Warning

Warning: This site contains images and graphic descriptions of extreme violence and/or its effects. It's not as bad as it could be, but is meant to be shocking. Readers should be 18+ or a mature 17 or so. There is also some foul language occasionally, and potential for general upsetting of comforting conventional wisdom. Please view with discretion.
Showing posts with label Libya. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Libya. Show all posts

Monday, July 29, 2019

Early 2012 CW Allegations in Syria

July 29, 2019
(rough, incomplete)

February predictions
I was recently alerted to an interesting report (props to Qoppa 999):
https://syriaaccountability.org/library/walls-have-ears/
Walls Have Ears: An Analysis of Classified Syrian Security Sector Documents" a report by Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, Published April 2019 in Washington, DC. A critical review post is pending, but one cited file ignited some old tinder I've been sitting on. The fire couldn't be contained, and had to be penned into this new post.

Said file is rather old, dated 2 February, 2012 - from Director of the National Security Office to "Comrade Director of the Air Force Intelligence Division." Approved, stamped, and circulated over the following days (Feb. 4-8), the memo is shown below and says (per the provided translation):

"We received information stating that the Libyan terrorists have acquired chemical weapons from the Libyan chemical arsenal. The weapons will be shipped to Turkish territories to be used later in some Syrian governorates, especially the ones that are facing unrest. This will be done in order to accuse the regime, in coordination with biased television channels, of using the chemical weapons, in order to escalate the Syrian crisis and internationalize it after all the failed attempts to move the Syrian crisis dossier to the Security Council.
Please review and do the necessary *
And long live our message

* Elsewhere, SJAC takes this phrase as likely meaning assassinate someone. In this case, probably not. Maybe it carries that secret meaning in no case. 

The SJAC report poses this as a probably fabricated claim, sown in these documents as a top-secret cover-story for their own planned CW usage. (Considering how "the rhetoric of the Syrian government following chemical weapons attacks suggest that this could have been an additional shield from culpability – documentary evidence to protect the government from accountability and to point the finger at rebel groups, either for internal consumption or for external actors who might review the documents in the future.")

But as far as most people know, there were no regime chemical attacks alleged at this time, nor in the following months, either to match a prediction or to prove some basis for planning a cover-story. Behind the scenes, it's worried they'll be used "later" and even at this blog, I tend to start noting CW allegations much later - only in November and December of 2012.

And so far I haven't tended to consider Libya's stockpiles. The sarin used in many incidents was more likely custom-made by or for Jabhat al-Nusra and their select allies. But that's not some firm law of nature, and even if its mainly true most of the time, this early on, different sources might be called on.

But whatever the source, there was some unexplained concern about the issue from probably the same week as this memo, but well outside the official channels producing it. Paul Wood noted in The Guardian, February 11, 2012 following on a recent visit to Baba Amr district of Homs. Then under siege but weeks from full military reconquest, Baba Amr was the opposition's top issue and prime focus for employing propaganda claims of this sort - the natural place for "Assad" to unleash any strange chemical nonsense:
"Baba Amr had been under siege for months. Jedi snapped on the third day after hundreds of shells, mortars and rockets had fallen. He walked back and forth shouting: "The army is about to use chemical weapons. They're already sending in ground troops." Neither was true. Under the constant shelling, people were becoming hysterical." (emphasis mine)
Wood considered this to be "hysteria," not a reflection anyone's real plans or concerns. But the article also noted how "State television denied there was a bombardment. It told the inventive lie that residents were setting fire to rubbish on their roofs to give the impression of an attack. The official media also said that most of the violence was caused by the rebel fighters of the Free Syrian Army – "terrorists", "criminal gangs" or "agents of Israel" in the language of official spokesmen.

This could refer exactly to Danny Abdul Dayem, who worked with the armed fighters, coordinated fake videos with them, and called for foreign, specifically Israeli, military intervention, notably over the government offensive in Baba Amr in February. He was famously caught out on this, though to be fair, I'm not sure of the date of the incidents or their revelation; less than a month after this Guardian article the story was out, with Dayem even challenged on-air by a peeved Anderson Cooper at CNN. Likely the Syrian authorities referred to him, as well as less-famous others engaged in the same kind of activities. That's some "lie" to invent its way to being true like that.

So Mr. Wood didn't know everything, including whether there was or wasn't reason to expect chemical weapons usage, in Baba Amr, in the first half of February, 2012. And as it happens...

February chemical attack(s)?
… there was an allegation around this time, or a string of them - sooner than the memo suggests and perhaps unrelated, but perhaps not. I've sort of glossed this over as too vague and isolated to consider, but I had seen it listed in a 2013 report assembled by professor Julian Perry Robinson - an excellent resource, with this early incident I didn't know about

ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA, a Harvard Sussex Program Occasional Paper by Julian Perry Robinson, June, 2013
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/occasional%20papers/HSPOP_4.pdf
Incident [L2] February 2012, Homs (Bab Amr): Use by the regime . On 21 February 2012, Istanbul Hürriyet Daily News reports having just been told by Lt Abdulselam Abdulrezzak, “who used to work in the chemical weapons department in the Syrian army and defected to Turkey last week”, that “chemical weapons were used against civilians during the military offensive of the Syrian security forces in Bab Amr [a neighbourhood in Homs]”. … The newspaper also reports him as saying that “Syrian soldiers were given gas masks recently in order to protect themselves from the chemical weapons that would be used against the protestors in Syria”.

Alleged chemical weapons expert defector Lt. (or captain?) Abdulrazaq is a character we'd keep hearing from … yammering about the regime's regular use of mustard gas and odorless sarin by December 7, 2012 (Times of Israel), would later join and be spokesman for Nour al-Din al-Zenki, child beheaders and likely CW users in 2016 (Zaman al-Wasl) as they likely used CWs to deadly effect in Aleppo. He would again help deny an Aleppo rebel chemical attack in November 2018, as "military commander of the National Liberation Front (FNL)" (Al-Arabiya)

The cited Hürriyet article is still available but adds little to Robinson's citation. The date of any incident seems unclear - just then, the 21st? Abdulrazaq was interviewed on 19 February (per Robinson), after defecting shortly before that. Is it something he learned of before or after this? It should be before if he ran away in disgust over the event and another one planned; besides CW use in Homs, "They wanted to also use it in Zabadani [on the Lebanese border] but they made an agreement with the Free Syrian Army forces at the last minute and they backtracked. I couldn’t stand all these and ran away."

An earlier Jerusalem World News article cites al-Arabiya interview on or before Feb. 14 (image source), where he claims a nerve agent, likely sarin, has already been used somewhere in Homs, was threatened or planned in Zabadani too, so he seemingly refers to the same incident(s) in Homs, which happened prior to Feb. 14, at a time the Guardian's Paul Wood felt the claims were not true.

