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Showing posts with label UNSC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UNSC. Show all posts

Saturday, January 25, 2020

The OPCW, Power and Lies, a Mental Iron Curtain

25 January, 2020
(rough, incomplete)
daily updates to 29 Jan.
last edit 3 February

On the 20th of January, a rather important Arria-Formula meeting  of the United Nations Security Council was convened by the Russian Federation (with help from China China, who staffed it with Russians and a Syrian that knew the case better. Topic: Implementation of UNSCR 2118: OPCW FFM Report on Douma. The purpose on the convening end was to draw attention to what they see as serious flaws in the investigative work of the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) and its Syria Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), and its controversial investigation of the 2018 incident in Douma, Syria, that led to civilian deaths (accepted as 43 or perhaps more, with strangely credible tallies of perhaps exactly 187). It also led to competing claims and shifting narratives, missile strikes, etc.

Of course, recent leaks and "whistleblowing" activity have raised widespread doubts about that investigation... How much intro do we need here?

This is the room as it was occupied for this meeting - from complete video on WebTV.un.org. (This video, not a transcript, is the main source I'll be citing for comments, noted with "v" and the app. time-stamp of the comment.)
The big bank of tables in the middle that sits empty - I think this is where a Mr. Ian Henderson would have sat, pretty much alone, if he had been there (I also don't watch many UNSC sessions). Veteran OPCW inspector Ian Henderson was given a chance to speak by video (starting at 0:57:26), after his visa to travel to New York and attend in person was blocked, presumably by the United States government. (he only mentions "unforeseen circumstances around my visa waiver status" ) Henderson is already a name known by many as the named author of an internal OPCW FFM engineering report (ACLOS posting) contradicting the findings of the FFM's public final report (issued 1 March, 2019). The assessment by Henderson, working with the FFM's "engineering sub-team" was suppressed until it was leaked to the public, in May, 2019, via the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda, and Media (of which I am a member). This began the stream of leaks that sparked so much controversy and debate about the reliability of the world's only trusted watchdog against chemical weapons.

The information about the Douma incident presented by the panel (including Russians, a Syrian, and Mr. Henderson by video) is generally covered elsewhere. Here I'm interested mainly in how the contested information was received, and the "politics" of that. I don't usually write or comment much on that level of things, the talkers and their fora. But this was just so fascinating once I started reviewing it closer, and so much of what's said clicks deliciously with things I know about, allowing for a possibly amazing review - if I could even get all these issues and quotes, links, sub-topics and intros un-bottlenecked, written, formatted … or close enough to get this up - as usual - "rough, incomplete" (it grows, sometimes to complete)

Ian Henderson: in Review, in Absentia
After being invited by the Chinese delegation convening the session, Henderson says he encountered unclear visa problem that prevented attendance. This is perhaps from being South African (as I hear, but some say British), or perhaps from having visited Syria, and not on what the US considered official work. That could be another way of saying he was not part of the OPCW's FFM, in line with shifting allegations that the man is suspicious and/or didn't matter and his work is flawed. I didn't finish considering that aspect in my last post following up on Bellingcat's well-timed "we need to talk about Henderson." (It got stalled on a question about report timing I'll come back to). But it considers alleged problems with the engineering report he authored; it doesn't seem that was rejected for being wrong. For a more comprehensive but basic review of Henderson and his presentation, see Ben Norton's overview at the Gray Zone, with full video and transcript of Henderson's video presentation.

Jumping in to the heart of what he says, so we can measure the response... At the time of a June, 2018 draft report of the FFM's findings, Henderson explains, numerous team members had "serious misgiving" there had been a chemical attack in Douma at all. A heavily redacted interim report was issued on July 6, and then some half the team (including Henderson) was excluded on or by 30 July. The final report was then slowly churned out consulting a few outside experts whose methodology remains unclear. As Henderson told the assembly “The report did not make clear what new findings, facts, information, data, or analysis in the fields of witness testimony, toxicology studies, chemical analysis, and engineering, and/or ballistic studies had resulted in the complete turn-around in the situation from what was understood by the majority of the team, and the entire Douma [FFM] team, in July 2018" ( my analysis of what was removed or changed between a draft report dated June and the final public report gives some scattered insights - the changes seem quite shady, especially in the toxicology area, which gets its own post)

Credit for Courage?
The US representative, in her statements, would laud "the brave efforts undertaken by the OPCW FFM to obtain the information necessary to conduct its investigation," complaining "Russia would later call into doubt the results," disrespecting that courage. But Ian Henderson - and others, we hear - have the same doubts, and he at least was in the part of the FFM that went to Douma, where people died getting access, and a Russian soldier (or Syrian, accounts differ) was wounded just testing the security scene (more detail below). The FFM team members coming later took far less risk, but some, it's true. And it was these same people - all but one of the Douma team (of unclear size to me) - who were reportedly excluded from involvement in the probe as of 30 July, 2018. Ironically, the fiercely defended public findings are the ones with the notably "brave" people excluded. Russia was the party giving them and their findings a louder voice - after having provided their security while in Douma. The United States was ignoring them, except to (apparently) block their visas, so others could ignore them more easily.

Perhaps related: the public findings were vastly different from those reached in June-July, 2018 by the broader FFM team, as Henderson says. A comparison between the leaked draft report and the final bears this out strikingly (see link above). The changes were done by the other part of the FFM team from the safety of "country X," mainly based on repeated harvesting of alleged witness accounts, and with input from just one Douma team member (a paramedic by training, as Henderson has explained), besides those outside experts in engineering-ballistics and toxicology, who were only consulted starting in September. And as Henderson noted, just how they came to their odd but convenient conclusions is not explained well at all.

Some have heard more than others: Peter Hitchens writes recently "So, who exactly were these experts? The identity of one of the experts is known. It is also known that a verbal account of their consideration, was along the lines of “they say that one of the scenarios may be possible, but the other one very unlikely”. As for the other two experts, it is difficult not to be sceptical." The details of that are secret, and it may not be true, but it's worth mentioning as possibly true - and hugely relevant if so. According to the FFM's final report, their conclusions were "complementary," but that is a relative and thus flexible word.

Barzeh inspections: "another story altogether."
Henderson capped his video remarks by informing the UN Security Council this was not "a political debate" in his mind, even if it was in others'. He followed this by noting - and this is entirely new to me - that he also headed the "highly intrusive inspections" at the very chemical laboratory in Barzeh, near Damascus, which was destroyed in missile strikes in response to the alleged attack in Douma. In fact, he claims to have headed the two inspections prior to its destruction, and the one afterwards (so about the same time, perhaps before, he would deploy to Douma). Again, that was in response to a chemical attack Henderson and others felt may have never happened. He only hints at the irony, conceding the events around Barzeh presented "another story altogether (from the incident in Douma). And I shall now close. Thank you."

That other story, in brief: on 4 May 2017 - shortly after some 90 people died in the alleged sarin attack at Khan Sheikhoun - a Western "intelligence document obtained by the BBC" claimed "chemical and biological munitions" were still being made in Syria, in clear violation of their obligations under the chemical weapons convention. The document claimed this happened at several named facilities, including the one at Barzeh, and that Iran and Russia both knew and approved. (BBC News)

Then the OPCW had a look. They would later summarize the result:
"On 22 November 2017, a second round of inspections was concluded at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC. In February this year, samples were sent to two designated laboratories for analysis. The results of the inspection were issued on 28 February as an addendum to my report EC-87/DG.15 (dated 23 February 2018) and it was noted that the inspection team did not observe any activities inconsistent with obligations under the Convention."
https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/EC/87/en/ec87dg21_e_.pdf

But after the Douma incident on the 7th of April, when it was wrongly believed at least 70-85 people had died in a sarin attack, US military officials decided the Barzeh site and others were active again and bombed them with some 100 missiles. This caused no toxic or biological releases, but was claimed to somehow set the Syrian CW program back years. Syrians denied the charges, saying only permitted, civilian medical products were made there. CBS News had a reporter, Seth Doane, visit the site, where he could only see snakebite anti-venom was produced there. They coldn't be sure what else might be, but "CBS News looked into the OPCW report from Barzeh and it noted the Syrians had delayed the visit for security concerns, but didn't find any red flags."

Removal from relevance, put in context
Anyway, Henderson does seem to be highly relevant to the whole Douma case and everything wrong with it, besides being part of the laudably brave portion of the FFM that was rewarded with exclusion from helping to form those public FFM findings taken as gospel. So naturally, he wasn't allowed to appear. Also, OPCW Director General Fernando Arias, and representatives of its Technical Secretariat (leadership, basically) declined the invitation to come and help sort things out, leaving the Russians, Chinese, etc. in charge of something to be painted as terrible and Russian. (v 1:03:45)

There are further efforts at making Henderson "in absentia" from "credibility" whereby certain parties strive to discredit Henderson as an irrrelevant hack or possibly a Russian agent, along with other vague smears. An article on that is forthcoming, but nothing that ugly turned up in the aria meeting. Representatives of friendly governments mentioned Henderson and/or his findings as relevant, while a slight majority of representatives took the France-US-UK position side ignored those aspect of the "Russian disinformation" altogether (a section on this below/forthcoming) For example ambassador Chalet made no mention or hint of these doubts having any separate reality outside of that clever Russkie campaign.

