On the Layla Shweikani Issue

December 29, 2018

In late November, news broke that a dual US-Syrian citizen was killed in detention in a Syrian prison, some two years earlier. Layla Shweikani (Arabic: ليلى شويكاني ) was a U.S.-born Chicago native, educated as a software engineer. But she went to Syria in 2015, ostensibly, to help displaced people in the Damascus suburbs of Eastern Ghouta.

The area was run by Saudi-backed hardline Islamists Jaish Al-Islam, who apparently approved of her work. Other women activists there, like Razan Zaitouneh, have been arrested and killed by JaI for challenging their harsh policies. But it seems Shweikani was arrested by the Syrian authorities instead, and is believed by most to have been executed following on torture, and surely for no real crime except trying to help the Syrian people.

Since I don't follow the news closely, my first view happened to be via Tony Cartalucci at Land Destroyer on December 15, panning "a particularly scurrilous op-ed appeared in the pages of the Washington Post" two days earlier which, he argues, lacked "any actual evidence" for the allegations. He also considers a report in the UK Independent, which featured more explicit evidence. But as he accurately put it, the source for that was "dubious activists relying on second and even third-hand accounts."

- Washington Post article by Jason Rezaian (soon arrested in Iran, tried, and convicted for espionage, as noted).
- The Independent article by Richard Hall

In this post, I'll offer a reasoned rundown of what we supposedly know, and what we don't really know, and what possibilities exist.

The first 33 months of silence
Activists are pressing president Trump, with apparent futility, to impose penalties, and shaming the public and media for supposedly ignoring the crime. For example, rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill.) told WaPo's Rezaian in early December “It’s disheartening that there not only has been no outrage over the murder of an American by the Assad regime, but that there has been little to no coverage on her story by our national media.” The story had by then been making limited rounds for perhaps two weeks, with little evidence yet and, as it turns out, emerging from the blue with zero preludes or prior reports.

As people are guilt-tripped for silence over this crime, it should be noted everyone including her family, her government, and Syrian activist groups failed to make any public mention of the case in nearly three years since her reported arrest in February, 2016. WaPo: "She was being held in solitary confinement with no contact with the outside world." For some reason , even the people who knew she was in there didn't make one-way contact possible by speaking of her case.

Opposition records often give clues, and my primary source is the databases of the Center for Documentation of Violations (or VDC). It's pretty exhaustive up to a point, but never got a report of her as detained or killed. This seems to be the proper spelling of the fairly rare name in question: شويكاني
The VDC lists 2 men of this name killed, a civilian in 2014, a militant in 2015, both from Mleha, E. Ghouta. No women or children appear. For detainees, they list just 4 men, 3 in mid-2012 and one in late 2013 (one is from Daraya, the rest from Mleha). None since, no Shweikani women. (there's also a database for missing, which lists zero Shweikanis.)

So she didn't make it into this source. Nor did her father, nor probably her fiance. A decent internet search suggests no one else anywhere reported her arrest or detention or worries, prior to the recent news. On Twitter, I found Tweets featuring her name in Arabic first appear, just barely, on November 26 of this year, come in heavy in the following days, and sporadically since. It seems no one spoke of her prior to that.

I don't what this means, if anything, but it's odd. Detained activists are usually named as heroes and supported with protests, petitions, hashtag campaigns, etc. But here, a U.S. citizen activist and some family members are detained February 2016, contact was made with U.S. Government help 10 months later (see below), execution should have seemed likely or imminent (see below), and then contact was lost for two years, apparently with no clarification from Damascus ... and still no public note or complaint of the missing U.S. citizen, the detained activist facing execution, perhaps already killed.

But the Syrian government just now (sometime in November) confirmed her death, on December 28, 2016, through an update to its civil registry. It doesn't say she was executed, or was even in jail, just that she died. Other information might well clarify that, but that information might be untrue, in whole or part.

Then, suddenly everybody knows just when and where she died, and were able to speak about it. The explanation they'd give is they knew where she was and how she would have died if she had. But since the regime cruelly refused to confirm the killing, uncertainty over her fate and perhaps some kind of threats made them keep quiet about it (like maybe they would kill her as soon as anyone spoke up). In that case, perhaps a Syrian affirmation of hear death was taken as credible proof of something they highly suspected, and was enough to shake their tongues free.

That's entirely possible, but I suspect the abnormal quiet is some kind of a clue to the hidden truth of this story. For now, it's just worth noting.

Anyway, considering everyone else's silence for nearly three years,  I don't feel so slow in catching the story and following up with this starter post that winds up just missing the mark of two years since her death, and one month after the first anyone heard of her.

How we know she was in jail
My main question in general with tortured detainees is whether they ever were prisoners of the Syrian government, rather than of opposition groups with their own genocide plans (see Fail Caesar part 6 for well-founded doubts even in those cases that have supposed photo proof). But here, it seems Layla Shweikani was held in Syrian prison, and did presumably die there, possibly in an execution. So the usual line of questioning is - barring a surprise revelation - out the window.

Since Washington withdrew its meddling, hostile "ambassador" to Syria, Robert Ford, early in the engineered conflict, the U.S. pursued Shweikani's case through the Czech ambassador to Damascus, Eva Filipi. As the Independent reported, "ten months after she was first detained, on 18 December 2016, Filipi visited Shweikani in Adra prison on behalf of the US government."

It's a logical possibility that ambassador Filipi fabricated this visit to help sow a false story of the detained American activist - especially considering the case of Robert Ford. But it's surely not an accusation I'm making. As a professional politician outside the Jihadist deception network (alleged inmates at the prison, etc. are always suspect), she's presumably trustworthy - on basic facts like this anyway.

The government officials and reporters passing on news of her meeting are probably doing it correctly enough. Important context is probably left off, but  I presume this visit was real, and so: Ms. Shweikani was held at Adra prison as of December 18, and the Syrian government acknowledged that fact by granting the visit that proved it. And unless she was released in the interim (which seems unlikely) the same authorities' claim she died somewhere, somehow, ten days later, means she died in prison. Execution is obviously one way that happens.

In his report, Tony Cartalucci added some questioning of the WaPo journalist Josh Rogin, who acknowledged "we don't know the specifics of Layla's death ... Thank you for that caution. ... But the regime is responsible for her death, in their custody." From this, we can say Rogin is pretty sure she was in jail when she died, and can only claim general responsibility based on that. And that's probably accurate enough while the rest is, in fact, hearsay. And there's been a lot of that regarding Syria, that either goes untested or fails a test.

The charges and Shweikani's uncertain fate
Without explaining how this was known, the article claims the prisoner admitted to the leveled charges, but only after "Shweikani had been threatened by Syrian authorities that they would harm her family if she did not confess to the ambassador to the crimes she had been accused of, which she then did."

If this is true, she said in the meeting that she was guilty. The claim that this was extracted under threat is suspect; there's little reason to know what happens inside torture chambers at Adra prison. Was this just a guess? 

What were the charges? Most sources are vague, saying it was related to "terrorism." But Richard Hall wrote for the Independent how Layla was arrested sometime in February, 2016, "along with her father and her fiancé. She was charged with planning to assassinate members of the Syrian government."