Military actions in Baba Amr (Baba, Amro, etc. - in red on district map below) were alleged and actually happened all during February, with Government control announced at month's end. A sizeable and maybe final militant retreat south to Abel to discover a sizable massacre there (just before their arrival, they say) on Feb. 27.  (just off the bottom edge of the map)

The agent(s) and effects
On the 14th, Abdulrazaq was cited as claiming deadly nerve agent like sarin was used in Homs. It's Israeli experts who decided he meant sarin, but he did say "“A little amount of this is enough to carry out a mass extermination."
https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/14/194585.html
Cited interview, also says "nerve agent," also planned for Jabal Zawiya and Zabadani - sounds like the same story about CWs in Homs. Initially, a very deadly nerve agent was used. But no mention of deaths... also no specifics on dates of use, symptoms suffered by how many, etc. Terrible, but vague.

But on the 21st he told Hürriyet Daily News the toxin employed in Baba Amr was, rather, “BZ-CS, Chlorine Benzilate, which damages people’s nerves and makes them fade away." The reference is a little confusing, but Julian Perry Robinson adds: "Chemically, BZ is 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate and CS is o -chlorobenzalmalononitrile, so it is not obvious why ‘BZ-CS’ should have been glossed as ‘Chlorine Benzilate’.  Nor is it obvious that either agent would have brought about the signs and symptoms described." He also notes it's the first time BZ has been mentioned as part of Syria's CW capabilities. Is it something the Libyans had?

This "BZ-CS" apparently refers to two agents in combination: the incapacitating agent BZ and the common irritant tear gas CS, and shouldn't have a combined singular name like he gave. These symptoms combined might be similar to that described, but as Robinson notes, not an "obvious" match, especially for the strangely delayed onset of signs.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3-Quinuclidinyl_benzilate
Effects: the following may occur from inhibition of central muscarinic receptors: disorientation, agitation, tremor, ataxia, stupor, coma, hallucinations and seizures. Other effects on the nervous system inhibit glandular secretions and sweating, causing hyperthermia, flushing, dry mouth. Vision problems, tachypnea, nausea and vomiting, paralytic ileus (intestinal), and urinary retention may also occur.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CS_gas
Effects: "The chemical reacts with moisture on the skin and in the eyes, causing a burning sensation and the immediate forceful and uncontrollable shutting of the eyes. Effects usually include tears streaming from the eyes, profuse coughing, exceptional nasal discharge that is full of mucus, burning in the eyes, eyelids, nose and throat areas, disorientation, dizziness and restricted breathing."

later sources add to the picture, but complicate the timeline.

https://rosealhomsi.wordpress.com/2012/03/29/chemical-weapons-in-baba-am/ 
Documentation of injuries possibly caused by the use of chemical weapons on civilians during the attack and siege of Baba Amr, Homs. March 29, 2012 · by rosealhomsi
During the last 2 weeks, the hospitals in northern Lebanon have received and analysed several injuries, injuries on those who fled the neighborhood of “Baba Amr” in the city of Homs. The injuries were caused during the brutal crackdown and siege led by the Assad regime prior to the regime forces storming on land. The injuries and illnesses only deteriorated..."
This describes symptoms including: "neuropathy, arthralgia, joint pains, amnesia, skin rashes, hair loss and abdominal pain" - "a raise in temperature and night sweats" - irritation, boils on the face, mouth ulcers and, strangely, hair loss from the head and body, besides constipation and urinary retention. The signs had a slow onset, only noted "3 or 4 days" after leaving Baba Amr, perhaps longer since alleged exposure. 

As noted militants left and attacks should have ended before March 1 - chemical incidents blamed were "prior to the regime forces storming on land," so more likely back in mid-February. But these cases of alleged poisoning linked to that campaign were reported only from mid to late March and into April.

Robinson:
 A video said to have been filmed at a hospital in Homs on 6 April 2012 and distributed by networks supporting the Syrian opposition shows a doctor displaying a video of a patient and denouncing “the use of chemical or biological weapons against the civilian population of Baba Amro, a neighbourhood which has remained for months in rebel hands, and so was heavily bombed by the Syrian army”.
"tiredness and fatigue accompanied with muscle pains across the body. The patient felt weak especially in the lower part of the body, as well as joint pain, pain around the joints and pain in the lower back."

"the symptoms began to appear at the same time as the Assad regime attack on the named neighborhood, Baba Amr." So presumably the mean during February.  from Facebook, content unavailable - a 2-page Arabic document is shared here, presumably relating the same details as below. It's from "Syrian Refuggees Coordination" and also dated March 29. https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.414955381863454.118487.241475429211451&type=1

also shown - chapped, bandaged, yellow hands with dark patches - a man with pixelated face, oddly yellow skin visible at the forehead and ears, very thin hair fallig out over his pillow - a woman with sporadic red irritation of the cheek, burned and peeling lips. Still, any clear pattern of correlation is far from obvious.



Fatalities?
Robinson: "The doctor refers to twelve cases, including two people who died..." prior to April 6.

No clearly reported deaths at VDC, but... Thamer Mohammed al-Saud, from Guerran Hasakeh killed somewhere by "other" (no toxic gas category at this point) with the notes: "He was suffocated by tear gas "

Maybe coincidence with Mr. Saud, but a Saudi - Ayman Hweti - died 3 days later. A non-civilian, he was tasked with whatever by his group, Al-Qaeda franchise Jabhat al-Nusra (well prior to its future ISIS members peeling away), until he unusually died from "other" on the 23rd, with no explanation.

- Salman Abdul Qader Othman, age 27, from Turkman Bareh, Aleppo, killed 2012-02-25 by other: "He died in hospital affected by the gas which he suffered two weeks before during his participation in a demonstration in Salahidin district." That would be around Feb. 11, but up in Aleppo, not in Homs, where folks like Jedi were fearing such use in those same days. And they heard it literally took two weeks before Mr. Othman died instead of recovering. That can happen, depending on circumstances, but it seems strange.

I looked into dates through March and April, but nothing more compelling than these three emerged by way of deaths recorded.

In context (Somewhat disorganized patterns and speculation)

Again, this event or cluster of events and vague allegations seem disconnected from the mainstream of them starting late in 2012 and running up to the Ghouta massacre in August, 2013. Julian Perry Robisnon 's report agrees, has the one entry only for early 2012, as [L2] - following [L1] about CW allegations against Hafez Assad way back in 1982, and events resume only with [L3] in Homs, December 23.

