Mid-December, 2016 Hama CW Allegations

December 3, 2019
incomplete

I just stumbled across this video I'd never seen, of an incident I'd never heard of.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YVZp2kjyMbI
Dec 10, 2016 Civil Defense in Hama dismantles unexploded cylinders

Description: The Civil Defense team found in the al-Ghab plain unexploded cylinders containing chlorine in agricultural land, which poses a danger to the lives of civilians as they are explosive and are being removed by the chemical team of the Civil Defense.

This seems to be just-now deployed, dropped by helicopter they say, in a little-noted regime CW attack... on some scrub grass?

This event seems to have gone pretty well ignored. My admittedly incomplete "red flags" report of early 2017 included nothing about it. 11-23, 28, 29 12-8, 12-9 (not 12-12) marked the end of those decried chlorine attacks accompanying the government re-conquest of all Aleppo city. Next in that report is the strange incident listed as 12-12 rural Hama. It's actually 2 events over a couple of days in ISIS-held turf, where Syrian or Russian forces were accused of killing dozens of civilians with sarin nerve agent, a disturbing renewal of use mainly stopped after the Ghouta gambit failed in 2013. But it wasn't decried so much, maybe disbelieved for coming from ISIS people, or on the idea civilians there only need protected by regime change - the same attitude held for residents of Damascus or any government-held area subjected to terrorist attacks. Anyway ...

And it was no fluke - a similar thing was alleged in Khan Sheikhoun on 4 April, 2017, where "moderate rebels" ruled; some 90 civilians died, believed to be from government-delivered sarin, and missiles were soon flying. The Uqayribat-area attacks are an underrate precedent to consider better than I or others have so far. So I'll use this post to consider these as well, now that I can add this: the December sarin attacks seem times with the panhandle chlorine … drop. The latter has no apparent purpose except to display relatively innocent chlorine once again, maybe to erase the news of sarin use about to be made? The twin events might have been co-crafted to indicate where "Assad's CW campaign" would go after the world failed to decry the gassing of E. Aleppo strongly enough, and a U.S. president Trump might refuse to recognize his predecessor's "red line" over CW use.

10 December: Chlorine barrel bomb
Just what's shown in the video is a bit confusing; something white in a field is blown up at 0:57, and items are recovered from a field next to torn white stuff.  The fields and days appear different, and it seems order is: first a chlorine barrel bomb - a true barrel in this case - impacted an empty field (reason for alleged drop unclear). Next, the parts of this were recovered, later piled up under a bunch of hotel towels and blown up for safety.

The date and location of use not clear, but presumably soon before (the 9th and 10th most likely), and in this unnamed spot in the al-Ghab plain of northern Hama province - probably in the southern part? A few White Helmets men and allied locals are seen or spoken to, but especially this guy, who looks familiar from at least one other CW events I've studied (Khan Sheikhoun, I think). Reader Andrew says this is Mohamed Kayal, head of the White Helmets chemical unit. He's from Khan Sheikhoun, and his brother was also a White Helmet, killed by the malevolent Russians in June, 2019 (as explained on Facebook and at Orient News).

Here's the collection site with danger sign, rusted barrel, maybe a prior warning sign crudely torn down?

What's shown is an unusual method of making a chemical bomb (said to be chlorine), which I at least have never seen. It uses a large, welded-shut steel or iron barrel, containing several small unusual cylinders with crude nozzles and hinged handles, apparently re-purposed to hold chlorine. The apparently including a cylindrical device that looks familiar, seen broken off in some detail. But another device at 0:30 is part of the chlorine destruction bomb. I included two frames from that in case it shows clues of just what they blew up (unlikely though - very brief view)

This type of bomb has been seen before, in fact, at least tice … f/c - Kobs tweet


11-12 December, Uqayribat area

There's not that much known about this incident, by me or much of anyone. It has two parts, a dawn attack on each of two mornings, blamed on Russian forces, and credited for killing about 75-100 civilians in two or three villages near the town of Uqayribat, inside Islamic State territory. For the moment, this is just a quick review of the available information:

A Closer Look On Syria: Alleged Chemical Attack, December 12, 2016
compiled the available sources at the time.

OPCW's FFM and JIM seem to have issued no reports about this incident, and perhaps none considering it at all. It did sound like there would be an investigation; a 13 December statement by the secretary-general described the recent allegations as being "of serious concern." But the results of any investigation seem hard to find.

Human Rights Watch report:
Clearly not to be trusted as factual, this is still the most valuable and detailed report I know of. The area is controlled by Islamic State: "The Dawood Brigade, which controls the area, declared its allegiance to ISIS in December 2013." There were two attacks reported, killing a reported 67 between them (Jrough Dec. 11, 25 dead - Al-Salaliyah Dec. 12, 42 dead), though HRW also heard reports of up to 93 killed. My own mapping of the area is at right. Both attacks were at about 7-7:30 AM, with clashing stories on the color and smell of the smoke, etc.

Other reports have death tolls at 86, 93, and "at least" 93, including at least 28 children, with a third attack at Hamada/Hamadi Omar nearby. Two released photos showed a row of five dead children in the back of a truck. I don't know of any imagery or even clear description what the blamed sarin-delivery weapon looked like or how it impacted.

Visual symptoms:

* foam, fairly white

* no cyanosis - if suffocation, not terribly prolonged

* splotchy skin, little evident irritation

* dark-sunken eyes appearance: no specific cause for that, and it's likely just shadow from the low light angle.