First off, Hall can't know what the charges actually were - his activist source almost surely filled in this detail, as he did for most relevant details. And as we'll discuss next, he doesn't seem very trustworthy. But if this is the charge - and it should be the one she claimed to be guilty of, before an ambassador and a judge, if so - it would probably be known early on; her family probably learned of it from or before the December 18 meeting with ambassador Filipi. It's surely a death penalty crime, and execution should be expected with little delay, justified or otherwise. And at some point, as I'll explain next, they learned she had been sentenced to death in a December 26 trial that lasted 30 seconds. Yet, as the Independent reports, until the 2018 confirmation...

"Since there was no official confirmation of her death at that time, Shweikani’s family still held out hope that she was alive, and that she would be released. From the time they lost contact with her at the end of 2016, the Czech ambassador continued to make enquiries about her with the Syrian government and the case was followed by the then US envoy to Syria, Michael Ratney." 

That sounds like it's missing something. The Americans must have been given no clear answer? Why would Damascus deny a supposedly valid execution for terrorism? Did they actually send an answer but the Americans - for example - "misplaced" it, in order to maintain the illusion of a horrible injustice and cause for yet more "pressure on Damascus"? There are open questions here.

Another way of looking at it; a US citizen was allegedly involved in assassination plots in Syria - and no one mentions her detention, least of all the U.S. government, until Damascus brings up her name first in 2018. That could be coincidence, or might help clarify what caused that unusual silence.

Qutaiba Idlibi's "Research"
Alleged threats behind Shweikani's confession to ambassador Filipi were mentioned above. It's not clear how these were learned of, but that's presumably some of the prolific detective work by "Qutaiba Idlbi​, a researcher who works with the relatives of Syrian detainees," as cited for the Independent, not in the WaPo piece. After stumbling on his Twitter account (first tweet mentioning her case - Nov. 27, 2018) I asked him about that finding in particular: "Are you the source for that claim? How was it learned of?" (awaiting a response...)

Based on info he gathered (when?), Hall at the Independent would report:

"What happened next was discovered by Idlbi through testimony of other inmates at Adra prison, where she was held, and contact with Syrian officials after the fact."

"...Eight days later [Dec. 26], Shweikani was taken from Adra prison to a military court, where she was asked to answer to the charges against her. “The trial is basically one question: ‘Do you admit to the accusations?’ Layla said yes, due to the threats on her family’s life,” says Idlbi.  “Through an official, we found out that a judge sentenced her to execution for terrorism. The trial lasted 30 seconds.”

The trial part would be internal. It would almost require a functioning insider to witness it or know a witness. Luckily, Idlibi claims, there was an unnamed official sympathetic to the opposition who knew of these details and leaked them to this researcher. It's not clear when he pulled this convenient trick, but presumably well after the fact. These details would make her death pretty certain, as they seem to do now. Yet for years, this info was apparently not available as "Shweikani’s family still held out hope that she was alive, and that she would be released."

I suspect this 'sympathetic insider' only 'stepped forward' in November 2018, as if to bolster the government's new listing, as if he had no clue before, or maybe had just forgotten until the registry update jogged his memory. But it seems likely he only handed over these long-quiet details, to support more opposition claims, in the days before Idlibi would finally 'reveal' his own ongoing research.

Otherwise, this "researcher" Idlibi relies - as many other opposition propagandists do - on alleged prisoners who saw detainees here and there, and bring this up upon their alleged release. In this case, I suspect all such source were 'released' suddenly in late November, 2018, just as that official came out to help Idlibi with his big debut as a world-stage research guy.

Here's another little puzzle - following a trial on December 26, as Richard Hall heard it:

"According to Idlbi, Shweikani was then transferred to the infamous Saydnaya prison, just outside of the capital. “Since then our assumption is that she was definitely killed. Because usually you are executed within 48 hours [of a verdict],” he says."  

So it was illogically that "Shweikani’s family still held out hope that she was alive" - at least, once this presumption was formed (just when is unclear - when someone who saw it was allegedly released?) And from that point forward, this outlandish fantasy somehow underpinned their continued public silence, until the regime finally admitted it on their own.

Furthermore, the presumed date, known since whenever, happens to match exactly what they Syrian government had just confirmed - December 28 (transferred Dec. 26, usually killed within 48 hours). Are they really that predictable, or is this a fake prediction fitted to the revelation after-the-fact? The latter option remains open anyway, since Idlibi waited two years for this regime confirmation before raising any public complaints.

In support, the article notes how the Syrian Network for Human Rights also "believes she was executed on 28 December 2016." The SNHR is a western-funded pro-regime change front propaganda group, as Cartalucci notes. It's also the more shrill, partisan propagandist cousin of the widely-cited Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, from which it branched off following an early dispute. The SNHR, not the SOHR, endorse the claims brought by Mr. Idlibi, which means nothing. It blames Assad, so they agree. (that's not to say the western-funded SOHR would NOT endorse the story...)

As Cartalucci notes, Idlibi's status as an opposition member means he lacks neutrality as a witness and further, he might be repaying favors to a hostile state; "Qutaiba Idlbi lives in the United States after receiving a scholarship to study at Columbia University," as Cartalucci found with a bit of his own research. I can add it says Columbia student right on his Twitter profile. More research on this chap may be in order. But even as I'm sure Idlibi is researching me now (as if that matters), I probably won't bother much. My questions are those raised here, and digging around won't answer them. Some discussion with him might provide clues, however. I am going to pursue that.

What Remains
Idlibi's research might still be partly or totally true. I doubt that, but doubt is just what it is. Otherwise, there are other possibilities for the few solid facts here:

1. she was executed legitimately, for a serious crime she was guilty of (or reasonably considered guilty)
2. she was executed illegitimately, on false charges (I take it as my job to question such claims, not rule them out absent a very good reason)
3. She died of natural causes, illness, etc. It happens in jails and prisons everywhere. (but that would mean her charges, confessions, and perhaps trial and sentencing to death at the same time are coincidental)

There are also standing questions over the government's actions. At least as the stories imply, her family was never informed, obviously not given her body. Washington and the Czech ambassador pursued the case, we hear. They must have been misled/uninformed over the execution. I'm not convinced that's the reality, but it could well be. There are different possible reasons, some of them reasonable, why Damascus might stay quiet on this execution in particular. But certainly that secrecy would feed into narratives like those circulating now.

And let's consider the troubling precedents and prior allegations that make these stories seem likely enough most won't even bother with specific evidence. What we think we know about Assad's secret prison killing machine includes mass arrests of innocents, inhumane conditions, routine torture, false confessions, and mass executions, thought to have been ramped up lately. This is; all alleged, with the allegations widely credited. Like most, Layla is said to have been killed at Sednaya prison, the "human slaughterhouse" as decried by Amnesty International in a report I considered here.

It's widely accepted there must be a system to this mass killing, some order for it coming from on high. There probably should be, if it's real. In fact anti-Syria investigators have gathered close to a million pages of top secret documents seized from overrun government facilities, etc. But despite the public bluster, these "Assad Files" apparently reveal no such orders. The best examples they can find to even suggest it note some beatings and some torture have occurred in Syrian prisons. But officials are only seen - talking candidly and secretly between themselves - calling these "mistakes" and ordering that it be stopped. Oversight is proposed. Some deaths by disease are also noted; officials secretly suggested more attention to cleanliness to minimize that. (see here) The orders TO starve, neglect and mass exterminate the prisoners ... yet to be found, just like the orders to shoot or arrest peaceful protesters.