My further research has prior events, all in the Damascus-Ghouta region, on Dec. 22 and Dec. 6, following on three quieter events in November, and claims - from defector Abdulrazaq - that CWs "were tested in eastern Aleppo with the assistance of Iranians" in late October or early November. This was preceded by propaganda activity including the founding, in Turkey, of an "office for documenting the chemical file in Syria" in October (now CDCVS), warnings from pre-White Helmets "civil defense" in Douma of impending CW use (mid-Sept. - 2 months before first reported use right by Douma) - some expressed concerns over Syria's CW arsenal sparking president Obama's Red Line threat/offer, first stated on August 20, and again on December 3. Further, "on August 29, a Syrian channel stated that it learned of a plot involving Saudi Arabia, the Al-Arabiya media outlet, the U.S. and (then-government of) Yemen that involved rebels using mortars to carry out a chemical attack." (Clarion Project)

But from August-December was a time of build-up, but from here back to around March is a bag gap of little to no alleged chemical usage by the Syrian government. This was the span of marketing the sectarian mega-massacre narrative - broadly Houla to Haswiyeh (Homs), massacres from March up to in January, 2013 described an arc from horrified acceptance to growing skepticism and concerns that maybe it was actually Sunni terrorists hacking up Syria's families.

So who was it putting a pause on their chemical weapons narrative in order to focus on this other big project? They resumed from December to March, 2013 as the massacres narrative stopped bearing fruit. They were on to things "only the regime" could pull off. There was a scud missiles phase in there too.

When attacks resume, mixed-unclear methods, then BZ or similar would be one theory for one set of symptoms reported in December, again in Homs city - 7 men reportedly died. My analysis here explains how both BZ-type symptoms were cited, as well as sarin signs. Reports clashed: pupils were both dilated and constricted, patients responded well or adversely to atropine. Similar confusion to Capt. Abdulrazaq above claiming one or the other or noth were used earlier in Homs. In December, it sounds like the effects were immediate, as they should be for an incapacitant, an irritant used to disperse crowds now, or clearly for a nerve agent that operates in micro-seconds. Unlike the earlier BZ-CS-GB incident(s), the signs werenot delayed by 3-4 days or a few weeks. smoke grenades were blamed - no images, but possibly the same modified tear gas grenades used by Jabhat al-Nusra for sarin attacks in April, 2013.

Also note: in between, back in Libya where the seized chemicals may have originated, in October, 2012: reported chemical attacks by "revolutionaries" against holdouts in Bani Walid - a doctor who was soon reported killed first helped break this story, reporting symptoms including: difficulty breathing, secretions from the mouth, muscle spasms, and blurred vision.

Thursday, March 8, 2018

Khalifa Haftar: A true leader of Libya

Guest post by Adel Karim
March 8, 2017

(This is a submitted article, reflecting the author's opinion).

In the run-up to the presidential elections the internal situation in Libya is getting sharper.
This situation has affected not only ordinary people, but the separated Libyan tribes and communities. Many of them began to realize that their choice will determine the whole country's future.

Thus, many tribal leaders and Libyans believe that Khalifa Haftar is currently the only person able to reunify the country, and provide its stability and security. He is considered to be a man who will return peace and prosperity to the country.

Representatives of the Supreme Council of the Libyan Tribes and Cities believe that the current situation in Libya is affected by controlled chaos aimed at prolonging the political and economic crisis.

Analysts estimate that such an opinion reflects the nation's mood. According to different sources, more and more Libyans support the LNA's leader Khalifa Haftar's policy. It is also evidenced by his increasing international influence.

At the talks held on July 25 in Paris, French President Emmanuel Macron held a meeting between Libya's UN-backed Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The negotiations led to the road map that was formulated to settle the Libyan crisis and to the truce agreement between the parties. It was also stressed by Macron at the press conference.

Besides, last December supporters of Khalifa Haftar held demonstrations in Benghazi, Tobruk and Tripoli calling on him to take charge of the country. A lot of Libyans believe that the Government of National Accord headed by Fayez al-Sarraj is no longer legitimate. They condemn Sarraj's policy that led to the uprising of many fragmented factions controlled by foreign countries like Turkey or Qatar. 

Libyan tribes share the same point of view. Their leaders are reportedly showing greater support for Haftar due to their belief that he can be the one to stop the terror in the country and deal with extremist groups that make obstacles on the way of government's restoration.

Apparently, Libyans are divided between two political forces. However, more and more people realize that their vote will determine the country's fate. That's why they are ready to put away all the disagreements of the past and unify under one common goal.

Friday, October 20, 2017

Who is in real power in Libya?

Guest post by Adel Karim
October 20, 2017 

Note from the editor: I haven't written or posted on Libya in years, and have fallen totally behind on the situation. I was contacted just now by investigative reporter Adel Karim suggesting I publish this piece (already run at Eurasia Review at least). Taking at as sort of an honor, I copy and paste this useful analysis. - Adam Larson
---
Who is in real power in Libya?

After the U.S. and its NATO-partners invaded Libya in 2011 and killed its leader Muammar Gaddafi, the country is being into chaos and suffering from political instability and violence by different terrorist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS and AQIM.

Two opposing forces are currently competing for political power in Libya. The first one is the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj in Tripoli. Another is the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk supported by the Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and elected by popular vote.

It is noteworthy that Khalifa Haftar has managed to succeed in fighting extremists and jihadists in six years. Besides, thanks to Haftar, a tribal unification process has been going on in Libya. His combat-capable army currently has 60,000 soldiers.

The LNA controls the most important coastal oil terminals located in Libya's ‘oil crescent’ that includes Ras Lanuf, Es Sider, Marsa al-Brega, and Zuwetina oil-exporting ports. These towns export about a half of all the Libyan oil.

At the end of May, 2017, Khalifa Haftar established control over the strategically important Ufra Airbase located 500 km south-west of Tripoli. At the beginning of July, 2017, Field Marshal announced total liberation of Benghazi, the second important city in Libya, from terrorists. Despite the risk of being arrested by the detachments controlling Tripoli, that victory was also celebrated by the inhabitants of the capital, not only by the residents of the east of Libya.

The LNA currently controls more than 80 per cent of the country. Actually, the real political power in Libya is concentrated in the hands of Khalifa Haftar.

In his turn, Prime Minister of Libya Fayez al-Sarraj only formally controls the western part of the country and has more symbolic than actual influence on the current situation in Libya. He has never managed to expand his power out of Tripoli in 18 months.

Fayez al-Sarraj doesn't have any armed forces. Several armed groups in and around Tripoli only support the Prime Minister but are not subject to his authority. He can give orders only to the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) in Tripolitania headed by Haithem Al-Tajouri.