At least one exception was the UK's Pierce, who did mention Henderson AND his findings, but surmised "Mr. Henderson's papers seem to reflect a personal view." As packaged, it was a view apparently endorsed by an "engineering sub-team" of the FFM, and largely based on work by consulted experts who clearly agreed with their own work. But she misses those details, even as she seems to laud his work in a sense; "of course" such an open, "scientific" process worthy of our blind faith would spur "robust" discussion of multiple viewpoints. In the end the three experts trumped the one, and not that this it was simple majority-mob rule, but the most and best views must have combined, because she concluded "what counts is the final, considered, assessment." (v 2:12:00)

Otherwise, the information presented in the aria session, according to Pierce, were "elaborately constructed arguments," emphasizing the words and the suspicious nature; one does not simply utter such detailed lies on accident! But "those arguments have failed to convince OPCW membership in the Hague, and we are sure that they will not convince member states here in New York. They have been masquerading as fact, and their clear aim is to protect the Syrian regime ...by undermining credible and independent investigations."

Pierce tweet: "Today we heard the Russians trying to deny facts that have been established by an independent body, trusted by the international community to do its work,@OPCW.This is frankly a shameful response to the very real horrors on the ground in #Syria."

USUN tweet:"False accusations leveled here today by the Russian Federation and their briefers are FALSE--a worrying sign that the Syrian authorities and Russia are continuing to target White Helmets for further attacks."

The Mental Iron Curtain and 
the Weighing of Authority vs. Doubt
A central divide emerges here, a newly-formed ridge in the global mindscape, along which the new Cold war's mental iron curtain has been extended. We can see the construction in progress in the course of this session, reflected partly in how to answer this question:

Is the OPCW's recent crisis of credibility (to the debated extent it exists) warranted by any real flaws in the OPCW's or the FFM's investigative processes? Or is that merely an illusion created by "Russian disinformation" with malign intent and no valid basis? 

Opinions and read-out statements differ (some review below - "adherence to the script(s)"). But in whichever way, the question is in peoples' heads now, enabling this historic assembly to take place and start to address any problems that might genuinely be distorting the organization's important work.

Early in the session, Russian rep. Shulgin from the panel mentions an earlier plan for a meeting with "all of the specialists that took part in the investigation" of the Douma incident, but he says the US representative had opposed this quite sternly. He quoted her describing the planned session as "a Stalinist process in the Hague of intimidation and cross-examination." (Shulgin's quote, translated twice - v 0:15:55) It's not clear if it was especially evocative of something Stalin would do, or if the only intent was simply to say VERY, VERY BAD RUSSIANS.

Apparently the US was able to block that formula, but not the one that finally materialized, featuring Henderson alone - the one expert "whistleblower" already publicly named. He wasn't allowed to actually be there, but the meeting happened, and he was allowed to speak, pre-recorded, on the big screen. So we're not in the most extreme kind of "Stalinist" totalitarian control we could be, where all dissent is completely stifled. But this US-led tendency is problematic, and getting worse.

Shulgin's comment might refer to the same Ambassador Cherith Norman Chalet, Acting Deputy Permanent Representative, who attended the 20 January session and delivered some prepared statements. The United States, she said, "objected categorically" to the very meeting as part of "Russian efforts to exploit the platform of the Security Council to further its own political and military agenda in Syria, propping up a murderous dictator at the expense of the Syrian people." And she made it clearer than ever that, despite all the details just presented, the publicized FFM findings were "the facts, full stop." and any other opinion - even one from within the FFM's probe or even its most qualified experts - was wrong, if not outright "disinformation." (remarks begin v 1:25:42 - see also clarified text version: https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-an-arria-formula-meeting-on-syria-chemical-weapons/)

A 2002 Vote of No Confidence 
Using a UNSC session to sow false claims, trying to unfairly influence or control its operations: this is a heavy charge from those defending the public's confidence in the OPCW. It's also ironic or hypocritical, given how the United States has previously forced an OPCW director-general from office, by undermining confidence in the agency's valid work he was leading, because it was complicating their plans for an illegal war.

It was claimed that was for the common good and to save lives, by going to war with Iraq. It wasn't like the Russians do it - to shield Ba'ath party dictators in the Middle East over "credible" claims or even "facts" regarding weapons of mass destruction. José Bustani, a Brazilian diplomat, was the OPCW's first DG ever, who was trying, in 2002, to work with Iraq to eliminate their chemical weapons program. The United States was citing as a reason for war, and apparently, the Bush administration didn't want that reason resolved. It's credibly alleged (but denied) that undersecretary of defense John Bolton oliquely threatened Bustani and even his sons, who were living in New York. (The Intercept).

Bustani persisted in doing his job undeterred until the United States called a special vote of no confidence, at which they arranged a majority vote to remove him, in an effort at improving morale within the OPCW. (48 states voted yes, only 7 opposed, and 43 abstained from the ugly process - State Department tally). Bustani's sons were never harmed, he was compensated by some agency (not the US) for his lost job, and donated that money back to the OPCW. (Wikipedia) And little surprise, he remains skeptical of how the agency has been run since then; after hearing from whistleblower "Alex" at a Courage Foundation panel in October, 2019, Bustani was quoted as saying "The convincing evidence of irregular behaviour in the OPCW investigation of the alleged Douma chemical attack confirms doubts and suspicions I already had." (Courage Foundation)

Bustani was also not present at the arria session, and his story was brought up by no one, that I noticed.

No such episodes are known of since then so that any US/Western control is quieter, and more multilateral. It is widely suspected; there's an image gaining in currency of an agency is so beholden to Western interest to distort their investigative work. While the mechanics of any control remain murky, details have recently come to light (see WGSPM on how the Douma probe was "nobbled").

In that view, the lopsided external influence of the Western powers stymies truth, compelling some honest employees to  find their own ways to get the truth out. Anyone enjoying the fruits of that influence clearly would not invite these whistleblowers to the UN to expose the reality in a proper forum, and might even block them. So naturally it would be down to Russia, most likely, to try and get the dissenters heard.

But then, as things work out, their voices become "Russian disinformation" to many, and can be safely ignored. And they are; ambassador Chalet for one never accused Ian Henderson of knowing involvement in this Russian campaign, she just doesn't acknowledge his existence, let alone his reasons for doubting the FFM's public findings (which is otherwise considered an "attack" on the agency). Like other speakers, she dismissed all such doubts in several ways, including to say "There is no basis for Russia and Assad regime to question the validity of the FFM report."

So in summary: Russia calls for restoring faith in the OPCW, US and allies deny any need to restore it, demand The FFM's public findings were "the facts, full stop." and any other opinion was "disinformation." Essentially insisting on blind faith in the FFM's findings as a moral imperative. Of course she and others would insist that's not because those findings happened to support the U.S./Western position, but because they care about truth and justice, and those findings were "the facts" - like a lot of other completely untrue things have been in the past, but the facts nonetheless.

In contrast, Syria's ambassador Bashar al-Jaafari explained, in contrast, "It is clear that some governments were trying to repeat in Syria what had happened in Iraq ... I mean using false allegations and lies related to the weapons of mass destruction, to find pretexts for acts of aggression and invasion," appealing to International law and urging member states to resist this campaign and to prevent the Western powers from destroying the OPCW the way they destroyed the League of Nations and would eventually destroy the United Nations. (v 1:21:26)

An Earlier UNSC Meeting on Syria CW Allegations
Okay, so the US threatened and removed a DG of the OPCW once, but they aren't alone in attacking the group; "When Russia and Syria dislike the findings of the UN or the OPCW," she said in her remarks, "they use meetings like this one to undercut those organizations and the facts that they provide."

Using UNSC session to sow disinformation and confusion - that's a heavy charge. A more appropriate use of a UNSC arria-formula meeting, in her mind, would include one called on 17 April, 2015 because the US wanted to complain about the slow progress in punishing the Syrian government for alleged chlorine gas attacks, especially one blamed for killing a family of six in Sarmin one month earlier, on 16 March. (State Dep't blog)

This was organized by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Samantha Power, to share uncorroborated testimony by US-supported activists, and a video of three young children supposedly killed in the Sarmin incident. The children, however, showed no sign of exposure to chlorine (red eyes or any sign of irritation). The boy may be the only one alive, but he appears comatose, barely even trying to breathe. This is not a chlorine effect, and more likely caused by a depressant drug (what killed the Talebs?) The two girl victims appear similarly pale but likely already dead. All three were probably poisoned deliberately.

The surviving boy might be murdered on-camera by a militant-affiliated medic who pierces the child's chest several times with a giant hypodermic syringe, twisting it around inside, but never injecting the mysterious fluid in the plunger before putting the needle away (SWEDHR/The Indicter, updates). My own new image below re-shows this now infamous scene as the suspect doctor is putting the syringe away; having stabbed the suffocating baby with it several times, his work was done. But that could be mercy, quicker than the suffocation the boy was doomed to by the almost non-existent efforts to suction the foam from his lungs. (and just now I'm noting the foam is a bit pink by the end - the doctor's needle rampage made it so he's bleeding to death and now drowning on his own blood, as well as being apparently comatose and barely breathing anyway.)

Power bragged that she and her team delivered their misinformation in "as rapid and moving a way as we could do," giving audience little time to think, which goes towards calling it Disinformation - misinformation used strategically to deceive. She also bragged how the audience were moved to "tears." (BBC) Not to take that too literally, but excessive lachrymation interferes with clear vision.

