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Showing posts with label UN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UN. Show all posts

Friday, March 8, 2024

Thoughts on the UN Report and What it Shows about October 7 Rape Claims

March 8, 2024

A Report from "the Viagra Lady"

Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict: "Mission report: Official visit of the Office of the SRSG-SVC to Israel and the occupied West Bank" 29 January – 14 February 2024 - PDF link:  https://news.un.org/en/sites/news.un.org.en/files/atoms/files/Mission_report_of_SRSG_SVC_to_Israel-oWB_29Jan_14_feb_2024.pdf

Press release: ‘Clear and convincing information’ that hostages held in Gaza subjected to sexual violence, says UN Special Representative - UN News, 4 March, 2024 - https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147217

The UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten, "following a 17-day visit to Israel ... reported on Monday that she and a team of experts had found “clear and convincing information” of rape and sexualized torture being committed against hostages seized during the 7 October terror attacks" and also "reasonable grounds to believe that conflict-related sexual violence occurred in multiple locations" during the October 7 attacks themselves. The latter is something I've analyzed here in some detail: Monitor on Massacre Marketing: Words Without Truth: How the New York Times Helped Netanyahu Weaponize Sexual Violence Allegations Against the People of Gaza

It's worth noting how, in 2022, Ms. Paten was caught laundering Ukrainian claims (seemingly recycled from Libya, 2011) that Russian troops were issued a Viagra equivalent to enhance their systematic rape of Ukrainian women. She passed this on as fact, but later admitted it likely wasn't true, and how she was handed these claims and did little or nothing to verify them. "I have an advocacy mandate," she explained. "My role is not to investigate.” Others at the UN did the investigating, and "in their reports so far, there’s nothing about Viagra." 

As then, Paten's mission to Israel "was not investigative in nature." It "was not intended to be, and is not a substitute for, an investigation by relevant United Nations entities mandated for that purpose, nor is it a replacement for criminal investigations and proceedings subject to due process of law." [25] The report also notes "the absence of United Nations entities operating in Israel, as well as the lack of cooperation by the State of Israel with relevant United Nations bodies with an investigative mandate." [55]

Press release: "Ms. Patten’s recommendations include a call for the Israeli Government to grant full access to the UN human rights office (OHCHR) and the Human Rights Council-mandated independent Commission of Inquiry on the occupied territory “to conduct fully-fledged independent investigations into all alleged violations.” 

But so far, they haven't done these things. Instead, it seems Israel only wanted some "advocacy" from "the Viagra lady," as they might have seen it, the one with no power to actually investigate. Interesting. 

But it should be noted that the Mission did apply at least some scrutiny to some of the provided information, even discounting some claims. It could be called an investigation, but technically it isn't. What they collect could be called evidence, but they call it "information." It's handled less formally, and ... something. I don't fully get the distinctions here, but it's discussed in the press conference (video at the top link). Their findings have less authority than those of a proper investigation, for one thing. 

Report Content: Still "No Medical, No Video - Just Words"

The report claims to draw on the mission's 33 meetings with "Israeli representatives," 34 "confidential interviews including with survivors and witnesses of the 7 October attacks, released hostages, first responders and others," and their "examining more than 5,000 photographic images and 50 hours of video footage." Due to the Israeli refusal to cooperate with the UN probes, "information gathered by the mission team was in a large part sourced from Israeli national institutions." [55] 

Right: Paten in Israel, next to Yossi Landau, southern region director of rescue group ZAKA, and a major producer of October 7 atrocity hoaxes (Israel MFA via Electronic Intifada)

The mission heard about alleged Israeli abuses of Palestinians in the West bank since October 7, including threats of rape, beatings in the genitals, unwanted touching, and "inappropriate strip search and prolonged forced nudity." They were not in verification mode for these reports, and made no visit to the Gaza war zone. The report notes that other UN agencies are working on these aspects, and of course they were never the subject of the Israeli pressures that prompted this mission.

The external focus has been on alleged abuses of Israelis by Palestinians, on October 7 and since. As the report concludes, the mission found "clear and convincing information that some hostages taken to Gaza have been subjected to various forms of conflict-related sexual violence," and they had "reasonable grounds to believe that such violence may be ongoing." This was "based on the first-hand accounts of released hostages," with no supporting evidence mentioned (not that much would be expected).

Released hostages Mia Schem and Agam Goldstein-Almog have given evidence for rape (of someone else), or a culture of it (barely restrained by a jealous wife) under Hamas captivity. But both did so after first speaking in a much different tone, or giving different details, and failing to mention or even hint at this dark side. Other former hostages have said they witnessed someone else being raped or the like, with no differing accounts to contrast. But that doesn't mean they are any more truthful. 

None of them are absolutely, necessarily false, but at least some hostage accounts are quite dubious, and it's quite possible all of them are concocted under pressure - external or internal - from the same "Israeli representatives" pressing for and guiding this UN mission. 

As for October 7 itself, the mission was able to "verify" at least one "incident of the rape of a woman outside of a bomb shelter" but heard "other allegations of rape that could not yet be verified." [13] Perhaps the one case was "verified" as in proven true, and perhaps other cases sit fully ready to join it. But by and large, it seems this comes from a policy of giving supposed witnesses the benefit of the doubt wherever it's possible, not just where it's warranted. It's almost like this is some UN Human Rights mandate - a supposed witness can NEVER lie, unless that winds up undeniably, 100% proven.  

October 7 rape claims are reasonably believable, according to the UN mission, "based on the examination of available information, including credible statements by eyewitnesses" and nothing else they mention. [58] It's not clear how they define a witness statement as "credible," but so far the public has only heard from the other kind. And regarding those they worked with...

"It must be noted that witnesses and sources with whom the mission team engaged adopted over time an increasingly cautious and circumspect approach regarding past accounts, including in some cases retracting statements made previously. Some also stated to the mission team that they no longer felt confident in their recollections of other assertions that had appeared in the media." [64]

Some witnesses changed their stories after theirs and others' were exposed as lies. Indeed, that must be noted.

The report does not mention any autopsies or medical evidence they saw to support the rape claims. It still seems Israel never gathered such evidence at all, perhaps for fear of discovering a negative answer.

The mission's call is also based on no video evidence: "no digital evidence specifically depicting acts of sexual violence was found in open sources" [77] and "in the medicolegal assessment of available photos and videos" - including those provided by Israeli sources - "no tangible indications of rape could be identified." [74] In "5,000 photographic images and 50 hours of video footage," including from Hamas body cameras, there was ZERO "tangible indications of rape" the mission could find. And they tried. So have the Israelis, and they give no indication of having found anything either. 

As I noted before; it's not that this stuff definitely never happened, but it seemingly never happened in front of a camera, which would be odd given the alleged scale of the abuse. It leaves wide open the possibility that all these "credible" but shifting accounts are simply lies.

Some Specific Claims Addressed

"The medicolegal assessment of available photos and videos revealed multiple corpses with injuries, predominantly gunshot wounds, including to intimate body parts such as breasts and genitalia. Because in most instances additional injuries were also seen on other body parts, no discernible pattern of genital mutilation could be established. [76] That's what I was asking, and what Schwartz and crew for the New York Times refused to consider when they wrote of "a video, provided by the Israeli military, showing two dead Israeli soldiers at a base near Gaza who appeared to have been shot directly in their vaginas." I added these injuries were "perhaps among other shots to every part of the body, or perhaps in the targeted way they suggest." The UN Mission found that, for the most part, these were just incidental parts of some body-wide shooting. 