Besides, the Libyan Prime Minister has failed to solve problems including outrageous crimes of numerous armed groups, restoration of justice and health care, and electric energy supplying.

Obviously, due to unsolved internal problems Fayez al-Sarraj and his government lost popular support and confidence of ordinary Libyans.

Meanwhile, supporters of Khalifa Haftar have already begun collecting signatures in support of his authority throughout the country. The Libyan Youth Movement (LYM) wants Haftar to control Tripoli. According to the activists, they have already collected 700,000 signatures in order to receive popular support before the end of Fayez al-Sarraj's term of office in December, 2017.

Undoubtedly, it will take years to completely restore statehood in Libya and the power institutions. However, Khalifa Haftar is currently the only real force that is able to stabilize the situation in the foreseeable future in the country.

Saturday, November 14, 2015

Latakia Massacres: Rebel Deaths Correlated by Groups

Latakia Massacres: Rebel Deaths Correlated by Groups 
And Overview of the Groups
November 14, (incomplete)
last edits Dec. 3

 "Martyr" "Abo Abdulrahman" from Libya,
Member of ISIS or FSA - lists disagree
Still struggling with my post on ISIS-FSA teamwork, I need some work space for this project to compare rebel deaths recorded in the HRW report (read or download page) compared to entries in the VDC database. A couple of interesting details were emerging, and it deserved a space to see how many more and to compare them.

HRW found 20 opposition groups groups were involved, and I see 17 listed, besides "FSA under Salem Idriss' command," which was claimed to be present but may not have been. Named fighters killed in the operation are provided for most groups.

For the VDC side, first, I'll use the entries collected here at ACLOS, (rebel "martyrs" with martyrdom location: Latakia), and later I'll look for further VDC matches.

I'll also use this a space where all groups can be listed, to provide basic details and some specifics for each.

1 Ahrar al-Sham

-Wikipedia page, as Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiyya (Arabic: حركة أحرار الشام الإسلامية ‎ Ahrār ash-Shām, meaning "Islamic Movement of the Free Men of al-Sham" (greater Syria/Levant) A coalition of Islamist brigades that "cooperates with the Free Syrian Army and other secular rebel groups; however, it does not maintain ties with the Syrian National Council." With a "strict and secretive leadership” and funding from Kuwait, Ahrar al-Sham was a founding and leading member of the Syrian Islamic Front, and was a member of the Turkish-sponsored 2015 Idlib "army of conquest" along with Al-Nusra. HRW heard that Ahrar al-Sham was a leading group in the offensive, and its local leader Abu Taha was deputized with dispersing the funds provided by Suqour al-Izz. They announced their role in “liberating” four villages," (Isterbeh, Nabata, Hamboushia, Abu Makka) and posted video of them breaking into homes in a fifth (Balouta). Ahrar al-Sham initially held no hostages, in September "assumed responsibility for the hostages taken during the offensive," somehow securing their transfer from fellow groups JMA and Daesh (ISIS).
Reuters, Oct. 11 reports a sort of denial from the group: "If someone uses a weapon against you, you have to fight them. If they do not, you must not kill them," and that's it. The unstated half could be that the Alawites raised the sword against them (all Sunnis) so the Alawites have to die. That vague statement was from "Ahrar al-Sham's political office in Raqqa." Raqqa was taken over by Islamists in March, 2013, and then taken by Daesh (ISIS) as their capitol in mid-August, just as this Latakia offensive was ending. So if Ahrar al-Sham had its offices there two months later, it suggests they were working with the Islamic State at that time (the Wikipedia entry doesn't mention any alliance or breaking of it, as it does with the other two).

HRW found "three Moroccan fighters from Ahrar al-Sham that were killed in Esterbeh on August 4." These overflows from "Sham al-ISlam", I'm guessing, are named:
-  Abu Omar al-Maghrabi
= Abu Omar al-Maghrebi, died in "Astrabeh Village" "Rank: FSA"
- Abu Moaz al-Maghrabi 

= Abu Moaz al-Maghrebi, died in Astrabeh Village. Also "FSA"
- Abu Adam al-Maghrabi 
= Abo Adam al-Maghrebi, died in "Astrabeh Village". Also "FSA"

So, Ahrar al-Sham, who cooperates with the FSA (besides with al-Nusra and, in this case at least, with ISIS) but isn't a member or beholden to any of their rules or commands, is listed by the VDC under a simplified "FSA" heading. From this and the rest, it seems "FSA" means against Assad, not ISIS, and not even al-Nusra. Except the one guy that was Nusra and the one that was Daesh ... (see each entry below). Everyone else is under that vague umbrella. Or, considering joint command, etc. ... "FSA" might mean more in this case, like some "free" fighters deputized by agreement just before the deal (who knows?).

Also of note: HRW reports "In one of the videos, lieutenant colonel Hussein al-Harmoush, the brigade commander from Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Maghdad al-Aswad battalion, is identified by name and seen shooting in the operation."  That's either a nickname taken in honor of an FSA Godfather, the late Lt. Col. Hussein Harmoush or quite a coincidence.

2 ISIS/Islamic State/Daesh
Should need no introduction... 

four fighters from ISIS killed during the operation:
- Abu Moqatel al-Tunisi (a Tunisian national), killed in Esterbeh on August 4
= Abu Muqatel al-Tunesi From Tunisia. Rank: "Islamic State of Iraq and Sham." Later changed to ISIS. Died in "Astrabeh Village" by Aug. 5.
- Abu A`bed al-Rehman al-Mesra’ni killed in an unidentified location on August 4
=? Abo Abdulrahman al-Libee, from Libya, died in "Lattakia" "Rank: FSA" (photo, dead)
- Hamza al-Shishani (a Chechen)

= no match?
- Abd al-Hakim al-Alaiwi 

=?  Abdul Aziz \ Soud al-Sbaie, from Saudi Arabia. Rank: ISIS. Killed Aug. 4, Lattakia.  Known as (Abdul Hakeem al-Mwahed). photos, alive and dead. 
- no match?
=? Mohammad al-Shahi ISIS, from UAE, killed August 15, doesn't say where
- no match?