Some further details about this case:

The children were seen dying in two consecutive videos: one was stamped with the logo of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Sarmin Coordinating Committee ("Sarmin" in gold, with the exact flag of Jabhat al-Nusra planted in it). The other was made by the recently-minted "White Helmets." The clinic is full of new blankets with their logo done in their allies' black-and-gold colors. It would look bad to use an Al-Qaeda-branded "snuff film" at the UNSC, so Power and her team probably used the White Helmets-branded film of the same snuffing. (a frame from the other one, then, is used above)

The ventilation shaft the chlorine bomb allegedly fell down to kill those babies (along with their father, mother, and grandmother) is about the same size as the bomb, or possibly even too small. To fit, it would have to be rotated just the right way, in maybe a 1-2 degree range (for a 1:180 to 1:360 likelihood). The UN-OPCW JIM decided that this happened, “improbable as it may sound."

That problem with the opposition-US narrative was worsened by the alleged weapon being unusually large. It was also rather implausible: a giant barrel bomb with flasks of potassium permanganate and metal canisters (that cannot be refilled, re-lined with plastic and re-filled) with hydrochloric acid, meant to mix randomly upon impact in hopes of generating enough chlorine gas to suffocate some innocent babies. An official but limited-run image is shared at right. Most experts agree this contraption, as I'll put it, would probably not work, even if it could be made to function, which seems doubtful. (WGSPM)

More questions with this incident can be found at A Closer Look On Syria (event page, and more yet on its talk page), although some of those points are dated. A more detailed analysis by Michael Kobs is available ...

But finally for now, this and surrounding 2015 chlorine attacks are now seemingly ignored by UN and OPCW-related sources; any recent lists of events blamed on Syria you check (if it's big enough and by them) will have a huge 2-year gap from May, 2014 to April, 2016 (charges against IS continue in that span, but not against the government). That includes the tear-jerking Sarmin incident and dozens of other perviously alleged attacks. For example, of the nine cases revived by the OPCW's new Investigation and Identification Team, none of them is in that span.

Problematic incident were encountered in May, 2014 and April, 2016, and as I just showed in part, serious problems emerged with the central and deadiest event in 2015. If one 'stack of files' should 'accidentally burn,' and it can be a big stack, this would be a good span to accidentally lose track of. But before the 16 March Sarmin incident went on the ignore list, the US was pushing investigators and UNSC member states to emote and act against Syrian government accused of dropping the chlorine bomb on that poor family.

Vasily Nebenzya might refer to this very episode (or to a more recent one regarding Khan Sheikhoun in 2017) at 1:33:05 in the video, right after Chalet's remarks about abuse of UNSC sessions: "I wish the distinguished representative of the United States were able to be here in the room in person when there WAS a disinformation campaign on [something different, misrepresentations?]. I know she wouldn't have changed her statement she read out, but still ..."

No Western representatives appeared moved to tears by the Russian-convened Arria-formula meeting. Germany's rep. did call it "very, very sad fiction" as well as "fantsay," and "absurdity," drawing on the reference to Alice in Wonderland first raised by Nebenzya at the session's start. Thus might any resident of Wonderland complain if they followed that rabbit on his way out the tunnels to Planet Earth and the light of its sun.

More Western (Dis?)information 

A "reality" vs. "the facts" vs. best reading so far 
on probe delay and evidence tampering   
In her remarks, Ambassador Chalet lauded the FFM's public findings as "the facts, full stop" and declared "we must defend the credibility and the findings of the OPCW and the UN from disinformation." At the same time, she spouted falsehoods to the assembled representatives of member states, including at least: "the reality is that the regime sought to undermine the investigation by delaying the entry of investigators to Douma, so that Assad can clean up the crime scene and tamper with evidence."

The allegation she described as "reality" was widely repeated during the delay of several days back in April, 2018, when the FFM was in Damascus but hadn't gotten to the crime scenes. But it was never borne out by evidence. The FFM's final report mention no such stalling, actually explaining how "considerable time and effort were invested in discussions and planning to mitigate the inherent security risks to the FFM team" "unacceptable risks" included "mines and explosives" that could be left, and "sleeper cells still suspected of being active in Douma." This assessment by Syrian and Russian officials "was shared by the representative of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)." It was decided by all Syrian and Russian Military Police would work together to provide security. Then:

"During the reconnaissance visit by UNDSS on 18 April 2018 to assess the first two locations planned to be visited the following day, the security detail was confronted by a hostile crowd and came under fire from small arms and a hand grenade that exploded at Location 2 ...The incident reportedly resulted in two fatalities and an injury to a Russian soldier. ... the planned deployment of the FFM team was postponed until the security situation could be reassessed."

It would be another few days before they could get to the pivotal location 2 on the 21st, and there's no sign of the Russians and Syrians slowing things down - unless one wants to imagine they set up that incident in a false-flag scenario just to buy more time (perhaps she and the Trump administration did conclude this?). Otherwise, it's curious how ambassador Chalet's "reality" clashes with the FFM's "facts, full stop" on this point that seemed important enough to raise during an important UNSC meeting.

And as it turns out, most of those "facts, full stop" are wrong anyway, but less so; all other credible sources (ex: a statement from the OPCW itself) agree this security visit was on the 17th (not the 18th), there were two incidents (one had a crowd, the other had violence), and a Syrian officer was wounded (not a Russian one), and not severely. No one else mentions any fatalities but still, that part might be true (if so, most likely they were among the attackers). https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2018/07/swept-under-rug-part-1.html

But to be fair, Russia's ambassador Nebenzya rebuts Chalet with his own bit of Russian mis/disinformation, claiming the site visit delay was decided by UN security because of the western powers' missile strikes nearby. This is a common claim in Russia but seems to be unfounded. Barzeh is only a few miles away, close enough that it (and all those civilians to be protected there) could be affected by any released toxins. But it was struck on 14 April, three days before the advance mission described above, and probably before they were even discussing the issue of access.

Further, experts have stated that sarin could not be "cleaned up" to the point OPCW investigators would not find it, and on 17 April "it was likely that residual samples of nerve agent would remain for at least another week, even after an attempted clean-up"
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/s,yria-crisis-medics-intimidated-over-douma-gas-attack
The relevant site with fatalities was inspected just 4 days later, and there was no sign at all of sarin, almost certainly because it was simply never there, as so many had falsely suggested, and as 2 unnamed US officials claimed outright; blood and urine samples tested for chlorine and "an unnamed nerve agent" -  but no signs of any nerve agent ever turned up at the attack sites).

Unneeded but neat visual summary of these 4 "realities":
 

Assad "strengthens his position" with Ghouta attack 
Syria's ambassador Al-Jaafari relates an epically frustrating story for his nation shortly before their accession to the CWC and the OPCW (1:06:50 in the session video). A chemical attack on the morning of 19 March, 2013 at Khan al-Assal, Aleppo, killed 25 civilians and plural "soldiers," as Jaafari puts it, besides 110 civilian and military members who were affected but lived (previously I'd heard just one soldier and 19 civilians died, including a doctor killed by secondary contamination). Russian and/or Syrian tests showed sarin was used in that terrorist rocket. Western powers scoffed at this, insisting if it was sarin, the government must have hit their own guys somehow, because no opposition party could have sarin, probably.

It took "4 months and 11 days," Jaafari told the arria session, before a UN-OPCW team came to investigate, arriving in Damascus on the 18th of August, 2013. By then, any sarin remaining at the site would probably be long gone, though indicative metabolites or breakdown products of it would likely turn up. It still could have been a fruitful probe … if the militants hadn't overrun Khan al-Assal over the summer, reportedly killing eyewitnesses and destroying evidence, besides making a site visit impossible for security reasons. But there were things on file and witnesses in and around Aleppo, and they planned to go there and learn.

But then, as Jaafari explains, that team was "about leaving the hotel to go to Khan al-Assal [sic - Aleppo area] when another chemical attack took place - incidentally speaking, incredibly speaking, amazingly speaking" in East and West Ghouta around Damascus. This changed plans so investigators never left the capitol, and started planning to visit sites in both East and West Ghouta instead, where it was alleged as many as 1,7000 civilians were killed with sarin fired in a dozen rockets, in the most massive chemical attack in the world for decades.

Khan al-Assal "has still not been investigated," Jaafari adds. Later, we learned, THEY (allegedly) used the same kind of sarin in Ghouta that was used in Khan al-Assal. Both events are now pinned on the government in many minds, based on that claim alone. So allegedly, they prevented investigation of KAA and implicated themselves for it in one ridiculous move, that also killed many hundreds of innocents (if not the number claimed, at least 3-400 were killed in a manner that was never properly investigated). That came near triggering U.S. military strikes and risked an all-out regime change campaign, having committed all this idiocy far across Obama's "red line." (see my article from May, 2013, with 2016 updates)

To be clear, the Syrians have always denied doing that, and have insisted whatever exactly WAS done, the takfiri terrorists running those areas must have done it (primarily the Saudi-backed Jaish al-Islam, working with other factions, including frequent collaboration with Jabhat al-Nusra). Jaafari had in April, 2013 accused the Western powers of "torpedoing" Syria's request to investigate the Aleppo attack. But it wasn't really sunk until August 21 - just as it almost seemed to be working -by what they see as yet another terrorist attack by the same or an allied group. And it's not even surprising to them how the Western powers and a terrorist attack seem to have the same motive in this area of frustrating investigations into Syria's claims.

The German representative notes "the representative of the Assad government said this CW story didn't start in Douma, and I can only subscribe to this," sort of. No, the story started with, well, not Khan al-Assal as he said - well, maybe, but he chose to pick up at the end in August. That event was mentioned, but "no member, no one in the podium proposed it, refuted it, but also didn't mention it - the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons against its own population." He refers to the French ambassador's statement citing 1,300 civilians killed. and adds "we must never forget this."

