu season anyway). Then the seasonal declines stop and reverse into mysterious rises, usually right at the time that would best explain the mystery - COVID 19 is causing increased deaths at that same time.

Above was an ONS figure10 showing "respiratory illnesses other than I/P" but also taken as non-covid: these should also be higher in winter, falling over the spring. But 2020 saw a massive increase, almost 20% below average for the first 10 weeks to nearly 40% above in weeks 11-18, then back to at least 10% below in weeks 19-28.

Davis complains how ONS was suggesting covid death had been lumped in with I/P but then "contradict this notion in their own report. That does find it "unlikely that symptoms of COVID-19 have been mistaken for pneumonia since Week 14 (week ending 3 April 2020). It is possible this contributed to non-COVID-19 excess deaths observed before that time.” (emphasis mine) - apparently the point they started applying a more exhaustive sorting of deaths, besides accepting far less patients. He cites their figure 13 which claims to show "no clear increase" in "the percentage of non-COVID-19 deaths due to each of these underlying causes where pneumonia or influenza is mentioned" - noting some slight rises but final lows allowing for little false inclusion. 

But the best place to see any rise is with the cause mentioning pneumonia most frequently. Chronic lower respiratory disease (death cause #4, 18,783 deaths in 2018) has this on 45% of certificates, until exactly when covid deaths were spiking but still heavily  misdiagnosed. Here it rises slightly to 50%, and then drops sharply to about 38% after covid is filtered out better, meaning an extra 12% was mixed in prior to that visible spike. But when did it sneak in? I/P deaths usually show a strong seasonal decline in this span, but the line here just stays flat at 45% for a long time, as if the natural decline had been offset by a small but growing number of undiagnosed Covid 19 deaths starting around week 7 - just as SARS 2 community transmission was first noted in early February. Adding this to their plotting:

Next up: all deaths "where the underlying cause was respiratory disease (ICD-10 J00-J99)" in England and Wales, flu season 2019-20. Actual weekly numbers are included in the ONS yearly fatality summary (PDF), usefully listed by week, right alongside Covid19 deaths. This is  I/P and chronic lower resp. disease (killers 4 and 5), combined with a few others. I plotted these, noting the same interrupted seasonal decline mentioned above, first just traced in, based on the interrupted fall and lower levels seen later. 

If this baseline is correct, the suspicious overage in respiratory illness deaths would be the shaded area, peaking in week 14 at about 900 above normal - nearly double the expected number. Combining weeks by visual estimates, rounded to the nearest 50 yields around 6,150 above-normal deaths by week 21. In the later weeks, baselines and comparisons are unclear, and case transmission should be low, so it didn't seem worth trying to count any excess. The little bump in weeks 33-35 seems to matter, but I'm not putting a number on it. 

Later I found, from the ONS reports, a 5-year average for this mimicking the same patterns but higher on the scale. As with most relevant death causes, 2019-2020 was a low season to start. Compare to that, there's no above-average deaths until week 14, but I think the full pattern comparison shows how meaningless that is. 5-year average surprised me in showing the same New-Year's hump but higher on the scale, with a similar decline also staying higher. Usually this is shallower than in 2020, and continuous as I guessed - it doesn't go flat at week 7. There's even a similar rise at week 14, right after 2020 hits average at week 13. But the rise is much smaller normally, when there's no Covid 19 epidemic to strangely mimic. As you can see, my estimate was pretty sound, and so there were around 6,000 excess respiratory deaths to week 21. The possibility of these continuing since then appears a bit stronger now.


Considering lockdown and social distancing, all contagions should suffer in their ambitions, and the baseline for legit non-covid death may well be lower than this, making for even more excess. We could add a token 50 fatalities to get a fair and conservative minimum of 6,200. This doesn't add to prior calculations of 30,000-40,000 non-covid excess deaths in the U.K.. It just explains 15-20% of them, and gives an idea of the scale of relevant deaths that could plausibly add up to just the big range I propose.

LUMPIN20 Recruits the Top Five Killers

Aside from emergency visits, Davis points out that "crucial surgery and diagnostic tests, for a range of other serious conditions, have been delayed in huge numbers." Some conditions left unchecked will be ones with a normally low death toll, but he suggests the same applies to all five top killers (aside from covid). As Davis points out, for sufferers of these conditions, "during the Lockdown regime, treatment and essential screening has effectively been withheld." Once again, these are (by what seems to be 2018's figures): 

* Dementia and Alzheimer’s disease: 13% of all deaths registered were due to one of the two and they are the leading cause of death for women. In total, 51,407 deaths were reported due to dementia and Alzheimer’s disease in 2018

* Ischaemic heart diseases: 23,662 deaths.

* Cerebrovascular diseases: 20,523 deaths.

* Chronic lower respiratory diseases: 18,783 deaths.

* Influenza and pneumonia: 17,614 deaths. (source)

Davis explains "The top 5 leading causes of death account for more than 40% of  deaths" in England and Wales in 2019. "On average these five causes kill 0.37% of the population every year, equating to approximately 0.06% every two months. Roughly the same figure as reported COVID 19 deaths." By his math, the one virus officially killed as many as all of these do combined in a normal year. In 2020 they killed quite a few more, but most likely they didn't do that on their own. No, they had help - from the year's top killer and/or the lockdown.

