Massacring Protesters: Really?

The First Straw and Big Question Assessed
September 10, 2011
last edits, Sept. 29

The Order to Kill Demonstrators: Generally Accepted
Huge neon question marks have by now been affixed, usually to the less-visible  back sides, of most of the constructed accusations of the Libyan propaganda war. Human Rights Watch and others have repeatedly found against African mercenary claims, Amnesty International and others have found no basis for the general mass rape charges  (adding Viagra to the mix seems to done the field in). Even the US military acknowledged there was no evidence of aerial bombardment of Libyan cities and protesters as widely alleged, when there really should have been some. The emotionally potent charge of Children shot by Gaddafi snipers in Misrata might sound compelling, but anyone with the two shown x-ray images can see they're the same, fake, image (see link).

But one crucial accusation, the first and perhaps tallest construct, looms over the rest with no flashing sign yet, remaining generally accepted, even among such critics: the government order to shoot at peaceful demonstrators simply for daring to protest. The charges of doing so from the air are rightly ridiculed, but few go as far as I will here and directly question whether it was done from the ground either.

It's not a patently ridiculous claim, and one supported by numerous injured civilians we were shown. No one can deny that people who are described as protesters were injured and killed by live fire, at different times and places, often vague. Some were even cut in half (by anti-aircraft guns it's said) in pictures I've seen. At first, I myself accepted the basic accusation, thinking Gaddafi just didn't play the Arab Spring game. If his populace was to be weaponized against the "revolution" by the usual Western conspirators (as I'm sure he'd suspect after following events of the past decade) he'd move to destroy their weapons. You simply kill some, and hopefully send the others running in fear. It surely wouldn't have been the first time an unfree state used such sheer force to stay that way.

But while there is plenty of precedent, and proof of injured and killed people to support the accusation, what's never been scientifically proven (supported by clear video evidence, for example) is the exact circumstances of this violence - where were these civilians at and what were they doing when damaged so? The question is a complex one, and perhaps impossible to settle decisively. I've been considering this question but haven't until now created a dedicated post to best address it in one spot. Now that it's up, you can see why - it's a doozy of a post.

The Government Story: Defending Bases
We all know the official story in the international community, almost universally accepted at the moment: the insane and ruthless col Gaddafi ordered his citizens slaughtered for simply defying his rule, but damnit, now we would defy it too. They were simply protesting in some peaceful protest place when it happened. They did nothing to provoke or necessitate the violence they suffered. Troops fired indiscriminately, killing women and children, people not even protesting. They had snipers shooting those who tried to retrieve the dead, and so on. They did so consistently enough it couldn't be the actions of rogue commanders, but had to be an order from on high, presumably from Muammar Gaddafi himself.

This primordial sin, almost universally perceived worldwide, was the basis of Gaddafi's forfeiture of legitimacy in the eyes of world leaders. The exact death toll was always vague, but presented as alarmingly high and likely requiring some intervention. (note: the exact death toll is not clear, is important, but is not addressed here. This is about the qualities of death, not quantities.)

But below is, first, a video I made a while back, and then some text, that seek to first explain and then explore the Libyan government's own version, which hardly anyone's heard except maybe in passing derision.

In the video, government spokesman Moussa Ibrahim can be seen at a February 28 press conference explaining their view, as opposed to that of "the media and the UN." At the beginning, there were "genuine, Libyan, peaceful protesters" with what he called "legitimate demands" for "much-needed political improvements." Some of them also waved the old monarchist flag while insisting that Gaddafi step down, which the government would not call a legitimate demand. But they weren't shot for anything they said, Ibrahim asserted, legitimate or not. This only happened after the protests were "hijacked" by violent Islamists, including members of al Qaeda, into a physical attack on Libya's government and people.

"[The Islamist-led "protesters"] immediately moved to attack and acquire weapons from police stations, army camps, and munitions depots. [...] the fights between the security forces and the armed individuals caused the deaths of hundreds of people. We never denied that hundreds of people were killed in the last few days. But those people were from both sides, and as a result of armed individuals attacking police stations and army [barracks] [...] the army and the security forces were not trained to deal with such a dramatic turn of events."

Also in the video, the leader's son Seif al-Islam Gaddafi says a total of 159 people, presumably on the civilian side alone, were killed in the rebellion's first days. "Most of them died when they attacked military sites," he said. This is from a July interview with Russia Today, in which he again denied any order to kill protesters, and explained the cause of the shooting so:

"The guards fired. That's it. The gurads were surprised by the attack of the people, and they started firing. They don't need an order to defend themselves and to defend their bases and camps."

As he rightly noted, this is standard for any country in the world, should armed and angry mobs attack a secure installation. The idea seems to be to avoid enemies, foreign or domestic, from killing your forces, sabotaging your hardware, or worse yet stealing your hardware. Because then it can be used to attack more bases in furtherance of a violent civil war, as the Libyan government alleges happened repeatedly in their country from the early days onward. The explanation fell on deaf ears (or hard-of-hearinng ones - see below).

Just for one example of an even softer response, protesters filmed themselves firing their guns into a military base around Feb 21, and suffering no violence themselves. But they did cheer with gunshots in the air as an ambulance took out someone injured inside. (see video study here) A documentary by R. Breki Goheda, based on the government's version with detailed information, shows this same camp (perhaps near Misrata), before it was finally taken by the armed civilian gang. Inside the opened gates, we can see in the distance soldiers standing at the alert, clustered with vehicles. Goheda's narration says they "refused to open fire at protesters," and instead only "opened fire into the air as the attackers were advancing in the barrack." It's said the protesters won there, as they seem to have everywhere else with a strange confidence against a bewildered enemy, in what Goheda artfully termed an "organized and coincident process." 

The Video Record: No Proof Either Way

Secretary of State Clinton said on February 28, in support of vigorous action against Libya, "we have seen Colonel Qadhafi’s security forces open fire on peaceful protesters again and again." Unless she and some associated "we" have access to secret videos and photos the rest of us don't, she's simply incorrect. We have seen it reported and alleged time and time again, but that's just not the same thing. 