It's true Jaafari did not remind the meeting of the huge alleged death toll or the findings that his government was probably behind it. No reminder was needed, he disputes all those details, and the dispute would distract from his point that - as they see it - the Ghouta attack or massacre was done by others to frustrate the government's plans, not to further them. He contests the accepted version, but didn't bring that contest into the meeting. There are in fact amazingly powerful, irrefutable arguments he could have called on, and which I could bring up now, but I'll take Jaafari's lead; considering how much we're already covering here, and how important it is to cover that well, we'll come back to it in another "session" (blog post/article).

France's highly agitated ambassador ignored Jaafari's reference, and claimed "no one contests" that the Ghouta attack was carried out by "Assad" who was at the time in a "bad position" - again, with the OPCW inspectors finally there to look into the sarin attack in Khan al-Assal. And so he "decided to gas 1,300 women, children, elderly people from his own country to put himself in a stronger position." Again, the position was possibly at the brink of destruction, or at least with a bad record and a re-frustrated probe of the Khan al-Assal attack, which none of these critics ever acknowledged. Western powers and terrorist sarin rockets remain on the same side in this regard, going on seven years later; "we must never forget" one part of that story, but if possible we should always forget the other part. Both parts play into the amazing bigger story we'll be coming back to.

Other issues
As a practice in brevity, allow me to say other issues were also raised by the distinguished colleagues, and to then proceed to a final section, which no one is really required to read.

Adherence to the Script(s)
After the panel's presentation, some of the assembled representatives - not all of them - chose to give a statement on their nation's position. None sounded improvised. Many included an almost ritualized absolute statement of their nation's continued and total rejection of any CW worked into most statements somewhere. Some share such exact phrasing to suggest both sides had given out recommended points that people drew on as they saw fit. They also take notes as others speak, may copy lines from each others, etc. and mostly the statements seem unique, if prepared and bearing little relation to the panel's presentation.

Certain subjects are raised in combination by those supporting the Western position in upholding their general script: OPCW findings are fair and balanced, cannot be challenged or questioned, must be trusted as they are - Russia shields Syria over its gassing of its own citizens - they did it in 2013, agreed not to, but 6 years later here we are discussing more of the same - Syria might be in non-compliance with OPCW declaration rules, gaps still need addressed - the IIIM / IIT must go ahead, and accountability is crucial / impunity can't be allowed - support for White Helmets against negative claims about them - other crimes of the Syrian or Russian governments (Salisbury attacks, supposed cyberattack on OPCW, invasion of Ukraine, Caesar photos, attacks on medical facilities, etc.) - conspicuous shows of disrespect.

Note: I made almost zero effort to find the names of any representatives past the one Trump sent. The British one I know from being ripped on Twitter.

- France: perhaps the hardest position of all, or just the very agitated presentation makes it seem that way - Syria is hiding something, not cooperating with inspections, where are stocks of sarin and chlorine coming from? Warns of impending CW attacks in Idlib, etc. v1:34:00
- United States - covered well enough...
- United Kingdom - same...

U.S. ambassador Chalet stops her dull statement-reading at 1:32:56 and starts stacking the sheets together as if to leave immediately. She is gone by the next wide shot of the room at 1:45:36 and doesn't return before the session ends at 3:21:12 - below, noting she's sat by UK's Karen Pierce, a visible anchor, which seat quickly become and remains empty.

Prior to that, at 43:21 she's not even there yet, and a large bald man is sitting in her seat Reactions from the Russian panel (mixed amusement relating to a mustache? confusion/consternation, unclear ...) at 0:56:20, include looks in about the direction of her seat. This is just before Ian Henderson's presentation, which as slow to get started. She's probably there for just 37 minutes, 0:56 to 1:33. I didn't find a single floor shot with her present. (Note at 1:45:36 Vietnam's seat is empty too. But he seems to be standing right there. That might be because he had to keep getting up anyway to allow that display of American exceptionalism. )

That was the "F-UK-US" coalition, basically the writers of the "script" in question, the three whose military strikes on a sovereign nation were "justified" by the findings they for sure still believe in. Other nations who wound up saying about the same, ordered somewhat from hardest position to mildest.
- Estonia: hard position, strong wording used, emphatically praises White Helmets, insists on accountability, blocked so far by Russia's veto - looking at the Russians, "impunity cannot be an option."
- Germany … very astute and keen on referencing things others have said - the one to surely mention the Holocaust-evoking "Caesar photos" - cites 39 witnesses behind FFM's findings, misses that 1/3 of them, taken in Damascus, flatly contradicting the final conclusions. The other 2/3 were in "country x" and had grown from 21 in mid-2018. 5 more were found in October, nearly all miracle survivors adding convenient details. Many others in Douma might have added to the other side, but were never sought out. One side had to be lying, and the FFM decided which one they didn't want to hear any more of. 2:15:36
- Canada, also for Australia, NZ: condemns leaks, trusts findings, "technical secretariat staff put their lives in danger" to get these facts, praises WH, helping OPCW prevent hacks and cyber-attacks (from Russia, obviously), didn't mention anything to crack down on leaks and whistleblowers, but that is the root of the current "problem"
- Belgium: supports the report - full trust in leadership and "the rigor of its internal procedures" as they stand - opposes anyone questioning its findings - opposes impunity - lack of accountability encourages more attacks, threatens the whole world
- Croatia, also on behalf of EU (both express full confidence)
- Tunisia: "The reports of the FFM reports must not be subject to controversy, so that the OPCW can continue its work in an objective and impartial manner" - lack of total agreement with the Western position undermines the OPCW's credibility and ability to hold perpetrators accountable
- Dominican Republic: hopes IIT can get access, identify perpetrators, discover where they get their materials, etc. "ultimate consequences"
- Japan (vaguely on-script)
- Switzerland ...
- Costa Rica ...
- S. Korea/Rep. of: bright kid, sign not lit but present, on-script

14 total plus New Zealand, Australia, EU spoken for

A smaller but sizeable number say something different, which is more interesting.

- Indonesia ("alleged chemical attacks" - "transparent , impartial investigation" needed to prevent doubts, disagreement - few if any digs at Russia or Syria, past must comply, etc.)

- South Africa (reports should be true reflections of the investigation, at least suggesting they may not be that way right now, or they lose credibility - not because of Russian lies - few if any digs at Russia or Syria)

- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: much of the usual included, emphasis on eloquence, and conspicuously trying to take both sides with grandmotherly wisdom - a debatable approach but I think she swings it, in tandem with some vanilla vagueness - accountability is important, Syria must cooperate etc. but also OPCW "must be beyond reproach" (not IS?), urges that standards apply, emphasizing transparency, mentions possible "rigorous scrutiny" it could withstand and shouldn't fear - it should not be politicized - mutual trust with state parties is central to its working right - and she states her government's position as for universal principles for all humanity, against "SELECTIVE uneven and unpredictable truths" ("full stop") ... applications serving "hegemonic power or great power ambitions." Tiny countries often do, especially in support of Western projects like the war on Iraq. Sounds like she's saying "no" to any such deal, from either side. In general terms.

- Vietnam: softly but pragmatically issues a quick agreement to the basics of FFM being trusted to decide such matters, then lodges a question (rhetorical, I think), or a puzzle maybe, to the effect: so how do you check and find out if they are doing their work properly? It seems like a possible scenario in his mind, and - by extension, I'll add it could appear some states were seeking to shield it from scrutiny to protect its corrupted but useful process. He might have suggested their answer to how you check is "you don't. we said blind trust, full stop."

- Niger "truth ... eventually," so far investigations "have not allowed us to establish responsibility for the atrocities committed in a manner which is acceptable to all" - investigations must be inclusive, the lack of consensus, etc. means OPCW's credibility is in actual danger (not just in Russian lies), favors a "serene technical analysis" over shrill political accusations, etc.
- China: thanks panel, naming Henderson as part of it - mentions doubts and controversy, including by relevant experts - valuable information was presented, transparency should be enhanced from current standards, "China opposes hasty conclusions or arbitrary accusations" - again, their feeling were strong enough they - not Russia - convened the meeting. As such they got the first word after the panel's presentation (v 1:22:20), followed directly by the US denouncing the Russian stunt.
- Islamic Republic of Iran: Calm presentation in English - Syria surrendered its CW program, is fighting terrorism, works with OPCW - Syria has been a victim of the CW attacks - Iran knows all about them too - it seems the opposite of truth prevails, FFM reports are sub-standard, politically biased
- Egypt: The Egyptian ambassador delivers a seemingly strange and tangential statement emphasizing non-state actors and terrorists, crediting Syrian claims on some states helping train terrorists in CW use and also moving the terrorists to Libya - (sounds like "country X" in both regards) - but more on topic, the OPCW needs the highest levels of accuracy, yet some relevant reports were ignored, adding to questions raised about their objectivity. Stability and security are mentioned as top goals for Syria, "accountability" not mentioned - likely would say accountability was needed for the terrorist groups they suspect were to blame for the Douma incident, but that can of worms was left unopened for the moment.
- Russia, with the presentation, gets credit for anchoring the list of those not on the western script.
- Syria - in the panel and being their rep, of course Jaafari counts just like the Russians.
10 total

It's not clear what all other states were in attendance but didn't speak. I see signs lit up for but heard no words (directly) from: Slovakia, Latvia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Burundi, Argentina, Greece, Kazakhstan, G(eorgia?), Belarus, and  New Zealand is there with sign lit, but is spoken for by Canada - and they're seated together out of alphabetical order.