Most of these are also included in the above list of "conditions which can quickly become fatal if not treated in time." But I don't think all of these five require tight weekly management to avoid sudden massive deaths, that sometimes begin a few week BEFORE any lockdown-related changes occurred (see above, weeks 11-14). So that in itself cannot explain all of  of the rises shown in ONS 2nd report, figure 9 (with added notes). This shows weekly deaths from top 5 killers # 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, plus lung cancer and the elder-oriented "symptoms/ill-defined," shows as percentage difference from a 5-year average for the same week. There's simply no good reason for these to do much more than wiggle a little above and below average, aside from deaths involving COVID 19 wrongly mixed in. 


Limited treatment likely contributes a bit to the deaths rate for one or two of these, maybe a fair amount for another. But such spikes with all of them  (considering rises and declines) could be better explained by new damage caused widely by unknown covid infections incurred a few weeks before. 

The worst effects and best indicators are with Alzheimer's-dementia - up as much as 120% above normal (220% the usual number) in week 16 - and "symptoms, signs, and ill-defined conditions" (meaning general debility, frailty, senility etc. of older folks) up as high as 150% above normal in the same week 16. The other taken-as death causes included show a rise and then fall at the same basic time, but to lesser degree (proportionally): chronic lower respiratory infections, cerebrovascular diseases, ischaemic heart diseases, lung cancer, and influenza and pneumonia. 

Note how the these likely false inclusions vary first with a mild rise than massive spike of deaths in week 14, then better but imperfect filtration mellow the increase, then more deaths steepen it anyway, and then finally an oddity: as the effects of lockdown could win over the effects of the virus, there are far less of these deaths - they fall back to their yearly norm of well below average. That happens quickly, by week 19. As noted above, Davis worried about cardiovascular deaths "over the nearly three months long Lockdown regime period." As shown in fig. 9, a leading part of that (ischaemic h.d.) is shown above increasing before 3 April (app. start of curtailed medical care), then peaking and falling alongside covid deaths before falling to normal. It killed at elevated levels for about six weeks, not the whole 3 month. 

Again these are the five top killers in the UK (aside from Covid 19 this year), all markedly elevated in just that pattern suggesting many, most, or all of the excess deaths are NOT "non-covid" after all. 

Among the smaller-scale killers in England and Wales are other elevated causes of likely relevance. Again, Covid 19 has wide-ranging effects on the lungs, heart, blood vessels, kidneys, and probably on the brain and neurological system, and several of these conditions are known to be linked to confirmed virus deaths. They will connect with unconfirmed deaths too. That's probably the main reason the following causes were all in general and drastic increase during the UK pandemic, although medical service changes and other factors will also play in.

cause          peak rise above 5-year average 

                                        (in weeks 11-18, age 65+ unless noted)

Cerebral Palsy etc.        31.73%

Diabetes                42.3% (under 65)  

Parkinson's disease         39.41%

epilepsy                 33.58%

hypertensive dis.         53.23%

cardiac arrythmias          33.47 (w19-28, under 65)

cardiomyopathy       31.10% (w19-28, under 65)

heart, ill-defined           23.01%  (under 65) 

pulmonary h.d.             22.91%

urinary/kidney dis.     23.26% 

All to get a little more detailed consideration in time.

Conclusion

Iain Davis' "LOKIN 20" was supposed to encapsulate a majority of abnormal U.K. deaths as caused by lockdown and related measures, leaving relatively little to blame on COVID19. Instead, it's just a poorly-defined catch-all trying to claim some half of all covid deaths, and all others above average, regardless of cause - hence we call it LUMPIN 20. Yet the mysterious combined forces behind that kill overwhelmingly when COVID 19 is killing, and then relent when it does - starting about 3 weeks after lockdown. It kills at the basic speed as that syndrome, and in the same age groups. And it kills its victims in  the same range of ways, taking advantage of the same conditions it turns to co-morbidities just like covid does. 

LUMPIN 20 comes across as COVID 19s' evil twin. But in reality, it's the same thing with some ignorant doubts slapped on. 

Davis dismisses COVID 19 as killing only those with serious and largely age-based conditions that would have killed them fairly soon anyway. In fact that seems to be his main basis for deciding the virus "has low mortality rate" and/or one that was not "high impact," making it "absolutely comparable to influenza" 

It was made to seem as if the 34,359 lives taken in a panic by LUMPIN 20 were of an ordinary spread, including plenty of productive lives cut well short. But Davis never specified this, leaving the type of lives lost rather vague. Either way, as a slight majority of deaths or greater, he'd say LUMPIN 20 clearly outweighed the smaller number (maximum 46%) of relatively marginal lives taken by the flu-like virus.

But it turns out to be overwhelmingly the same people who have been killed by the factors he refers to as "LOKIN 20." Davis may or may not realize the hypocrisy here: lockdown was imposed (ostensibly) just to spare some lives - tens or hundreds of thousands, for all he knows - from COVID 19. But considering those lives would be mostly old people with conditions who were going to die soon anyway, it's an outrage that the response caused - he thinks - 34,000 deaths. And these were - as the facts reveal - among mostly old people with the same exact conditions, presumably just as likely to die.