3 Jabhat al-Nusra
Al-Qaeda's official affiliate in Syria, identified by HRW as a leading group, involved in hostage-taking, executed captured cleric Badreddin Ghazal. HRW heard about: "three fighters from Jabhat al-Nusra killed on August 4"
- Abu Zabir al-Maghrabi (a Moroccan), killed in Abu Makkeh
= Abu Zubair al-Maghrebi From Morocco. Rank: Jabhat Nusra. Died in "Lattakia: Boumka village" by Aug. 5
- Abu Hamza al-Maghrabi (a Moroccan) killed in Barouda
= Abu Hamze al-Maghrebi, died in 'Lattakia: Baruda' (by Aug. 5) Rank: FSA. (photo, alive)
- Abu Ibrahim al-Libi (a Libyan) killed in Barouda
= Abo Ibrahem al-Lebi From Libya. Rank Jabhat Nusra. Died in "Lattakia: Baruda" by Aug. 5

4 Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA)
JMA commander Abu Suhaib al-Libi (as Identified) w/captives
Wikipedia page - (JMA, Arabic: جيش المهاجرين والأنصار‎ Army of Emigrants and Supporters), formerly known as the Muhajireen Brigade (Katibat al-Muhajireen), " briefly affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), but after changes in leadership it took an increasingly hostile stance against it. In September 2015, JMA pledged allegiance to the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra Front."
JMA-Daesh confusion - formally allied at the time, using the same basic flag (their with extra words added, it seems): SOHR Facebook post "Confirmed reports that a Libyan Emir of the ISIS was killed by the al-Hamboshiya clashes ..." HRW heard he was neither ISIS nor killed (see here for details); he's one of two local JMA commanders, both Libyans. Neither is listed as killed. The VDC lists neither as killed. HRW says he was injured twice, and treated in Turkey. They say he "appears to be" the masked man hosting the hostage video uploaded September 7. His co-commander is mentioned by HRW as an apparent overall operation commander:
On August 13, Sheikh Saqr, the commander of Saquor al-Izz, tweeted that Abu Jaafar al-Libi from Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar was the leader of the operation and that his deputies were Abu Jaafar from ISIS (see Section on ISIS above) and Sheikh Qahtan from al-Tawheed.
April, 2013, the HRW report states, they established a “mujahedeen operations room” in Jabal al-Akrad, used it to organize with other extremists, and then had the center used to organize the August operation. The activist HRW spoke to (organized the groups, allied with most) said he first entered the villages later in the day on August 4, and told them “The villages fell so easily that the men were free to roam around and slaughter at their leisure…the Libyans [Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar] did not kill, they slaughtered, even women and elderly.” 

HRW learned of "10 fighters killed from Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar during the operation, many of them Tunisian and Libyan nationals." Note, none has either of Abu Suhaib's given names.
- Abu Rehmat al-Libi was killed on August 4.
= Abo Rahmeh al-Liby died Aug 4, "FSA" (photo, alive) - Commander Abu al-Farouq al-Libi 
= no match?
- Abu Obeida al-Maghrabi were killed on August 14 in Obeen.
= no match
- Abu Youssef al-Ansari 
= no VDC match
- Abu Ashraf al-Tunisi,
= Abo Ashraf al-Tunsee died in "Lattakia" by Aug. 7 (photo) "FSA"
- Abu Abdallah al-Tunisi,
= Abo Abdullah al-Tunsee died in "Lattakia" by Aug. 7 "FSA"
- Abu Trab al-Libi
= no match
- Abu Hazifa al-Libi
= no match
- Abu Hilal al-Libi
= no match 
- Abu Obeida al-Tunisi 
= no match
were also all reportedly killed (date and place of their deaths is unknown)

One of these may = Abo Rahma al-Libee died in "Lattakia" (photo) "FSA" died (by) Aug 7

Note: VDC apparently didn't get direct reports from JMA activists.


5 Suqour al-Izz
Wikipedia as Suqour al-Ezz - - (Arabic: كتيبة صقور العز‎) - primarily Saudi jihadists - initially cooperated with both Daesh and Nusra, rejected the former and merged into Nusra in January, 2014.HRW adds: "Sheikh Saqr, the leader of Suquor al-Izz, seems to identify himself on what is believed to be his Twitter account as the person responsible for the finances for the operation and that Abu Taha from Ahrar al-Sham was his deputy in this regard. The operation was reportedly largely financed by private Gulf based donors."
 
Suquor al-Izz also lists the names of several fighters killed during the Latakia operation between
August 4 and 16.
- Abu Malkat al-Azdi was killed in Esterbeh,
= Abu Malek al-Azdi unknown origin, Rank: Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (originally) Now says rank:FSA. Killed in Astrabeh, by Aug. 5.
- Abu Moaz al-Jezrawi in Barouda, on August 4.
= Abo Mouaz al-Jezrawee From Saudi Arabia. Died in Baruda "Rank: FSA"
- Abu Malek Mohamed Gharam al-Shehri, who is identified as a frontline commander, August 8 
=   no match?
Abu Medawi Yehya al-A`sseiri, August 8 
= Yehya al-Eseiree FSA, foreign (unknown) Aug 8, known as Abo Medawee, during clashes with regime's army
Abu al-Bara’ al-Si`ayri, August 8 
= no match?
Abu Hazem al-Qsseimi, August 8 
= no match
Abu Sleiman al-Tunisi (a Tunisian)  August 8 
= no match
Abed al-Basset al-Tunisi (a Tunisian) August 11
= no match 
Abu Kahled Bandar al-Kahledi on August 16.
= no match 

Note: VDC apparently didn't get direct reports from SaI activists.
6 Ahrar al-Sahel Brigade
(FSA, app. not under Idriss central command) 

An August 12 video shows FSA's chief Salem Idriss visiting "the commander of the Free Syrian Army battalion (brigade) Suquor al-Sahel, Saeed Tarbush, who was injured in the fighting in the villages," declaring "we will do our best to meet the needs of this battle and provide everything we have…" to this group, or someone else they represented? The report says:
The Ahrar al-Sahel Brigade announced its formation on May 23, 2012 as a unit operating under the FSA in Latakia.218 Based on statements made by the leader of the group, Abu Ahmad, the group does not appear to be under the command and control of Salim Idriss.
 This group is the best fit for Idriss-supported or commanded or worth being seen with anyway. They also claim involvement on the 4th in Isterbeh, Abu Makkah, Hamboushia, Beit Shakouhi, via a sub-unit (the Assad Allah Hamza battalion. Abu Talal, reportedly the commander of the Assad Allah Hamza brigade, was reportedly injured while fighting in Esterbeh on the same day. Amer al-Haddad, an al-Hijra ila Allah fighter, was killed there. HRW saw graffiti in Abu Makkeh - on a house “Liwa Tahrir, Ahrar al-Sahel Battalion”
Amer al-Haddad, an al-Hijra ila Allah fighter, killed in Esterbeh
Amer Jamal al-Haddad, FSA, age 25, from Syria, actually - Hiffeh, Latakia, so nearby. died in (blank), Aug. 9 from "shelling by regime's army." Photo (alive).