* smoky-bloody hands, bandaged forehead (on child in yellow LOLO shirt), fairly dingy clothes = signs of captivity, poor treatment

It's possible sarin killed them, but then if ISIS had sarin to do this with, could they have failed to use it in a bigger way, against Westerners, to make some news? It's also not the best choice if you do things the way Syrian Islamists seem to - captives in gas chambers can die from any cheap old chemical.

HRW: symptoms include breathing difficulties, red eyes or swollen eyes and vision problems, headache, lack of coordination, vomiting, swollen face, coughing blood, and dilated pupils (sarin causes the opposite), as well as constricted pupils (HRW notes the conflict), unconsciousness, convulsions, "hysteria." 

Re-examining the partial VDC record: they still in late 2019 have 34 killed: 33 from Jrouh village, one from Hamadi Omar, in the span Dec. 9-15. (Query result) For reference, HRW hears just 25 died at Jrouh. No others were listed differently - all Hama people killed Dec. 10-12 = the same 34 plus a few scattered others from the wrong towns.

An interesting twist: at least 24 of the 34, perhaps 27 or more, are from one family named al-Hassan. Is this the exact all-related 25 HRW heard about and saw no issue with? Extended families do often live near together and could thus fall to the same chemical attack, but still, this might be evidence of family targeting by ISIS.

* Adnan Mamdouh al-Hasan, his unnamed wife, son, daughter = 4

* his brother Sami Mamdouh al-Hasan, wife, 4 sons = 6

* their father Mamdouh al-Hasan al-Mhawesh = 1

* Hatem Mohammad al-Hasan = 1 (died Dec. 15)

* Mohammad Sfouk al-Hasan, unnamed wife, 5 sons = 7

* his brother Munzer Sfouk al-Hasan, 3 sons = 3

* their father Safouh al-Hasan al-Mhawesh = 1 (I don't know the meaning of Mhawesh on the 2 fathers)

* girls missing family names may relate = 2?

* Meriam Ali al-Abdulla might be another wife = 1?

Total = 24-27 of 34.

How many died in the other towns and why VDC didn't list them: unclear. Did the same family get targeted in different towns?  Did different families fare extra-poorly in each town as in Jrouh, or was it more random otherwise?

More perhaps forthcoming.

Painting Vs. Reality in Syria Crisis Response

Assad Files 2018, Part 3
September 10, 2018
updates Sept. 28, Oct. 13

Note, October 13: a better, more readable version at 21st Century Wire, that more fully explains the context and implications. with the help of Patrick Henningsen, who added a few points, provided the space, and has promoted it as the important find it is.
---
In Assad Files 2018 part 2, we looked at three more documents shared in a recent channel 4 program, that offered further insights into how banal and non-criminal Syria's prison system really operated back in 2012-13, amidst this horrendous crisis and endless cartoonish allegations. In summary, we learned of these orders suggesting the "Caesar photo" victims probably died somewhere less normal:

Now we go further back to the allegedly brutal response to peaceful protests that sparked armed resistance ...

August 5, 2011 Crisis Cell Meeting: A Picture Was Painted
I'll start with a re-write of some points raised back in 2016, in my first analysis of the so-called "Assad Files," building off of an ambitious piece of propaganda by Ben Taub at the New Yorker.

Assessing the "Linchpin" of the CIJA Case
In the article, Taub paints fairly benign statements from government officials as deeply ominous - suggesting this is about what the guys informing him (the CIJA [committee for international justice and accountability]) are also doing. These quotes can seem that way - with lights from below on either side and the background dimmed. For example, Taub explains, there was a crucial meeting of the Central Crisis Management Cell in Damascus on August 5, 2011, worried about “the laxness in handling the crisis,” which was getting bigger.

Aug. 1, Hama: a bit of that "crisis" they talk about

It's not mentioned here (dimmed background), but this was just a few days after militants overran parts of Hama city on July 31. They killed dozens of policemen and soldiers, dumping some in the river early on August 1, throats sliced, cursing the dead "soldiers" and shouting Allahu Akbar. One man asks people not to film, but at least 3 do, and the one vide was published. An opposition activist confirmed this incident to CNN, warning there were Al-Qaeda elements involved after returning from the fight in Iraq, and it might turn their rebellion ugly (or might already have, depending).

Already back in early June, 2011, there was a massacre by the "Free Syrian Army" in Jisr al-Shughour, claiming the lives of around 120 security members and an unknown number of civilians. Theories were floated that this was a regime crime against those who "refused to shoot protesters," perhaps involving Hezbollah extremists… but it wasn't as clear on that as Hama a couple months later.

Hama is the city most-associated with alleged regime massacres by the president's father Hafez Al-Assad, and was recently inspected by US ambassador Robert Ford in early July and found to be totally militant-free. So we can be pretty clear who's responsible for the deaths of July 31: 24 members of the security forces, and around 80 men and older boys, allegedly all civilian. The 80 almost has to include some fighters killed in their ambitious coordinated attacks on different areas. That toll also might also include civilians killed by Islamists for their support to the government, or just at random in order to blame the government for the biggest death toll possible. It might also include innocents killed by the government, but their motive remains unclear...