Finally, the type of lives being about the same, let's reconsider how many each takes and, more importantly, how that varies over time. Even the 29,349 maximum COVID 19 deaths Davis allows is a serious death toll. Being a highly contagious disease spreading exponentially up to lockdown in late March, it clearly would have killed far more if measures had been much weaker or enacted even a few days later. In contrast, lockdown and related measures - even if they were behind much of the excess mortality (which, again, doesn't seem to be the case) - only killed for a short while before relenting, allowing all-causes mortality and nearly every specific cause to return to average or below within 2 months after lockdown.

Maybe he couldn't see it then, but we can now: the virus is the greater killer by far. It's probably responsible for around 99% to 99.9% of all LUMPIN 20 deaths, and about 99.9% of all covid deaths. 

But Davis et al , consistently opposes any measure limiting that - ostensibly to "fight the power" AND save lives. But to favor an anti-lockdown position AND acknowledge the facts (including just who died under lockdown and when) would be to consciously sacrifice far more lives just to avoid 'healthy young people' or businesses having to be inconvenienced. They shouldn't have to shut down, limit crowds, mask up or keep a distance or any part of that incredible global plot. Nor certainly should they be grounded failing that. Any further lockdown must be resisted, to keep the pubs and dance clubs open and maintain the old normal, all that free market fundamentalist stuff ... just to resist sound medical advice mean to save a lot of lives that tend to be less economically productive. 

Let it rip, let's part, let the deadwood burn off already. See anything from the American Institute of Economic Research, for example - they fetishize some vague ideas of herd immunity, citing Kyle Reese from The Terminator or whatever, avoiding details like 60-80% of people needing to be infected before that works (that's probably at least 5x the infections so far in the U.K., off the top of my head) Knowing ~95% of those who will die had conditions anyway, who cares if it's 10 or 20 or 60 million that die globally? The AEIR sponsored the expert-endorsed but similarly vague and reckless "Great Barrington Declaration" that seems to have impressed "herd mentality" fan president Trump.

That's the anti-fascist way? No, that's actually kind of an ugly position. At the very least, it's not as compelling as a nice dramatic story putting us at the center of a just and total struggle for survival against a huge China-inspired plot. We simply must reject the fabricated fear, resist the mask, and pursue the holy grail of herd immunity. We must, or we all die off in WHO "health camps" or they'll "Great Reset" us, whatever that's supposed to be (I should have a look). Readers and donations are fired up by stuff like that. Many people with ingrown intellects, and especially it seems in England, spin variations back and forth, reinforcing each other's suspicions, and increasingly take them as facts. And these anti-fascist facts obviously trump all ignored facts of a more logical sort.


Whatever the reason for that widespread fact-swapping, the effect is to maintain their confusion and prolong their fascinating tale of epic struggle. Most of them are so far in to their stories by now they can barely even see over the edge of the pit and perceive the common-sense, socially-responsible thing to do. They need to accept that starting doubt they had 6 months ago and keep stumbling over, but for God's sake, finally go and give that a real, open-minded double-check. And in the meantime, call it a doubt - not a fact - and quit being controlled by fear of just cooperating with the rest of us. If everyone would take the danger seriously enough to cover their face and maintain some space, you know,  just in case it is a real hazard? Is that really such a big a risk to take?

Update, Nov. 23: I meant to develop this more in another post as this one is so bloated, but quickly - the top 5 killers plus lung cancer and the ill-defined kind, plotted atop covid and compared to all deaths.

Interesting. How many others might covid explain? Taking the listed co-morbidities as sum-100% (not sure if it is or if they overlap and up to more, meaning I can't say how big "all others" really is). But this suggests some 82% of the peak deaths are covid and the other 18% (~5,500 over the five deadliest weeks so far) might include others, as well as however many deaths lockdown-related measures caused or contributed to.


Monday, October 5, 2020

Covid 19 Deaths, Not Lockdown Deaths, Part 1: Why the Deadly First Month?

Covid 19 Deaths, Not Lockdown Deaths, Part 1: Why the Deadly First Month?

October 5, 2020

Lockdown Kills! We've heard this around from people who think the SARS CoV-2 virus itself only kills on par with a seasonal flu. Yet all over, a serious outbreak leads to alarming daily deaths from confirmed infections, and then an enormous number of people past expected norms die on top of that, far above what the virus is known to kill, but piling up just when its deaths do - primarily in the 3-4 weeks after lockdown orders are imposed. 

Alarm bells!

What started as a response to just two of the many articles around making such claims turned into a strong but expansive general rebuttal that needs to be done in three parts. I'll start with virus apologist John Pospichal's "Questions for lockdown apologists," which Vanessa Beeley for one passed on as a "very well researched article." He clearly put some work into it, and it's astounding how he was able to follow through that far while completely missing the fairly obvious answer that whole time.

Peak Deaths AFTER Lockdown - Why?