Sunday, June 21, 2015

Syria: Homs Massacres

June 18, 2015
(incomplete)
(last edits June 22)

Update June 21/22: What timing. The day after I first posted this, it so happens the Daily Beast ran this:
"A Damning Indictment of Syrian President Assad’s Systematic Massacres: A new report sorts through the record of sectarian carnage and leaves little doubt who are the worst offenders."

This draws on a report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), a UK-based anti-government group, capable of leaving "little doubt" that ISIS, JaN, and Kurdish militias have committed some sectarian massacres, the government's forces have done more than all those combined by far, and moderate FSA rebels have committed zero. Report download page. It says "From March 2011 until June 2013, no other party other than government forces, or its local and foreign militias, has perpetrated this kind of massacres." Feel free to compare that to what's shared here. PDF report direct download link. It's called "the societys massacre," I guess because it's the world's fault and responsibility to stop it. I haven't read it yet, but I imagine it will take its own page.

It would be: Syria Massacres: Reviewing "The Societys Holocaust"
The report focuses heavily on some of the same events covered in my research - 22 of the pro-government side's 49 sectarian massacres were in Homs province, mainly in and near Homs city. I've covered at least 10 of the 22, 8 seem new - ones I missed - and some I'll have to check on. There are many others I looked into that they didn't include here.  (like Tasnin, now covered pretty quickly - likely cleansing of the Alawite and loyalist families in town - number killed vs. just stolen is unclear)
 
Overview:
Even before the infamous "Houla Massacre" three years ago, some more informed sources will tell you there was already a bleak and terrifying pattern  this fit right into. From late 2011 into 2012, by opposition reports, Assad's forces and his Alawite "Shabiha" militias (ACLOS article) were murdering the people of Homs province, and especially Homs city.

Homs is Syria's #3 city after Damascus and Aleppo, near the Lebanese border, ethnically mixed - it was wracked by violence later than in Deraa, but well before 2011 was out. The worst was done with a combination of in-home slaughtering of whole families by the Shabiha, not sparing children, and often with horrific torture and abuse prior. And sometimes the army killed masses of locals at once with distant artillery shelling, although sometimes the victims on rebel video wind up looking the same as the executed kind of locals. Whole families were wiped out and neighborhoods emptied, in the face of such a brutal terrorist onslaught. Both sides blamed each other for this destabilizing violence, which drove increasing calls for intervention against the government.
 
I  - I could say we, but it was almost totally me here - did a ton of research into the record and found it no less hideous than advertised. It's worthy of a PDF report, and I started on one, but decided there was too much work to flesh it all out, etc. and more immediate priorities kept emerging anyway. But for now, another spot to direct readers to the detailed ACLOS pages:
Homs Massacres (a well-organized guide) - Talk:Homs Massacres (overflow details)

What's covered:
Massacres: define loosely as 4 or more civilians at once, or larger numbers of fighters - (lax definition) - must be executed up-close, usually. Singular killings, like the rebel sniper shooting of 10-year-old Sari Saoud in November, 2011, are not counted. Individual men kidnapped and murdered even in pairs aren't counted. About 57 qualifying events were identified, placed on the timeline, and analyzed to differing degrees.
Mainly in the first 2 years: the massacres identified span from the start of the war (March, 2011) up to August 2013, with the last period covered less intensely and missing a few, and with a very few since then also considered. So basically, the first two years - Massacres fell off somewhat by then, and my coverage fell off even more. I've missed some for sure sine mid-2013.
Mainly in and around Homs City: geographic scope: (I never did get to al-Qusayr very well, nor Rastan or Talbiseh, for example - originally excluding these, along with Houla. This means it's a bit incomplete even for the area considered. Distant areas of Homs province, like Palmyra, where ISIS/Daesh is committing obvious massacres now, is not included. Homs city, all districts, immediate outlying towns, further towns to the south, west, northwest - mainly the Houla area - are well-covered.  

Within those limits, I count app. 1,400 people minimum and up to app. 1,900 maximum killed in apparent deliberate massacres - according to reports from both/various sides, that seem credible (in death toll if not in details). Across the board, in the deaths of this many, I've applied our brand of skeptical analysis of all available evidence, looking for patterns - when where and how, which families were getting targeted, etc. I found solid and recurring questions about the opposition reports, and increasing signs that the government reports were always closer to the truth - it was the foreign-backed terrorists spilling this Syrian blood.
 
The Timeline: A Black Winter and After
One interesting pattern that emerged was when the worst of it happened. I was first compelled to investigate this after seeing terrible bits on Youtube and had a bad feeling, even before Houla but more so after it, as I looked closer at what was going on and had been going on.  The non-stop horror show, it seems, started in earnest in December, 2011 - after the Syrian Army agreed to pull out of Homs over prior and lesser allegations, letting rebel forces move more freely and start finding and documenting more and more damaged homes and murdered locals - all somehow by the regime's forces who lied about pulling out and should be punished. Fairly small and often especially cruel mass-killings were being discovered almost weekly, then almost daily in February, 2012. February 4 saw the Khalidiya Massacre - the largest one yet, branded as 200+ civilians killed by deliberately murderous Army shelling on the eve of a UN Security Council meeting (see below).

After Khalidiya, the Army came back to Homs, whatever anyone chose to say about it, clearing Baba Amr by the 28th, they announced. From there, massacres and all kinds of violence in the city dropped off, later to flare up again. And mass-killings and robberies in the countryside and smaller towns increased. As the punch of the FSA grew into the year, and/or as it took one new and discrete allies, larger occasional massacres were inflicted on outlying districts of the city (Karm al-Zaytoun, Deir Baalbeh), but then it was mainly outlying areas, most notable al-Houla, where the action turned in 2012.

Rebel holdouts remained in the city into 2013 - Baba Amr was again taken over, and again reclaimed by the Army in March, 2013. Again, countryside massacres increased, including increasingly overt sectarian massacres as rebels entered the Valley of the Christians. From there, it seemed to continue moderately, and since ... well, we keep not seeing news stories about big and brutal massacres like Houla - at least in Homs province. It does seem the perps are keeping it to a lower-profile kind of terrorism, or they have diminished capabilities. Less obvious crimes worth learning about surely continue to some degree - I may catch up on that, depending.

Reference Maps
Homs city, by district:
In purple: two districts with important and huge massacres prior to Houla. Deir Baalbeh could also have been purpled. Red: Baba Amr - the early primary base for rebel fighters in Homs - more of a constant meat-grinder of almost daily mini-massacres and/or purported government shelling deaths - few specific incidents really popped out as prominent enough to make a page for, yet it probably witnessed the greatest overall death toll. It was the government re-taking of Baba Amr in February, 2012, that marked the end of the rebel militant heyday in Homs city. Not indicated: other districts that rebels claimed and held out in even longer: Old City (center) and Wa'er (western suburb, really)
 
Homs area, as covered:
Rastan (red) is an area I considered more in the Hama orbit, not really covered. And Talbiseh also got sidelined pretty much. Some other outlying areas might've been missed a bit. So this tally I get from the incidents I did consider - app. 1400 minimum to app. 1,900 maximum - is not even complete for this map. Some outlying areas - Haswiyeh and Duvair - are close enough  actually better seen in the city map, above. al-Shumariyeh should have been marked - on the lake, just southwest of Qattinah.


Select Massacres
Of the dozens covered, these 17 by Size, Fame, telling pattern, etc.

* April 17, 2011: Tellawi Family Massacre: An Alawite brigadier-General, along with his 17-year-old son and his two nephews (15 and 17) were dragged from their car and brutally murdered and mutilated. Both sides blamed each other. Also, this is Syria's independence day.
 
 
* September 24 section: Zhouri SFA Massacre: 7 members of the Zhouri family (including a teenage boy) and 8 others, variously defected/refusing soldiers, "SFA," and civilians, are killed in al-Qusayr. Probably related to the following one:
* September 24 (app.) section: Al-Assi River Massacre: An unclear number of bodies are found in the river - one clearly recovered from the water looks like a paramilitary man, tortured. At the same time several military personnel, political and criminal security policemen and murky civilians - perhaps 12 or more total - all died, many listed as detention-torture victims like the one river body we're shown. The killing and dumping seem to have happened in or nearer to al-Qusayr to the south, but the victims tend to be from or killed in Homs.
 
* Early December, 2011 Sectarian Killings in Homs "Sixty-one people have been killed in the Syrian central city of Homs, according to Al Jazeera's Rula Amin ... Among those killed were 34 Sunnis and 27 Alawites, she said. It was not immediately clear who was behind the violence." The linked ACLOS page explores this allegation and various reports of the days December 3-7.
 