Over 100 dead in a day was a minor milestone in the public mind. That third digit was more in the interest of the opposition seeking help than in the government trying to prevent that. Because as it was reported and widely accepted, the Syrian government killed over 100 "people" in Hama that day in an unprovoked massacre, crushing the protests with snipers and tanks in a senseless, one-sided slaughter. It seems the events of July 31 left president Obama "appalled," and seeing the "true nature" of the "Assad regime," starting a process that led to the statements of August 18 demanding the Syrian president step down in some unclear "transition." (NYT)

This would the standard toxic situation over the following years. Naturally, authorities hoped to shut it down as early as possible. "[S]o as to speed up putting an end to the crisis,” the intercepted dispatches say, authorities hatched a unified plan that night, and in fact, Taub writes:

"This policy became the linchpin of the CIJA’s case against officials in the Syrian regime. ... For the CIJA, identifying suspects was easy, Wiley said, because “their names are all over those documents.”

So let's take a look at what they were able to get out of this August 5 centerpiece. as Taub writes, the idea was "to target specific categories of people." "First," it was "protest organizers and “those who tarnish the image of Syria in foreign media.”" Next and finally, it was whoever else, if anyone; Taub doesn't specify any other target types. Here's just how he wrote it:

Emma Reynolds wrote for news.com.au about this in a similar vein, citing Taub:

By August 2011, Syria’s shadowy Central Crisis Management Cell revealed that they were concerned about “laxness” and poor coordination from the authorities dealing with insubordinates. They arranged for regular raids on opposition activists and critics of Syria in foreign media. Their coordination messages paint a clear picture of how orders for what happened to people like Mazen al-Hamada came all the way from the top.

Al-Hamada was one such activist, arrested while smuggling baby formula to a woman in Damascus in March 2012 and bundled into a car....

They weren't going after any armed groups or anyone else, just people struggling for freedom or smuggling food. Dissent, humanity: shut-down. Militants: ignored? Non-existent?

My suspicion then was the parts about demonstrations were really in there, but alongside the real worries about militants running amok, and the two classes might even be linked in a way that makes sense. That's totally not what the memos said, according to the CIJA via Ben Taub and the New Yorker. But I never did trust those assurances.

What They Were Saying the Next Day
We've still never been allowed a view of any original documents from that August 5 meeting of the Central Crisis Management Cell (CCMC). But now we can see a memo dated the next day and referring to the CCMC meeting in question. Demonstrators, foreign media, wanted persons, clearing and holding areas, and then explanation of the regional investigative committees are all included - and so are all the surrounding parts left out of the painting shown to millions back in 2016. Thanks to an online video from Spanish paper El País, we can see the whole page translated to English, and the Arabic original to a lesser degree, and do some comparison.

Building the case against Assad’s regime
El País, June 15, 2018
https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/06/12/inenglish/1528799235_796657.html
This is apparently a September fax of an August 18 (forwarding?) of an August 6 memo, discussing the previous day's crisis cell meeting. It was directed, on the 6th, to regional Ba'ath party branches in the governorate of Hama (listed first), and also of rural Damascus, Deir Ezzor, Homs, Idlib, and Daraa (in that order) - the places the Islamist insurgency had taken root at the time. It also tried hard in Baniyas, but was contained already. Aleppo remained mostly peaceful at this time. But the first one listed here is Hama, which had witnessed the massacre of soldiers and police a week earlier.

Yellow highlighted by El País, about the same points early shared all alone. The red underlining added by me shows important points they left out in that process.

The relevant paragraph (middle, with highlighting) does mention demonstrations and demonstrators 4 times - at least per the provided translation. But this memo also mentions - as I suspected - "armed gangs" that cause "human and material losses" by vandalism, looting, pillaging, attacking state institutions, and "killing and terrorizing citizens." This all required so-called "security operations" that were expected to incur "losses," perhaps related to the weapons they hoped to seize some of.

They also decided some soldiers had a way of losing their weapons to the militants, or being "reluctant" to fully face the "armed groups." These might even be sympathizers, people willing to defect, sabotage things, or kill their fellow soldiers. This is probably the "laxness" referred to in Taub's painted version, but there seems to be a bit more we still can't see.

Arrest THEM = people wanted for violent offenses. "Especially those" is a subset of THEM, so violent offenders who also incite demonstrations, etc. However much sense that makes, it's what this translation says. The wording is odd, and raises questions about the translation, which we'll return to shortly. But it does not say go after people who just organize peaceful protests or just talk smack about Damascus.

"Clean every sector of those wanted persons" starts the next paragraph by referring to the same - violent militants, and "especially" those organizing demonstrations and smear campaigns as well.

So the earlier presentation cut all the red parts above, in their selective quotation of the yellow, just as I suspected. Officials were worried about the militants like they should have been, and it was the main issue. But tt didn't come through in the painted picture of a calm crackdown on peaceful dissent, inviting outsiders to arm the emergent "Free Syrian Army" to "defend the protesters."


2 More Docs, More on the Violent Demonstrators
A total of three documents at least are partly shown in the El País video: the other two have dates and document numbers redacted (why?), but may be contemporaneous supporting documents.

One is an undated request for information, from interrogations and potentially involving torture. Methods aren't explained, but they sought more information from "detainees who incited demonstrations" and also those "who had contacts with foreign bodies," perhaps including "plotters" and/or "bodies which took part in funding and arming demonstrators." Here again, the kind of "demonstrations" they're concerned with involve weapons. They also wondered about the "volume of funding and armaments" going to those "demonstrators" and their origins. So they mean weapons supply, not "arming them with knowledge" or something.