After a quick read, it seems Pospichal just asked variations of one (compound) question: why did Covid 19 deaths, and indeed overall (all-causes) deaths, spike suddenly after lockdowns were imposed, and remain high for weeks afterwards, and not rise noticeably before that, despite the virus apparently spreading for months already? The suggestion is that the severe restrictions are what killed so many over the first few weeks. Just how and why isn't made clear, but the patterns were supposed to speak for themselves in showing it must be something else.

The discussion of early spread is interesting, seems true, and it's worth asking why it didn't kill more widely before (except it seems in Spain, S. Africa, somewhere in the U.S. by Christmas, anywhere a below-average baseline hides the small early death toll, etc.)  Many, many places see unexplained surges of deaths in mid-February, some building on one already underway. But these surges tend to drop - apparently on their own, or from quiet control measures - before the covid surge noticeably begins, variously in mid-February to mid-March. 

Perhaps a more contagious strain started spreading in January, or it just started spreading from far more points in quick order, adding to the existing transmission pathways, hitting the point of exponential growth where it goes from all-but invisible to overwhelming in very short order.

Whatever to make of that issue, once the new wave of infections took off, late February up to lockdown, it got bad all over quite fast. As cases and impending deaths rose sharply, escalating measures were taken. And yet the impending deaths rose sharply for a couple weeks after the final lockdown orders, as if the orders did NOT magically cure them. 

Virus and overall deaths continue past the peak because ... most of them are virus deaths, and in those death comes well after infection and confirmation, not the same or next day. In fact it can take just a few days up to a month, and usually 2-3 weeks, with several sources agreeing on 18.5 days median time between first symptoms and death. For example, Drugs.com gives 18.5, while indicating 19, in a chart I adapted below to get a better view relative to actual infection date.


I'm still no expert, so keeping it broad ... 2-14 days is commonly given as the broad span between infection and symptoms. Confirmation date will vary a lot too, from first concern to first symptoms, to several days after that to ICU admission around day 12 (to death, to never). But confirmation doesn't matter here. Broadly, Covid 19 deaths will follow infections by a wide range of between 20 and 33 days. That may be a bit late and long, and it will describe just the majority of cases involving a real struggle. There are some with bad prior conditions where just a few days of infection is enough to push them over the edge, so a number of deaths resulting from any one day's infections will come scattered over the days and weeks before the crowd arrives at the final finish line.

So if you look at the day after lockdown, you'll see deaths already set in motion about a month back. If infections are to fall off, check for that around 20 to 33 days later. If the response was good, I reason you'll see them already falling by then.  

Working in this key detail to the handy graphic Pospichal had prepared flips his case around nicely. Deaths peak usually 15-20 days after lockdown, maybe depending on how well prior measures had worked. They always fall steadily during the 13-day span roughly corresponding with the last pre-lockdown fatal infections. new cases/deaths will have come in, and a new surge might be waiting in the wings if measures failed, but here we see the high death tolls Pospichal wanted to claim as lockdown deaths all show how well lockdown saved lives.

Madrid: 

Ile-de-France aka Paris, I think. A bit of a slow response, but then quite effective, as seen from 21 to 33 days out and beyond. Good thing too - notive it peaks at nearly 5,000 deaths in a week - the norm it had been was just over 1,500/week. Anyone care to see what would happen if they did lockdown a week later?

London: unusually, that plate had its control measures marked in red a week earlier than they should be, putting more deaths after the orders and less of them before. Interesting. Corrected here, checking 20-33 days out, something deadly was in fact locked down pretty well, besides the people.


New York City, a bit more inexact timeline here at right, but it seems to be the same picture: Lockdown worked, completing improvements made at least a week earlier with other measures (the slope goes from almost vertical to 60 degrees before peak).


Finally, hard-hit Guayas province, Ecuador (below). They saw peak deaths near 700/day 18 days after lockdown, with a sharp fall starting day 19, down to 200/day by day 33, and to average levels again by day 37. That seems to have worked out exceptionally well.



Conclusion

Everywhere, after 18-21 days plus some resolution, these last pre-lockdown cases have died, and deaths then fall steadily by day 33 to fairly low levels, taking different turns from there. That means the lockdown orders and preceding measures worked. The main question on the death delay is answered.  Lockdown did not cause those ongoing coronavirus deaths - it stopped them from rising higher over a longer time. 

To note: the drastic shutdowns and stay-at-home orders so widely used did not do this single-handedly. Social distancing and special protection of the most vulnerable, by themselves and others, seems to have an even bigger impact on falling death rates. These can be seen lowering deaths prior to full lockdown, and must be behind the consistently lower fatality among older people during secondary outbreaks over the summer and fall. But the spikes of death we do so still see - smaller and delayed - show how they can avoid the virus much better when it's not being spread like mad. 

And we know lockdown didn't do this cheaply; the disruptions have been enormous. But the global surges of deaths this year are not one of these costs.

But if one still insists it really wasn't the virus but some aspects of the response, or anything else that killed these people, well... now we can add a detail, in case anyone wants to find out just what is truly to blame. The mystery cause(s) overwhelmingly kill on just about the timescale Covid19 would, peaking about 20 days after lockdown and falling from there. There are some other details we can add, and will in part 2 fairly soon.