The first problem I noticed in comparing Tripoli's explanation and that of the rabble forces was a lack of video proof either way.

The proof of the government's side might have been base security camera tapes, but these aren't likely available to them after each of the facilities was taken over. Whereas if the "protester" version was true, there would not likely be any lack of such proof; they'd end up with the tapes from the bases. And more importantly, the crowds had many, many iPhones and other cameras everywhere they went, and aside from their proud excursions into racist snuff films, we see in their  recordings people protesting, and then civilians injured and dead. There should be several videos, probably dozens, showing the crucial middle part - some of those hundreds of peaceful protesters visibly knocked down by government bullets. Instead we have three that I know of, discussed next. (see:  Video Study: Protesters Being Shot, Anywhere)

While the government's got no video of these base attacks either, one protester video at least provides a decent support for Tripoli's claims of repeated armed attacks. It's widely illustrated that on consecutive days, February 17-20, protests and/or funeral processions in Beghazi turned somehow into violent clashes with deaths on both sides. It probably didn't help that these kept happening next to the Al-Fadhil bin Omar Katiba barracks, Benghazi's main military base in the city's center.

On the third day, February 19, we have video of two injured "protesters," one apparently just deceased, the other being carried up a street from somewhere to the west-southwest, away from the setting sun. The spot it's filmed was identifiable in satellite imagery, and proves the injured man was being carried down al-Hijaz street, away from the Katiba's valued north gate four blocks back. (see map at left, and the post February 19's death toll  in Benghazi for more details). Keep that north gate in mind - it comes up again in the conquest by "protest" of that base on the following day. 

To be sure, some of Muammar Gaddafi's and the Libyan government's claims, freely mixing al Qaeda, foreigners, mass drugging, mass rape, cannibalism, and CIA manipulations, are questionable at best. But the part about a violent and apparently orchestrated turn of events is well supported. Any government would probably have responded at least as harshly as Libya's did. 

No Proof, but Evidence: Exceptions to the Rule?

Seif al-Islam said "most," not "all," of the killed civilians were involved in attacks. We don't know what "most" means from their point of view, but there do seem to be exceptions to the rule. 

There are two instances I'm aware of (and I admit my knowledge there isn't exhaustive) of apparently unarmed civilians shot dead on camera. These both happened during a funeral march on a certain street in al Baida on February 17, and were captured by three cameras, one from street level and two from above.  I've analyzed the videos and collectively, they show two unarmed people shot down in the street, at different times, some distance from a line of armed police/soldiers at the end of the street.   

No other gunmen are visible from these rooftop views or from the ground view (except maybe a couple), so the presence of security men in the area, some would argue, is enough to demonstrate the pattern alleged. But some evidence supports my strange hunch that anti-government snipers on rooftops - apparently next to the cameras filming - were responsible. 

There's video 2's strange camera move to consider - popping from behind a possible sniper nest to film the crowd again just as the shot is fired. And there's the possible rifle on that same rooftop filmed by a another camera (video 1 as listed). And then consider the line of sight. Each of the two protesters were shot as they came into camera view, which is also the line of fire for any sniper in the same location.

But my theory, even though better illustrated than I thought it would be, is not proven. But these possible sniper clues hover above all three of the videos and both filmed victims of unprovoked shooting that I know of. I will leave this space open for any other excepions to, or refutations of, "the rule" that I run across or have suggested. Evidence of apparent state brutality like these videos is not proof, but it is worth a look, and I challenge any reader who thinks I must be wrong to please dig around for anything to support that hunch.  

Defiance of the Order as Evidence of the Order
One of the more powerful illustration of the alleged commandment to massacre was the repeated allegation of government soldiers executed for refusing to follow it. We only know of this because their bound and executed bodies were then found by protesters with a magical knowledge of just why they'd been slain - "because they would not commit the brutality commanded to them."

On February 23, a total of 130 soldiers were reported by a sham Human Rights  group as executed like this and for this reason across Eastern Libya. There was no evidence to support that, and enough against to disprove it in at least 27 cases. First, 22 soldiers executed by rebels, as their own video proves, were boldly blamed on the regime for "refusing to fire on civilians," and included in the 130. Ironically, their rebel-issued death sentence has been translated as based on the fact they DID shoot at the armed people attacking their base (apparently Labraq airbase).

And another, more horrific case of fobbed-off rebel brutality, presumably also included in the same 130, concerns another five "soldiers" found charred in the conquered barracks in Benghazi. This find occurred on February 21, right after "protesters" there had burned to death five innocent men from Chad. That's 27 so-called mutinous soldiers executed. The oher 103 we just don't know the details, but the patterns illustrated so far do not line up with what the rebels asserted.

Evidence by executions, claimed by rabble forces, when the killings are demonstratably carried out by them, clearly does nothing to support their own claim. In fact, it goes strongly and ingeniously towards disproving altogether the legend of the order to cut down peaceful protesters.

Maj. Gen. Younes, Deadly Force, and the Benghazi Katiba
In his Russia Today interview, Seif Gaddafi explained how his reaction to news of massacres in his country was to get ahold of the man in charge of internal security - the interior minister, Maj. Gen. Abdel Fateh Younes.

"My father called the general Abdel Fatah - he's in Benghazi now - he's one of the leaders of the rebels. He called him, and I called him, and the calls are recorded. We told him many times: "don't use force with people." He told us: "but they are attacking the military sites. It's a very difficult situation."

Younes apparently won that dispute, and by the 20th, as Benghazi teetered on the brink, the secretary himself rolled a major reinforcement in personally, ready to negotiate or fight. Instead he defected, marking a major turning point in the war no one even knew was a war yet.

He was sent to re-enforce the Al-Fadhil bin Omar barracks. Many sources agree the base was decisively takend Feb 20, following an attack by a suicide car-bomber who'd blended into the fourth day of funeral processions-turned-to-battles there. After he destroyed the valued north gate with a truly powerful explosion (also not seen on any public videos), the insurgents were able to enter the base full-force. They reportedly killed an unknown number of soldiers, beheading at least one, before Younes had even arrived. The remainder, holed-up in various buildings, were spared and allowed to leave only by the bargain Younes struck that night.