They also considered the reports of a woman found, bound on a bed with a "sharp object" or "knife" left in her vagina, or as the Times put it, citing a provided photo, with "dozens of nails driven into her thighs and groin." All agree she was found in a home in Be'eri that was explosively collapsed, but they agree that had nothing to do with her injuries. In contrast to the Times' reporters, the UN mission found this claim "could not be verified by the mission team due in large part to the limited availability and low quality of imagery." [65] 

They heard from "other credible sources" about women, especially around the Nova music festival, partly or totally naked, "with some gunshots in the head and/or tied including with their hands bound behind their backs and tied to structures such as trees or poles.[58] "The mission team was also able to ascertain that multiple bodies of women and a few men were found totally or partially naked or with their clothes torn, including some bound and/or attached to structures, which – though circumstantial – may be indicative of some forms of sexual violence." [60]

Some went to the rave almost naked and were later found dressed just the same way. Charred, mutilated bodies with torn clothing may indicate Hamas violence or Israeli tank or helicopter fire, which is now understood to kill an unclear but significant number of civilians. Some victims might wind up flung against and then "attached to" some structures, for example. Otherwise, maybe these images (which we haven't seen) do show the results of Hamas raping women and even men, during some breaks in the fighting. Or it seems quite possible some ZAKA types, who would have more time on their hands, stripped some bodies and tied them up to look that way. 

Paragraph 14 and 65 combined explain: "The mission team conducted a visit to kibbutz Be’eri and was able to determine that at least two allegations of sexual violence widely repeated in the media, were unfounded due to either new superseding information or inconsistency in the facts gathered ...  including first responder testimonies, photographic evidence and other information." 

The "sharp objects" claim above is a third claim from Be'eri they could neither confirm nor refute. But they were forced to dismiss these other two claims.

Paragraph 65 continues to specify "the allegation of a pregnant woman whose womb had reportedly been ripped open before she was killed, with her fetus stabbed while still inside her."  It's not explained how they discounted this story, almost as if it were fit to dismiss out-of-hand. And it probably is, but it seems to fall under "inconsistency in the facts gathered" - one of two reasons given to discount two claims. 

This bizarre claim was originally lodged, it seems, by ZAKA's Yossi Landau (to Paten's left in the photo above), and has been debunked by Ha'aretz and others, including (and especially well) by myself, based on inconsistent facts. Most note that no pregnant woman was reportedly killed on October 7, making for an easy case. I was able to add a later report of one pregnant woman that was reportedly killed, and she fit some reported details of this story (aged ~30 & 4 months pregnant), but with a different true story; she was killed randomly in a grenade attack at a roadside shelter after fleeing the Nova rave. She was not slaughtered at a house in Be'eri, where she did not live, nor in front of children that weren't even born yet (that was to be her first). 

Paragraph 65 continues to the second refuted allegation: 

"Another such account was the interpretation initially made of the body of a girl found separated from the rest of her family, naked from the waist down. It was determined by the mission team that the crime scene had been altered by a bomb squad and the bodies moved, explaining the separation of the body of the girl from the rest of her family." 

The Sharabi Girls: Who was Where?

Here we must pause. This almost surely refers to one of the Sharabi sisters, Yahel (13) or Noiya (16), and probably to Yahel. Both were REPORTEDLY seen as apparent rape victims, in the only scene remotely similar to this that has been reported. But in most versions, there were two girls found. 

Military paramedic "G" has claimed to several sources he saw the bodies of two girls in a bedroom, separated from any parents or guardians. One was face-down on the floor with "pajama pants pulled to her knees, bottom exposed, semen smeared on her back," alongside another girl on the bed, with "boxer shorts ripped, bruises by her groin." [NYT] The Times report found these girls had the same ages (13 and 16) as the only sisters reportedly killed in Be'eri, Yahel and Noiya Sharabi.

This paramedic's story is challenged, but in two different ways. One of these versions can hardly be true, but neither can be discounted just yet. 

First, some reports cited by the Gray Zone, then the Intercept, and seemingly supported by the girls' grandparents, have the girls dying in the embrace of their mother, not separated and raped.

The GrayZone cited The Times of Israel:  "Family said that the bodies of the three women, who all held dual UK-Israeli citizenship, were found in an embrace." But for what it's worth, the only family they mention hearing from is "Lianne’s parents, Gill and Pete Brisley."

A BBC report along these lines also heard, exclusively, from the grandparents in Bristol, and they heard this exclusively from "a soldier" who says he found the girls: "Mrs Brisley said they later found out the bodies of their daughter and grandchildren had been found by a soldier "all cuddled together with Lianne doing what a mother would do - holding her babies in her arms, trying to protect them at the end". 

The Intercept would later add how all 3 ladies “were just shot — nothing else had been done to them," according to "their grandmother Gillian Brisley," speaking to Israeli Channel 12. “They were found between the ‘mamad’” — the house’s safe room — “and the dining room and it’s an awful thing to say, they were just shot — nothing else had been done to them. They were shot,” said Gillian Brisley. “A soldier said he saw our daughter” — the girls’ mother — “but she was covering the two girls and they were shot,” added her husband, Pete, the girls’ grandfather." 

Again, this is what the soldier told the grandparents. For all we know, he may be the same soldier/paramedic G, giving them and the outside world two different stories. Or perhaps it's another soldier. But no matter how many sources the claim gets repeated to, it remains questionable, considering there's another version backed, it seems, by the new UN report.

The Intercept, referring to the girls only by initial, noted how "N was initially reported missing for two weeks because her body had yet to be formally identified." This refers to the alternate version where the older sister, Noiya, was considered missing and possibly kidnapped, ten days after the massacre. 

The Sun (UK tabloid), October 17, speaking with family members and visiting the home, reported "It has been confirmed Yahel died alongside her mum Lianne while her sister Noiya, 16, dad Eli, 51 and uncle Yossi, 53 were missing or kidnapped." No third body, identified or not, is mentioned as being found in their home. I had read this as excluding her from the house - she was somewhere else, perhaps abducted to another house with others, where they were killed alongside their captors. But perhaps she was here the whole time and they just thought that was someone else's body?

The Sun: "A hallway where a huge blackened smear of blood appears to be the spot where Lianne died. And upstairs, another bloodstain tells its horror story in a room where Yahel slept — heavily staining the carpet close to a pair of pink pyjamas and vanity case." There's some blood visible on the floor, or at least on a rug edge (?) and some light blue cloth there, despite it being kept mainly off-frame.

Noiya was finally identified a few days after The Sun report, on October 22 (Guardian) or 10/23 (Jewish News).

When he spoke to Republic TV (India), on or by October 25, G might have hinted that one of his "girls" was - or had been - missing (Eylon Levy posting). He specifies "2 girls," but mainly ignores one to focus on "the girl" who was "laying on her bed - on the floor" (correcting himself), left to lie "in the blood of her ... in a pile/puddle of blood." Was he about to say "the blood of her sister," but realized she wouldn't be there? If so, why include her in the scene at all? And either way, it's his later accounts (CNN & NYT in December) that he's plenty clear on both victims being teenage girls, and both being in this room. So maybe I just imagined those clues.

The girls' uncle, Sharon Sharabi, does not come down clearly supporting either story. He told The Intercept “To tell you concretely what happened in Be’eri, or what happened at the house of the Sharabi family, I don’t have an answer for you ... There is certainly no credible information I can give you, only testimonies of ZAKA or of military personnel who arrived at the scene first and saw the atrocities. So any information I might give you is information that I’m not confident about, and therefore I would rather not give it [at all].” 

"He added, “I’ve heard all the versions. What’s the truth? I don’t know.” Sharabi emphasized that he firmly believes there was widespread sexual violence committed during the attacks of October 7," but he won't endorse unreliable information from ZAKA or the IDF. And this is why uncle Sharon doesn't write for the New York Times. 

The rest of us should feel no better informed than he is, and maintain an open mind, for what it's worth, regarding what happened in that house that day.

Kibbutz Be'eri spokesperson Michal Paikin also denied the rape(s), telling The Intercept “the Sharabi girls ... were shot and were not subjected to sexual abuse.” But Paikin did not address this controversy of who was found where.