Saturday, October 3, 2020

England and Covid19's Younger Victims Everywhere

 October 3, 2020

While the United Kingdom has suffered perhaps the worst death toll in Europe during the Covid19 pandemic, only the larger half of above-average deaths have been linked to the SARS CoV-2 virus. The rest are disputed excess deaths likely caused by unknown infections with the same rampant pathogen or, to many minds, by the lockdown itself. 

Among these, Kit Knightly at the Off-Guardian blog noticed, at the end of July, a trend in the mortality data. Among hard-hit nations, the vast bulk of victims were over 65, but England was different, seeing an "Unprecedented spike in deaths of 15-44 year-olds." Knightly found these, by age, "unlikely to be due to Covid19" and claimed - falsely as we'll see - "no (other) countries anywhere show increased mortality in people under 45." This "unprecedented spike," he says, "seems to be unique around the world. Why?" He offers no guess, except to doubt that it was caused by the virus, and suggesting the actual cause might be what I call "lockdown, somehow." 

The unusual level of deaths referred to is real, and we'll look at it in a little detail below. In fact I can add the issue has become a bit more pronounced since his article. Knightly takes 15-44 as too young to include many covid deaths, but this is sloppy thinking. As I'll show, it doesn't seem there that many, really. And also, 15-44 is broad, including some overlap with semi-old groups where fatal conditions apply more than one might think. Some quick basic references to start getting a view what rates apply around age 44, the upper end of the range in question:

compared to 18-29year-olds:
* 40-49 years had 3x higher hospitalizations, 10x higher deaths.
* 50-64 years had 4x higher hospitalizations, 30x higher deaths
* ages 35-44:  1,780 deaths, 1.722% of total
* ages 45-54: 4,976 deaths, 4.815% of total
* ages 18-39 had a  0.06 "hazard index"
* age 40-49 was 0.3
* 50-59 was 1.0, etc. 
By June 14 (citing old numbers since revised down): of a total 44,869 deaths: 40,023 were 65+, 4,359 were 45-64, and 487 were under 44. That small portion will be spread out over all the ages, but we should get why they'll mainly be clustered at the older end, with probably over half of them aged 35-44, and maybe even with over half of them in their 40s (and also predominantly male).

I'm still no expert, but when I looked into it early to assess my own risk, it seemed ages up to 30 had negligible deaths, with a slight increase in risk accumulating between ages 30 and 44, a slight but marked increase, it seemed, right at 45 (the line I'm just past). Of course it's down more to conditions, and I'm on the wrong side of that line too (maybe related to my anti-virus bias?) I don't recall now just where I had seen that and why it seemed so year-specific when most sources I see now just give ranges. But it had seemed to me the biggest single age difference was between 44 and 45, with the difference being smaller between 46 and each year up to around 55, where it gets increasingly worse every step from there up - I didn't pay as much attention past my zone, which we're dealing with here. 

If 45 is such a cut-off, a group spanning up to 44 might seem safely in the low fatalities zone. But in reality and on a big scale, there can't really that much uniform difference between the two ages. If 45 tends to be the start of high risk, 44 1/2, 44, maybe even 43 1/2 should see some early risk-bloomers. It would mean a sharper increase right around that age, over the slight increases seen from age 30-40. Reasonably, that means of the 487, likely 1/3 to 1/2 of this small number were aged 40-44. That would be 162 to 243 deaths = 0.36% to 0.54% of the total killed in the UK's first wave. There are already the scattered few in their 30s and early 40s this adds to. The total might be significant, if still paling in comparison to the masses of fatalities in higher age brackets. 

This pattern was noticed in combined mortality - covid and supposedly non-covid deaths. But the latter can in fact include any proportion of undiagnosed virus-related deaths, depending on the details (as well as vice-versa, also depending). My opinion remains a solid majority of those disputed excess deaths in the UK, and even some of those below average, were killed by SARS CoV2, following on confirmed, unconfirmed, and totally unknown infections. It kills almost always with the help of existing conditions, which it turs into co-morbidities, during or after active infection, by direct suffocation or exacerbated damage, causing death often decades ahead of schedule.  The relative few deaths in England and elsewhere under age 45 would be primarily among the 30-44 age sub-group, centered old (mostly 40-44). As far as I know, that exactly the age break down for all the elevated 15-44 deaths. 

I'll try to look out for, and will suggest someone should make available, relevant fatality breakdowns (esp. for the UK/England) for that overly-broad age bracket 15-45. But for now ... 

The stats cited above for UK deaths - again this is with the first wave up to late May/June, while the issue in question was only noticed in late July, in part because it was becoming more evident by then. If they were more covid deaths, they would follow the same age patterns, and that's just what's in dispute here; they seem to be too young. That pattern does exist and, as I'll show, it's gotten even clearer since then. England's "non-covid" deaths aren't just unusually young on average, they're getting younger all the time. And yet, the bulk of those above average (and even some of those below it) probably are more-yet victims of the same deadly virus.