The torture part of Layla's tale might be a specific from Idlibi's supposed insider, or simply inferred from the record of allegations and the supposed proof in the "Caesar photos," said to show "torture." Tony Cartalucci noted this:

"Part of [WaPo reporter Josh] Rogin’s diversions included references to the 2013 “Caesar photographs,” which Rogin would claim were “verified” by the FBI. US Representative Kinzinger is also fond of invoking the photographs which were allegedly smuggled out of Syria and reportedly depict Syrians "tortured then executed" by the Syrian government. "

"What Rogin failed to mention was that the photographs were “verified” only as undoctored by the FBI who never once stepped foot in Syria to investigate or verify the identities of or circumstances surrounding those depicted in the photographs."

This is true and well-put. They are genuine photos, mostly or all taken at an official location in Damascus near Assad's palace. But where did these thousands of real and emaciated bodies come from? I've made a huge project of analyzing these photos (not all published, but a lot of work is collected here). For a nine month span, the bodies came thorough at a rate of about 1,000/month. This is a huge crime. The circumstances deserve careful consideration, not the easily-convinced, almost kneejerk Assad blame they were greeted with.

Some photo evidence and considerable logic suggest those thousands of men and boys (and one woman) were prisoners of the local terrorists (see again FC6). Most likely, that would be the same Jaish Al-Islam that freely kidnaps non-Sunni civilians and uses them how it sees fit (see Fail Caesar part 8), and also seemingly approved of Layla Shewikani's work with "displaced people." Knowing they had a sympathetic insider at the morgue end ("Caesar"), I think they killed off most of the huge number of prisoners they held, forged "regime prisoner" numbers on the bodies they dumped for the government to process as unknown. Then, I suspect, the insider "confirmed" those numbers with his own unofficial morgue photos of the victims, to make it all look official.  Even many opposition sources support my hunch that most of the victims are captured Syrian army soldiers and the like (allegedly, they had "tried to defect" - see here).

So there's little documented reason to be sure this torture-killing of innocents by the "Assad regime"  is a real thing, let alone the obvious explanation for Ms. Shweikani's fate. We should still be applying some skepticism to the specific evidence and, as we see above, finding it doesn't hold much weight on its own. It needs these precedents to be real, but they probably aren't.

Remember Nabil Sharbaji
At least some detainee stories seem to be simply made up, or grossly embellished. Consider the case of Nabil Sharbaji, arrested at the uprising's start in March, 2011, but quickly released, detained again in Feb. 2012 for helping start an opposition newspaper, and held for longer. In late 2012, he allegedly wrote down the names and details of some 82 cellmates at Adra prison - in blood and rust with a chicken bone, on scraps of rough cloth, and seemingly illegible - as highlighted in a presentation and documentary film sponsored by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum.

Then he was arrested a third time at the end of January, 2013. That last arrest is suspicious, going ignored by most sources, and following on an even more-ignored release. He may have been in real jail before, was released twice, and was then kidnapped into a terrorist dungeon for the final and fatal stretch. (see my analysis for this and the following details). It should be noted he, like most highlighted over such fates, was always opposed to violence and Islamism. If anyone had a reason to kill him, it would be the violent Islamists taking over his neighborhood. And yet it was the cruel Assad regime, we hear, arrested everyone nice, forcing the rebellion to turn violent and Islamist...

As it happens the 82-names list - some pile of cloth - was allegedly hidden in the cuffs and collar of one shirt and smuggled out by Mansour Al-Omari, who also ran the VDC's detainee database (that never listed Layla). According to this man and that database, Sharbaji was never released after the second arrest; he kept sending out notes from the regime prisons (mostly with ink and paper and smuggled in unspecified ways) long enough to disprove rumors he was killed in April. The notes continued up to August, 2013, with sightings and an alleged prison visit in October, 3013. But then there's no news I could find for over three years before, in late 2016, the same Mansour Al-Omari revealed how his friend Nabil had been killed two years earlier; "He died in the Saydnaya military prison after a jailer kicked him in the chest" on May 3, 2015.

This would have happened two months after Sharbaji  was reliably identified (March, 2015 - see second VDC martyr's entry) in a "Caesar photo" looking like he died of suffocation. But it's dated February, 2013, and no Caesar photos show bodies later than mid-August of that year. (Alleged sightings continue into October - just long enough to 'clarify' he lived past the photo collection.) But that really looks like him, and timeline analysis supports this is the right basic time for that body number to pass through, probably about two weeks after that murky third arrest. Unless the ID is wrong, he was dead before most of the smuggled notes attributed to him, and some of the alleged sightings. He might still have written that famous 82-names list before he died, but you know ... I just don't buy that either. I find that evidence almost ludicrous in and of itself.

It's worth remembering Nabil at this time, and wondering how widely this kind of embellishment happens. Maybe something of the like plays into the stories about Layla Shweikani's death for no crime, under systematic torture ordered by the brutal Assad regime.

Ma'an Massacre, 2012: Did the Rebel Offensive Falter?

August 4, 2015
(completed August 6)
(even more completed, August 7)

Maan (Arabic: معان - translates "glitter" or "gloss") is the name of a Syrian village located here on Google maps, and on Wikimapia, 22 km north of Hama, and near strategic Morek. Maan is an Alawi-majority (Alawite) village, with a smaller number of Sunni Muslim families. It was the site of a semi-famous alleged massacre by anti-government Islmaist forces (not ISIS) in February 2014 (coverage on A Closer Look On Syria - ACLOS)

This post deals with the less-famous December 2012 massacre in Ma'an, as covered on the ACLOS page Maan Massacre and its discussion page. So yes, this small town has reportedly suffered two massacres so far, at least. The best English source besides ACLOS is SyriaNews.cc, Feb. 14: What Happened in Maan, the Two Massacres.

By some informed sources, in the 2012 massacre, 23 victims, mainly men but including women and children were killed, some victims were beheaded, and bodies were burned. This happened during a three-day rebel occupation of the town, from Dec. 24-26 as reported by the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), who draw on anti-government sources and others as well. Rebels didn't directly (or widely?) acknowledge their occupation, but did report a massacre there at that time (SOHR did not hear about that - ACLOS detective work pieced it together, long before the SyriaNews accounts confirmed there was a 2012 rebel sectarian massacre there). 

But at the time, the VDC, Local Coordinating Committees, and others (hardcore rebel sources) say it was Alawite Shabiha militias who came in on the 25th, Christmas (which the Alawi have celebrated in the past), and killed the few Sunnis in town - though it took rebels a week to find out and tell the world, quietly and with no video.

The question taken up by this post is do the hardcore sources claim or deny that rebels were in Ma'an?  We'll see by following, to some extent, what they have said about that area in the surrounding days.