The other shared document is an undated arrest warrant, directed to local commanders in Daraa governorate, asking for the arrest of six people (names removed), as soon as possible. This adds nothing - it's the reason they were wanted that matters. Are they armed militants, or demonstrators and image tarnishers? Above, and left out of news stories, the people were wanted for the crimes of vandalism, killing, and assault on the citizenry and government institutions, and some of THOSE were "especially" wanted for additional media-type activities. Are these 6 just regular wanted, or "especially" so?

And even that question doesn't matter totally;

demonstrations, propaganda, media and "human rights NGO" contacts, and weapons and sectarian mayhem, are all seen with good reason as part of a unified package, a coordinated attack on their country seeking a repeat of the Iraq and Libya regime-change scenarios. Unauthorized demonstrations, at which unauthorized gunmen shoot people and blame the government, was a serious problem. All aspect of such a machine would need shut down.

The Local Coordinating Committees (LCC) is named. Publicly, they organize, promote, track peaceful street protests, but they also work with military groups and disseminate their reports, and had nearly every martyr of regime brutality reported with video of the body, as if they had a direct line with the angel of death. The Syrian authorities will have rightly pegged the LCC as organizing both military and propaganda activities. Such people were tarnishing the image of Syria, by committing crimes - often hideous ones -that were being video-recorded and blamed on Syria with great frequency and alarming success.

The main translation issue is with what the LCC organize: protests as implied, or a more vague type of "events." See below.

There's no mention of arresting baby food smugglers like Mazen Hamada, and no order to implement a baby food embargo in the first place. And still nowhere have we seen any orders to enforce the inhumane conditions on detainees Hamada and others describe, or to systematically exterminate thousands of them, as the "Caesar photos" claim to show.

Translation Issues?
I don't usually presume translation issues without a specific reason - it's quite possible, but the main issue seems to be what's edited out - redacted or just not shared. I found one Arabic translator so far on Twitter with time to help.

First, a minor issue: a partial view of undated request is visible enough

https://twitter.com/amin251/status/1037326833988108288
https://twitter.com/amin251/status/1037346529906970624
"the detainees who incited demonstrations and had contacts with ... plotters, and bodies which took part in funding..." In the translation, the "and" becomes an "or" for a more inclusive reading of who's "especially" wanted.  But either way, it's the class of crimes they were detained over, and information was sought.

More importantly, we get some decent views of the (ostensible) Arabic original of that August 18 fax of the August 6 memo. Below is a full-page view, but small and, as it happens, the important paragraph in the middle is underneath the animated titling for "ARREST WARRANTS." That paragraph is also shown scrolling by larger in such a way all 8 lines can be taken and reassembled (below). 

An "Arab Ba'ath Communist Party" is mentioned at the top - as Amin251 explains, should be Socialist
"الاشتراكي = Socialist. "Communist"  would be written "شيوعي " The name of Syria's ruling party is Ba'ath Arab Socialist, and that's who the memos and translators refer to, so there's no real contention, and it's not a directly important issue. It might show a right-wing bias on the part of the translator, inserting "socialist = commie tyrant" messages in the translation. That might lead to further distortions, but hopefully we can see these directly. 

With tips from Amin and my own careful looking... here are the words in play for those odd instances of "demonstrations."

المظاهرات
phonetic: almuzaharat:
The usual word for public demonstrations (plural). Also translates like manifestation, display, etc. It does similar in English. It appears zero times in the memo. The singular form is about the same, doesn't appear either.


مظاهرة الاحتجاج
ph: muzaharat alaihtijaj
A phrase for protest demonstration (singular - plural is barely different). This also doesn't appear (that I caught)

المتظاهرين
ph: almutazahirin
The usual word for demonstrators and/or protesters, ones who participate in the above. This appears where it should, being translated as "demonstrators." Good there.

 تظاهر

tazahar - to demonstrate. this appears twice, suggesting a bit of paraphrasing for 2 instances (rather than "demonstrations" it says "?? demonstrate(ing/ed)." I'll see about the exact wording for each, if possible 

 التظاهرات

altazahurat

with one loose quote-mark attached, Google Translate gives "demonstrations" with alternates readings: feint, simulation, pretense. Hmmm. With the quote mark cut, it's just "events" and no hints provided. Amin251 notes the usual word for "events" in a general, and maybe military sense, is:
الأحداث (al'ahdath).
But this word doesn't seem to appear. This other word is unusual, but apparently valid, maybe a regional thing, or personal choice of the author. Its exact meaning here isn't totally clear, but the context involves weapons, death, and crisis. It happens to look like the usual word for demonstrations, and it can also mean the same thing. In context of the other words, it likely does, but perhaps not...

Here's where these words appear in the paragraph. Translated paragraph repeated below for comparison.

So far, it appears the translation is ok, despite the appearance. But I still have questions about the wording around the 2 cases of demonstrate, and the LCC's "events", the "especially those..." part, and how the whole run-on sentence here suggests lumping that might be inaccurate (and/or issues, etc.).

Such things can tweak the wording to support the reading you want. But mainly, the only way to make this document fit the agenda of the day is to just quote the parts about "demonstrations" and pretend there was no talk of militants at all. Every nation has a right to defend itself from armed insurgency, and the point of this exercise is to prove the Syrian state was way past its rights and had to know that. So the CIJA just cut the parts that disprove their case before they offer a couple stray lines they like as supposed proof. Clearly showing it with minor redactions isn't a good idea (see my effort below). The best plan they took was to present just the yellow lines and pretend that's all that mattered.