Europe's Younger Death's Assessed

I checked deeper into the data Knightly cited (see below - the European Mortality Monitoring Project (EUROMOMO) - 20 European nations signed on to pool mortality data from 2016 on to help track public health threats like this one - there are signs of the same thing happening in other countries, most notably in Spain. Actual levels barely avoid reaching excess, but they do so after rising from the early low, sometimes for a couple weeks in a row, and at the right times to caused buy the virus. 

See here for the data cited: https://www.euromomo.eu/graphs-and-maps. For reference, the involved countries/locales are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany (actually 2 entries: Belrin, Hesse - the rest of the country?), Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK as its four countries: England, N. Ireland, Scotland, Wales.

The Z-score they use for measurements will be explained somewhere ... the provided baseline uses historical weekly death tolls and some seasonal and yearly variables like heat waves into an algorithm that should decently predict the number of deaths to expect - basically - if this pandemic hadn't happened. (or so I gather on a skim of the site)

While the scale of it has no clear precedent among the examined examples, the issue of elevated younger deaths is not unique to England. How it compares to trends in, say Brazil, India, or Iran remains unclear, and even among the other EUROMOMO  states, we can see it's not entirely unique or unprecedented. In case after case, with varying clarity, we can see rises in deaths here corresponding to those among older classes and with known surges of coronavirus infections/deaths. 

And as I'll show, the rises in younger deaths are followed by larger surges among older folks aged 45-64 and more so with those 65+, just like covid death waves might move. The pattern was terrible in the pandemic's first wave prior to general lockdown and related control efforts, but greatly muted in the second waves of summer and fall. It's as if the older section were learning and avoiding the virus better while those aged 15-44 seem to keep getting it and then dying at about the same rate they always did. It's only natural then that the deaths are getting younger on average. And this would support a connection between all age groups -  same virus, different learning curves.

Upon a bit of examination, several countries' data is clear that parts of 2020 have been quite deadly for Europeans aged 15-44. Those parts tend to match up with Covid19 1st and 2nd waves, and otherwise might reflect less obvious levels of the same thing in between. There will be other causes mixed in bringing the death higher or lower than the virus alone would, but to imagine anything else causing the bulk of them ... is something I'd need a little help with.

Knightly picked for consideration the five European countries "most affected by Covid19 so far," which he fairly considered to be Italy, Spain, Belgium France and the UK. For each one, he showed a graph of weekly mortality for those aged between 15 and 44, squished small to show several years. England definitely stands out,  but at least Spain is visible even there as scoring significant excess at relevant times. Most of the others show different kinds of rises to and past the upper limit of normal, often after a quick rise from a level well below average, often corresponding to periods of strict lockdown (see France for example). 

Increases in younger deaths can be seen among all EUROMOMO nations combined: definite excess in this group past the red upper 5 at w12-16, and close to it w31/32, with two spikes to the upper 2 at year's start and February (possibly related), and a bit past that line in week 22 following the April peak, and close again week 37, with the most recent weeks elevated and holding steady just below the 2. In all countries combined, deaths 15-44 are well over baseline in the second half of the year, after starting a bit low. England will be the biggest contributor to this, but not the only one. 


Here I added the green box and other labels, including to explain the graph used throughout. The original chart also gives actual numbers of deaths, unlike most of them. Weekly deaths as high as 1,448 in week 15, to an expected baseline of about 1,170 - an additional 24% died across these 22 nations. It hits 14% over in weeks 31 and 32. )

Also note in the plotting above and those below a possibly misleading optical illusion: in most cases the actual number of deaths age 15-44 is unclear, and may seem large by the graphing. But usually this bracket dies off in fairly small numbers, with proportionally small variations that - by the nature of small numbers - look fairly dramatic and erratic. So it's not that hard to exceed normal or even excess, as soon as there's anything around to push them higher at all. If I read it right, the above plotting uses a baseline of around 1,150 to 1,200 deaths per week between all 20 involved nations. That 24% excess would only be an extra 288 deaths, across 20 nations and in a whole week.

So even England's massive spike looking similar to those for older folks still represents a fairly small portion of deaths. As noted above, only 487 Covid19 deaths under 44, plus whatever excess past that (another 300?)  fill out that massive peak up to June. A few hundred people in their 40s plus a few hundred all younger ages combined, some confirmed and some not, in a hard-hit nation of 67.5 million - is that really so hard to swallow? 

By-Country Analysis
Some other countries considered, just in text first, then visuals for some:
Spain: plotting shows excess for ages 15-44 at weeks 4-6, w12-14, solid excess at w5, 13 then average, then excess at w31 and 35, and all high near upper 2 in between.
Italy at upper 2 w8 9 12 14 16, and low since
France: w13, 15,  then a steep fall w 16/17, average since, until a rise to near upper 2 at w32
Austria: a smooth rise peaking w11 near upper-z, notable lack of low usual low weeks - all high must add up.
Belgium: rises within normal at weeks 5, 12, 36
Portugal: at upper 2 w27,29,31, with actual excess w29
Switzerland: a rise peaks at upper 2 w15, 23
Sweden scrapes it w10, 15, but otherwise near and often below baseline. This was part of their plan - it was the old Mr. Tegnell was willing to lose a bunch of.
Netherlands: odd pattern, possibly unrelated (more study in image): early spikes, moderate since, then near-excess again at weeks 33/34 and 36.