Finally, the UN report seems to support the sidelined "Sun" version; that a single girl was "found separated from the rest of her family" is presented as a fact, which they have a specific explanation for: "the crime scene had been altered by a bomb squad and the bodies moved, explaining the separation of the body of the girl from the rest of her family." 

Was she found with the others, then moved, and later found separate? But not the other sister? Did they just infer that, or is this based on relevant, factual details they learned? Two reasons are given for dismissing two claims, and this one seem to be due to "new superseding information." New information. Let's take careful note.

And let's ask WHY would a bomb squad be moving bodies around? Does a girl's corpse need carried upstairs before you can be sure there's no tripwire attached?

So now the girl is said to be alone, her sister still downstairs or missing somewhere else. There's still no great reason to believe G's description that included two girls, but let's consider, as this semi-informed new report also states as fact the one was found "naked from the waist down." A story including that also has what seemed to be semen smeared on her backside, in that position. This would mean she - or her body - was raped in that room. And if this rape came after her body was moved there, for whatever reason, by members of an Israeli bomb squad... it might suggest someone on that team, or someone they cover for, raped the girl's corpse. 

One question about the claim arises: If Yahel's body was moved upstairs from an original spot, it seems unlikely that much blood would it shed on the floor upstairs; once the heart stops beating, bodies only bleed passively. 

OR if the other version is true, and she was always cuddled with her mother and unidentified sister downstairs, then whose blood is that visibly on the floor upstairs? Maybe neither story is true, the room is where Yahel was killed, with no cuddling but also no rape.

In that case, the bomb squad story was ... some kind of misunderstanding? It's an awkward story, but it might help cover for an even worse one. Let's consider what if a rescuer with ZAKA or some elite military unit had assaulted the girl's corpse, and this became known to Israeli officials. They might want to back off the rape claim entirely, in the most convenient way - cite that mother's embrace story one of their soldiers originally told. But if they also knew the same body was seen upstairs alone, they might  choose to suggest mother's embrace, so no rape, then moved upstairs and still no rape - obviously, since Hamas was long gone by then. They would be throwing the paramedic's account under the bus, but it seems to be there already, so why not? Then maybe a bomb squad seemed like the best explanation for that move. Although the supposed reasoning isn't clear, I also can't think of anything better.  

Side-note: State of bodies

“Lianne and Yahel could only be identified through DNA samples. Noiya was identified through her teeth only two days ago.”

https://www.jewishnews.co.uk/we-just-buried-a-mother-and-two-daughters-when-the-father-is-missing-i-feel-this-is-a-second-holocaust/

Uncle Sharon Sharabi gave it the other way around, speaking to The Intercept: “Lianne and [Y] were only identified through dental records, and [N] by DNA,” he said. 

Either way, this suggests their bodies were in a poor state that's not clearly explained. Max Blumenthal wondered at the GrayZone "if their bodies were, in fact, burned beyond recognition" and, if so, "how was the paramedic “G” able to detect semen on one of the girls, and bruises on the other, and view their states of undress"? But for what it's worth, in the Sun's photos, the home doesn't appear badly damaged or burned, so that may not be the explanation. This remains another open question about this case.

Saturday, April 25, 2020

Entities the IIT "reached out to"

April 25, 2020
incomplete

2. The IIT itself interviewed 20 persons of interest, including alleged victims, during this
phase of its work. Since the incidents under investigation took place in the same
geographical area and within seven days of each other, most of the persons of interest
were able to provide information for more than one incident.
(including the one that was clearly invented retroactively - not just unverified civilian witnesses, militant ones, possible militants speaking as White Helmets (day job), but also to … the White Helmets as a group, a bunch of Syrian opposition groups who collate the same kind of allegations, and various European agencies and NGOs that collate those collations and are taken as lending credence in the process (not that it was needed...)

These interviews were considered in conjunction with statements previously provided to the FFM and other entities. In relation to other entities that were willing to provide information, or
provide leads for the investigation, the general approach of the IIT has been to request
access to information that the IIT considered could be obtained from those entities,
and to assess it together with the rest of the information already at the IIT’s disposal.
In its investigation, the IIT reached out, among others, to the following entities:124

list:
1 The Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS);
2 Chemical Violations Documentation Center of Syria (CVDCS);
3 Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA);
4 Europol Analysis Project on Core International Crimes (AP CIC);
5 European Union Satellite Centre;
6 Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) – Peace and Security;
7 Human Rights Watch;
8 Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic;
9 Open Society Justice Initiative;
10 Peace SOS;
11 Syria Civil Defence (SCD);
12 Syria Justice and Accountability Centre;
13 Syrian Archive;
14 Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR);
15 Syrian NGO Alliance,
16 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) - relevant if the meteorological data was manipulated

Not: SOHR, any Syrian non-opposition groups like ... ones that have existed, still might, but I'd have to check.

1 The Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS);
- ?

2 Chemical Violations Documentation Center of Syria (CVDCS);
- interesting history, etc.
-- ...

3 Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA);
- Assad Files: hoax
-- https://21stcenturywire.com/2018/10/11/revolution-unraveled-assad-files-now-an-achilles-heel-for-war-crimes-narrative/
- http://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2016/04/regarding-those-assad-files.html
- star witness who helped fill in the gaps
-- https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2020/03/some-different-opinions-on-retun-of.html

4 Europol Analysis Project on Core International Crimes (AP CIC);
- sounds sure to be unbiassed (sarcasm)

5 European Union Satellite Centre;
- relevant if the meteorological data was manipulated

6 Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) – Peace and Security;
- compiled the most inflated, dishonest collation of CW allegations against Syria to date
-- https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2019/02/a-change-of-thinking-on-douma-chemical.html

7 Human Rights Watch;
- identified KhAB-250 by looking at it inside out, other incompetence
-- https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2020/02/on-opcw-bellingcat-collaboration.html

8 Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic;
- uniquely Syrian CW weapon, etc. Bellingcat collaboration?
-- https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2020/02/on-opcw-bellingcat-collaboration.html
- e.g. reliance on bogus OPCW findings like 'no wind theory' and location fudging to make their spread seem to work
-- https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2017/07/idlib-chemical-massacre-4-4-17-wind.html

9 Open Society Justice Initiative;
- no research of my own - what can a Soros-run compiler of allegations really add?

10 Peace SOS;
- sounds cuddly - don't know them

11 Syria Civil Defence (SCD);
- would surely be in on any staged scenario, which they considered, and found against, based on things and stories "SCD" handed them

12 Syria Justice and Accountability Centre;
- https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-clearer-view-on-assad-files.html

13 Syrian Archive;
- just video archiving? some commentary attached, maybe more?

14 Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR);
- long record, no overview of my own, several good articles by others
-- ...

15 Syrian NGO Alliance,
- ?

16 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) - relevant if the meteorological data was manipulated

Monday, March 2, 2020

A Sarin Blame Shell Game: Hexamine to Hex Assad

March 2-3, 2020
last edits March 5

As proof of the Syrian government's responsibility for years of alleged sarin attacks, a cluster of chemical impurities found in field examples is often cited. It's principally Hexamethylenetetramine - aka Hexamine - that's noted, but there are others as well in a package I'll nickname "HexAssad." It's apt in that the chemistry is used to curse and damn the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad, in a sort of voodoo sense rather than in reality. But that does strike me as corny, so I'll only use the nickname sporadically.

I've largely sidestepped this issue in the past with a basic view that:
a) I'm not clear if the found formula truly matches the government one, and
b) even if it did match entirely, it could be mimicked, stolen, or even handed over by an opposition-supporting state or agency, besides the obvious option of being Syria's own. Even if those other options rank low in comparison, they must complicate the picture more than HexAssad advocates let on.
c) considering the lack of absolute certainty, the numerous other clues for opposition use of sarin and against government use cannot just be short-circuited and must be considered. So this is what I've focused on over the years.