Follow-Up (Sept. 28)
This point deserves some. I finally asked the author, after noticing he is on Twitter, and how he won the Pulitzer Center's RFK prize for journalism in 2017 for this work "chronicling a team of international investigators who smuggled secret Assad regime files documenting torture and other war crimes out of Syria." It was a dramatic read, but too bad it relies on a dubious alleged witness and grossly mischaracterized documents.

So I asked him "any idea how the red-underlined parts here went missing in your article's version of this "linchpin"? It seems to be a plan to stop "armed groups" killing people." (follow-on tweet to correct to "armed gangs.") No response expected, but expectations can be interestingly dashed.

Update, October 13: Even with another nudge added, I still received no response prior to drafting the 21st Century Wire version of this story, where I conclude: "I asked Ben Taub about the details missing in his article, but so far he has not responded. It’s not clear if he or – more likely – the CIJA made the decision to delete the militants and distort this evidence. But someone did."

2017 Hama Offensive: A Hostage Raid?

October 29, 2017
(rough, incomplete)

This is sort of a side-issue connecting or perhaps feeding into the April chemical massacre in Khan Sheikhoun that I explored a bit, and the bits I found seems worth sharing.

The issue is: the opposition's 2017 Hama offensive, with dramatic and scary advances from March 21-24, followed by days of occupation over several new towns. It was routed and reversed by March 31 by the Syrian Arab Army and allies, who also kicked opposition forces out of Halfaya and Taibet Al-Imam, to lessen the chances of a recurrence. The changes both ways were dramatic and perhaps not well-considered. Here's my crude mapping from what I found so far.

As the Wikipedia article explains the motive: "The rebels aimed to capture Jabal Zayn al-Abidin and attack the Hama Military Airport, and reportedly advanced to within 7 kilometers of Hama city." Video: The first village to fall in the hands of the Mujahideen is the village of Arza in the northern countryside of Hama 3-23. Reports out of Hama on the 30th give Arza, Al-Shikhah to the south, and the Point 50 army base to the north vacated by rebels on the 30th. See map to see how close al-Shikha would out them to Hama and the airport. Somewhere I saw the intent was to send a message to "the regime" that the war was not over.

It was a costly gambit. Might there be more reason to embark on the adventure that lost them Halfaya and Taibet al-Imam? Other possible motives:

-  to provoke the government into some reaction, or to create the conditions where a faked response would seem more believable.

- Just have brief access to things or people they usually wouldn't?

Kidnappings? 
Was this Hama offensive, at least in part, a mutli-front hostage raid? Previously we've seen reports that some 250 civilians kidnapped and shipped north before the Islamists left.  as prev. covered Idlib CW false-flag covers for Islamist massacre - this is a pattern that recurs in previous CW incidents -  the victims are "displaced" or seem to be hostage. This wasn't reported at first, perhaps kept quiet amid negotiations, until a bunch of people died in Khan Sheikhoun on April 4.

Only on April 4 did sources inform Al-Masdar News about " 250 people from Majdal and Khattab were kidnapped by Al-Qaeda terrorists last week." What was suddenly new: "Local sources have claimed that many of those dead from the chemical weapons (in Khan Sheikhoun that day) were those from Majdal and Khattab." They also heard from a family member of an abductee that “the jihadists then took them all to Khan Sheikhoun.”  How that could be known, aside from a victim ID from there, is unclear. There's been no further news I'm aware of on these supposed matches. I'm skeptical of the claim, but it's possible. Tactically, out of fear that such could be proven, the jihadists might keep any hostages from this offensive for later swaps - and use other hostages they seized more quietly.

Al-Namechange front and their Islamist allies were likely planning Ghouta II - if possible, they might even want to approximate, but probably not match its death toll - something well into the triple-digits, like 300, might be great. Coincidentally, they tried to take Mahradeh, Ma'an, they took Majdal and Khattab, they took people. Some 250, it's said, just days before about 100 died in Khan Sheikhoun a ways north.

Adding to This...
For what it's worth, here's a little review. This is also in part a big list of videos and some materials for further study. Already interesting little things are turning up buried in this imagery. What I could use more of, from any reader who understands spoke Arabic, is some translation of what people say in these videos (or anything especially interesting, anyway)
Not comprehensive, just mostly from a Youtube search and a few previously-known reports for context ...and a decent Wikipedia article 

The Hama offensive (March–April 2017) was a military offensive launched by Syrian rebel groups led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) north of the city of Hama, as part of the Syrian Civil War. The offensive began on 21 March 2017, and the rebels aim to recapture areas recaptured by the Syrian Armed Forces in the 2016 Hama offensive, as well as pushing into Hama city.[59][60][61]

Wikipedia: "According an SAA Tiger Force commander, there were about 6,000 HTS and allied militants involved in the offensive."

Also "The offensive was coordinated with rebel forces in Damascus' eastern suburbs, who launched their own operation in March 2017." That will be the Saudi-backed Jaish Al-Islam, most likely.

It started on the eastern front on March 21, when "two Tahrir al-Sham suicide bombers detonated two large car bombs against government positions in the town of Suran." Soon the SOHR was confirming this and parts of Maardis were overrun.