In my crude visual explorations below, I'll show the interrelated rises and falls between 3 age brackets (15-44, 45-64, and 65+), while exploring a new theme I noticed; the disputed death cause(s) seems to spread from the younger to older over time, with peaks tending to appear about a week later in each bracket up from 15-44 (with a week being the finest time unit available). In the first wave, each level also shows a higher peak of deaths and a longer post-peak high following it, and with little or no time delay. In subsequent waves over the summer and fall, the same effect appears but much more muted, sometimes invisible, and it takes longer for a spike of deaths to appear each level up. Those aged 45 and up and especially aged 65 up have by and large learned to avoid Covid19, and they do that now. They still die from it, but in lower number and after evading it longer than than they did before. 

England, noted and visual: w13-16 high excess, pretty high since, esp. w30, 32. w13-17 at upper 5, peaking at z-score 6.45 week 15 - solid excess past the 2 w20, slight w23, 30, 32, 38. Legendary excess among the older groups during the first wave. As often happens, this instill a strong communal lesson - from purple forward, the time delay between a surge hitting different age groups is longer than any others I looked at - 2 and 3 weeks, to the 1 or 2 weeks or no offset with the rest. If English youngsters are especially infected and dangerous, could it be the older folks know this and avoid them a bit better than usual?
There's also a notable rise in all ages deaths in the first weeks of the year, spiking shortly after Christmas family visits would occur, with ages 65+ in excess, scraping the upper 5 in weeks 1 and 2. A similar trend in the US involved a holiday surge of mysterious "pneumonia" deaths in week 1, just as the first confirmed covid19 death (unknown at the time) occurred on January 4. Did England see the same kind of thing?

Wales - the closest thing to another England, most likely to develop or catch the same problem: similar rise offset between ages but shorter - mostly one week, and note above how 15-44 deaths start below average/baseline prior to the April peak, and remains solidly above after that. Wales displays the same pattern, but more muted. As noted above, all EUROMOMO nations combined also shows the same basic pattern. From week 20 forward it rises to entirely above baseline, scraping the upper 2 at week 22 and surpassing it at week 33, while deaths for older classes remain close to or below baseline levels of death.

Spain: less time delay - generational mixing is the norm? (orange, green). But in the purple min-rise - is the loosened lockdown, continued segregation of elders? And that was later loosened? I haven't followed, but if I had to guess... 


Also I had noted before a surge of deaths in Spain in late 2019-2020, when they did have at least a couple of known covid cases. There on the left we can see a similar pattern between all age brackets. But just what caused that to level off and drop well before the bulk of covid cases would take some explaining. Maybe they had a bad flu before, that actually WAS its own thing.

Italy- looking milder than I'd think relative to the red line for upper-5 significant increase. Great display of magnified and delayed tolls at each bracket up, following a basic shared pattern in all three color-coded phases. 


France - as with Spain, not so much for the time delay, and the deaths among younger people tends to come at the end of each surge, when it's more often at the start.  But again rises in deaths occur in all 3 groups at a time of surging likely covid deaths, and to an increasingly similar scale (on the Z-scale) each time. See in France too how deadly lockdown was to 15-44 year-olds (weeks 16-19, most recent weeks)


Netherlands: almost backwards for age offset, but again all three ages brackets have surges of death around the same time, most likely from the same cause.

Blah Blah then End
People aged 15-44  - especially the younger half of the bracket - are on balance the most mobile and least cautious, the least burdened by a sense of personal danger, and thus the most likely to stumble into the SARS Cov-2 virus early on, and to be the main drivers of contagion everywhere. They don't die as often as older patients do, but they suffer some deaths along the way - especially among the older half, and primarily those aged 40-44, or anyone with the right conditions.  It won't then move to an older group an leave them alone, but the graphs almost look that way. Some of them may have some a heart valve disorder, etc. and would die suddenly, while less of them die after a struggle (absent some such swift assassination, they can often win a struggle), so their deaths might spike earlier in a surge.

Older folks know the danger and are more careful, but when it's spreading widely enough, many wind up getting it eventually -  around a week later on average, and much more fatally per capita. Many of these deaths are also swift, but it more often comes to a struggle, which they more often lose. It will be just as fatal to them now, but less are dying. This means one way or another, the virus is getting to less of them, and getting there later when it does.

The younger folks, by contrast, haven't learned they have anything to learn, and so they keep getting infected and thus dying at the same or even higher rates as they were before. Considering the lessons most of us have drawn, so many convinced this is a harmless flu except to people over 60 or 70 or at least over 50 - they WOULD get infected more widely, and find their fatal percentage much more effectively, apply it to a far greater number, and gradually or swiftly skew the average death age younger. 

If we could only see just where in 15-44 it's centered, we could probably see even more clearly how my reading makes the most sense - ignorance is the #1 extra contributing factor to this issue. 