Intentions: Strategic, not Genocidal

In late 2012, Rebels were clear in their intent to conquer (or "liberate") Ma'an. This stemmed from their interest in controlling Morek - north of Hama, an important town on the highway to rebel-heavy Idlib province.

They were already exercising limited autonomy in Morek since early December at least, arresting regime loyalists and protecting the community. On December 1, they moved to arrest a dangerous criminal named Azam Awes somewhere in Morek. But as the opposition Violations Documentation Center (VDC) records it, an unnamed Daughter Azam Awes, age 5, was shot and "killed by mistake while the revolutionists were arresting her father." This 5-year-old girl is listed by VDC under regime forces fatalities/other statistics, status: regime's army, rank: civilian. It's not as clearly accidental that her dad, regime's army, rank unstated, was also shot dead that day, before or after his "arrest."

But full control of Morek evaded the rebels, partly they said because rockets kept hitting the town from Alawite villages nearby. And so, another front they were forced to open was just to the east. A Dec 20 Reuters report says rebels began to push into Morek this day, besides on other fronts in Hama province. They hear rebels had already "laid siege to ... the Alawite town of al-Tleisia, and "they were also planning to take the town of Maan." An anonymous rebel captain in Hama explained: "the rockets are being fired from there, they are being fired from Maan and al-Tleisia," ans so to control Morek "we need to take Maan."

Below, then, the target area: Crucial Morek on the far left, three towns to the east highlighted. Ma'an and Tulaysiyah are explained. Later reports say three Alawite villages, including Ma'an, were conquered by rebels but re-taken by the 27th. By deduction, the third town is probably Zughba - on Wikimapia labeled "al-Zoghba - Alawite village." Violence and deaths on the both sides are recorded here in the opposition record.In fact, it almost seems soldiers and local "Shabiha" fighters only died there. It's quite interesting, and covered below.

Area rebels had recent experience attacking Alawi "Nussayries" (religious enemies) and denying it on a massive scale. This announcement came ten days after rebels first announced the massacre in the Aalwi half of Aqrab, southern Hama, - up to 200 civilians killed by fellow Alawi of the "Shabiha" militias, they said, as rebels stood by amazed. There was a quick refutation of their story, and of a (clear) massacre at all, by Alex Thomson of Channel 4 News. His report was clear that anything bad that did happen was on the rebels who had kidnapped 500 Aalawi civilians, killed some perhaps, and threatened and lied about the rest. But the lack of anyone else seeming to care - with some days to feel that out - may have helped the Islamists decide they could do it in Ma'an as well.

And just then a new coalition of them was forming, officially on December 22; the Syrian Islamic Front comprised 11 salafist rebel groups, with Ahrar al-Sham (free men of Syria) being the most prominent of these. (Wikipedia) The Syrian Islamic Front did not formally include the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (Victory Front). But the "fronts" openly worked together from this inaugural offensive and onward - as well as earlier, in battles like the one for Aqrab.

Dec. 24th: Fighting to Get In

The Ma'an offensive was just one part of a province-wide campaign that saw fighting and often victories in several areas at once. Only having placed most locales, it's a bit confusing and hard to be sure I'm considering all relevant areas. It's a good climate for massacre shell games, or for someone like me to imagine them anyway.

The opposition's definitive Local Coordination Committees (LCC) used to issue daily reports with reported events and videos compiled by area. These will be the central source for the rest of this article (mostly via Uruknet, sometimes from the LCC's own site). (Note: anyone who wants to open these and read more, they have lots of videos - graphic - and load slow, and can freeze browsers)

The report for December 22 (LCC) shares nothing clearly relevant to this area, but says the Morek (Mawrek) offensive was well underway and yielding victories. It's the same for December 23. No siege is mentioned on Ma'an, Tuylaysiyah, nor Zughba.

But December 24's report mentions "clashes with regime forces in Maan Village" (perhaps meaning the whole area shown above, the "Ma'an front"). LCC reports 19 martyrs in Hama this day, with the most intense shelling in Hama countryside. "Maan: Severe clashes around the village between the Free Syrian Army and regime forces." Two rebels that get named were killed during the battle of Ma'an:

- Mohammed Bassam Jenani, 27, FSA fighter
- Faisal Hawedi "from Aleppo way" 

The affiliated Violations Documentation Center (VDC) has matching entries for both: Mohammad Basam Genane  from Hama:  Hamideih neighborhood, killed  2012-12-24  by Shooting and Fiesal Hwede Hama  Aleppo Road Neighborhood  2012-12-24  Shooting) VDC lists another LCC doesn't: Hasan Masha'an.

Another shared entry took some work I'll show. LCC Dec 24 video: Martyr Ahmed Yakflouni Al-Maarawi in Maan, Hama (rotated still at right). That's an unusual name I've never seen. I found no clear VDC match. The video says his name is  ابو محمد بتفلوني (Abu Mohammed something -  Gtrans gives "Ptvlona" - letter by letter says b-t-f-l-ou-n-ya) with Maarawi written out in 3 words as sons city Maara. Description says he was martyred with his brothers in Hama, near the village of Kawkab (south of Ma'an, labeled on map at the top of the article). LCC mentions this day "Kawkab: Fierce clashes between the Free Syrian Army and regime forces were reported on the outskirts of the village." Family might fight together, or try fleeing Ma'an together, to the south ...

But this is another killed rebel, a senior one. The Arabic name بتفلوني yields zero hits for the whole war. But cutting the first couple letters helps find in the VDC database 3 people I'd call B(a?)kflounia - t for k typo. The very guy on VDC, English: Ahmad Bakflone, non-civilian, FSA, from Maaret al-Nouman, Idlib (son of Maara). He was shot dead Dec. 24. Martyrdom location - Hama Suburbs: Maan town. Notes - Leader of Islam Battalion was martyred during the clashes with the regime forces in Maan town. No brothers are listed by the VDC this day, with that name. Brothers in Islam/fellow sons of Maara?

There's no word or clue in the LCC's report of the 24th about taking Ma'an, nor of causing people to flee there, nor of stopping them from doing so by shooting up their cars. That doesn't mean none of that happened, it's just what they don't mention.

One report from the day hears of a fighter jet rebels shot down: "Activist Sami al-Hamawi said opposition fighters used anti-aircraft machineguns to bring down the plane outside the Alawite village of Maan, which opposition forces have been trying to lay siege to for several days. He said the plane was flying low over an area opposition fighters had seized." Trying to siege suggests not succeeding yet. Over an area they did hold, outside of Ma'an, suggests the areas they hold are outside of Ma'an. This is what they're saying though, and not necessarily the truth.

December 24 IslamforHama video, from some Alawite village in Hama, or a road outside of it anyway, shows several dead fighters in camouflage along the roadside in the mud. This seems to be in al-Zughba, so it will be covered below.

Who Slaughtered this Family?
(optional side-note, possibly unrelated, possibly related directly, informative for context either way - nine members of a family fled from Damascus area to Morek, tried to flee at the time of the rebel advance, were caught on the road and executed with blades, bodies scooped up and filmed by rebels - rebels are vague who that was done by, or if it was maybe "regime indiscriminate shelling." - moved to Mawas Family Massacre)

Signs they Got In

A useful, if poor-quality video (stabilized, so not the original...) Free Sham address Shabih of Alawite village (trans) Ma'an Hama - Part of the battle and the Al Ahrar al-Sham Martyrs Brigades and the Al-Hamza against Shabiha of Ma'an Alawite village in the northern Hama 24 \ 12 \ 2012 has been killing some thugs and led to some (martyred?) Mujahideen mercy of God."