* Late December, 2011 Zoeib Family Massacre the killing of at least six victims related to and including Ghazi al-Zo'eib, the elderly former head of the Baath party in Homs (allegedly a rebel supporter at the time).
* Late December, 2011 Massacre for the Monitors: Baba Amr and perhaps elsewhere: In the days of a long-sought visit by the Arab League's observers to the rebel hotbed on December 27 and 28, regime forces in and around the district went on a spree of Shabiha in-home executions and strange shelling that left rebels with bodies to all but slap the monitors with - like the boy laid on the hood of their truck (inset) 
  
* February 3/4, 2012 Khalidiya Massacre: (from Homs Massacres on the World Stage):
Khalidiya: A small picture of massive protests,
around a lot of coffins, after a huge massacre
of immense mystery
The first really sizeable and promoted alleged massacre in Homs, a triple-digits one, was on the morning of February 4, just as the UN Security Council met to discuss a resolution to force Assad to resign over things like that. The Khalidiya Massacre of 138 was the core of a touted 200+ civilians snuffed out overnight, under brutal artillery shelling by the Syrian Army. Whole families were killed, as dozens of their homes were smashed, initial reports said.
French foreign minister, Alain Juppe, said the Homs bloodshed was a crime against humanity and "those who block the adoption of such a resolution are taking a grave historical responsibility." [1] U.S. president Barack Obama explained why Assad's government "does not deserve to govern" and "must step aside ... immediately." In support, he referred to the 1982 Hama Massacre (the 30th anniversary of which it happened to be) and to how just "yesterday the Syrian government murdered hundreds of Syrian citizens, including women and children, in Homs through shelling and other indiscriminate violence." [2]
Rather, the core 138 victims seem quite possibly to be civilians taken hostage by rampant rebel brigades. Opposition records show 130 adult men and 8 boys (a few teenagers, a 9-year-old, and a few unspecified). The "entire families" killed in their "homes" were 100% male and 94% adult. This is highly suggestive of sex-sorted hostages, not some unusual family dynamics. This supports the contention by some locals that those killed, as seen on rebel video, were their family members previously taken captive by the rebels in Homs. That is, the massacre was quite likely done with weapons and fighters funneled by U.S. allies, on people captured with those weapons, using the security vacuum created when the "Friends of Syria" and Arab League forced the Army to withdraw from Homs in December. Calling for the whole government to leave Syria in response to that - and the timing suggests that was the idea - seems a bit perverse. But a lack of the slightest detail grasp prevents most people from even seeing that possibility.

Below: three of the victims of this random shelling massacre:
 
* Abel Massacre, Feb. 27 2012 64-86 victims, all adult males from Baba Amr, it's said, were found executed south of Baba Amr, just as rebels were finally chased out of Baba Amr, to the south. The same exact pattern would play out with the March, 2013 Abel massacre (see below). Between this and some follow-up massacre of mainly men, several Melhems and others of frequently targeted families appear.
 
* March 11/12 Karm al-Zaytoun Massacre At least 100+ and up to 224 victims in two days of rolling massacres in Karm al-Zaytoun and al-Rifae districts, Adawiya, etc. The more famous first half was blamed on Syrian army and Shabiha, and said to have killed at least 21 women and 26 children, among 108 total. Some child victims show rather extreme injuries or mutilation, in extra-shocking images taken by rebels, later re-cycled for the Houla Massacre. Again, the government and some locals blamed terrorists, who had abducted family members they recognized in rebel videos of the dead. Further, an alleged perpetrator later spoke his involvement in a cleric-blessed "slaughter" of more than 80 civilians (probably non-Sunni) in an "apartment" over a couple of days. Rebels in one video are caught referring to the slaughtered victims as sheep, a chillingly relevant clue picked up by pro-government media. 
 
* April 7-11 Deir Baalba Massacre: This underrated massacre reportedly took somewhere in excess off 200 lives, reportedly all civilian, and of several select families - including at least 58 victims from various families named Al-Abbas. They reportedly died by field execution by free-roving gangs, mainly in the days between April 2 and 10. While the Army and its accomplices allegedly hid all the bodies away, mass graves of around 100 bodies total were reported by the opposition as of the 11th, and dozens of rotting bodies continued to be "discovered" until early May at least. 
 
* May 25, Houla Massacre: Let's save space here. This one has its own masterlist here besides its own blog, and ACLOS page (with sub-pages) that spawned two reports (see the Houla blog for those.
* May 25: Shumeriyeh Massacre The same day, an often-confused operation out of al-Qusayr, south of Homs) that reportedly killed about ten civilians from two families in the Alawite village of Shumariyeh, on the south shore of Lake Homs.
 
* December 10 Aqrab Massacre: At the north end of al-Houla, the Alawite half of Aqrab town was overrun by rebel brigades, and some 500 civilians taken hostage in early December, about a week before this alleged massacre. Rebels say on the 10th Shabiha were holding the last 200 or so prisoners (some 300 were freed in exchanges - with rebels) and blew up the house they were in. Initial estimate were 125-150 dead. But a Channel 4 News video from the scene shows the house remained intact, the story is false, and the actual fate of a reported 125-233 Alawites, including women and children, remains unknown. The known details leave little cause for optimism. Names of note: of the original 500, 300 are said to be of a Jubeili family. A "Judl" boy was spared, a Daoud family was targeted in the takeover, two Hosins and a Youseh were released, other victims names don't appear. Five Shabiha are named as villains: two Jubeili men, two Melhem men, and a Faiz.

* January 15, 2013 Haswiyeh Massacre: Busatin al-Haswiyeh, in the northwest of Homs, near Duvair (see map). Shocking initial reports heralded 106 victims, whole families of local civilians, again killed by Shabiha for daring to help the rebels. But the first list of 100 names included 75 adult male victims, and locals living there told the British media (Channel 4 and BBC) the massaccre was by, apparently, Jabhat al-Nusra. Their attack on the town killed about 30 uncooperative civilian locals, and "many" adult male militants were killed in the following battle. The layout of the crime scene and other clues support the locals' version.

* March 25-29, 2013 Abel (and related) Massacre(s): Three extremely brutal massacres over five days show an unusual degree of bestial mangling and perhaps an extra rage and frustration on the part of the killers. Abel, meaning apple, is just 3 km south of Baba Amr, Homs, and the incidents began the day after rebel forces were fully chased away from there after a huge and frustrating defeat, running to the south. Collective reported death toll: app. 90. Similar pattern with February, 2012 Abel Massacre.

(at right: a woman rebels say was killed in this massacre. They know which body was hers, and they say they found this photo, which loyalists took, before murdering her and the other locals (which was all just before rebels arrived to find all this evidence).

* August 2: section: Al-Shawahed Massacre: Near Hosin Castle, six locals, four from an al-Ali family, are abducted and slaughtered by the roadside, allegedly by Shabiha. Same day, someone kills a state security forces member of the al-Ali family in a neighboring town.
 
* August 17, 2013: section: Marmarita Massacre 14-15 locals (including a boy and two women) in the Christian village next to Hosin Castle are killed during a rebel raid.

Saturday, June 20, 2015

Syria Chlorine Allegations: Where Was Dr. Tennari?

Syria Chlorine Allegations: Where Was Dr. Tennari?
Adam Larson
June 20, 2015
(incomplete)
updates 9-8-2016, 3-19, 3-27-2017 

A Global Player at Center-Stage
Dr. Mohammed Tennari is the Idlib province Coordinator the Washington DC-based Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), a group opposed to Syria's government and allied with the competing "transitional government" in Turkey. Not far cross the Turkish border in northern Syria, Tennari set up his Field Hospital in the city of Sarmeen (alt. Sarmin - clinic logo at left), southeast of the regional capitol Idlib. This reportedly was started  in 2011, supported with funding to hire staff, secure supplies, etc. from SAMS (SAMS), as well as Doctors Without Borders/MSF (MSF), and it continues running today with an unusually transparent and public medical process (see the clinic's Facebook page for intensive surgery documentation).
 
Dr. Mohammed Tennari, left, and interpreter
during congressional testimony, June 17
(AFP/Getty Images photo via ABC News)
He obviously spends some time in Turkey and, recently anyway, transiting to and from points west. Dr. Tennari was in New York on April 16 to address a closed-door session of the UN Security Council said to move everyone to tears. (BBC) Most recently he addressed a meeting of the U.S. House of Representatives foreign relations Committee, on June 17 (PDF "transcript" from house.gov). He's always urging foreign military intervention or, in June, asking alternately for help in "reinforcing and rebuilding secure underground hospitals" to withstand the onslaught, if no one has the fortitude to stop it like they should. 

Tennari's main thrust and selling point in these lobbying efforts has been relating his direct experience with the government's intolerable chlorine barrel bombs. He came on the national spotlight after his clinic hosted the deaths of three young children, aged 3, 2, and about 1, on March 16, 2015. It was the first and worst of the new round of alleged chlorine attacks in Idlib. These deaths were exactly what he showed to move the UN to tears and, apparently, short-circuit their analytical skills.

This info-offensive with dead babies and calls for war against a Baath party government in the Middle East has been frequently compared to the 1990 Iraq incubator babies disinformation fiasco (many examples in the Guardian's comments, for example). That dictator-killing-babies story boosted support for the 1991 war on Iraq and was a fiction hatched by the Kuwaiti royal family and PR firm Hill and Knowlton. One big difference is here there undeniably are babies being killed by someone who either has bad aim or very bad morals. But otherwise, the propaganda power of the dead baby should be noted as one reasons to suspect this might be just that - but hatched by a different kind of PR group...

We know Al Qaeda's branch in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, was at the time of the incident the leading force deciding who lives and who dies in the Sarmin area. The area would still, even after all the running so many have done, contain some religious enemies - Shi'ites from the nearby and vulnerable village of Fu'ah, Sunnis who they think support the infidel government, etc. These might wind up dead in fits and spurts as soon as there's a good cover story and some fake names lined up.