In the last weeks I finally engaged in a broad - if not deep - review of the many hexamine-related claims and debates from late 2013 forward, and produced a sprawling pile of text I'm not even sure how to organize. In this post, I meant to just share several high (or low) points in the blame game and address these. But in the end I wound up including most of it, and only somewhat organized.

Hexamine for sarin program? 
Establishment CW expert Jean-Pascal Zanders has said: "Since (hexamine's) presence in samples was first reported by the UN investigative team last September in relation to the Ghouta attack and the OPCW later released that Syria had declared 80 metric tonnes of the chemical in connection with sarin production, there has been furious speculation as to its exact role."
(perhaps, since the declaration didn't specify its exact role in anything more specific than "CW-related", partisan thinkers were scrambling to "prove" it related to their sarin process and linked it to all these deadly attacks they need punished for.)
http://www.the-trench.org/syrias-cw-declarations/

Zanders includes hexamine under "sarin" on this list, either because it was declared that way or because he wanted it there.
https://www.the-trench.org/syrias-declared-precursor-chemicals

Declared chemicals and quantities - 80 tons of Hexamine, here not under any heading to clarify what it was used for:
https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/ADM/PSB/Tender/Request_for_EOI_OPCWCDB_EOI012013.pdf

Reseacher "Unknown" (now) achieved some well-deserved if anonymous fame as "Sasa Wawa" or "WhoGhouta," running in 2013-14 a well-organized blog Who Attacked Ghouta? Hereafter WhoGhouta produced some good coverage of the hexamine issue:
http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/12/hexamine-is-not-smoking-gun.html
https://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/04/hexamine-again.html
http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/02/more-on-hexamine.html

WhoGhouta seems correct to point out the exact use is unclear, establishing that it has been (and likely would be) used as a stabilizer for sulfur mustard, and that seemed a plausible use here where Syria produced that. Some neutralizing agent for general CW cleanup was also noted somewhere, and there might be other intended uses for hexamine all us non-experts just couldn't know of.

That's my quick take on that aspect, left sparse due to open questions - to be refined or even altered if I see adequate reason.

Lloyd-Postol-Kaszeta Debate
I didn't dig deep into the details of this, but a Bellingcat summary of the debate poses as a central issue hexamine's solubility in the precursor DF and whether it could be used as an "acid scavenger" as Kaszeta poposed (or something to that effect). This has been validly argued down IF in-flight mixing was truly central to the Lloyd-Postol argument, as it says there. That's never been part of the weapons I know of; in 2013 two weapons are alleged (grenade, volcano rocket). The volcano at least could only have a unitary fill of pre-mixed sarin, while the grenades are less clear to me. 2017's sain attacks allegations had special binary weapons alleged, apparently designed for manual mixing right before loading on the jet.
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/06/21/know-hexamine-syrias-sarin/

But that point's not clear to me, and if Kaszeta's case is that "the use of hexamine as an acid scavenger had not been documented" in any of the "various nations" considered, that would make "the apparent use of hexamine in the Syrian government’s Sarin manufacturing process unique" among states, but maybe common among terrorist groups. So IF terrorist sarin couldn't possibly be fielded in Syria, AND if the hexamine formula was Syria's previously-unknown process and not another state's unknown process, then we could be sure, like Kaszeta, that it's "like a chemical fingerprint linking Sarin attacks to the government."

Anyone interested in that debate: Lloyd and Postol debating Kaszeta's analysis, convincingly show he has no true expertise, and arguing his findings were "fraudulent."
http://goodtimesweb.org/diplomacy/2014/postol-debunks-kaszeta.pdf

This was debated, but it seems the main controversy from Kaszeta's side was whether Postol's source Maram Susli was correct, or terribly biased, and/or if she was a dangerous chemical terrorist - her take:
https://syriangirlpartisan.blogspot.com/2014/12/my-part-in-postols-investigation-of-dan.html

Ake Sellstrom and Shifting Methods of Blame
December 18, the New York Times would run the story "Report Detail Could Further Implicate Syria in Chemical Attack, Analysts Say." This cited analysis by CRBN (preparedness) expert Dan Kaszeta, first run 4 days earlier at Eliot Higgins' "Brown Moses" blog, arguing that "Hexamine may be the smoking gun." From here the HexAssad notion was widely picked up and expanded on.

The point was soon adopted by Ake Sellstrom, the chief of mission for the UN-OPCW investigation into the Ghouta attacks. Kaszeta was able, by July 2014, to add this sticker to his latest article on the "chemical fingerprint of Assad's war crimes":
"An appropriate question was put to UN/OPCW mission members in at a U.S. Congressional hearing. Ake Sellstrom, chief of the UN/OPCW mission to Syria and Scott Cairns, his deputy, stated the use of use of Hexamine in the process which produced the Sarin used in the Ghouta attacks is a possibility. It is clearly stated on the video of their testimony from 4:52 onward."

Winfield: Why was hexamine on the list of chemical scheduled to be destroyed it has many other battlefield uses as well as Sarin? Did you request to put it on the list or had the Syrian’s claimed that they were using it?

Sellstrom: It is in their formula, it is their acid scavenger.
Kaszeta adds "although various detractors have claimed that this quote is fabricated, the author has confirmed it generally with Dr. Sellstrom and specifically with Gwyn Winfield, who has a recording of it."
http://ciceromagazine.com/features/the-chemical-fingerprint-of-assads-war-crimes/

Oddly, we need to be assured there's a recording and also video - we don't get to see or hear them. Sellstrom's lines do sound a bit terse and to the point, as if other words were edited out, like "people are claiming" and "however..." And there don't seem to be any follow-up statements where he clarifies the point. But otherwise, Mr. Sellstrom probably did adopt this idea, then if not still, and would say there was likely proof now. OPCW's Cairns would concur, but the factual basis is not clear.

Note how both men (Sellstom and Cairns) signed off, in September 2013, on the single East Ghouta rocket bearing of 285 degrees, which (as others found) lined up with West Ghouta bearing to jointly point to a government missile base about 10km from each strike zone. But the W. Ghouta readings they gave are quite dubious, as was the alleged weapon and its alleged impact, and other details (WhouGhouta). And the E. Ghouta bearing is clearly dead wrong (WhoGhouta instant notice, my later analysis, my visual below).

That wrong picture helped Human Rights Watch (see at right) and others blame the government, but only until it was proven the volcano rocket's range was at most 1/4 that required, and the cited trajectory was wrong. Sellstrom seems to have accepted both points by the time of a December 13 press conference announcing the release of the UN-OPCW mission second report. As Whoughouta relates: "While probably not too relevant anymore, Sellstrom makes a very significant statement distancing himself from the "trajectory intersection" theory, saying "The flight paths do not seem to meet as may be indicated in the report", and adds that a range of 2km for the UMLACA (aka Volcano) is "a fair guess". (note "may be indicated" puts it softly, and this is still quite relevant 6 years later.)
https://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/12/review-of-un-press-conference.html

In a France 24 interview on 18 December, five days later, Sellstrom sounded unclear on attribution. The question was down to who would likely have the delivery weapons; these largely seemed improvised, but it's noted both sides can do that. It's mentioned and agreed that soldiers were attacked, some exposed to sarin, but again both sides can make DIY mortar shells (filled with sarin, and logically both sides are capable of attacking their own fighters in a false-flag scenario). The important volcano rockets blamed for the 21 August attack were another but also ambiguous story. There's no clue of a chemical "fingerprint" yet to rule out opposition delivery. At 3:40 Sellstrom says "I would probably not have proof to name down one side or the other. The evidence isn't there yet to be sure, I would say."
https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x18k4fn

From the "yet" it almost seems Sellstron expected there would be new evidence to that effect, and it seems the first public airing of the HexAssad clue was just at this same time. in fact the same day, December 18, the New York Times would run Kaszeta's theory that Sellstrom would adopt next.