The French terrorism and intelligence groups CIRET-AVT and CF2R made a joint investigation in Libya and issued a report in May, 2011. Speculating on reasons for the lack of protester shooting they saw evidence for, they offer a little conspiracy theory about the eventual star defector:

The government, surprised at the escalation of the insurgency, did not want to start a blood bath, so as not cut themselves off from the tribes, nor to create the problem of vendetta (revenge.) It is not inconceivable that the interior minister (Abdel Fatah Younis) deliberately gave orders to do nothing, so the insurgency could take hold, from the perspective of his imminent departure for Benghazi.

That is, perhaps Seif was lying and such an order was issued, but blocked by Younes. Either way, if there was such an order from on high, it didn't get sent down the chain, judging by the evidence - and lack thereof - for its execution.

They did get the Weapons
The first thing that really struck me as odd about the first days of the civil war is how non-violent protesters, whom I believed were being shot dead in droves, were able with just anger, and despite the heavy losses, simply take military control, even briefly, of half of the cities in the country. I sensed we were missing something there, and the things I've found since are starting to reveal what that was.

The "protesters" did, starting on February 19 at the latest, acquire heavy weapons of war from military bases they somehow conquered, despite just protesting. For just one important example, the Katiba in Benghazi remained in protester hands thanks in part to Younes' defection. But as they made off with many many more weapons, it was civilians doing the driving and handling, not military professionals. These were happy just to be allowed to leave the scene alive, in the opposite direction.


Some of the hardware taken from the Katiba is seen at left from a Russia Today news video - tanks, Grad rocket launchers, and more. Other weapons taken from Zintan to Zawiyah, Misrata to Dernah, were shown in other videos made by protesters, and largely included in my own video up top.

Goheda's video explains that "rebels stormed most of the military camps in the country," along the way seizing "different types of weapons, including: 250 tanks, 72 armored vehicles, 112 artillery, 176 anti-aircraft machine guns, 254 rocket launchers, 222 light machine guns, 3,628 rifles, and a large quantity of ammunition." I can't vouch for all of that, but it sounds about right considering the small samples we've been able to see of rebel arsenals coming together all across "Free Libya" in those early days and weeks.

Every time a new city center saw its display of rebel-held weaponry, the "freedom fighters" would trumpet that the military there had defected, bringing their weapons along. We see claimed defectors in original uniforms and such in a few videos, and some later in rebel non-uniforms. The people holding the weapons are usually clear amateurs so excited to be armed like Rambo they can't help but fire into the air incessantly. Consider this video analysis by C.J. Chivers; not a person on the crew running this artillery piece in Misrata knew they were standing ten times too close to that wall for safety. At least two rebel fighters were injured by the sloppiness, including one whose femoral artery was severed and who likely died soon after. (But they did the job - the place they were blasting was like swiss cheese, and had several very destroyed government soldiers and a mysterious charred boy inside.)

Brutality and the Boys in Blue
Libya's Internal Security Organization, being the usual force to control and deal with crowds and riots, would have been the main people expected to fire on protesters on, before, and after the "Day of Rage" that brought "peaceful protesters" out to tear down the state. It was Internal Security who held that line in al Baida, and were blamed for the shootings of the 17th and many others. But according to Goheda's video, they were given orders "not to open fire under any circumstances." Other than the al-Baida videos discussed above, I've seen no evidence to counter that.

Another video I made:

Instead, as we can see there, the brutality was generally against them. Several among the dead at in the "al Baida massacre" wear the blue camouflage, along with another black-skinned ISO cop, tortured horribly and shown off as an African mercenary in Az Zintan. Not included in the video, another ISO soldier, by his blue jacket, was killed and badly mangled in some town, his limp and disjointed body then hoisted up joyously in the gate of some official building by a meat hook under his chin. (this is visible here)

The CIRET-AVT/CF2R report cited above also discussed the three weeks in which az Zawiyah, just west of the capitol, remained in protester hands unmolested. “During the three weeks, the police received written orders not to do anything against the insurgents, not to shoot, not to confront them. The police also had to evacuate their own buildings due to the attacks by the rioters. […] The local authorities and the police complained openly about the absence of orders from Tripoli…” As for what happened during those weeks, I have a great analysis here, and the report added:

[A]ll public buildings were pillaged and set on fire. [...] Everywhere, there was destruction and pillaging (of arms, money, archives). There was no trace of combat, which confirms the testimony of the police [who claim to have received orders not to intervene] [...]

There were also atrocities committed (women who were raped, and some police officers who were killed), as well as civilian victims during these three weeks. [...] The victims were killed in the manner of the Algerian GIA [Armed Islamic Group]: throats cut, eyes gauged [sic] out, arms and legs cut off, sometimes the bodies were burned. [...]

Another Official Story Assessed: The UNHRC Report
The United Nations Human Rights Council sent a three-person fact-finding mission to Libya in May to investigate the alleged crimes of the regime and/or rebel forces. They issued a report (the Advance unedited version is still the only one available - PDF link) on June 1 that came out at least somewhat more reasonable than what the rebel-fed Media had so far patched together. They explain how the charge of Gaddafi's protester massacre was their primary focus:

The catalyst for establishment of this Commission of Inquiry was concern over the use of force against demonstrators in mid to late February. The Human Rights Council in Resolution S-15/1, expressed “deep concern at the deaths of hundreds of civilians,” referring also to “indiscriminate armed attacks against civilians” and “extrajudicial killings.”[p3]

What they found confirmed, to their satisfaction but not mine, that there were apparently orders to kill peaceful protesters. From their conclusion:

99. The Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Government forces engaged in excessive use of force against demonstrators, at least in the early days of the protests, leading to significant deaths and injuries. The nature of injuries inflicted in several locations (with high proportions shot in the head or upper body) is indicative of “shoot to kill” operations. From the common style of response in many parts of the country, it would appear likely that the forces were given orders to engage in the harsh crackdown of demonstrators. Such actions represented a serious breach of a range of rights under the ICCPR including the right to life, the right to ... [p 37-40]

The question, again, is "under what circumstances did these killings happen?" The report does acknowledge the government disputed the prevailing story: "The particular circumstances, leading up to the use of force by security forces against demonstrators, have been contested by the demonstrators and the Government." The latter said what I've related above, and "protestors have reiterated the peaceful nature of their demonstrations." The facts, as I note here, do not clearly support that, but the commission accepted it anyway.