As that situation might suggest, the stage Dr. Tennari rose to fame on is troubling one. At right is one sign of serious problems with Tennari's clinic in al Qaeda territory; Mohammed al-Taleb (as given), the youngest victim of that inaugural attack. On the  left is a stray view of him in the general treatment area, sat upright, receiving oxygen by a mask, and having injections at least considered, if not performed. He lived long enough to get to the emergency room. On the right is the more famous view from there. He's left on his back, apparently vomiting or exuding mucous, depending, and given no breathing assistance, even as he tries once to draw a breath on his own and fails. "Assad" was blamed for his inevitable death, but "Assad" could not stop them from continuing oxygen support, nor from making the other errors that may have helped finish off his sisters Aysha and Sara as well.  Please see the explanation at What Killed the Talebs? : "A disturbingly unsuccessful medical effort")
Exactly one month later, director Tennari spoke to the Security Council session, describing his version of the night's events with himself at the center of the medical drama. New York Times reports Dr. Tennari “said he tried to save the three children" seen in the videos. Elsewhere he's said "as quickly as we worked, we could not save them," (AFP) and - while the grandmother died before arrival - "we tried to treat the others. The children were foaming at the mouth, they were suffocating, then their hearts stopped." (HRW) Later, he told The Guardian:
“The children who came to us were suffocating and we couldn’t do anything because they had breathed too much chlorine,” Tennari told the Guardian from Idlib, describing the most difficult cases he had to handle. “It’s very distressing to see children suffocating in front of you and you cannot do anything.”
He doesn't explain why he could not get that mask back on Mohammed's face, for one thing. Maybe it's part of the (Islamist?) "fate" concept Civil Defense ("White Helmets") chief Raed Saleh talked about; referring to one of Mohammed's sisters, probably Sara Taleb, he said "we did what we could to save her, but dying in silence was her fate. Death in silence before the whole world.” Why is this their "fate" in anti-government hospitals? Why the combination of preventable death, and a global audience for it? The answer can perhaps be sensed in the accompanying calls to "stop the death" - not by enforcing proper medical procedures in this or other rebel clinics, but by starting an air war against the religious enemies of the people the clinic managers are allied with.

There are a number of possibly shifty details Tennari has offered casting some doubt on his true knowledge of the events of March 16. But after that inflammatory introduction, these are best considered in a section below, so we can get to the main question...

Was He Even On the Stage?
As the New York Times related, Dr. Tennari "tried to save the three children shown with their grandmother’s body in the video that he said was taken that night." From this, there's little reason he should not be seen in that same video, or set of two videos rather, filmed mainly right around the children as they died. These show everyone who was that close to the central drama, but Dr. Tennari does not seem to be one of them. It's all but impossible to prove a negative like his not being at the clinic, but from the available video, we can see that he probably wasn't there, and he almost certainly wasn't in the emergency room at the crucial time.

The question was first raised and considered in this section of the ACLOS event talk page. Here, you can check for yourself if you like, or have the time. Dr. Tennari looks like this:



And here are the emergency room videos, apparently what was shown at the UNSC and for the HFRC, as Dr. Tennari sat there claiming his central involvement in this drama. Can anyone spot him actually in that drama? I can't.

Video 1, Idlib Civil Defense


Video 2, Jabhat al-Nusra

In the first one, we can see only Mohammed is there at the start - anyone helping prior to this wouldn't be treating "children," just the one child. Mohammed is alive at the beginning, the girls are brought in halfway through the video, and one person says Aysha is alive (breathing) near the end. In video 2, they all increasingly seem dead. There's little to no gap between the videos, which show the time when the children died. Any life-saving efforts on them would happen in this span I estimate at 4-6 minutes long. And we see life-saving-type efforts, just poorly done, and mainly after the kids are dead.

Dr. Tennari is not the cameraman for either video, we can presume, so should be one of the people seen, eyes burning or not, hunched over the victims at least part of this time.
There are 7 people of medical relevance outlined here at ACLOS, numbered in order of appearance. Two of these - M1 (right, wearing the Taqiyah cap favored by some Islamists) and M6 (below, on the left) seem to be - or be considered as - qualified doctors. Neither of these men is Dr. Tennari; M1 is too old and lean, while M6 is younger and has all his hair. Is he one of the rescue workers whose faces we can't fully see? Visually, M4 or M5 (on the right below, holding Aysha so gingerly) could be him, but the director isn't likely to be working with the rescue teams like that. Is he hiding under a hijab as the one female nurse, M2? Is he one of the other, less relevant, people here? Or is he simply not in the room?

Consider M6, the young doctor (on the left in the image at right). For most of video 1, he's consistently not seen or sensed in the room, until he appears from the back at 1:34. From there on, he's clearly in the action through both videos. Dr. Tennari seems to be missing in that same way, but for the whole time.

A less thorough scan of videos from other parts of the filed clinic also failed to reveal any matches. He may have been on-site, just out of frame at times, maybe he is visible and we just can't see it yet, or he may simply not have been there.

It's a valid question, then: where was Dr. Tennari?
* Was he there after all? Can anyone out there locate a possible match? Comments below are open.
* He would have less reason to be in New York or Washington before he and his clinic delivered their chlorine attack and dead-babies story - but he is with SAMS, if not a Syrian-American himself. So maybe he was in the US.
* Maybe he was off in Turkey, or even Qatar for example, securing support.
* Maybe he was working elsewhere in Idlib, or elsewhere in Syria, or was at home like he says, but passed out drunk, or something embarrassing.
* Consider: he works and lives mainly in an area run by known terrorist groups and their ideological allies. For all we know he was briefly arrested that night so others could manage the clinic for a while - maybe he had nothing to do with the crime spree (see below), but can't say anything or they'll brand him a regime collaborator, execute him, and his children will be the next random victims of "Assad shelling." That's an overly-imaginative scenario, but there are a lot of possibilities in that direction, tainting his reliability as a witness. All we know is he flew out of this terrorist-held area to the UN and Capitol Hill and issued some softened demands, something about delivering explosives to kill the religious enemies of those terrorists. All pure coincidence, right?

Update: He was At Least Near the Stage 
--(Added 3-27-2017)--
An important point I've been half-aware of half the time this post has been up. Dr. Tennari, I presume, is seen in this video ("testimony of director of the hospital for cases affected by chemical gas") filmed apparently at this clinic during the events in question. It was posted quickly, before 9 am on the following day, and seems filmed in the dark hours.

He has the dark rings of no sleep under his eyes, and seems strangely out of the loop, in street clothes with no gloves or scrubs, seemingly trying to avoid eye contact with the whole room as others bustle about treating patients. His clothing helps clarify he's not even the guy in the green hoodie above, and simply wasn't in the ER when he says he was.

From his body language, he seems to mumble in dejection to the cameraman, and seems almost bullied or worried about other people present... or maybe he's just got a headache. This dialog clearly deserves translating, if it can be made out. But just from the visuals, I get the impression Dr. Tennari was there telling the first rebel story, but from a spot to the side of the main stage. Maybe he was pushed aside by some ambitious new team managing this night's special event. That's a lot to infer. I may be back with content. ...

In this new Al-Jazeera English report, Dr. Tennari describes himself as hectically running around from one patient to the next, and the whole scene was "noisy." Is that his way of explaining why he doesn't seem to appear in the ER videos? It doesn't seem to match what he is seen doing - chatting on the sidelines in street clothes as if he literally had nothing better to do.
----

Crime and Punishment, and Evidence
On June 17, Dr. Tennari presented alongside former ambassador to Syria Robert Ford, and border doctor Annie Sparrow (her "voice cracking with emotion"), who also happens to be the wife of Human Rights Watch CEO Kenneth Roth. All three were quite clear and professional on the point that that the government and its helicopters were behind these chemical attacks, and ideally at least, they should be stopped with some sort of aerial solution. None of them makes note of the unprofessional medical care that contributed to the deaths.

Consider; including the six who died on March 16, the death toll from 30+ alleged chlorine attacks is said to be ten, as of mid-June. Dr. Tennari swears everyone in Idlib is hopelessly terrified anyway, for whatever reason no one can change, and this is both why "Assad" does it and why it must be stopped (see Why Chlorine?). As allegedly used, chlorine counts as a chemical weapon and may well cross Obama's "red line." So Tennari has some alleged reason to press for direct U.S. military intervention in Syria. But after the hearing, a report in ABC News passed on signs that the audience was perhaps not as moved as it was hoped.:
Rep. Ted Yoho, R-FL, told the witnesses the committee was introducing a resolution condemning the chlorine attacks that included a “strong recommendation” to the international community requesting no-fly zones to be implemented. However, he said military fly zones shouldn’t be seen as a solution, but a military operation. “I just want to remind everyone that a no fly zone is an act of war,” Yoho said. “We're attacking a sovereign nation that has not attacked us. They are not a direct threat to the United States.”
"Sure," Dr. Sparrow might as well have responded, "just get that protective solution in place so the death can stop, like we did in Libya."

To the commission drafting that request, or those reviewing the request, anyone who reads this ... not only is it an act of war, it's one being requested based on the provided evidence we just looked at parts of. And while we have this case open before us, people of Earth, another important feature of the events of March 16:
the victims in this deadliest chlorine attack were visibly not killed by chlorine at all.
As best explained in the previous article What Killed the Talebs? the children, especially Mohammed, show signs consistent instead with an overdose on some CNS depressant drug, most likely some kind of opiate. This is seriously the best visuals-based assessment anyone has yet made (but open to review). A drug overdose of course would not come from a barrel bomb, but from a person in this Islamist rebel-administered area.

In the case of the girls anyway, and likely with Mohammed as well, the drugging happened before they were brought into Tennari's clinic. But it was probably done by friends or overlords, and still perhaps using drugs supplied to him by MSF or SAMS and somehow "loaned out." There was a chemical murder in the area, and  a staff that had chances to stop it, but let these pass. Why save a life if the plan is to end it? But why would the same plan hold into the clinic, past its ethical gates?