This all occurred between Richard Lloyd's establishing a 2.5km range discussed by HRI Nov. 30, already getting agreement from Higgins - before McClatchy News would report formalized findings by Lloyd and prof Postol, on 16 January, 2014.
https://humanrightsinvestigations.org/2013/11/30/evidence-error-human-rights-watch-chemical-weapons-attacks/
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24761710.html

That's the rocket convergence method of regime blame failing and being replaced with the HexAssad fingerprint method, which still hasn't been universally seen to fail.

In the same interview, Sellstrom is said to add this supporting criticism of Syrian government claims: "If they really want to blame the opposition they should have a good story as to how they got hold of the munitions, and they didn’t take the chance to deliver that story.” This suggests they were not making up a story but truly did not know. In this thinking, it's suspicious if they don't have a story, and of course it would be at least as suspicious if they had a story with any degree of detail - I mean, how could they know all that unless they made it up themselves?
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2014/08/20/attempts-to-blame-the-syrian-opposition-for-the-august-21st-sarin-attacks-continue-one-year-on/

JIM Report, 2017
Reuters: "Two compounds in the Ghouta sample matched those also found in Khan Sheikhoun, one formed from sarin and the stabilizer hexamine and another specific fluorophosphate that appears during sarin production, the tests showed."
"The same test results were the basis for a report by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in October which said the Syrian government was responsible for the Khan Sheikhoun attack, which killed dozens."

At the outset, the chain of custody issue must be noted; OPCW personnel were unable to visit the site (reasons are debated), so to accept environmental or most biomedical samples they would have to break the standard rules, which call for direct collection by certified OPCW personnel according to a strict protocol. Here as in most cases, the samples were primarily collected and handed over by opposition-aligned parties with an interest in blaming the government, truthfully or otherwise.

However, that doesn't prove the samples are tampered with, and there was some semblance at least of a verifiable collection process. And unusually, the rest of the samples the OPCW received from Khan Sheikhoun - seeming to match up on the key details, as far as we know - were gathered by other local activists trusted by the Syrian government, and thus not likely to be working on that same script. These might have duped Damascus with some of the same spiked samples, but it also seems reasonable to consider the dual-sourcing as minimizing (if not erasing) those doubts. So we can  proceed, with only a grain of salt, with the analysis of "The samples from Khan Shaykhun." I believe these all the relevant statements are in paragraphs 56 and 84-90.

First, hexamine: samples from the purported bomb crater "confirm that sarin was produced by the binary route, in which DF is combined with isopropanol (iPrOH) in the presence of hexamine" (84) and "a reaction product of sarin with hexamine that can be formed only under very high heat." (56) I'm not sure what to make of that. I hear the reaction process is highly exothermic - it produces a lot of heat, and in a pre-loading mix binary weapon like the M-4000 (see below) it's done under a water shower to keep the bomb cool until the mixing is done. As it turns out the M-4000 is the alleged delivery weapon in Khan Sheikhoun.

Next, the JIM raises a few further matches between the DF (sarin precursor) surrendered by Damascus and the samples taken at Khan Sheikhoun. These matches ARE specifically with what Syria had and would use. But they aren't conclusive in identifying the owner, and may serve only as similarities. But these add some to the rather weak hexamine lead.

Paragraph 88 summarizes how these "marker chemicals" being present in both the KS samples and Syrian stocks "is a strong indicator that the sarin disseminated in Khan Shaykhun was produced from DF from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile."

Paragraph 85: "The five DF samples from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile and the environmental samples from Khan Shaykhun all contained the impurity phosphorus hexafluoride (PF6). " The rest explains how this is formed when hydrogen fluoride (HF) is used as a fluorinating agent in the production of DF.

Paragraph 86: "Two of the five samples from the Syrian Arab Republic DF stockpile contained the impurity phosphorous oxychloride (POCl3)." Some other markers (isopropyl phosphates and isopropyl phosphorofluoridates) were found in Khan Sheikhoun that, the JIM learned, would be formed (only?) if the DF had POCl3. Thus: "Their presence is a strong indicator that the sarin disseminated in Khan Shaykhun was produced from DF from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile." They don't mention that it could also indicate a source with similar DF production.

"87. On the basis of the foregoing, the Mechanism concludes that the presence of the marker chemical PF6 is evidence that HF was used to produce the DF that was the precursor for the sarin released in Khan Shaykhun. HF is a very aggressive and dangerous gas and therefore is difficult to handle. The use of HF indicates a high degree of competence and sophistication in the production of DF and points to a chemical-plant-type production method."

This seems designed to implicate the government, a state with control of territory, factories, experts and foreign help as needed, etc. The opposition had pretty much all the same, at the time running some half the country with enormous foreign support, from both within their Islamist support networks and without. Both sides are fully capable of handling a dangerous substance without incident, or maybe with incidents. Do we know there weren't any? What was the point of this point?

The minor point in paragraph 56 came sandwiched between these claims: "According to information obtained by the Mechanism, the filler cap, with two closure plugs, is uniquely consistent with Syrian chemical aerial bombs." (the only known basis to conclude this would only emerge weeks later, but maybe they had a sneak peek at the M-4000 binary sarin bomb. A likely plug from one wound up right in the crater, with hardly any other debris. Suspicions it was planted are well-founded). And furthermore, "Information was also received that additional metal fragments collected from the crater might correspond to parts of Syrian aerial chemical munitions." (Nothing identifiable I know of. All the distinctive parts aside from the cap wound up in Lataminah a week earlier) These dubious points add to the largely failed evidence for a Syrian air-strike, in case the chemistry wasn't sufficient in itself.

Paragraph 89: "An initial screening of the reports concerning previous incidents of the release of sarin in the Syrian Arab Republic showed that some marker chemicals appeared to be present in environmental samples. This would warrant further study."

90: "The presence of marker chemicals that are believed to be unique is a strong indication that the sarin released in Khan Shaykhun, as well as in previous incidents, was produced using DF from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile."

They hoped to expand this finding to implicate the government more clearly in the other alleged attacks. These have been followed up on, and will likely expand further with the wok of the new UN-OPCW "Investigation and Identification Team." Of course the JIM itself is long dead, after Russia (at least) refused to extend its mandate, claiming it was using unsound methods to pursue political aims of other states - essentially, they the JIM had been weaponized.

Obvious political motives aside, assuming the chemical findings and reasoning are valid (despite the precedent for skepticism), we can specify this HexAssad package includes these compounds also to be found in the DF produced by the Syrian CW program:
* phosphorus hexafluoride (PF6)
* phosphorous oxychloride (POCl3)

Unless I missed something, that's all they added. I'll leave it to others to say how complete a match that makes, to consider what other compounds might have not have matched, etc. Either it's definitive or it's not. In the latter case, it would be proven a different type - either an unknown Syrian product, or someone else's. If it were a total match, it means someone's using the exact DF or the exact DF recipe as Syria did, so it's either them or a selected ally, or someone else using their stolen stuff, or someone quite well-informed deliberately mimicking their process to frame them. (or using the same fairly-standard DF recipe just by natural coincidence?)