Fighters are seem firing from the orchards, around small stone-and-clay structures (right, some in a small pit). There are buildings nearby ahead (to the right from top view), as well as behind - this is pretty much inside whatever town. Possible mosque minaret seen at 3:16. The twin structures the scene at right is filmed at - old, indistinct, on a line pointing towards the minaret - the best thing to look for is a water tower we see the base of, in the near distance. It's hard to make out Ma'an with the two images Google Earth has. No spot match identified yet, and it might be one of the other towns, for that matter. (Awaiting a breakthrough.)

(follow-up: current Google Earth/Maps image is June, 2014, middling resolution. The only previous one, 2004, has useless resolution. A water tower can be and perhaps was demolished, to limit future resistance to siege. I just don't see one anywhere (maybe at the center of town, 3 tall lines? still present if so, but can that fit this scene?)

Wherever it is, they're taking return fire. The video ends on a panicked note of retreat. Is this done so clearly to help show how they never did get into Ma'an? Was it completely staged, or just a useful edit from the real footage? I haven't noticed any other clearly labeled Ma'an fighting footage. So this is the furthest we see them get. Note the weather: cloudy, breezy, recent rains (ground is green and seems damp).

Dec 24, Syria Politic (site closed over threats) reported at the time on the "Killing and wounding of dozens in Ma'an, Hama countryside after Islamists attacked "in revenge for Halfaya"" (alleged bakery bombing from the day before). Islamist fighters attacked residents "on the outskirts of the village. ... some of them were killed in their homes, such as Yacoub Salema." LCC doesn't mention that, and VDC has no entry.

SyriaNews heard from "Firas," a local who says he lost his mother and four siblings in this massacre, and was wounded in the second one in 2014. He said “The first time the Takfiris attacked was on 24/12/2012. There was a wedding and they took the chance to enter some vacant homes. They attacked three days later killing tens of civilians amid media silence.” The best reading is the wedding happened on the 21st, the attackers robbed homes then, and launched the actual attack with "slaughtering" on the 24th. (other details left out for brevity - see the article)

Some opposition sources reported a rebel attack and partial conquest on the 24th. Naharnet reported  how "Jihadists overran large parts of an Alawite village in the central Syrian province of Hama on Monday," referring to Ma'an, and citing the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. No civilian deaths are mentioned, but the SOHR heard "at least 11 rebel fighters and 20 regime troops were killed." The VDC disagrees - it was 17, at village alzoghba with no regime losses specified in Ma'an.

No one mentions a massacre of civilians at this point. But the VDC lists two civilians from Ma'an who were shot dead the 24th - Unidentified 1 and Unidentified 2 - both with notes "His body was found murdered and thrown in the village." Which village isn't specified, actually. But wherever, rebels then arrived and took photographs (at right) soon after. Or maybe the VDC just obtained these pictures somewhere.

The green ground, signs of mud, and indistinct light look pretty consistent with the rebel video filmed nearby this day. But implicitly they were not killed by the rebels, but by someone else. Note also the blankets - both guys were killed somewhere, carried to this patch of ground, and then laid there - they were "tossed" in to this spot, not found shot right there. It was smart to not claim that.  Now it was whoever - corpses were being tossed around just before the Mujiheddin arrived?
 
Silent Occupation?

Dec 25 LCC: more rebels dying in the battle for Ma'an.
- Yasser Mohammad Tinaoy, 33 years old and a member in the FSA ... from Andalous neighborhood. (VDC has Yaser Mohammad Tinawi)
- Hassan Mashaan (VDC has Hasan Masha'an , Tariq Halab neighborhood  2012-12-24  Shooting)
- LCC misses but VDC lists also Abd al-Raheem Mobarak    Non-Civilian  Adult - Male  Hama  Arbe'in Neighborhood  2012-12-25  Shooting

There's still no word about taking or occupying Ma'an, like the SOHR heard and like others claim and evidence may show. Still taking losses means still trying to get in, or facing resistance anyway. And there's still no word on the 25th, by anyone, of a massacre in Ma'an, which the VDC records later claimed happened on this day. Nor are any killings noted in Tuylaysiyah or Zughba, where no fighting is mentioned either.  This continues into the 26th, with another "warplane shot down in Morek, Hama." Two jets they claim they shot down. That could be. I didn't notice a video to prove either one, however.

The 25th is the last day the LCC shows any signs of a fight for Ma'an, with no mention of a victory. Air attacks were kept at bay, even though someone thought they were neeedded (if that's true) But something on the ground was slowing them own, it sounds like. Did they fail in their mission to seize the Alawite viallges, and just give up after so many died? Only 6 or so killed rebels are listed to the SOHR's at least 11, but the LCC wouldn't list or mention Saudis, Tunisians, etc. fighting with them.

By other sources, it seems rebels enjoyed a partial - or maybe total - conquest on the 24th or 25th, and apparently held whatever part for two days, or parts of three days flanking Christmas. Ma'an was reportedly re-taken by government forces on the 26th (or maybe 27th), as part of their announced and successful offensive in the region. ABC, Australia, reported Dec. 27: "the army took control of three Alawite villages in the central province of Hama, among them Maan, large swathes of which were overrun by jihadists two days earlier, the watchdog (SOHR) said." This could be that day or the day before, as it seemed ... I searched for a primary news source, didn't find it.

On both the 26th and 27th (Uruknet - LCC) the LCC has no mention of Ma'an or anything nearby, nor of massacres - they deny taking or losing the town. Still, rebels seemingly conquered Ma'an, and two other Alawi villages, but lost them within three days or less. They didn't even clearly admit to taking anything, which questions whether they ever intended to announce it. Or did they predict, as anyone could ahve, that they wouldn't hold that much hostile territory for very long? Did they know this would be temporary only?

Recalling that the whole point was that "to control Morek "we need to take Maan."" That sounded like a permanent arrangement they needed, something they couldn't likely get, and didn't get. All they were able to do was create the conditions where, well...

Slow News About the Ma'an Massacre of Sunnis, by Alawis

The news broke on January 1 that there had been an invasion of and a massacre in Ma'an. It had never happened there before. This was from opposition activists, widely reported in the Arab world, hardly anywhere in the West, and nowhere in English. Germany's Der Spiegel reported on the 1st this basic story (translated):

"...members of the militia had Schabiha in the village ... of Maan beheaded 23 people. Those killed included ... the few Sunni families who lived in the village. Also seven children were reportedly killed. The corpses were set on fire, so that some of them could not be identified."

"The massacre is said to have begun after rebels attacked checkpoints in the region on Monday (the 24th or 31st, not made clear here). These were then called the militia fighters."

Shaam News (Arabic)

(Shabiha) committed horrible massacres against our brothers the Sunnis, who make up a small percentage of the village ...  homes on their heads and then burned all the bodies .., has been reached twenty-three a martyr and the number is rising .. In addition to a number of martyrs under the rubble of demolished houses.