"In the early days of the protest there was little evidence to suggest that the protestors were engaged in other than peaceful assembly," the mission noted. "Little" evidence is a relative call. There's a decent amount and it's consistent. There is even less evidence that those "protesters" who were killed were engaged in anything other than starting an armed insurgency.

The report's relation and refutation of the government story:

96. The Commission was told that when the demonstrations erupted, instructions were given to security forces to withdraw from police stations and security premises. The Government has stressed that the live ammunition was only employed in response to demonstrators’ violent actions. The Government also noted that demonstrators attacked police stations, destroying approximately 17 stations several of them in various cities and towns of Libya, and that demonstrators took up arms against the security forces. The Government was thus of the view that any use of force had been justifiable.

97. The majority of information collected by the Commission, however, indicates that the Government forces used live ammunition against unarmed peaceful demonstrators in many instances.

Generally they just catalog the numbers of dead as reported, focusing on the shoot-to-kill clues, presuming peaceful actions only on the victims' parts, and accepting every report possible to suggest government forces fired "indiscriminately," often killing people who weren't even involved in protests. The whole way what's missing is any proof their basic presumption of peaceful victims. Since this has not really been established, the report, at least in this regard, is an exercise in faith-based "investigation."

It is accepted by both the Government and the demonstrators that Government forces used significant force, including the use of firearms and other weaponry against persons participating in demonstrations in various locations within Libya during the period studied by the Commission. 

Adding "participating in demonstrations" makes this statement untrue. Attacks to secure weapons are not "demonstrations." Scratch that phrase and what they say here is true.

They acknowledge in Misrata, "on 21 and 22 February, demonstrators attacked Revolutionary Committee offices, police stations and military barracks, taking arms and weapons from these locations." But as they heard it, this was only after days of brutal attacks on completely peaceful people who were suddenly, when angry, able to actually take over and remove weapns from military bases - with sheer Arab Spring enthusiasm, we're to presume.

In al Baida, "at least 40 persons were killed during peaceful demonstrations between 16 and 19 February," they noted. Problem is, police station were burnt there as early as Feb 15, anti-government snipers might have been behind any of these killings (and apparently are behind the recorded ones), and by about the 19th, the city and surrounding military bases - including Labraq (or al-Abraq) airbase - were completely in the hands of the "peaceful protesters."

93. On 18 February, at the demonstrations near Al-Abraq Airport (east of Al-Bayda town), the Commission received information that 11 persons were killed by security personnel of Khamis Katiba, including the Commander of Husein al-Jiwiki Katiba. According to several sources, the Commander was killed when he refused to shoot at demonstrators, and was shot as a result of his refusal to shot at demonstrators. 

Yeah, you'll get "several witnesses" when, for example, several people involved in a killing agree to a cover story. The big clues is the old "killed by his own forces for being a good guy" schtick. It was a lie in the "al Baida massacre," and in the burned soldiers in Benghazi thing, and probably here.

Why do they know it was the Khamis brigade that killed an officer and 11 of their own? Why were they "demonstrating" at the airbase to begin with? The people involved themselves told the media, if not the UN, that they went there, on the 18th, to capture or kill "African mercenaries" they thought were coming to kill them. They took it militarily on about the 20th, after a couple days of fighting, executed some prisoners, and kept 156 black Libyan soldiers alive long enough to be proven not mercenaries. That some of their own were killed in the process should be no surprise, to us or them, prepared as they were for martyrdom.

The claim of government orders to kill demonstrators weren't just on the word of rebel sources but also, the report explained,"corroborated through information collected from some security personnel."

One member of security personnel, currently in detention, stated that he was among 250 soldiers deployed by the regime to “contain demonstrators” in Benghazi on 17 February. Interrogation records provided to the Commission by the Benghazi General Prosecutor’s Office state that members of the security forces were given orders, by their commanding officers, to use force against demonstrators. In at least one transcript, there is an admission of involvement by a member of the security forces in the random shooting of protestors in Benghazi on 20 February.

February 20 is the day Benghazi fell, as the Al Fadhil bin Omar Katiba was overrun. The report did pass on that "government opponents assumed control over the Katiba premises in Benghazi," but made no mention of the suicide bomber that allowed that, or of the soldier killings inside. And it even has the date wrong, citing the 19th when the decisive brutality that took 60 lives, by their own numbers, occurred on the 20th, mostly following the suicide bombing and the pitched battle within the walls. Why on Earth was anyone firing randomly that day, when a concerted militant force was attacking the base and hacking off heads? 

His "admission" to doing this is just not credible. This claimed evidence from the inside is quite likely the result of forced confessions, and the commission's inability to spot that (or to admit they did) is telling.

The report is deeply flawed. But it formed the basis of explaining why the intervention the UN's top member nations were already deeply invested in was not completely unjustified. In fact, they seem relatively in tune with the existing mission in an accompanying press release, again of June 1:

The team, led by Professor Cherif Bassiouni, an Egyptian jurist and war crimes expert, calls on the Government to immediately cease acts of violence against civilians in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law, and to conduct “exhaustive, impartial and transparent” investigations into all alleged violations.

Even if this statement had been issued on February 18, it would have been poison advice to a besieged government. But here it was June, and they called for a current, one-sided cease-fire. There was no mention of the fact that by then the "civilians" were trying their damndest, with half the nation's stolen hardware, and with eager NATO air support, to attack the capitol and everything between. Mr. Bassiouni, like the power structure pushing this war through, was in effect calling for Libya's government to surrender abjectly to the armed insurgency.