England is heavy on semi-misinformed libertarian lockdown rejectionists and herd-immunity-enthusiasts, even among otherwise bright people. It does not surprise me that an unusual proportion of the 15-44 drivers there wind up dead, with both higher spikes and a higher prolonged elevation between. I'm not surprised to see it bleeding over into Wales. All things considered, this probably is due to the same virus killing so many others. More likely there are just far more people aged 15-44 than we realize, far more than normal, with unconfirmed infections. Many will have sought out infection deliberately. The unconfirmed fatality ratio we'd be looking at might then be about the usual. Maybe it higher than even this, because of more diabetes than usual, or whatever. But either way, it all makes sense to me. 

Here's another thing I found to help understand: ONS 2019-2020 weekly all-cause mortality surveillance for England and the "devolved administrations" of Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland, in less detail and the latter with a 2-week time lag.  


upper 2 (upper normal range) used here, and broader age groups: 0-15, 15-64, and 65+. Just one group sees excess past week 23, and it includes the segment in question, adding a bit of time-and-space detail to the picture. 

We'll start at the last high week you could call part of the April peak - week 22, ending May 29 (example PDF link): "In week 22 2020 in England, statistically significant excess mortality by
week of death above the upper 2 z-score threshold was seen overall. Statistically significant excess mortality was seen by age group in the 15-64 and 65+ year-olds and sub nationally (all ages) in the North East, North West, Yorkshire & Humber, East & West Midlands, East of England, South East and South West regions." No excess deaths in Wales, Northern Ireland, but  (as usual noted in a later report) there was in Scotland back in week 20, when almost everywhere was.  

From there forward, statistically significant excess mortality was seen in ...
week 23: Excess seen sub nationally (all ages) in Yorkshire & Humber and East Midlands regions (not Scotland or anywhere outside England, from here on out). 
week 24: no excess anywhere
week 25: only in East Midlands (all ages)
week 26: East Midlands  (all ages)
week 27: no excess
week 28: ages 15-64, East Midlands 
week 29: ages 15-64, East Midlands 
week 31 no excess
week 32: ages 15-64, East Midlands  (all ages)
week 33: ages 15-64, East Midlands and South West  (all ages)
34: no excess 
35: no excess - 
36: "Statistically significant excess mortality was seen by age group in the 15-64 year-olds and sub nationally (all ages) in the North East, East Midlands and South West" - bit the actual death toll given is far lower than the other weeks - see notes below.
37: no upper-z excess 
38: no upper-z excess - ??
39: sub-nationally (all ages) in the North East and East Midlands regions

"All ages" doesn't mean every age group was in excess. It means ... not sure. Ages aren't given for reginal overage? General excess, but only a tiny bit over in a few areas, under in others, with no one bracket standing out for excess? 

Anyway, no age bracket stands out then except 15-64, apparently meaning nationwide, but clearly driven most by constant excess in East Midlands. It keeps doing that. Why? I offered my guess already, a couple of times. Sorry.  

So England's excess deaths also centered in the East Midlands, besides being younger than usual. Nearly all of them will have some kind of condition, even a mild and totally unknown one, been smokers, or obese. I bet they also have a higher tendency for taking their health advice from alternative media. Maybe just the person who infected them did. For whatever reason, the excess deaths never stopped there, hovering above and just below that generously high upper 2 z-score level. weeks 28-33 and 36 is when more younger folks start dying even more, which would be some days to week(s) after increased infections during the second wave in September. 

Ref: week 22 where I started, with deaths coming out 757 above my calculated multi-year average for that week. That's down from  +1,578 in week 21, following a peak of 12,711 above average (well over double the usual deaths) in week 16 (and week 17 wasn't much better). Those all labeled as showing significant excess deaths in all or most areas and age groups. But at week 35 where it's 857 above my average, it's called not significant. Then the next week it says deaths are up all over, despite the lowest numbers yet? Week 36: "Statistically significant excess mortality was seen by age group in the 15-64 year-olds and sub nationally (all ages) in the North East, East Midlands and South West" coming to the furthest below average toll yet: 1,807 below my 3-year-average. (7,739  deaths vs. 3ya 9,546 - ONS uses 9,182 5ya for this week). The pattern plotting these weeks 35-37 is \/, while the description is opposite, and EUROMOMO data for England agrees, giving the weeks a  /\ pattern, but kinf of tilted or flipped (and actual numbers unclear for better comparison). I'm still working on a big project involving all this that got hung up on that very confusion.

Update October 7:  
Figure 3 shows "Non-COVID-19 deaths are generally below the five-year average for younger age groups from Week 12 (week ending 20 March 2020), particularly those aged 10 to 39 years." 
notice the cut-off age. 40+ aren't so particular in being low, and they would grow in time. But they show weekly deaths by 10-year brackets, and on review, I may have overrated the 40s. At least by variation from the norm, the 30-39 bracket did almost as poorly, though compared to probably lower norms.
It seems plenty in their 30s die as well, and that's part of why 15-44 year-olds die so much.
Figure 2 in the later report shows the same over lockdown and into the summer, used here (remixed with notes) to compare the 4 age brackets where covid-age deaths can be still be seen as the ones in excess, a bit younger than you'd think, if not younger than usual.