Reuters, 2018
Exclusive: Tests link Syrian government stockpile to largest sarin attack - sources
Reuters, January 29, 2018 / 11:13 PM
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-chemicalweapons-exclusiv-idUSKBN1FJ0MG
in a January, 2018 Reuters article, the HexAssad chemical findings remained - to informed sources - "the strongest scientific evidence to date that the Syrian government was behind Ghouta (and the rest, by extension).
Laboratories working for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons compared samples taken by a U.N. mission in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta after the Aug. 21, 2013 attack, when hundreds of civilians died of sarin gas poisoning, to chemicals handed over by Damascus for destruction in 2014.
...
The chemical tests were carried out at the request of the U.N.-OPCW inquiry, which was searching for potential links between the stockpile and samples from (the 2017 alleged sarin attack in
) Khan Sheikhoun. The analysis results raised the possibility that they would provide a link to other sarin attacks, the source said.
So looking for a link to stockpiles, they apparently didn't find one that was very clear, or it would be mentioned. But as I'll show, that was never clarified in an article that reads like a verbal shell game, where the focus shifts without explanation to matches with OTHER SARIN INCIDENTS, all of them disputed.

Following this alternate path yielded results: The tests found “markers” in samples taken at Ghouta and at the sites of two other nerve agent attacks, in the towns of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib governorate on April 4, 2017 and Khan al-Assal, Aleppo, in March 2013, two people involved in the process said. “We compared Khan Sheikhoun, Khan al-Assal, Ghouta,” said one source who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the findings. “There were signatures in all three of them that matched.”

The results? HexAssad could not be clearly linked to stockpiles but did keep turning up in attacks the government is blamed for, but which they kept blaming on terrorists - after all Obama's "red line" threat against Damascus was a tempting invitation for the other side.

The Reuters piece cites Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, "an independent specialist in biological and chemical weapons" assuring us there's no chance "rebels or Islamic State were responsible for the Aug. 21 Ghouta attack." But he seems to be an active MI6 agent who coordinates w/opposition on CW investigation and propaganda, so not independent. In fact he routinely lodges politicized and invented claims I've called unhinged (two tweets).

"Amy Smithson, a U.S. nonproliferation expert" was quoted with: “A match of samples from the 2013 Ghouta attacks to tests of chemicals in the Syrian stockpile is the equivalent of DNA evidence: definitive proof.” This doesn't seem to be quite true, nor relevant, as they do not have a total match; all she could specify was the same hexamine finding which was “a particularly significant match,” being "identified as a unique hallmark of the Syrian military’s process to make sarin," the article explains. The match remains unclear, and its uniqueness unknown. But Smithson also cites a "mountain of physical evidence that points conclusively, without a shadow of doubt, to the Syrian government," which "this match adds to" but can also lean on, in case it's not so certain after all. Smithson can overstate it all she wants, but that clear evidence simply does not exist, as so many articles at this blog and even in other places has amply demonstrated.

UN CoI Infographics
6 September, 2017 graphic with notes by me (chronological event numbers, red notes, etc.) - note in the 2 green boxes they've got entry 1 - previously seeming to be a terrorist attack - tied to incident 5, Ghouta, with the same government sarin in both cases. Khan al-Asal, 13-9-2013 has "chemical agents used bore same unique hallmarks as in Al-Ghouta (21 Aug 2013)" and that was fom the "Syrian military chemical weapons stockpile," and implicitly handled by its well-trained owners and not some ill-prepared thieves. The complex irony or cynicism of this linkage is simply astounding, and beyond the scope of this post. But for now just follow that bouncing ball into a 2019 update:


12 March, 2019: "Between March 2013 and March 2019, the @UNCoISyria publicly reported 37 instances of the use of #chemicalweapons in #Syria. The vast majority of these attacks (32 of 37) were perpetrated by Syrian Government forces, including through the use of #chlorine and #sarin. #HRC40 @OPCW"
https://twitter.com/UNCoISyria/status/1105408408830820355

The other five left at "unknown perpetrators" are pivotal - sarin attacks specified elsewhere as involving the same identifiers. Khan Sheikhoun and Al-Latamneh (29, 28) are clearly on the government apparently because, as mentioned, it was decided to be "air strikes" with air bombs that spread the sarin, where that's not the case or is less clear in these other five cases:
Khan al-Asal, 19-3-13
Uteibah, same day
Sheikh Maqsoud, 13-4-13
Saraqib, 29-4-13 (should be under Idlib, not Aleppo)
Ghouta, 21-8-13

From this, it seems the chemistry wasn't enough to pin the blame; it's not a DNA match or a fingerprint after all, and some of the most important cases of all are left at "unknown perpetrators." But that appearance isn't allowed to hold up long; the same exact sarin said to be used in the 2017 bombings is also said to be used for incidents 1, 4, and 5 on this list; by extension the government did those too. And the same perpetrator is suggested in the other cases: incident #2 seems coordinated with #1 (as was a barely-noted claimed attack in Homs the same day - see here). #3 used the same hand grenade blamed for #4, and both of these were allegedly air strikes as well (the grenades were stuffed into cinderblocks, maybe put in a cardboard box, maybe with bags involved, and other cited sarin-TNT barrel bombs - the accepted version is 2 grenades in a box, dropped from a helicopter so the pins pull on impact. As "proof," video of one was shown, seeming to both glow white and emit white smoke as it fell - or that was some white phosphorous being dropped and someone got confused. But we can see here why it's important that it falls from an aircraft, which "rebels" don't have. There's an Assad regime "fingerprint" in there, so it better not come right from a Jabhat al-Nusra fighter's chest, even though that's the only place they had been seen otherwise.

Also note in both infographics a huge gap of nearly two years from April 2014 to April 2016 not covered (top graphic, see event 9 vs. 10 - bottom, see 13 vs. 14. Several deadly and emotive attacks were alleged in this span and previously considered. But here and everywhere else, it seems official acknowledgment of all those had ended by September, 2017 and remain off the radar, for reasons that remain unclear.

Summary
Eliot Higgins/Bellingcat, June 2018: "it was a French National Evaluation about the Khan Sheikhoun chemical in April 2017 that provided the first significant piece of information on the use of hexamine, nearly 4 years after the August 21st 2013 Sarin attacks.
“According to the intelligence obtained by the French services, the process of synthesizing sarin, developed by the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and employed by the Syrian armed forces and security services, involves the use of hexamine as a stabilizer. DIMP is also known as a by-product generated by this process.”"

To me that reads like a more elaborate way of saying "we think it's their method." They cite who it would be done by as if it were a known fact rather than their politicized claim.

Higgins (same link): "The presence of hexamine at every confirmed Sarin attack shows the hexamine is part of the Syrian government’s manufacturing process."

As I've said all along, they can only tie the attacks to each other, not to the government, even with this touted chemical fingerprint.

see https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-sarin-evidence.html

Sunday, March 18, 2018

On Social Media and "Anti-Rohingya Hate Speech"

March 17, 2018

Yanghee Lee, the UN's Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, recently said "Facebook has now turned into a beast" for allowing the promotion of violence and/or hate against Muslims in Myanmar (BBC News). The mass-displacement, burning of villages, and man killings alleged last year against the so-called Rohingya (hereafter Rohingya Mulsims) * A soon-to-be released report contained the details leading the commission to raise pressure on the social media giant to better enforce safety.

Before addressing the grave human rights problems UN people and Facebook are struggling with ... some overlooked context before we take one step forward. There's an optional step back afterwards, but I have to briefly take us here again.
* (they speak a dialect of Bengali they call Rohingya, but there are also Hindus, etc. who speak the same dialect but are not the subject of dispute).
 