This bold move of dubious propriety was based, it would seem to most, on the team's exceptionally clear findings that the government had proven itself brutal to the point of falling outside the normal rules of respect for nations the United Nations was supposed to ensure.

But the reality wasn't really as clear as all that, was it?

Suicide Bomber Opens the Katiba

May 22 2011
last edits, September 30, 2011

Note Sept. 30: When I first wrote this piece I did not know the formal name of the military barracks in question here. It's often called the Katiba, as used below, but that just means something like "brigade." But it's called the Al-Fadhil bin Omar barracks, at the time housing a brigade of that name.

Three months ago the other day, the Katiba barracks fell to what was becoming the Libyan rebel army. The large, loyal, and well-stocked military base in the middle of Benghazi would arm much of rebel-held Cyrenaica after defection of general Abdel Fatah Younes there on February 21. This came the day after the base's main gate was blown open, triggering a fierce battle within the sprawling complex. The swift culmination of that episode was a major turning point in the fate of the city, Libya's second largest and soon the de facto rebel capitol.

This post focuses on the opening of the gate by an act that, in any other context, would be denounced by the Western media as an act of terrorism. Consider this still from a Russia Today broadcast, showing the effects of a very powerful blast:

Further images of the damaged gate can be seen here, here and here.

Al Jazeera had an excellent photo but nothing much on the cause, mentioning this suicide bomber not at all.

A gaping hole in the northern wall of the compound, all twisted metal bars and jagged concrete blocks, marks the spot where protesters first managed to push through under a hail of gunfire. In white spray-paint, someone has written "Martyrs' Square" in Arabic on an unhinged metal gate that hangs off the breach.

But others give due mention of Mahdi Ziu, the middle-aged executive turned Jihadist. The Guardian, for one, reported two months later:

Ziu was not classic suicide-bomber material. He was a podgy, balding 48-year-old executive with the state oil company, married with daughters at home. There was no martyrdom video of the kind favoured by Hamas. He did not even tell his family his plan, although they had seen a change in him over the three days since the revolution began.

But Mr. Ziu (see tribute  poster at left, from here) did drive an explosive car, we're told, from within a funeral procession, right at the Katiba's north gate and blew it open, probably killing some guards and helping make the heavy weapons inside available to all sorts of riff-raff. The Guardian's use of plastic language re-brands what elsewhere wouldbe termed a disaster and a heinous crime:

The Middle East. A man with a car fashioned into a bomb. He disguises his intent by joining a funeral cortege passing the chosen target. At the last minute the man swings the vehicle away, puts his foot down and detonates the propane canisters packed into the car.
It all sounds horrifyingly familiar. Mahdi Ziu was a suicide bomber in a region too often defined by people blowing up themselves and others. But, as with so much in Libya, the manner of Ziu's death defies the assumptions made about the uprisings in the Arab world by twitchy American politicians and generals who see Islamic extremism and al-Qaeda lurking in the shadows. Ziu's attack was an act of pure selflessness, not terror, and it may have saved Libya's revolution.

Admittedly, it was a rather violent selflessness, with further violent effects.

Then Ziu arrived, blew the main gates off the barracks and sent the soldiers scurrying to seek shelter inside. Within hours the Katiba had fallen.
[...]
What followed wasn't pretty. "(The revolutionaries) were beating Gaddafi people they captured, it's true. When they captured a Gaddafi soldier they said: 'What was this man doing? He was shooting us.' Gaddafi's soldiers wanted to kill anyone. They were using anti-aircraft weapons on humans. It cut people in half. People were angry," says Fasi. So angry that some of Gaddafi's soldiers were lynched. At least one was beheaded.

CNN reported the story a month earlier, but got the name a bit different, as Mendhi Ziu.

Confirmed: Hero Story of Benghazi Suicide Bomber
CNN reports that a man named Al Mendhi loaded his car with explosives and drove it into a military compound in Benghazi last week [...] Mr. Mendhi, a 49 year old oil company worker, is being hailed as a hero, because it was his sacrifice that enabled the resistance to overtake the barracks and roust Gadaffi's army, ultimately regaining the city of Benghazi. He had filled cylinders with cooking gas, packed them into his car, where he sat and prayed for half an hour before driving the car at high speed into the compound. His valiant efforts were not in vain.

Re-gaining Benghazi? When was it first lost?

His best friend reports that he carried the brave man's remains out of the car, and said that "If I didn't see it with my own eyes, I would not believe it myself."

There was a car left? There were remains? Is this the car? It looks just about like an other car looted and burned within the compound. It doesn't look blown up by the blast center responsible for ruptiuring the concrete gate building. I'm no explosives expert, but there seems ample room to wonder whether this was the result of exploding gas canisters at high speed, or of something quite a bit more professional-grade.

For what it's worth, I confirmed the location from imagae analysis of the Russia Today footage. By background structures, I decided it's clearly the north gate, the west lane (inbound?) passage. These images show my work.

Update, Sept. 30: This historic bombing of the north gate and guard house - either the actiual blast or the destruction after - is something that, like protesters being shot, is simply absent from " "protester" videos. Russia today showed it, outside media showed it, but somehow the people who did it seem to have kept it mum,as if that would help us fail to notice they were"protesting" places to smithereens.

It also has a way of being glossed over or ignored in mainstream run-downs of the battle for Benghazi. For example, the UN's Human Rights Council issued a report on June 1 (PDFlink) about the early violence. It could and should have addressed this particular act but somehow missed it. They make note of an extracted "admission of involvement by a member of the security forces," in rebel detention, "in the random shooting of protestors in Benghazi on 20 February."