- Souran 3-22 video, Hadi Abdullah: Video from inside the city # liberated photos in the suburb of Hama and explain the latest details of the battles and where the liberation arrived

March 21 video: "Free Army of Idlib Preface to the Assad forces inside the town of Khattab in the northern suburb of Hama."  - firing improvised rockets into Khattab. Some of the effects of this is shown in later videos. (see Tour of the town of Khattab newly liberated 3-23  which just barely avoids showing us at 0:11 a possible weapon that's large, yellow, and cylindrical)

Chemical Warfare?

Perhaps the most interesting thing found so far, panned over in that last video, gets its own explanatory post  here: A 44-liter chlorine tank is seen in Khattab after rebels were done firing things on the town and were in control of it. It's the same kind the Ilslamists usually say falls from regime helicopters, but seems to have deformed differently than usual. Here it landed by the apparent city hall and adjacent army position, and they never mentioned it. Just a couple days later, the same exact tank was reportedly dropped from a regime helicopter on a cave hospital in Al-Latamnah, in the first publicized area chlorine attack of the year. How many non-publicized chlorine uses were there before that? Just this one, or more? And who was behind it?

Surrounding Mahradeh

An important goal of the offsensive, apparently, was encircling Mahradeh, a sizeable Christian-majority city by Sunni Halfaya, long targeted with shelling, siege and raiding when possible. March 23: Al-Azza army frees the shaliot barriers The northern gate of the town of Mahara in the northern suburb of Hama. Shaylut checkpoint (Wikimapia), just across the demarcation line, and just north of Mahradeh. Here we see Jihadis cheering with the smokestacks of Mahradeh power station behind them, a bunch of Christian infidels just to the right of that.

Then they got it largely surrounded, taking Mahradeh's south flank - March 24 Army of Glory "controls the villages of Majdal and Maarazaf in the countryside of Hama following battles with the regime forces. March 25 - signs: the other towns are west and north of Mahradeh, so this must be south of it, so Majdal or Maarzaf. 

On 3-22 (maybe premature) it was announced "The army of pride controls the highway between the towns of Mahreda and Hama and the regime" An Al-Masdar report of March 23 adds "The insurgents expanded their assault and attacked the predominantly-Christian city of Mahardah, shelling it with mortar shells and homegrown rockets and cutting off the road linking it to the provincial capital."

3-24 video: Magdal village in the countryside of Hama after liberation from the grip of the regime.

3-25 Syrian Event Center video: Our correspondent from the heart of the city of Majdal after the control of the Free Army on the outskirts of Hama. A dead soldier is seen, details unclear but he lays awkwardly. His shoes have been removed - customary for Islamist execution. They weren't taken off right here but somewhere prior. There's also lots of wire tangled around his feet, as if crudely bound. His arms aren't visible, perhaps bound behind his back. An unclear large object lays near his head (or ?). This is how the regim's grip was loosened, to "liberate" this town.

3-25 Mahmoud al-Hamwi:  A tour of (Maarzaf) village in the countryside of Hama confirms the control of the army of pride over what the regime claims." That's even further west on Mahradeh's south flank.
 
Rhabat Khattab army base
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h5AcPgqGjHg
A field tour of one of the surrounding barriers in the town of Khattab in the countryside of Hama
Mahmoud al Hamwi March 22 

3-24 SMART news https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WIy5GALcZII
Mahmoud Hamwi Smart camera enters the town [sic] of Rahba Khattab in the countryside of Hama after the control of the military factions
Rahbet Khattab army base, just north of town
Hadi Abdullah at Khattab base 3-23 video: From inside the village of Rahabat Khattab after being completely liberated from the Assad forces within the battle to liberate Hama

Another video just after the takeover on 3-22 is mostly filmed at the same army base, but opens with another killed defender on the roadside in another, unclear spot at the edge of town. In camouflage gear, he also seems executed. There's a pool of blood from his head, which seems to be partly missing. Presumably, a gun was used, but that's not clear. His shoes were also removed before they killed him, laid neatly next to him. He wasn't fighting or even running, although he doesn't appear bound.

"Regime thug," Alawite, or otherwise, executing captives is a war crime. Here, the foreign-supported Islamists openly show us two examples, but Human Rights Watch et al. don't seem to have even noticed.

People seen under occupation:
Mujahideen liberators liberate many villages in the northern Hama countryside, 3-23, location unclear (hand-painted sign is hard to read - could almost be al-Shikha or al-Sheer, but seems more like al-Shalq, which doesn't seem to exist...) empty streets, some (homes?) have had fires inside.

"Believe it or not the system of (rural) Hama depends on the dogs guarding its leading officers." 3-23. At an apparent base or home of an officer, perusing files. A civilian dog is seen, likely crippled (hasn't left, doesn't move), is tossed a pack of cigarettes. No one hurts the dog on camera - the cameraman seems slightly amused, except the dog is boring, so he become just indifferent.

3-22 Khatab, Assi Press in the newly liberated town of Khattab - one man interviewed expresses joy at being liberated. 3-23 Al-Jazeera, Khatab - desolate. 3-22 Khatab - Mahmoud Hamwi talks to some fighters. No civilians around. - Khattab 3-24 SMART News - a few adult male civilians walk about. 