Pro-opposition Orient News ran a video on Jan. 1 or 2 (a copy) about how Ma'an "completed the series of massacres" by "Shabiha" and against Sunnis in Hama. Footage of the Qubeir massacre bodies is shown, along with survivors of Aqrab (the ones who blamed Shabiha, under duress, Alex Thomson thought). Other footage includes a burned corpse in a truck, and may be of Ma'an, or more likely just not placed by me. 

One scene, however, also appears in a 2014 video from pro-government al-Manar TV about the recent massacre in Ma'an. If so, it's clearly historical, not from the massacre that happened just days before, and it belongs here. (a still from each video compiled at right, Orient above and Manar below, each one stretched a bit towards normal)

LCC January 1:

More unusual, unplaced video, that could be related to Ma'an:

"Leaked : In this horrific leaked footage filmed by a regime shabiha, Assad's troops take great delight in terrorizing a group of helpless and bound prisoners before isolating two of them, who are stabbed to death before having concrete slabs dropped on their bodies" 

That video was since removed as shocking and disgusting, which it surely was. Less concrete slab, more concrete allegations re: Hama - LCC reports a high toll of 44 martyrs in Hama, "including 23 martyrs from the village of Maan and 16 from Hasraya," both sets in massacres that happened not then but earlier ... the latter, in a bit.

"Hama: Maa'an: 23 people were field-executed by regime forces in the village. It should be noted that they were executed a week ago and their bodies were found today. The martyrs are:Khaled Al-Khalaf Fawzy Al-Arer, Mohannad Al-Toqany and his son Khaled Al-Satof, Ali Al-Rady and his son, Turkia Ahmad Al-Mohammad and her son, Abdullah Khodair Al-Mohammad and his brother Ahmad, 5 people from Al-Awad family, and 7 unidentified children. It should be noted that there are bodies still under the rubble of burned homes."

It's not clarified how and by whom they were just then found, in their homes in the town, and why those people couldn't find them sooner.

Tulaysiyah and Zughba, Laundering Defender Death Locale
There was no word of massacre in these other two apparently overrun Alawi villages east of Ma'an. The only LCC mention of Zughba was to note a rebel killed fighting there. Dec 25 "Hama: Jaber Muhammad Ibrahim was martyred during clashes with regime forces in Zughba Village." VDC lists him, FSA. "Martyred by regime forces sniper gunfire in the battle to liberate Zughbeh." (note: LCC same day also notes "Idlib: Defected soldier Muhammed Mustafa Ibrahim was martyred, he is from Houla, Homs"). LCC didn't mention Tulaysiya.

The VDC, however lists 17 apparent defenders killed in Hama province, and 15 of these share Martyrdom location Hama: Zaghbe village. The Zughba victims, it says, died only on the 27th - implicitly, by the time gov re-claimed it, so... another regime crime? No. The VDC notes on all 17 have something about date of death, mostly "is unknown exactly."

Is death place known exactly?

One Tulaysiyah man (Tleseih) is listed dead - implicit Alawi resident. Some are from Helban, Salamaiya, 16 km south of Zughba (WM). Others are from Sabburah, Sheikh Ali Kasun, and other nearby places in Hama. No regime forces from Ma'an are listed. One is from Homs, "Worked at the Brigade 66" (just north of Halban). Implied there is a conquest further south than the Ma'an front.

Possibly related, LCC Dec. 24: Hama: More than 15 regime forces' personnel have defected on the road to Salamiya, east of Hama." This sounds like soe of the areas these 17 were from. And "More than 15" is pretty close to 17. Did they defect after death, or on video shortly before? 

As with Ma'an, there was no video of the bodies, the direct evidence with clues of who they were and how they died - but it happened after their withdrawal, right?

Video!
A December 24 IslamforHama video makes the case for them all dying here, from some Alawite village in Hama, or a road outside of it anyway. Village name ( الزغبة ) doesn't seem to quite say Zughba, but pasted in Wikimapia, it points only to there. This shows several dead fighters in camouflage along the roadside in the mud (one still at right), and in one case, a head-shot execution victim is right in the middle of the road, closest to the village. I count at least 16 victims.

A December 25 video shows more of the same scene, with many of the same bodies, and some others. I haven;t correlated a tally, but about 20 total sounds close. This is more than the VDC specifies, but maybe the same they list, as regime victims for this whole offensive. The SOHR also heard at least 20 defenders were killed. Is this what they're talking about? Is this really all there were? And were these really all killed right here?

top left, looking into town, bottom left looking away

Where is it?  A straight road into town, running maybe east-west (towards setting sun). First buildings on the left, on line with two tall trees. Further back, homes spread to the right. A thin tower is visible that way. Turning the other way, a tel (sharp hill) is visible on a line almost the same as the road's (labeled at right).

Checking all three towns,  and a couple others in the area, all these features say this is on the western road into Zughba. The line of (stones?) to the right (blue line) isn't there in GEs 2007 image not the one from May 2014 (current at Google Maps). But maybe that was temporary. It's still the best match I can see. See comparison below. The trees are further in than I thought. The tel is just right (bottom image shows line of sight to it - the smaller bump next to it is probably a shed that's nearby on a similar line)

one orange square turned blue and I didn't notice. Damn MS paint

About 180 meters from that first house on the left, a larger military truck (lorry) sits on the road, all its tires flat. Near the truck, a patch of pavement with a different quality (not always visible), a gap in the rock line on the north side just after (white lines - these appear in the 2007 image used at right - this strengthens the match).

The truck's direction of travel (suggested) is away from town. The bodies seem to be evenly on both sides in the stretch of road between it and town. It's as if they jumped off the sides for a while and then died, and then the truck stopped when it got empty.

The second video's description translates "Al-Nusra Front has protected them God Brigades stormed the village in the upper Villus (al-Zughba) Hama northern barrier 20 \ 12 \ 2012 was the liquidation of a number of thugs and hit a convoy servo escape the rest of the Shabiha resulting in the martyrdom of a number of Mujahideen mercy of God. The Almighty God willing this will be the fate of all children supporting the criminal murderer Bashar al-Assad"

The VDC describes these men as killed by "shooting," and a few seem simply shot. But in some cases, that's clearly not the case. I see here: at least five likely Islamist-style slaughter victims: skull sliced open from behind and brain laying aside, a throat carved out, an eye missing, an apparent hacked forehead, one man with his chin sliced in half and throat sort-of torn open, not sure how to call that - and some others that are less clear.

These bodies were apparently tossed out here  one-by-one after death. They weren't killed here, all the same couple of meters from the road, each somehow murdered in horrible ways in the open. Some would run further out. More would die in and clustered around/under the truck. Many were dragged into place, but the one left in the road argues against this being post-cleanup. This is a body dump, likely from the army struck rebels stole, and then parked here as a prop for a fictional story.

This dump might have been after the victims were first trucked to this town from wherever, dead or alive. That's an important point, as it obscures just where rebels were doing their most effective killing and capturing - at a time they were downplaying any conquest of Ma'an - the site of someone's planned sectarian massacre.