The Real Beast in Myanmar
There were many unprovoked massacres of Rohingya civilians alleged, but only one killing of ten men at Inn Din has been proven and admitted and stands as an undeniable violation. These men are claimed as civilians, but the supporting stories contradict each other and they were most likely militants. Other militants, if not the same, had just provoked the local Buddhists by murdering one, then overrunning the area, looting homes as villagers hid in the monastery. Later, after some clashes and the arrest of 10 suspected fighters, some soldiers let the slain farmer's sons strike some blows. The Mullah or religious leader among the captives was beheaded. It was a brutal and illegal act, but a provoked one, and may literally be the only such thing soldiers or Buddhist civilians participated in.  (see here),

Many other alleged killings remain just alleged, lacking not just a government admission but also lacking bodies or other evidence, and often shifting and illogical stories that can hardly all be true. (see some details covered in various posts here and in part 3 of my Indicter series). Several hundred to 1,800 or more civilians were reportedly butchered just the village of Tula Toli on August 30, as supposedly witnessed by some 70+ survivors and witnesses, but with no one filming it, and with clashing details. They even lodged clashing false reports about the real killings at Inn Din. Their Maung Nu massacre happened on two different days, etc. The record is a real mess. A while back I issued a sort of challenge to the media on "fake news" and the Myanmar alleged ethic cleansing. (I mean to do more follow-up, but didn't really expect any response).

Considering truth is hard to know but sometimes discernable upon investigation of the evidence ... there was exactly one proven massacre of clear civilians, and close to 100 of them. And this one that we know happened, this tip of a possible iceberg ... was by Rohingya Islamist militants. Declared infidels, the Hindus were kidnapped from their homes near Kha Maung Seik in the far north, just hours after ARSA attacks overran security forces in the area. Men, women, babies, and elderly alike were marched off and slaughtered with blades and dumped in narrow, deep pits hidden in the brush. 93 of them were either verified as killed or remain missing and presumed dead.

The Muslim militants also spared but kidnapped eight pretty women aged 15-25, whom they converted them by force to Islam and started marrying off to each other. Under this captivity, the women were held briefly at the Kutupalong refugee camp  in Bangladesh, and made to tell false stories under the threat that their children's throats would be slashed if they didn't. But this didn't work very well, and the police were called in soon. The Muslim men in the group fled, and the women, along with 10 children spared along with them, were rescued and eventually sent back to Myanmar. At first chance in the camp and ever since, they've told this story, not the one the Muslims had them say.
That's my reading, stated as fact, like so many others just do. I usually try to avoid it; dealing in likely facts that millions are trained to disagree with, you don't get far just swearing it's true. But here I'll go out on a limb and say that is what happened. For reasons, see my pretty powerful article on this amazing story at the Indicter. The following photo and quote is a good summary, from a detailed report in a government-aligned newspaper, Global New Light of Myanmar (GNLM).



The GNLM report adds that people speaking unknown foreign languages were involved, with one of these co-leading the operation, in which perhaps 500 fighters were involved. They shouted Allahu Akbar and called the massacre their celebration of the feast of Eid al-Adha. Local co-leader "Norulauk" reportedly told the victims before they died the area was now "our territory. … we will murder Buddhists and all of you who worship the statues made of bricks and stones.” But he also made the central error of letting those eight women and ten children to live to eventually report these details of an ethnic cleansing campaign.

Human Rights Watch was watching and had a response on September 27, as half the victims' bodies were found. Their South Asia Director, Meenakshi Ganguly, penned the closest to an HRW statement on this horrific violation, claiming that “no one has been able to independently verify the Burmese government’s most recent allegations,” which amounted to their “playing politics with the dead.” But these women called in their stories from the refugee camp in Bangladesh, telling the authorities where to find the bodies tucked away in three mass graves that seem designed to stay hidden. You don't need independent confirmation of the claim when there's an independent source for it. But HRW had no more to say, being far too busy issuing detailed reports promoting similar claims from the other side.

This isn't the only point but the best introductory one, a rare glimpse allowed by that unusual decision to leave some witnesses alive. In most Islamist false-flag massacres none of the real victims is left alive to tell the truth. Yet the chance for a rare view was happily bypassed by the most "credible" voices. Reading the news, many will have heard of this amazing story either barely or not at all. Isn't that odd? An aborted fake version of the Kha Maung Seik massacre was blamed on Buddhists dressed up to look like ARSA, attacking Muslims and Hindus alike, and was written in on three different days in various sub-versions. That got just as much attention as the true story did, before the whole mess was left unresolved and buried.

Dealing with Sunni extremists, as ARSA and its supporters clearly are, we should expect a lot of deception here, and perhaps no truth underneath it. Myanmar government might literally be telling it like it is, however many voices in the echo chamber here have said otherwise. HRW may never let themselves see it, but the evidence is pretty overwhelming anyway - if there's one "beast" to worry about in Myanmar it's Saudi-style Wahabbi extremist Sunni Islamism.

Every baby is born pure, but some Muslim-born ones go to a Saudi-style school or learn it at home, and wind up joining Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, or the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, depending where they live. These often wind up butchering infidels and framing other infidels for it in lies to yet other infidels - information jihad. They might consider everyone who watches any news or any video screen to be an infidel.

So ... one should proceed with caution, but hardly anyone vested with "credibility" does so.  That may be because - as in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere, they pick the same enemy states the West already wanted to take out, In a team effort, these regimes are toppled or crippled at every chance. The Islamists get away with their part and even get rewarded, sometimes with a new nation like Kosovo (or Arakan?) created to house them. And so they keep doing it, accelerating greatly in recent years. Just in the last decade millions have died often horrible deaths from this, and others live under inhumane captivity by or control of these poisonous people. If someone could claim control of or steer it, this global network of Sunni extremism would definitely be a "weapon of mass destruction" in itself.

There's no hint the UN's human rights people, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, etc. are on the lookout for this, even ignoring glaring inconsistencies in the stories they lodge, as they maintain a posture of firm belief. That's a serious problem.

And the Islamists with their medieval view use social media to spread their hate, considering it a religious duty. Lee said "I'm afraid that Facebook has now turned into a beast, and not what it originally intended." Having seen some of the false-flag Islamist massacres successfully promoted there to demonize their enemies (notably Alawites in Syria), with or without shocking gory images of the Islamists' own work ... she's right but backwards. Islamism is the beast, and  social media is its pet.

Social Media's Role in the Conflict
This one proven massacre of 93 Hindu civilians at Kha Maung Seik was not planned by Buddhists on Facebook. It was planned by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and allied terrorists, in various and mostly unknown ways.

ARSA's supreme leader "AtaUllah" sent orders on August 24, using WhatsApp, to prepare for attacks on security forces. An August 28 order to burn down Buddhist villages was also transmitted this way. (see International Crisis Group's December report). More secret orders like those to carry out massacres of infidels would probably be done by runners or perhaps coded communications, and not publicly on any social network. The Aug. 28 message sounds like the kind of thing they would mainly communicate this way.

WhatsApp at least should be taken to task for letting militants use their service to order illegal attacks on security forces, and incitements to burn villages. I'm not sure if they have been called out for this, or closed the terrorist leader's account or anything... worth checking into. I gather WhatsApp is more hands-off in their approach than the more discussed sites like Facebook.
But these don't seem to come up as an issue in the news articles, as if Rohingya Muslims - as the persecuted ones here - could never have nefarious purposes to use social media. I mean, isn't the only issue here those genocidal Buddhist? So what to do about them?

IF the UN investigators have Facebook messages of Buddhists or others coordinating mob violence attacks on Rohingya muslim civilians, or openly inciting such attacks or issuing threats - that would be evidence of a problem and would justify counter-action. That's direct criminal activity, like ARSA's WhatsApp messages of August 24 and 28 at least. But nothing of the sort from the other side is mentioned so far.

The Washington Post's Annie Gowen heard from non-Muslim refugees in Sittwe in November, who "said they were afraid to return home because they feared the Rohingya insurgents whose attacks on police posts in their villages precipitated the crisis." One was an older Hindu woman whos entire family was butchered. Another was a Buddhist college student who "recalled that one of his best school friends, a Rohingya, stopped speaking to him after the 2012 violence and later left the country. About three months ago, the former friend messaged him ominously on Facebook, “We are going to kill you.” 