This really should be considered carefully, and as Tennari and his allies ask, with an eye to some kind of punishment for the perpetrators. It's a at least as hideous a crime as they say, besides being an elephant-in-the-living-room insult to our collective intelligence. If the facts are as the visual evidence suggests, Dr, Tennari is complicit in these murders and the cover-up. And it's not even a very good cover-up, just one that the ruling elite is very hungry for. 

Further Red Flags
Some noted possible inconsistencies between Dr, Tennari's various accounts - mostly to be expanded on later - there may be others I forgot.

Fumes Off Victims Clothes?
From NYT report on UN session, April 16:
... Even treating the patients was harmful. Dr. Tennari said his eyes itched, and he felt nauseated. One of the nurses fainted from the chlorine fumes off the injured.” (NYT)
First, No one is seen fainting in the videos. Next, it's unlikely chlorine gas will drift or even rub back off a patient's skin or clothing enough to do anything, in the war Sarin easily could. It changes to hydrochloric acid on contact with water (so eyes, airways, maybe skin), so surface particles could irritate, even float up into one's eyes, maybe, off the clothes of a freshly exposed victim. But from what I've read, passing out would come only after severe exposure to an air-borne cloud of the stuff, after coughing violently for a while.
Human Rights Watch April 14 report, using a different name spelling, "Tirani": 
Mohamed Ghaleb Tirani, the director of the field hospital in Sarmin who treated many of those affected by the attacks, told Human Rights Watch that the patients’ clothes smelled strongly of chlorine – “like the detergent.” ... Tirani said that four of the paramedics at the hospital were affected by second-hand exposure, including burning eyes and shortness of breath and dizziness.
The problem with this, as anyone who's reviewed the videos or who was there should know, is the children at least had been stripped and washed before arriving in the clinic, as anyone can see looking at the videos he presented. Most other victims, if not all, seem to be similarly stripped (usually to underwear) and washed with water out in the street, then given a civil defense blanket and taken inside. It's true grandmother Ayosh is not processed, and seemingly remains in her clothes, but she's also wrapped in a blanket that would greatly mute any vapors - only her face and one arm are exposed.
Dr. Tennari should probably know what makes basic sense, and even if he wasn't there himself, he should have seen the videos and thought it out before the UN session. But what he says about "fumes" rising off clothes causing symptoms that secondary chlorine exposure would not cause makes very little scientific sense.
Later, just ahead of the June 17 congressional hearing, the Guardian reported a different story, or an unknown twist in the same one. Given a copy of his planned testimony (apparently the same one released by the House as a PDF "transcript"):
As he left his house to head to the hospital, he could smell bleach. “When I arrived at the hospital, a wave of people had already begun to arrive. They were all experiencing symptoms of exposure to a choking agent like chlorine gas. Everyone was decontaminated with water before coming into the hospital, and their clothes were taken off of them.
This now is clearer in matching what the video shows, as if he had watched it. But he insists he was affected anyway, and still blames the children - just not their clothes. In the full testimony (transcript) he says "As I worked, my chest became tighter and tighter, my throat burned, and I had a hard time breathing. The young nurse who took care of baby Mohammed had symptoms of a critical level."

Perhaps it's this tenacity in holding to his first story regardless of the holes in it that's got so many influential people willing to believe everything he says.

Friend of the family?
Dr. Tennari says the father of the killed family, Waref al-Taleb, was a friend of his.  "Their father was a friend of his, he said, and ran an electronics repair shop in town" (NYT) or "Among the people who entered, I saw my friend Waref Taleb. He ran an electronics repair shop in town, and recently helped to fix my phone." (House testimony) Add 3-26-17: Later he told Al-Jazeera Waref “was friendly, quiet, [a] good person,” who “had a nice family. He loved his family.” Tennari says his last visit to the repair shop in Sarmin was to fix an internet router, a month or two before the attack. “Taleb did not charge him for the fix,” Al-Jazeera reported, as a gesture between “the two Syrian friends.”

Well... when he first spoke, to MSF (who support his clinic with drugs and supplies) as "Dr T, the director of Sarmin hospital" and saw this friend and his family brought in, what did he say?
“We saw people arriving at the hospital from a neighbouring village ... Amongst them, there was a family, three young children with their parents. They were in a very serious condition, dying. Their parents were able to speak but they were having a lot of difficulty breathing.” 
But then they died, except the grandmother, who he says arrived dead. But that speaking the parents did before must be how he learned who they were, at first. Later he already knew, they lived in that geo-located basement apartment in Sarmin (see here), ran a repair business in town, and Tennari was Waref's friend and customer.

Talebs Gassed Through a Vent?
Dr. Tennari said the gas seeped into the home through a vent: "The family lived in a basement apartment which became “a gas chamber” when toxic gas seeped in through a vent, Dr. Tennari said." (NYT) But the visual evidence shows two walls of the  apartment blown apart. The OPCW investigators would later hear the barrel bomb itself fell through this vent - with "an approximate dimension of 3 m x 1.5 m" - and then knocked down the wall. "A ballistic expert analysis supports the statement of the witnesses, improbable as it sounds, that the device impacted through the ventilation shaft." (October, 2015 report, PDF) Tennari's first description could be a simple mix-up based on what he heard, or a red flag.

For what it's worth, as mapped (see here),  the alleged Taleb family home has always had a strange rectangular hole of perhaps this size or smaller, no bigger, along its north edge. This correlates to about where the bomb seems to have crashed through, or detonated anyway. What the hole looks like now is unclear, butit seems larger from how much light comes in. What seems like a strange new wall blocks the view. It's not a very clear situation yet.

Children's Symptoms
In testimony (PDF) before the U.S. House of Representatives, Dr. Tennari has cited a few symptoms he claims he observed, besides the smell, as proving the victims were affected by chlorine.
* "Mohammad was foaming at the mouth.": True but irrelevant. Only the infant does this a bit, because he's spit up and manages a few shallow breaths through the goo, causing bubbles. The girls show no such thing. And it's not a specific chlorine indicator anyway, contrary to popular belief. With the mucous produced, foaming can happen, or not.

* ""(Waref), his wife, his mother, and his three young children – all under the age of three – were a sickly pale color when they arrived, a sign of severe lack of oxygen and chemical exposure." This is true for the children at least, and it's a problem. If they'd been hit with chlorine  they would likely suffer some red skin irritation, besides major eye irritation, causing redness. Instead, they're just pale.  Pallor is more consistent with a drug overdose. He's thinking of cyanosis (a blue shift), which they also display, slightly (this is consistent with an OD as well, if it doesn't come with other chlorine-specific signs). The grandmother has a reddish face and eyes, suggesting maybe she was exposed to chlorine, despite what Dr. T describes. The father isn't seen clearly enough, and the mother isn't seen at all.

* Difficulty breathing/suffocating: Not in a chlorine sense. That would be violent coughing and visible efforts to manage lungs full of fluid and get some air in there. These kids... one (Sara) is said to be dead and seems it. Aysha is said to be alive, but never visibly breathes. Mohammed is clearly alive, as he tries one visible, yawn-like breath, and the bubbles ("foam") indicate he was breathing a bit in between. Being unresponsive, comatose, flaccid, plae, and "too sleepy to breathe" are all symptoms of a drug overdose, and roughly the opposite of what chlorine poisoning looks like.

No Beds for Grandma
"We were forced to treat Sara and Aisha on the body of their dead grandmother because we had no free beds." Dead bodies must be on a bed, even if it complicates saving the lives of children? Did they really have no other place, anywhere, to put her that didn't obstruct the emergency room? No other beds, no morgue, no free floor space? Unlikely. It seems more likely they left her there to make a visual point about their lack of space.
Consider this snippet of translated dialog from one of the blame-chamber videos (as shown on RT, about 2:05) "Make sure the mother (sic) is at the bottom of the picture, and the children are at the top." (they already were, so maybe it's more of a filming direction - don't film it sideways. Still, it's interesting...)

Oft-Destroyed Clinic and Financial Irregularities (added 3-19-2017)
See our ACLOS analysis of what Dr. Tennari calls the 11th and final direct air attack on the Sarmin field hospital, in October, 2015, which he claims destroyed it totally and left it out of business. Here's where the two blamed strikes hit, relative to the untouched clinic. The damage seems to be: an (abandoned?) school and guardhouse directly hit, the cameraman's leg was injured, and he limped it into the hospital, leading to an injured knee at the hospital. Also, a photo shows a trashed room inside, with equipment strewn about, but every wall intact and not even a cracked window. Somewhere, several local men and two hospital staff members were said to be killed by this air attack. How it all really adds up remains impossible to correlate.

Now note the hospital at that time is a 3-floor structure. Consider that it had just gotten that way before this. Here's a comparison of images from Google Earth showing its growth: correction, it seems to be just one floor to begin with, and the northern place two. The hospital has a second floor added in 2014, and a third added in 2015, with its roof still incomplete on August 18. In October, it seems to be roofed over: the top floor is as dark inside as the second.

So whatever it means, this place had just reached full size when "Dr Mohamed Tennari, director of Sarmin hospital, said the facility appeared to have been directly targeted and could no longer serve patients on one of the fiercest frontlines in the war. He said the hospital had been the target of at least 10 other airstrikes earlier in the conflict." (Guardian) As far as I've noticed, it may have shut its doors for good. I don't think I've seen any further reports from there.

(otherwise, forthcoming - here and/or at  this spot at ACLOS.)