7 Farouq Brigades
This is definitely a unit of FSA, if not under SMC control - Wikipedia states it was founded by a number of Homs based members of the Free Syrian Army mid-2011, including Abdulrazaq Tlass (Houla Massacre, masturbation), and others including Abu Sakkar (genocidal cannibal/scavenger)… powerful in 2012, sliding by mid-2013, defunct in 2014, helped form the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front along the way. Wikipedia says Farouq is Part of: Free Syrian Army, Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (2012-2013), but HRW's report said "It is not known whether the Independent Omar al-Farouq Brigade operates within the command structure of the Free Syrian Army". … at any rate, involvement here is not very clear: a September 21 video "shows al-Farouq Brigade fighters film the destruction in Barouda and Talla from afar pointing out the locations of the Syrian army. Graffiti referencing the al-Farouq brigade was also left in Abu Makkeh." No deaths mentioned. 

8 The Hassan al-Azhari Battalion
Led by "Abu Taha from Latakia," HRW reported, this battalionand "posted on their Facebook page that they liberated Nbeiteh village and that the fighters were on their way to take control of the Barouda tower."
An "opposition activist" told HRW “Abu Taha protected Alawite women from the foreigners [other fighters] who wanted to kill them.” 
fighters from their unit who died during the operation including
- Ahmad Khaled Khlou (killed in Abu Makkeh on August 6)
= no VDC match?
- Abo Mosaab (killed in Abu Makkeh, date unknown but announcement posted on August 6).
no VDC match?

9 The Heroes of Khirbet al-Jawz and the Oussama Bin Zeid Battalion (sub-unit)
(FSA, app. not under Idriss central command, graffiti in Hamoushiya proclaims their approval of a "genocide against the Alawites") No deaths listed.


10 Saif Allah al-Masloul, al-Ansar
HRW reports this group bragged on the 7th how on “August 5 they raided Blouta killing all the shabiha” (a day late?) A video shows them raiding Abu Makkah on the 5th.” They claim to part of “Al-Ansar.” Little else seems to be known. They report fighterAmmar Mustafa Mo`mari was also reportedly injured during the offensive on Abu Makkeh and died from his injuries on August 7.
= Ammar Moustafa Meaamaree FSA, died in Lattakia: Boumka village by the 7th.

11 Sham al-Islam (HSI)

A very intriguing group, apparently heavily involved - Harakat Sham al-Islam (HSI - Wikipedia article) (Arabic: حركة شام الإسلام‎, meaning "Islamic Movement of the Levant") is composed of primarily Moroccans. On 25 July 2014 that it became part of the Jabhat Ansar al-Din, which claimed neutrality in the conflict between ISIS and other groups (Syria Comment) HSI was involved in the 2014 Latakia offensive (late March) and then designated as a terrorist organization by the US State Department on 24 September 2014. On 23 September, 2015 Jabhat Ansar al-Din almost marked the anniversary of that by formally joining with al-Nusra, who claim to oppose Daesh. 
The WP states "The group was founded in August 2013 by three Moroccan detainees who had been released from the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, Ibrahim bin Shakran, Ahmed Mizouz and Mohammed AlamiHarakat Sham al-Islam first came to notice because of the role it played in the 2013 Latakia offensive," which was about the same time it first appeared. In fact, HRW (who gives another name for the leader, Abu Ahmad al-Muhajir, Moroccan and former Guantanamo Bay detainee) makes it sound like they were an informal group not yet announced at the time; HSI's formation was only announced publicly with a Youtube video on August 18, it says, as the operation in Latakia ended – waiting to see if any of them survived? Tamimi agrees: they emerged in "mid-August") (also notes "Mohammed al-'Alami, using the name Abu Hamza al-Maghrebi" and "Ibrahim bin Shakaran as its leader, who is known in Syria as Abu Ahmad al-Muhajir" - confusion resolved)

Their reported dead:
- Abu Hamza al-Maghribi (a Moroccan, via Guantánamo Bay), one of the group’s generals, was killed on August 4 in Barouda
= Abu Hamze al-Maghrebi, died in 'Lattakia: Baruda' (by Aug. 5) Rank: FSA
Zein al-`Abedine, a Sham al-Islam fighter as having been killed in Kindah on August 4.
= Zain al-Abden al-Maghrebi died in "Lattakia: Kinda village" Rank:FSA
Three Sham al-Islam fighters also died in Esterbeh on August 4
= ?? (unclaimed foreign FSA entries - any Moroccans left? yep)
=?  Nibras al-Maghrabee Morocco, "FSA" on or before Aug 7 (photo, dead)
= other 2, possibly listed, also as FSA, maybe even Syrian

Further, all 3 Ahrar al-Sham fighters, killed on the first day, were Moroccans - likely overflow from this group, loaned out. But note, VDC got all 6 Moroccans with both groups listed.
 
12 Al-Tawhid/Sheikh Qahtan Battalion
HRW: "The Sheikh Qahtan Battalion, formerly al-Tawhid (distinct from the FSA group)," operates "under the umbrella of Ansar al-Sham, a member of the Syrian Islamic Front." They were seen firing rockets on Barouda, and left tags in Aubin (Obeen). This groups started the Latakia offensive named Tawhid, but was renamed after "Sheikh Qahtan Haj Mohamed, a Syrian from Haffeh in Latakia, a deputy commander of the operation, was killed" They immediately renamed it after him. This = VDC's Qahtan Haj Mohammad from Syria, Hiffeh. Rank: "FSA." "Brigadier Leader," died Aug 4, location blank (photo, shown at right). HRW reports ''On August 13, Sheikh Saqr, the commander of Saquor al-Izz, tweeted that Abu Jaafar al-Libi from Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar was the leader of the operation and that his deputies were Abu Jaafar from ISIS and Sheikh Qahtan from al-Tawhid." This guy was chosen alongside an ISIS commander by the Daesh-affiliated operation leader, for a bit of local flavor.


The rest - Suqour al-Sham (FSA, non-command), Sons of al-Qadisiyya (FSA funding cooperation), Thuwar al-Haffeh, Ibrahim Khalil, Al-Shaheed Sino Rebels Battalion (small local groups) - have no mention of deaths.

13 Sons of al-Qadisiyya
This was formed around Feb. 2013, as “one branch of the “Civilian Protection Commission” in Latakia and its Countryside ... composed of various battalions including al-Farouq and al-Ansar” with a mission is to link the brigades with financial supporters and donors in coordination with the Free Syrian Army abroad.” In a video from August 5 or earlier, Sons of al-Qadisiyya fighters launch three grad missiles at some of the targeted villages. 