Their statistics show the biggest spike of daily deaths that day - 60 to the previous 20 and 20 (on the 17th and 19th). But they thought this was from an extreme, random-shooting punishment because "government opponents assumed control over the Katiba premises," in some unspecified way with no mention of a terrorist suicide bomber, "on 19 February!" No wonder their conclusions were so warped - these guys were confused on major events like this, which aren't even hard to figure out just with a Google search and no airfare required. The question remains whether this type of goof-up is accidental or part of some design.

Departures From Protocol at the UN

Sketching out the New Libya: Departures From Protocol at the UN
July 28/29, 2011
extensive edits Sept. 12

From What Fount Springeth This? 
The unfolding of the new libya, and its old colors of monarchy, has been painted as the natural triumph of the peoples' will against a tyrant's rule. This had just occurred in neighboring Egypt and Tunisia (and nowhere else yet), leaving everyone just knowing it was just time for change in that narrow region and, hey, who doesn't hate Gaddafi, right? Everyone who was capable joined with the masses, we believed, driven by the noblest of abstract virtues - freedom, equality, justice - perhaps unseen in such purity since the French Revolution. The old, the corrupt, and the cruel was to be swept away by crashing waves of light, it seemed back around March 1.

By now we can see this wasn't quite right (well, most of us can). In fact the reality on the ground seems artificially murky, brutal, deceptive, and highly troubling. And the first and major steps towards enforcing any new Libya - the help of powerful outsiders - looks more like a well-planned soft coup than a mass uprising.

The uprising originated, to some extent anyway, with Libyans - but only a select few visionary ones operating within Libya, in Paris, and especially in New York. These pioneers worked largely through the United Nations, but in an unusual personal, not national capacity. I'm no expert on international law, but I suspect what happened here was illegal.

This fascinating but ignored line of thought is the cornerstone of an impressive recent article I read and will cite throughout this one: The Role of the UN Security Council in Unleashing an Illegal War against Libya, by Ronda Hauben, published on July 20 by the Center for Research on Gloablization.

The article starts with the the official explanation why the UN's Security Council chose to take up the issue of Libya: a member state of the Security Council, Lebanon, had brought the issue before them in late February. This was followed by a second from the Arab League, and the white people countries well-known for loathing Gaddafi simply followed up on that. No euro-Imperialism there, most presume.

But the Arab League has its own conflicts of interest and reasons to dislike the Libyan regime, at least in the alleged 2003 Gaddafi plot to kill Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah (a decent starter source, NYT, on that strange chapter). There are also supposed rivalries over religious influence, wiath Gaddafi accused of wanting to supplant the medieval monarchy and make Libya the new center of Islam (can't find a handy link for that).

And Qatar, a firm non-european support for the rebellion against Gaddafi in every conceivable way, through the Arab League and on their own, has some kind of previous beef with the Colonel that's apparently quite serious. According to recently published reports, based on files found in Tripoli, British authorities had agreed to offer special protection to Seif al-Islam Gaddafi from a possible 2002 plot to kill him. According to Muzaffar Iqbal, writing for Pakistan's The News (International), the plot might be disinformation, but was linked to "Qatar’s interior minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Khalid al-Thani," who "was also accused of sheltering “terrorists” at his farm by none other Richard Clarke, the former White House counterterrorism director, who considered his ministerial post a “direct and serious threat to US forces present in Qatar.""

The Arab League - Arabs! - approved
"no fly" at the UN. Photo: Reuters, 
via the Sofia Echo

And as the UK Guardian noted, Lebanon also has its beef with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in the form of a long-dead Shia cleric allegedly killed and buried - or alive? - inside Libya. By the sound of it, this was well-played on by rumor-spinning rebel schemers and helped prod things along.

Along with a hasty, poorly-attended, and still far from unanimous vote, the Arab League - Arabs! - approved a "no fly zone," and thus provided a fig leaf for this open door to imperialist  bombardment of Muslims which they later - limply - protested for a couple of days.

The "hate Gaddafi" club - which the regime had clearly allowed grow too large - put themselves in charge of writing Libya's future. The "screw Gaddafi" and "oh well, what can you expect?" clubs - also too large - apparently just let them do it, with nothing more severe than abstention.

The Libyan Invite I: Dabbashi  
But even with the troubling grudges considered, this telling obscures an earlier and shadier genesis yet, Hauben argues, also from within the Arab world.

It was not a Security Council member nation which started this process. Nor was it the Arab League. Rather it was a party that one could argue had no legitimate basis to speak at the United Nations, especially not to the Security Council.

This party, was, by that time, the former Chargé d’Affaires to the United Nations for the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya [Libya], Ibrahim Dabbashi. Dabbashi had taken the unusual actions of first announcing to the press that he had defected from representing the government of Libya at the UN, and then requesting an emergency meeting of the Security Council about the situation in Libya.

His request to the Security Council began a process which, in less than a week, resulted in passing the stringent sanctions against Libya and the referral of its officials to the ICC that are included in SC Resolution 1970. SC Resolution 1970 then set the stage for SC Resolution 1973 passed three weeks later which authorized military action against Libya.

Mr. Dabbashi seems to be the second in charge of the mission to the UN, normally. The mission was actually headed by Abdel Rahman Shalgham, the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya's formal title). Why Shalgham's Chargé d’Affaires was able to have such leverage isn't clear to me; elsewhere Dabbashi is also described as the "Deputy Ambassador," so perhaps he was in charge at the moment, February 21 to be precise, for some legitimate reason.

Either way, the underling defected on day six of greatly misunderstood "protests", rejecting the post he filled ... or, rather, not doing that. As Hauben put it "while an appropriate course for a defecting government official from a country would be to resign his official position as a Deputy Ambassador for Libya at the United Nations, this is not what happened."

Dabbashi tells it juuuust how
it is. Photo: Al Arabiya

In fact, he went on to represent "the people" of Libya. This always clearly meant the anti-Gaddafi insurgents, and eventually their strange political leadership, the rebel Transitional National Council (TNC or some variant - they change it every couple months). But before they had quite gelled, Mr. Dabbashi in New York had declared himself their ambassador - and not the deputy. By dint of entrepreneurial spirit and swift action, he was now the boss now and his old boss ... that remained to be seen. Boss again, or an enemy supporting the "genocide?"