The village of Khattab in the countryside of Hama after its full liberation, March 26:

As a Jihadist fighter explains the situation (no translation of content), one old man comes out and watches the presenter from behind, apparently unnoticed. Shortly, a jihadist truck arrives and nudges him out of frame by driving right at him at low-mid speed. When the man sees its speed, he's startled, and quickly moves out of harm's way as seen here. Then the presenter notices him, and the video cuts.

People seen leaving/moving around:

3-22 Khatab, Assi Press A woman rides in truck loaded with bedding, and it seems nothing else but a generator (has a blue tank and a machine half)? They seem to be leaving, but could be arriving, or just going to another part of town. 

The amount of bedding is noteworthy: it seems far more than one home's worth Is there a group including women these folks are helping arrange collective housing and bedding for? Some shaken-loose "displaced" people who've decided to all shack up in one convenient and hard-to-escape locale? (the woman could be a liaison to "deal with the women" among the hostages, who would likely be kept somewhere nearby for the moment.)

In a video given as March 22, in Khatab, and overcast (Qassioun News), it's explained opposition forces "ensure the exit of civilians from the town of Khattab north of Hama after the opposition control." People ride a horse, some tractors, several motorcycles and even a few cars along a nondescript country road, with lots of bedding, rugs, pots and pans, a couple of portable generators perhaps, and so on.The location and direction are unclear, but it seems they're headed left down a slope into a misty area - likely then east towards the river

Who this is leaving and why is not explained. Generally the opposition likes people to stay put, as human shields, or to be arrested, if heretics/enemies. They often don't like and even shoot people who try to flee upon liberation (or so it seems to me - the fleeing regime forces are usually blamed, sometimes it's said to steal peoples' cars to flee in, though the cars are often left right there.).

Perhaps these are minorities, allowed safe exit - at least as long as this video is rolling, and so displaced Sunni families get their homes (if they get to stay that long). Or they're letting people of all stripes who fear the next round of fighting to seek safer places. Either way it seems more of a PR move than their norm. But if this were about snatching the maximum number of people, would they just let all these folks drive off?  Well, it's not clear where they're headed, and how freely. But they aren't tied up, anyway. There's no one on foot, and no gaps in the traffic. This movement feels organized, as in "here's your time to leave, single-file, move in the approved direction and don't stop."

A blue truck alone comes the other way along the shoulder, getting just close enough at video's end to make out a white patch at the back end for W77 or 77W. The white floral design on the front and apparently windows on a blue Super-Porter truck marks it as part of that system considered here.

These trucks are a bit of a mystery, but apparently linked to Jabhat al-Nusra, but no longer for openly military activities. They sometime haul materials, and a few of them were seen hauling victims of the April 4 sarin attack in Khan Sheikhoun, and then in the days after moving belongings of people who no longer lived there. Famously a W77 truck was seen ramming itself into a crowd of Shia civilians in Aleppo, largely children, before the driver blew himself up with a powerful car bomb that killed or wounded several hundred in the infamous April 15 Rashidin Massacre.

Was this W77 truck in occupied Khattab on its way to pick up some other civilians with special relocation arrangements?

Counter-Offensive and Return to Normal Life

The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) counter-offensive took days to start or take off, but areas were being abandoned by the 30th at least, and then it went quickly - before the 31st was out, virtually all gains of the previous days were reversed and, as noted above, the army later pushed rebels out of two cities they had held, to push them further back from Hama to decrease the chances of that kind of offensive ever happening again.

3-31 Ruptly videos after SAA in Khattab - no civilians seen
https://www.liveleak.com/view?i=92a_1490988323#8qBTEl4wq6wPxqrA.99
SAA re-took Khatab, Al-Majdal, Soubein (Khirbat as Sabila?), and Al-Shayr (al-Sheer - next to the former).

SANA March 31, Khattab - empty but for army, clearing mines, booby traps, and roadblocks (some of each are shown), explanations given in Arabic.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=55JuqGv6qn8

Northern Hama: The people of the towns of Khattab and Arza return to it after the Syrian Arab army returned security - April 1 video - many happy civilians seen - praising Jaish Arabi Souriya (SAA), waving to and talking to pro-government SAMA TV's reporters. Many of them drive the same kind of loaded odd tractors seen leaving on the 22nd.

Sputnik in Khattab April 3 as life returns to normal
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NbX873SPuZs

Back to the Alleged Kindappings
As noted above, reportsI'd heard before were of 250 civilians kidnapped - though not mentioned until April 4, and in context of being the real victims of the Khan Sheikhoun attack. From what I've found in this further search, I can add a few points of detail to this, but not much. considered town-by-town, where specifically people might have been abducted from:

Some from Majdal?
Wikipedia: "On 23 March,... Pro-government al-Masdar News reported that the rebels carried out a massacre of Alawites in the village of al-Majdal, killing up to 30 of them.[57] According to an opposition source, Sham FM radio reported that this was denied by Mohaled Hazzouri, the governor of Hama.[67]"
massacre denied probably means the hostages had not been killed, but were held alive. 30 of them.
Alawites lived there.
cited: https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/map-update-syrian-rebels-massacre-civilians-press-major-offensive-syrias-hama/
Reports came in that jihadi rebels massacred up to 30 civilians – mostly women and children – in the Alawite-populated village of Majdal.
https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/24530.html
Hama governor (Mohamed) Hazzouri told Sham FM radio the reports were untrue. (Mohaled in origina, but this is an error. There's no such name.) Report also notes:"Opposition activists said the governor may face regime reprisals over his statement" (ooh!) and Hama "is critically important to Bashar Assad and his fellow Alawite-sect supporters."