14 Suqour al-Sham
Associated with Jabhat Tahrir Suriya. A video “shows Suquor al-Sham clashing
with the Syrian army during the offense on Barouda tower on August 4,” and “graffiti identifying Suquor al-Sham was also left in Obeen village.”


15/16/17 Thuwar al-Haffeh, Ibrahim Khalil, Al-Shaheed Sino Rebels Battalion
These last three are implicated by graffiti, with limited background information, and no specifics on anything but where their graffiti was seen. As the report explains, Thuwar al-Haffeh (revolutionaries of Haffeh, a nearby city) marked a spot in Abu Makkeh, Ibrahim Khalil and his soldiers, in the Sleibeh al-Hamboushieh hamlet, and the al-Shaheed Sino Rebels Battalion in Abu Makkeh. Sino probably doesn't mean Chinese, but Hsino, as labeled on Wikimapia - a town near Salma.

---
18 Front for Authenticity and Development 
The Front for Authenticity and Development (FAD) or Authenticity and Development Front is a U.S.-backed, Saudi-funded, "moderate Islamist" force, using FSA colors and cooperating with them, but not a part of FSA or answerable to the SNC. Co-founded in 2011 by defectors including Farouq's Abdulrazaq Tlass, they maintain a low profile, appearing neither secular nor overtly jihadist. They have controlled territory, if limited to sectors of some cities and no swathes of land (once with sectors of Aleppo, Deraa, and Douma, decreasing from there, but in 2015 granted a prized share in Jis al-Shughour).
Graffiti implicates them, but the HRW report doesn't mention it. They cite a video from August 9 (still available) supposedly showing FSA fighters, as the title says. But the alternating corner stamps says FAD and someone else (unclear) jointly produced the video (among others from the offensive). And the graffiti at their checkpoint says this:
Which we had translated:
Top, easy: Allah Akbar
الله أكبر
Line 2 first half: first brigade
اللواء الأول  
Line 2, second half: an unclear symbol, then "western front"
 الجبهة الغربية
line 3 "belonging to Authenticity and Development Front. (or Front for... FAD)
التابع لجبهة الأصالة والتنمية
"Western front" is probably a unit invented just for this for this joint foray.
The graffiti was seen in a video of theirs, on the wall of a checkpoint at the entrance to the village of Kharata, population 37, suggesting they were in charge there at filming time anyway, which was not very early – the 9th. Other videos, will take more analysis. Some reports (like HRW's) don't mention fatalities there at all, but some say everyone in Kharata died, or only 10 survived.

--- VDC's "FSA," 
Foreign (not listed above)
Kuwait
Qatar
 
Saudi Arabia
Unknown

"FSA" Syrian
(partial list from ACLOS page - will see if report lists any)
  • Abo al-Moughira location blank, Aug. 4 (photo)
  • Anas Sheikhani Mount Kurds: Doreen, Aug 4 Video - oddly dramatic, filmed by a dead man. Or fake? Is that supposed to be the camera of Iehab dahou, from the Salma Media center, who is listed as getting shot Aug. 4 in Salma? (will be added somewhere above, later) Wasn't this right at the start of an optional surprise offensive? They make it look like some grim and desperate last stand.
  • Ahd Tarboosh, only listed local martyr Aug. 5, from"Hiffeh: Defil" died in Astrebeh (Isterbeh). Has video. (add: May be related to "commander of the Free Syrian Army battalion (brigade) Suquor al-Sahel, Saeed Tarbush, who was injured in the fighting in the village," paid a visit by Salem Idriss, under whose command the battalion did not seem to be, HRW found. Had another fighter die in the same village Aug 9) 
  • Haj Asaad Died Lattakia: Mount Kurds Aug 6
  • Malek As'ad Lattakia: Mount Kurds, not actually on the list, with death date 00-00-00, but by index number was reported right after the last, app. related martyr...)
  • Unidentified, but from Hiffeh. Died Aug. 6 Astrabeh Village
On the 6th, rebels were killed in two areas as government forces pushed back - Astrabeh Village (Isterbeh - several killed) and Kafraya (two killed). Daily deaths (a few) continued until about the 10th, increasingly by shelling, and increasingly back towards the rebel base town of Salma. For example Amer Jamal al-Haddad, age 25, from Hiffeh, died (blank), Aug. 9 by "shelling by regime's army." Local Syrians stopped dying, by the list, about August 10, and non-locals (mostly from Idlib) took over the dying from there, a few a day on average up to about the 20th. Some examples:

Monday, August 31, 2015

"The Rules of the Game"

The West's Takeover Machine, Before Libya
(old post I forgot - likely incomplete)
September 23, 2011

This is a big subject touching on two areas of interest of mine. A bit expansive, and with too many knowledge gaps, to write a complete essay - rather I'll just drop some related bits of food for thought on the Western regime change industry of the past decade.

It was really a simple and run-of-the mill demand that the"peaceful protesters,"and increasingly the world community, made on the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. It and its unique socio-economic system should commit suicide, step down and disband in favor of no one and nothing in particular. But the regime didn't want to die and - allegedly - turned its guns on the people to say no with the blood of hundreds of peaceful protesters. And he didn'tstep down in favor of ... whatever was there waiting to fill the void.

I saw an interview somewhere with Nouri al-Mesmari saying that in so doing, Gaddafi "changed the rules of the game." an early plotter saying that by refusing to bow to "protester" demands and step down, But fo the life of me, I can't re-locate the video interview where I was sure I saw him saying that. But the quote sticks anyway as the kind of thing someone would say. raising the question "just what is this game and who wrote - or agreed to - its rules?"
Nouri al-Mesmari, from Paris
Al Jazeera February 17 ??
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ObAbe2CvjjA

Everyone knows the answer - the people of oppressed countries came up with it themselves, in the game they initiated and most have enjoyed playing, called "the Arab Spring" - In Januray and February it became clear, as if by a sign from God, that it was simply and cosmically time for nations in the Tunisia-Egypt-Libya region to shuck off their brutal corrupt old regimes - it was a masterful bit of fantasy-creation, perhaps planned out to surround and drag in Libya - and Gaddafi was screwing with it by insisting that national survival trumps the West's regime change game.

Planning people's revolutions? the idea is a fairly new one - with social media and liberal ideals, western-oriented, idealistic youths craft a new future, somehow cripple and drag down the old, replaced with a Western-backed anti-whatever reform candidate who becomes the new president and starts towards NATO membership.