Ibrahim Dabbashi's actions were clearly geared towards creating a new nation in the space of the old, and that seems a bit like diplomatic warfare to me. And whether he knew or suspected it then, he was making himself the permanent representative to the UN for racist lynch mobs, looters and retribution thugs, arsonists, rapists, cop-killers, serial fakers of claims and evidence, neo-colonialist free-market sell-outs, genuine if misguided freedom-seekers, and, to some extent, al Qaeda and assorted Islamo-nihilist mercenaries.

Dabbashi's Roadmap
Either way, I went a bit beyond Hauben to see more of just what this turncoat did with his invented new position; it would take the form of words on the record. I rely on an article from Al Jazeera English, Feb 22. By this, it's not the cautious statement of a loyal servant of his government forced by events. The turns of phrase and even more the suggested actions reveal a rather advanced conception of what this crisis offered and how it should be exploited. Calling on the widely reported but unverified rumors of a bloodbath, he said in part:

The tyrant Muammar Gaddafi has asserted clearly, through his sons, the level of ignorance he and his children have, and how much he despises Libya and the Libyan people [...]
This is in fact a declaration of war against the Libyan people. The regime of Gaddafi has already started the genocide against the Libyan people.

The officers and soldiers of the Libyan army wherever they are and whatever their rank is ... [should] organise themselves and move towards Tripoli and cut the snake's head.

Here Dabbashi clarifies he is declaring war, but only after the other side started it. With quick and comprehensive thinking, he laid out much of how it should be done: he demanded an inquiry by the International Criminal Court for crimes against Humanity by Gaddafi and his sons (investigation done, warrants eventually issued, used as bargaining chips to bring the NTC to power). He warned of Gaddafi fleeing justice into exile (setting up the travel ban), and warned of money smuggling (setting the world towards freezing as much of the Libyan economy as possible).

He also prophetically recommended a no-fly zone and air embargo over Libya, as al Jazeera explained, "to prevent mercenaries and weapons from being shipped [sic] in." (It was only just then that rumors of aerial bombardment were starting to appear as well, greatly strengthening this case).  He warned of sabotage at oil installations "by the coward tyrant," (reminding us all what this was really about). And of course he encouraged employees of Libyan embassies all over the world to join him, and "stand with their people." He urged this specifically for the mission in Geneva, which should pressure the UN Human Rights Council to action. [again, the al Jazeera article]

By and large, these diplomatic defections did happen, swiftly and en masse, a real coup of an achievement. Other areas of the government and military only dribbled defectors, usually loud-mouthed ones, but the ambassadors just poured out, helping convince the world it must really be over for the Jamahiriya. And again, this moved fast starting on day six of the violent protests in Libya that allegedly surprised everyone.

Mr. Dabbashi's bold course of action, as personal as it was, could conceivably have lined up with the overall will of Libya's people.  Clearly a formidable segment rejects Gaddafi just as virulently (if less strategically) as he does. But with time to understand, we can see the impression of a total nationwide mutiny that drove Dabbashi was a fiction, and one he himself co-wrote.

Al-Mesmari and The Date that Lives in Infamy/A Cabal Enabled? 
The address above was given on February 22, since the UN headquarters was closed on the the 21st when Dabbashi first announced his resignation elsewhere (President's Day is for the whole world now). Besides commemorating our own great leaders, the date of his unequivocal defection is noteworthy. As Hauben explains, another Libyan official, Nouri al-Mesmari, also announced his resignation as the Jamahiriya's protocal chief on the 21st.

Al-Mesmari resigned from Paris, having informally resigned upon flying there, unannounced, in October. He had reportedly spent the time between linking French intelligence with Libyans planning some nebulous uprising set for February, and rebuffing all inducement to return to the targeted nation. (See here for explanation.)

Al-Mesmari's previous job as chief of protocol (from Which Dabbashi would so boldly stray) had put him into intimate contact with all diplomatic posts, like Dabbashi's. He told al Jazeera on February 27 (video) that he was "a pure diplomat," in charge of "relationship with the embassies." Strangely, six days after resigning, he told them "I am in charge of the diplomacy in Libya" (emph. mine).

And for what it's worth, it's also been speculated by seasoned observers that al-Mesmari was in turn put up to defect by now-defected Libyan foreign sinister Moussa Koussa (reported on Africa Intelligence, passed on via Meyssan at least).  Hauben also makes note of both men, Mesmari and Dabbashi, making specific use of the term "genocide" to describe what Gaddafi was doing. This term has no basis in reality, with the "cide" based on confused rumors, and the "geno" part being just silly. But that precise word, accurate or not, does have a certain resonance - especially in Geneva.

The apparent signal for these twin defectors in Paris and New York was the decisive turn of the previous day in Benghazi, their emergent rebel capitol. Heavily armed "protesters" finally overwhelmed the Katiba army barracks, after days of trying, with the heroic help of a suicide bomber. To save this last toehold of security in the city, Interior Minister Abdel Fateh Younes was sent by Tripoli to restore order. But upon arrival he made a deal - the surviving soldiers would be allowed to leave, and he, Younes the great, would join their cause, along with the force he brought. He was "with the people" publicly by the evening of the 20th.

It was first thing in the morning that these two made their announcements - only once it was clear Benghazi had fallen and Younes had jumped. If people are jumping, it might seem like the ship is sinking. And they knew, by some instinct (?), it was time to add to that impression and quickly, before it could be shown the Jamahiriya still sailed on, just a few rats lighter.


As I've noted here before, it's generally illegal to recognize a group not in charge of a nation. And even considering that, there was no group here - Dabbashi at first represented no legally extant body. If he was chosen by anyone in particular, (besides that defunct old regime that once chose him), it would be by a still-unproven conspiratorial cabal, who all agreed to things like "say genocide," and "be sure to mention his sons!"

If not Conspiratorial, at Least Illegal
These are just little clues, and not proof, but in concert with the stealing and re-appropriation of government posts, alarm bells should have been going off.