Unrelated? Hasraya Mass Graves and Checkpoint of Horrors

There is a parallel story well worth considering here, regarding the village of Hasraya, 24 km west of Ma'an between Kafr Zita and Jalama, where rebels took over and found a mass grave just as the Ma'an massacre is alleged. The implication is two same-day rebel offensives, in Maan and this way, with bodies found this way. Interestingly, it's about the same story in 2014 - rebels discovered a massacre in Jalama on the same day they denied one during their second conquest of Ma'an. That seemed to me like a possible means of Laundering the Ma'an Massacre, 

LCC Jan. 1:

"Hama: Hasraya: A mass grave containing the bodies of 16 people including women, they were all killed during the period of time when officer captain Ahed Abbas "Abu Jaafar" was in charge of the checkpoint that was located in the town before it was liberated by the Free Syrian Army. Some of the bodies were discarded in drilled sanitation canals, most of the bodies have not been identified yet."

Back on December 25, as the Ma'an Massacre was perhaps wrapping up, Hassariya yielded this news:

Hasra'a, Hama: FSA forces found a mass grave containing the remains of many martyrs killed by regime forces; many of the bodies had turned to skeletons. The victims are believed to have been killed at the checkpoint before their bodies were thrown into the mass grave."

The "skeletons" part makes it clear the people died long ago, decayed away before rebels even got there. But it's possible they were freshly killed but burned down to the bones. Rebels would claim the Ma'an victims were burned to the point of being unrecognizable, if not to the point of being skeletal.

Alleged timeline: abuses happened before liberation, under crazed regime commander - mass grave found once by FSA upon conquest, and as Maan massacre happens upon conquest, the 25th - graves found again, or new ones and also with old bodies, by locals 7 days later, as Maan massacre victims are acknowledged on January 1. Does that mean anything?

As with Ma'an, and unusually, the opposition's "activists" provide no video evidence for this Assad crime - they don't let us see under either of the two shells in this possible shell game. The checkpoint is distinct and well-framed in the video - in fact that seems to be the whole idea: "here's this checkpoint, right? Here's abuses happening right in it." That's exactly how it's filmed. I imagine it could be geo-located to the place they claim, and that rebel fakers indeed had access to it, for at least one late afternoon around then. Local victims, military or civilian, are likely enough. But the mass graves video, again, wasn't even shared, if it was even made.

Hasraya Checkpoint Abuse Video

How do we know crazy killers ran that place before?  LCC Dec. 25: "This video of regime troops beating, kicking and stamping on a defenseless young teenager at the Abu Hafar checkpoint in the village of Hasra'a, Hama was found on the mobile phone of an Assad soldier killed in fighting between regime soldiers and FSA troops who liberated the village."However, an anlysis suggests this video is faked. See split-off explanation here.

Map Center Map and Claim 
Syrian Map Center post from December 31 (Arabic) gives a map of Ma'an, with some areas just outside town to the north and south circled in blue and labeled 325 and 350. (They describe the village as "a base to direct the mortar fire," or had it directed against - might connect to these areas.)

2 reasons to mention this: they have a satellite image I don't think I've seen yet. As note, Google's Maan imagery is lacking. If I can find where this is from, maybe will help set the Dec. 24 attack video.

Translated, it says they were publishing details "a week after the end of the process," by Ahrar al-Sham Brigades and Jabhat al-Nusra - "aimed at a large gathering of Shabiha in the village." The operation was a "a big success" and "resulted in the killing of more than 200 Shabiha." This isn't reflected anywhere else - only the 20 or so dumped some kilometers to the east. Did they just add a zero, or get the alleged death toll from Aqrab two weeks earlier mixed in?

Body Abuse Video
But  bad stuff was happening and being filmed and they got video, or copies.

Two 'leaked' videos from the other side are shared up top for the 27th, not under the usual province headings. One is unplaced, one in Hasraya, Hama, and they both might be in Hama. The latter, will come back to. The former: Asad's Shabiha Mutilate and Burn the Corpse of a Citizen. My notes: men in irregular military gear, unafraid to show their faces, the one anyway (see right) stab a dead man in the belly very hard, then in the neck, insulting him for being an armed rebel. Then they douse him with gasoline, and light him up, swearing "we will burn the country for the sake of al-Assad."Only his left thigh is seen burning.

They clearly made this video message for someone to see, but didn't get to release it before rebels killed them, took it, and published it for them. Or maybe it was leaked, as described. Point being, Assad bad. The walls have bullet-holes, rubble - these "Shabiha" took over at this site, some hours before this video (rigor mortis) but no later than Dec. 25. And from the likely fake-ness of this video (high propaganda-to-plausibility ratio), I'd say these are rebel "defectors" with their old gear.

By clothing, I wondered if the victim was the unidentified Ma'an resident on the right in the image above. But build and all other clues suggest not, although the resolution is too bad to even be clear on this. I think this is likely a third possibly armed citizen of Ma'an whom the rebels "liberated." The hate in the stabbing, the hesitation at the neck, and the burning suggest maybe a lightly-filtered sectarian psychology like these defectors have.

Syria: Ghouta Chemical Massacres: Death Toll and Estimates

June 9, 2015 (incomplete)
last edits Oct. 24

Just how many people died in the alleged Sarin attack has never has been clearly established. As I've investigated this off-and-on over the last 20 months I've used the term x-hundred. I've considered it probably between 500 and 1,000, with a shifting idea on where in between, now settling towards the lower end of that range, or maybe even less than 500.

In the aim of getting a best reading and likely range, I've been comparing videos and photos of different body displays, getting some body counts and looking for repeats. Those shown in 2 or more displays that I've identified are at Body Re-Cycling  and go against straight scene addition in creating a visual minimum of credibly-placed victims in non-repeating groups. When there's more to say, it will go below under Our Estimate.

It's also well worth looking at what death tolls informed and/or powerful people have offered and what these seem to be based on.

White House Death Toll: 1,429
* White House Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 (from a few days after the incident) Excerpts on findings - specific - and methodology - vague.

A preliminary U.S. government assessment determined that 1,429 people were killed in the chemical weapons attack, including at least 426 children, though this assessment will certainly evolve as we obtain more information.

We have identified one hundred videos attributed to the attack, many of which show large numbers of bodies exhibiting physical signs consistent with, but not unique to, nerve agent exposure.

At least 12 locations are portrayed in the publicly available videos, and a sampling of those videos confirmed that some were shot at the general times and locations described in the footage.

This was in line with the most extreme counts offered, and far out of line with more evidence-based tallies (see below sections). A few mainstream news reports addressed this issue. For example:

U.S. toll for Syria higher than others' Britain, France and a key opposition group cite fewer dead in the alleged chemical attack last month. by Ken Dilanian and Shashank Bengali, LA Times September 04, 2013

But Britain and France have cited far lower numbers of confirmed deaths, ...U.S. officials say they can't disclose how they derived their figure without compromising intelligence, but they say it is based on a variety of sources and they stand by it.