The Game Rules are Written
This is an area I've studied in the past, and have some interesting if none-too-deep research together, pressed into sometimes embarrasingly-written articles
http://guerillas-without-guns.blogspot.com/
Utopian means for imperial gain in the former USSR - weaponized non-violence, turning a target nation's people against them with sanctions, propaganda, misguided idealism, funding and flattery, clandestine workshops, etc. Just like a CIA operation to support anti-whatever guerillas, but with no guns.
Helvey, weaponizing nonviolence
Weaponizing Nonviolence: Col. Helvey
Some Notes on Timing and Consent
Jonathan Mowat, in a brilliant 2005 piece for the Center for Research on Globalization, noted a 1967 report from the UK’s Tavistock Institute (the psychological warfare arm of the British military) that focused on the then-new phenomenon of “swarming adolescents” found at rock concerts. Author Dr. Fred Emery reported the underlying energy of it was associated with “rebellious hysteria,” and predicted that with more study the phenomenon could be controlled effectively as a sort of weapon. By the end of the 1990s, he predicted, these hormonal mobs could be used at will to bring down a national government. Mowat noted “the tactic of swarming” at work in the "revolutions" of 2004-05 as a “a new philosophy of war, which is supposed to replicate the strategy of Genghis Khan as enhanced by modern technologies […] intended to aid both military and non-military assaults against targeted states through what are, in effect, ‘high tech’ hordes.”

Right on target, these and other ideas fed into Yugolsavia's Bulldozer revolution, 1999, and soon after in a growing list of former Soviet republics. The site focused largely on the strangely consistent youth movement aspectof these -the well-branded group Otpor!(Resist!) was crucial in Serbia, helping bring down Milosevic.

The Game in the Former USSR
Kmara, trained by Otpor and using its ideas, helped in Georgia's Rose revolution 2002, and the larger Pora was central in Ukraine's Orange one 2004. Belarus (Zubr, denim revolution), Azerbailajn, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan...

The Game in the Arab World
This all being former soviet sphere, these patterns would change on export. I'm far hazier on the next phase in 2005, where besides several central Asian former SSRs, protest movements in the Arab world made themselves felt, esp. Cedar revolution in Lebanon. I never followed up on that either.

excursions into the Arab world crowned at the time by Lebanon's early 2005 Cedar revolution, sparked by the still unsolved bombing murder of former PM Rafik Hariri in February 2005 - blamed widely on Syrians who were then partially occupying the country - the Cedar revolution forced a Syrian withdrawal and resignation of the sitting government by the end of April - accusations that this revolution too was manipulated by Americans and Israelis (not to mention possible Australian assassins setting it off) have never been cleared away

Might is Right: Abdelnour's Philosophy
As for the Arab proxies the West worked with in such adventures, one of them, a Ziad K. Abdelnour, gave an admirably candid interview with journalist Trish Schuh in late 2005

Schuh: What is the future of Syria, of President Bashar Al Assad's situation?

Nour: Both the Syrian and Lebanese regimes will be changed- whether they like it or not- whether it's going to be a military coup or something else... and we are working on it. We know already exactly who's going to be the replacements. We're working on it with the Bush administration. This is a Nazi regime of 30 years, killing ministers, presidents and stuff like that. They must be removed. These guys who came to power, who rule by power, can only be removed by power. This is Machiavelli's power game. That's how it is. This is how geopolitics -- the war games, power games -- work. 
 
[...]
Q: I didn't see forensic proof in the Mehlis report that would legally convict Assad of Hariri's death in a court of law.

A: I don't give a damn. I don't give a damn, frankly. This Bashar Al Assad-Emil Lahoud regime is going to go whether it's true or not. When we went to Iraq whether there were weapons of mass destruction or not, the key is -- we won. And Saddam is out! Whatever we want, will happen. Iran? We will not let Iran become a nuclear power. We'll find a way, we'll find an excuse- to get rid of Iran. And I don't care what the excuse is. There is no room for rogue states in the world. Whether we lie about it, or invent something, or we don't... I don't care. The end justifies the means. What's right? Might is right, might is right. That's it. Might is right.

Q: You sound just like Saddam. Those were his rules too.

A: So Saddam wanted to prove to the whole world he was strong? Well, we're stronger- he's out! He's finished. And Iran's going to be finished and every single Arab regime that's like this will be finished. Because there is no room for us capitalists and multinationalists in the world to operate with regimes like this. Its all about money. And power. And wealth... and democracy has to be spread around the world. Those who want to espouse globalization are going to make a lot of money, be happy, their families will be happy. And those who aren't going to play this game are going to be crushed, whether they like it or not! This is how we rule. And this is how it's going to be as long as you have people who think like me.

Q: When will this regime change take place?

A: Within 6 months, in both Lebanon and Syria.

[...]

Q: But if it's just trading Syrian control for American or Israeli control?

A: I have -- we have -- absolutely no problem with heavy US involvement in Lebanon. On an economic level, military level, political level, security level... whatever it is. Israel is the 51st state of the United States. Let Lebanon be the 52nd state. And if the Arabs don't like it, tough luck.

2009-2011: Deeper Into the Arab World
The idea has been bouncing around, but used less openly it seems for a couple of years. It was tried again in Iran in 2009 -
2010 presidential directive - France-UK alliance and war games scheduledfor almost exactly the day they started their joint bombing of Libya - then this year uprisings on similar lines in Tunisia and then Egypt just appeared, sweeping aside the Ben-Ali and Mubarak regimes. Arab Spring - imitators in Bahrain (failed, no support, an ally was targeted), Saudi Arabia (same), Morocco (no support), Yemen (some support) and Syria (we'll see).planning that seemed serious enough they might in themselves be clues the whole row of three dominoes was set off by a careful plan on someone's part.

2011: The Rules of the Game Change in Libya
The payoff to the West is less obvious here, and so is the impression of Western engineering. Arab hands, domestic and foreign, seemed to (I also haven't looked into that). But boy did it ever put Libya into the frame just in time for Feb 17, fice year anniversary of a government-suppressed protest, and 15 years after a crushed uprising. And that is clearly a thing CIA types would desire, and there are signs of pre-planning

These start, as this article does, with al-Mesmari in Paris - Dabbashi in New York - signs of conspiract between them and others running back to late 2010, and sealed with their contemporaneous defections on February 21, both strangely speaking of a"genocide" that wasn't happening, and citing every wild rumor as proof. 

No more weaponized non-violence here - Libya would never crack that way, if anyone would after seeing it happen so manytimes, and finding ways to grow immune - this ime, protests were only paper thin, giving way by day three to military-level ... Whenever the Libyan rebellion is referred to in context of the goody-two-shoes Arab Spring, I'm reminded of the old commercials for the soap Irish Spring - after a hard, sweaty night slaughtering Gaddafi loyalists and beheading black men, a quick wash with Arab Spring® will leave you seeming as clean as a whistle.