It would appear to be a serious breach of UN protocol for a defecting official who had formerly been the representative of a nation that is a member of the UN, to be able to request a Security Council meeting and to have the Security Council grant the meeting and allow the defecting official to participate in the meeting. Similarly, to allow the defecting diplomat to make unverified allegations at the meeting against the government of a UN member nation would only compound the serious violation of the UN Charter represented by this abuse of UN processes.

I never really thought about it before reading this article, but that does seem quite illegal. I just thought it sounded extremely wrong. Why did I not think of, or hear of the actual impropriety of it? I can understand the Americans, French, Qataris, etc. biting their tongues and egging this on, but where are the clear protests from Russia, China, Venezuela? (Out there, perhaps, but ignored). This is really a strange and shady situation. As Reuters said:

The [security] council met at the request of Libyan Deputy Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi, who along with most other staff at Libya’s U.N. mission announced on Monday they were no longer working for leader Muammar Gaddafi and represented the country’s people. They called for Gaddafi’s overthrow.”

The Libyan Invite II: Shalgham Jumps Ship, Washington Sinks It
As we've seen, deputy ambassador Dabbasi took the first bold steps, while his superior, ambassador Shalgham at first acted differently. Before mindlessly repeating the tales of massacres and "genocide," he called home and asked. Hauben cites this video and explains:

Shalgham also attended the February 22 Security Council meeting, along with Dabbashi. In informal comments after the meeting, Shalgham indicated that he had been in contact with a relative in Tripoli and was told that the alleged atrocities that the media was claiming had happened in Tripoli were not true. 

Similarly, speaking to the press, he indicated that he had been in contact with government officials in Tripoli who said that they, too, disputed the claims of atrocities taking place in Tripoli and planned to invite journalists from Al Arabiya and CNN to see for themselves that the allegations were inaccurate.

These offers would have been useful towards establishing the truth as it's now emerging, but they were rebuffed forcefully by the West. Shalgham's pointed reference to Tripoli's view was not in the spirit of the cabal, and as that video link shows, made him a persona non-grata with the journalists there, expecting an absolute defection to the "light side."

But he was somehow brought around, perhaps by his number two, or any other comination of forces in this massive geo-political lynch mob against his home government. Within a couple of days, he too was resigning and denouncing his personal friend, Muammar Gaddafi, and his regime in stringent terms. A more specific example of the diplomatic disconnect over who represents Libya arises from his subsequent lobbying, as Hauben explains:

One good example of this departure from protocol obligations is demonstrated by two documents. The first is Security Council Resolution 1970 (S/RES/1970(2011). The document states in its opening statement (21):

“Taking note of the letter to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya dated 26 February 2011.” (S/Res/1970(2011),p.1)

The problem of acknowledging this letter this way in the body of Resolution 1970 is that on February 25, the former Libyan Ambassador to the UN, Abdel Rahman Shalgham had informed the Security Council that he had defected.

By February 26 he no longer represented the Libyan government. Consequently there was no basis for the Security Council to refer to a letter from him, as a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

The Security Council should have found a way to hear from a member of the government of Libya, rather than substituting a defector Ambassador and his delegation for the official delegation of Libya.

Once enough rats had jumped, the ship was sunk. However many nations immediately recognized them or didn't, the UNSC had recognized the rebels from a mile away as of February 22. The Gaddafi regime was diplomatically neutered, just a thing that the bombing of could commence.  As Hauben noted, the actual Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, headquartered in Tripoli, in charge of most of Libya, and supported by an uncertain but sizeable chunk of Libya's people, was not allowed to speak for itself. 

No legitimate Libyan government official was invited to take part in Security Council proceedings. When the Libyan government tried to appoint legitimate government officials to replace the defector delegation, the US government would not approve the visa requests for the replacement delegates, in violation of the Host Country obligations of the US. In this way, the US prevented the Libyan government from being able to present its case before the Security Council.

And so Mr. Shalgham, the slightly delayed rebel ambassador of NATO's Libyans, was number one again and Dabbashi again his deputy. The ambassador of the brand-new nation, sketched out in New York and soon inked-in with ever more blood in Libya, put his words on the record on the 25th. He easily swayed the council to embraced the new Libya, literally. One last time, Hauben:

In his presentation to the Security Council meeting on Friday, February 25, Shalgham made a virulent denunciation of the Libyan government, complete with analogies to Hitler. Shalgham ignored the conflicting accounts of what was happening in Benghazi and instead painted a picture of peacefully demonstrating civilians unjustly subjected to a massacre. 

Shalgham presented no proof for his allegations nor was he asked to present any. Instead, he was consoled by the Secretary General and members of the Security Council, with several Security Council members, embracing and comforting him. 

Photo: Monika Graff, Getty Images

At right is actually a separate hug on March 16, upon securing the pivotal no-fly zone at the UNSC, sanctioning NATO bombardment of his country. Shalgham, right, and the US ambasssador, Susan Rice, left. Might have that backwards, I don't follow the news too close.

Something snapped between February 22 and 25, and the real Abdel Rahman Shalgham was apparently killed in the process, another early casualty of the Libyan Civil War, snuffed out like so many under murky circumstances.

The Life and Death of Abdel Fateh Younes

July 30, 2011

It's fairly new news and there's a chance this will the first someone hears of it, so ... it seems to be solid that rebel military commander, Libyan turncoat and suspect double agent Abdel Fateh Younes has been killed, on July 28, almost certainly by the rebels who had him in custody at the time. They say, of course, Gaddafi militiamen killed him.

His Wikipedia says so, and gives some details and sources. I presume plenty other articles do as well.
Major General in the Libyan

I suspect this is a major voctory for the rebel,NATO side, and another blow to Libya's future. This thing is getting less Libyan all the time, and that's good - helps purify it. Viva Heftar! Viva CIA!

I will scrap this whole text and put in its place the promised 'life and death of' post, when I have the time. In the meantime, comments are welcome.