Ma'an?
Wikipedia: Rebel forces led by Tahrir al-Sham then proceeded to attack Suran and the nearby villages of Maardis and Ma'an. The rebels captured the three villages by 22 March,[63] but this was denied by Hezbollah.[59]" (Hezbollah frequently man the defenses of Shi and Alawi villages especially, to protect from raids and massacres.

Ma'an is an Alawi village long sitting at the front-line - I noted the moves against it here on March 23 because it was already the site of two Islamist victory massacres so far - In late December, 2012 Islamist rebels were unclear if they did or didn't overrun the town as intended, at the time they claim a regime massacre happened there, leaving 23 civilians beheaded and then burned...). Again they raided Ma'an in February 2014, killing several and abducting around 80 civilians, mostly women and children.  - the latter was followed some weeks later by alleged chlorine helicopter attacks in the area, said to kill a handful of civilians between them - nearly all listed as "displaced," from a variety of places that are never admitted to be Ma'an. (see here)

- March, 2016 offensive: The Islamists claim they took it, Hezbollah defenders deny it. Probably it was never overrun, but it possibly was. If  so, it was likely evacuated first, but it's possible people were killed or seized here. And they tried to get in, either way. Was some of what they were looking for perhaps still in Ma'an?

Maarzaf?
Gareth Porter has reported:

"The list of victims appended to that NGO report shows (#72-80) that Amer Nayf al Nayef from Hama province and eight members of his family—the only victims on the list not from Khan Sheikhoun itself – had all died that day. Last September Syrian Voice, a news website with contacts in the opposition, identified Amer Nayef as the head of the Hama Province Council’s relief office. "

This was after a Nusra-led offensive in September 2016 that displaced "thousands," who were being re-settled further north. He spoke about helping with that, but hasn't been heard from in connection to the more recent offensive and possible mass displacement that came just before he died along with some of those people, and probably all the family members living with him. The victims listed, from SNHR report:
    54- Amer al Nayef, lawyer, from Ma’rzaf, Hama
    55- Alaa al Nayef, from Ma’rzaf, Hama
    56- Mohammad al Nayef, from Ma’rzaf, Hama
    57- Alaa Mohammad al Nayef, from Ma’rzaf, Hama
    58- Alaa Mohammad al Nayef’s wife, from Ma’rzaf, Hama
    59- Sister of Alaa Mohammad al Nayef’s wife, from Ma’rzaf, Hama

As I mused here at ACLOS:

So the relief director (for the rebel side presumably?) and his whole family moved voluntarily to help the others who moved voluntarily, and then they all died from the sarin? It sounds like he was either helping, or voluntarily claiming that, in public statements. So he wasn't likely a prisoner. He could be a facilitator of the mass-abduction. Could he and his family have been sacrificed afterwards to help seal this especially important secret? Hm, possible. Otherwise, this could complicate the overall picture emerging here.

Not Zawr al-Ballah? 
Zawr al-Ballah ("Sunni village") is suggested by Wikimapia as the best area fit for Al-Zuwar ( الزوار - visitors). There are at least 4 others in the same area with Zuwar in the name, all along the river, but there's no place named "Al-Zuwar," where people were said to be exposed by a likely Russian sarin gas attack on March 30, in a Masar Press news story, while Latamnah was only hit with chlorine gas dropped by the Syrians. (ACLOS) It anything happened in Zawr al-whatever, it would be a fake airstrike, and the victims would be captives relocated from other towns to a small, 100% Sunni place, probably because they weren't actually Sunni. But any such story failed to stick, and instead, some civilians and a lot of fighters were said exposed by Syrian sarin attack a ways north near Latamnah, with 169 affected, one boy comatose but no one dead (ACLOS). Sarin was later confirmed as in something related to this incident. There's talk of a second sarin attack at the same time in a different, closer Al-Zuwar town, but still no further details about it. It's not clear if this other attack claim is being buried poorly or being kept alive poorly.

Out-of-Towners, as Listed

Rebels records for Khan Sheikhoun CW massacre - 6 from overrun Maarzaf (all in the Nayef group, as addressed). The VDC lists "Samer", age 18, as the only victim from Khattab. Another report lists a woman from Khatab killed, 89 of 91 listed in this SNHR report is Mrs. Hend Nabhan Duhna, from Khattab. Samer is listed the same, no family name (so 2 Khattab people in that report). That SNHR report claims 31 fatalities were of people hailing from other areas - that's one in three of 91 total. No one from Majdal is listed (that way) by any of these.

VDC lists 88 victims (all but the 4-07 entry on this list of 89 with one very delayed death and the rest on 4-4) Out-of-towners include: the 6 Nayef folks from Maarzaf and "Samer" from Khattab, 2 Rahal men from Kafraltoun (in that area, SE of Majdal, just off the controlled highway), men named Reslan and Rahmoun from Tamanaah (near Souran) ... and a bunch of others given as from Latamnah and many from Morek, both rebel-held the whole time. The majority are listed as from Khan Sheikhoun itself, any or all of these given details could well be falsified, although some of them seem to be anchored by genuine-seeming social media accounts, etc. The true mix of fact and fiction in who was killed and why remains impossible to settle. It remains possible people snatched in this offensive and mega-raid were used or, given the overly-obvious nature of doing that, perhaps they used other hostages nabbed more quietly.