In this same report, Obama spoke of "well over 1,000" dead, while Kerry assured the world "at least 1,429 Syrians were killed in this attack," and unnamed official agreeing that "officials believed the death toll could even go beyond 1,429." Shawn Turner, a spokesman for the U.S. director of national intelligence, said they used information "from a number of sources, including international and Syrian medical personnel, videos, witness accounts and social media reports." SOHR's Abdulrahman said "I don't know where this number came from," but then suggested he did know; "The U.S. took this high number from one part of the Syrian opposition that is supported by the U.S. government ...We don't trust them."

Reuters reported September 12 that "three congressional sources told Reuters that administration officials had indicated in private that some deaths might have been caused by the conventional bombing that followed the release of sarin gas." This wound up seeming a minor point (and also most likely an untrue one). More of interest is what the reporters heard

Administration sources told Reuters that they relied on a valid intelligence methodology to make the death estimate. An official said that it involved analyzing video pictures of victims, then eliminating from the fatality total any live person, any dead body with visible injuries and shrouded bodies showing blood spots. Classified intelligence tools then were used to confirm the provenance of the videos and to ensure that bodies were not counted twice, the official said.

This is not how one would reach a count like 1,429; It should be in the low-to-mid hundreds, if they kept to video record the rest of us can see, maybe a bit higher if they dug up all available photos too. (Once I've got a clearer count myself, I'll say what it should be.) The official doesn't specify how many people they counted when doing this, just mentioned that they did it, and it was "involved" in setting the death toll. But he hinted that it was some other non-public source that really mattered; "the official noted that U.S. intelligence had more resources to gather information than human rights or other non-governmental groups."

And they say whatever the intelligence behind the number, it's convincing; "Nobody who has looked at the intelligence thinks this number is way off," an unnamed senior U.S. official told Reuters. I for one find this show of confidence rather suspicious. Most likely they did just accept one of the higher rebel-supplied tallies and added a few to get their number. This would be a matter of policy that desired the biggest stick possible at that moment to threaten Syria with. All their other analysis would just be to appear rigorous, not to provide a useable number, let alone anything towards establishing a cause.

Other Friendly Intel Counts
British and French or whoever offered lower (minimum) counts. Will dig this up.

Unified Revolutionary Medical Office: 1,302
* The VDC's August 23 report includes the final statistics of martyrs issued by the United Revolutionary Medical Office in Eastern Gota." (better view in jpeg form here
this early list gives several areas which I can mainly read, with an Arabic alphabet chart handy - some don't line up clearly or make sense, to me, but this is what it says:

1.  ?? Douma - 20dead 630 affected
2. Saqba 105 dead, 1,460 affected
3. Kafr Batna 125 dead, 2,226 aff
4.  ?? (reads el-Hsan) 174 dead, 1,200 aff.
5.  ?? (reads al-shamiya - meaning M. al-Sham, or an area in east Ghouta I can't find?) 6 dead, 74 affected
6. Jisreen 16 dead, 17 aff
7. Irbeen 110 dead, 600 aff
8. Jobar: 27 dead, 700 aff.
9.  ?? (reads al-mlyahiya - meaning Mleha?) 87 dead, 165 aff
10. Zamalka 500 dead, 1200 aff
11.  ?? (reads ankhad (?) Rouh (spirit) - a sad cat video title translated suggests "save the soul" or "save our souls" - is that a place? Does it mean unknown?) 1 dead, 182 aff
12.  ?? (reads el-salmiya meaning ???) 46 dead, 800 aff.
13. Hammouriya 27dead, 200 aff.
14. total = 1,302 dead, 9,838 affected

This raises many questions regarding the now-accepted picture of a Zamalka-only impacts and winds to the W-SW. But so do a lot of unequivocal early statements from rebel sources, and each of the questions they raise has its own questions. The point is, it it yields same (rounded) total as a rebel infographic  shown below, 1300, and both being circulated within the first couple of days, might be a good baseline from which to add 127 later-identified victims and get 1,429.

Other Opposition
* "Where's the proof? Classified, says US, though poised to strike despite lack of evidence" By Zeina Karam And Kimberly Dozier via Hamilton Spectator Summary: Opposition SNC can only list 395 named and semi-named victims, while claiming a number "close" to Obama's. "In Ghouta, Majed Abu Ali, a spokesman for 17 clinics and field hospitals near Damascus, produced the same list, saying the hospitals were unable to identify all the dead." The SOHR had collected 502 properly name-identified alleged victims, and while that may not have been all of them, they didn't seem to feel there were anything like 900 more to identify. Doctors Without Borders/MSF had an Aug. 24 estimate of 355 killed, from 3 affiliated clinics. But they'd lost touch and been unable to get updates. Also a HuffPost report has MSF claiming 3600 casualties, 355 dead.

At one point the VDC listed just over 500 victims to the SOHR's 502, making this seem a likely real number. But the VDC insisted the number was higher and kept adding newly discovered victims, eventually listed over 900 (now down to 898 + one I found listed as "other" and + one with no date) - but by now I've identified dozens of duplicate entries, maybe they've culled some - dozens more are "unidentified,"  mostly all unverifiable anyway. VDC adjusted - they may reflect 7-800 actual dead, and I'd guess that's the highest they could get the death toll is no higher. It's a good roof above the roof of a best estimate.

WhoGhouta
A go-to source on the Ghouta Massacre(s), great on the issues they cover:
http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html (November 2013)

Evidence that hundreds were killed:

• We have not yet concluded our analysis of the number of casualties, but most sources report numbers in the hundreds. A good analysis of the different sources may be found here, reaching an estimate of less than 500.

That always seemed reasonable but I never checked what it was based on. Now I see the link is wrong, going to an unrelated statement. Perhaps they meant the on-site post for victim count from October, not filled-in but with some comments. Some interesting discussion, but the number 500 only appears from fellow ACLOS wiki member CE, in an October comment:

...For me the most credible account seems to be the one of the Center for Documentation of Violations, with around 500 victims, most of them named and many with photos. See here for details on the CDV data. That number is roughly on par with what the SOHR claims - who complained that the US was exaggerating numbers, which is quite remarkable as that outlet has been the default go-to "expert" for all things Syria numbers in the Western corporate media for most of the crisis, and often accused of exaggerating themselves.

So if that's what it Whoghouta was pointing to, it was a reasonable basis, coming from us. But it's not a very good final answer. These opposition sources were never to be trusted, or dismissed outright. The interesting sense of cross-purposes and meshing death tolls was momentary - we see now they're part of the exaggerator crowd Abdulrahman doesn't trust. It might wind up being around 500 anyway, but that's largely coincidental if so.

Our Estimate

A visual minimum can reliably be established - it took a separate post to explain and manage sub-tallies, visual aids, etc. With the work ACLOS already did plus a little correlation, I established how many bodies were at each site and how many were recycled between sites, and placed all sites (by visuals or compelling logic) in East or West Ghouta. Between the scenes, I count app. 420+ victims seen in the Ghouta area, and that's almost all of them we can see anywhere. The remainder probably belong as well. That's not proven, but it's apparently not a massive question. 

 

Considering that minimum but doing no further work, the death toll is likely 500+ - but how big the plus is remains unclear. I can't rule out 1,000+ or even 1,400+ but somewhere in the range of 500-800 seems most likely. And they didn't very likely come from Latakia, but somewhere nearer to Damascus - the Ghouta area itself, maybe southern Homs province or Deraa.