This sort of message would be well outside their rules, and may have been punished. (that's around mid-August, maybe before the August 25 ARSA offensive, so not backlash over the following ethnic cleansing allegations. It might be from an insider planning the violence.) It's quite possible there are similar messages, private and public, from the Buddhist side. Make no mistake, Buddhists are humans. The monks might tend to be above the fray, but certain "ultra-nationalist" ones like the infamous Wirathu have taken pretty ugly stances, which by the way are not supported universally among Buddhists. Regular folks caught up in disputes and violence can get ugly, whatever the religion.  The Inn Din massacre shows they can be physically violent, and it would be no surprise if even more would express it just in dangerous words.

But unless someone can show otherwise, some person's opinion has no relevance to someone else's alleged actions.

Or is it Thoughtcrime They're After?
But it's not clear this sort of direct threat or public hazard is what the UN investigators speak of. It could be they're taking "hate speech" more widely as ideas and speech that contribute to feelings against - specifically - Rohingya Muslims. It would seem fair enough to many, considering the alleged genocide they're going through, a special "never again" speech emergency. Such ideas  do complicate the public perception of the moment's championed victims. It would class as thoughtcrime in the totalitarian future of George Orwell's 1984.

There are troubling signs that the UN commission's thinking here is based on such political motivates.  The BBC News report cites Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee as saying "We know that the ultra-nationalist Buddhists have their own Facebooks and are really inciting a lot of violence and a lot of hatred against the Rohingya or other ethnic minorities." Actually inciting violence would be an issue, but "inciting hatred" ...
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43385677

That phrase just doesn't sound grammatically correct to me, and sounds politicized and vaguely newspeak. One incites violence, or maybe a panic, or the burning of Buddhist villages (from latin to excite, or stir-up usually, something active). Hatred can incite violence, but might need anger added as a spark. Hate is a longer-term state-of-mind thing, not an episode. I think of it as growing, being taught or learned, etc. Nonetheless, "inciting hatred" is a perceived problem people are tackling lately, as if it's a disease you can get from a single glance, or a fire you'll burst into instantly. (see below). It's a semantical issue. Let's jot get hung up on it.

The UN mission's chairman, Marzuki Darusma is cited by the BBC as explaining "that social media had "substantively contributed to the level of acrimony" amongst the wider public, against Rohingya Muslims." He added "hate speech is certainly, of course, a part of that," but some of it was other kinds of speech that also contribute to acrimony, or ill-will against some people and not others. For some reason this is worth a report and a news conference.

And they don't seem to care that it cut both ways. By the accepted reports 1,800 Muslim civilians were butchered at Tula Toli on August 30. With no provocation whatsoever, soldiers and Buddhist mobs surrounded the villagers on the beach, massacred the men, burned babies alive, raped women after killing their children in front of them, etc. Even Buddhist monks took part in it, as claimed. It's still supported by almost zero reliable evidence, but widely accepted as fact at places like the UN. But it would show some very serious hate from some very non-peaceful people.

True or not, might this kind of claim getting repeated all over not lead to bad feelings - and even unjust and poorly-aimed violence - against Buddhists, these satanic butchers claiming a religion of peace?

I didn't find many examples of actual violence against Buddhists outside of the battle zone itself, but I didn't have time to dig far. In Bangladesh, Mizzima.com reported in mid-September, "there have been some minor incidents targeting the Buddhist community" and authorities were stepping up security around their temples, fearing violence by radical Muslims in "revenge" for events in Myanmar. It was a real concern, and the information riling them up came largely by social media. It's been worse in the past; violent attacks by Muslims in Malaysa killed several Burmese Buddhist guest workers in 2013-14 over similar but much tamer allegations at the time, leading the rest to quit work and go back home in fear. (Heizman)

This year it seems oddly restrained and the issue is not so much violent but other possibly unfair backlash; protest, sanctions tarnished image for Myanmar's Buddhist community, and susceptibility to believing more of the same kind of accusations next time around. There's now more yet acrimony against Buddhists from Muslims and from the broader public. It's based on things they've heard and keep hearing, repeated with no skepticism on social media, in the mainstream news, and even by world leaders and UN officials.

These stories must be told in order to even be considered. But from there they should be considered - critically - which they aren't. And true or not, logical or physically possible or not, they most definitely add to vengeful attitudes against Buddhists. They even - dare I say it? - "incite hatred" against them. (having dared to say it, it still sounds stupid. This is clearly teaching hatred (or at least ... disdain, disrespect) by repetition, not inciting it like one would a fistfight).

But the UN mission doesn't seem worried about that trend even as they add to the list of villainy: the Burmese Buddhists try to deny their crimes and spread their hate to the wider world using the Internet. Is it really even-handed universal justice these activists are after?

Otherwise, this could be a political exercise operating under a thin pretense. If so, the consideration at heart would probably be just this: all this talk - especially the true and/or convincing talk - is complicating  their desired picture. It portrays deceptive jihadist mass-murderers where the Western-led "world community" shows more persecuted innocents in need of salvation. All these carefully lodged and accepted ethnic cleansing claims need a clear bad guy, and it has to be the government targeted for sanctions or worse in another regime-change type of campaign.*

* ("crazy thoughts" side-note: This is apparently how the "world community" closes down competitors and eventually absorbs more member states, so as to more resemble the actual entire world, all finally working on one agreed script. This is supposed to ensure peace at last, but war is too profitable and would continue, against member states accused of increasingly petty violations of their membership agreements, etc. So I advise nations and people - don't give in to this possible future. Unipolar power achieved by force and deception is not the way to go.)

How The UN Folks Identified the Problem with Social Media
The UN investigators cite some evidence to explain the problem with hate speech in Myanmar. Just what all that is remains unclear until the report comes out, but the BBC repost says "The interim report is based on more than 600 interviews with human rights abuse victims and witnesses" and other things like "satellite imagery, photographs and video footage taken within Myanmar."

So they again found that a bunch of places really were burned, saw the same weak video evidence and heard strong verbal claims already repeated so widely. They found that "some were burned alive in their homes" etc. etc.  They will hear about the Tula Toli rape huts with, and the carted-away bodies from Maung Nu everyone saw but no one filmed, etc.. They will take the chance to remind us once again of all that and how they totally believe the stories behind it, and totally blame the government and the local Buddhists for a campaign of unprovoked ethnic cleansing against innocent Muslims. Reasonably, in that light, they'll demand accountability. Again, according to my analysis, it's all likely bogus.

And now they can add that the people they blame - Burmese Buddhists, in general - use Facebook to express their dislike of the target group. Surely they can cite some posts including racial slurs, some expressed views in favor of locking the "Bangalis" out, or even a few personal opinions that the "kalar" should all be killed, or even a few direct death threats.

The investigators will probably not be able to show a link from those posts or people to any of the alleged violence and torching of villages last year. It's probably a bunch of lumping-together and blaming the whole community for a spirit thought to underpin all that. And it's partly a show of trying to help the Buddhists become less genocidal, a humanistic but condescending gesture - in lieu of harder options they're also pursuing.

With probably zero relevant connections discovered, Lee and Darusma and the rest the would have us believe somewhere in there is a serious problem contributing to real ethnic cleansing, and Facebook especially needs to solve it by silencing more content than it already is. Well I'm surely not convinced. It seems more like they're acting instead on the political course described above. If so, one can only hope Facebook refuses to play along and sticks to a spirit of fairness and truth.

What Facebook is Doing and What We Could Do
Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp and other social media sites and platforms are private property, allowed to run as the owners see fit. But they've also become so prevalent that they seem like public spaces. All the social media sites agree in embracing the same basic values you'd hope to find there - free speech, public safety, other things in various order. But it's a little ambiguous what to expect or try and demand from them in this regard.

The BBC report notes the chairman of the UN mission, Marzuki Darusma saying "As far as the Myanmar situation is concerned, social media is Facebook and Facebook is social media." So in some minds, they're tackling the issue across social media. The report continues:
Facebook has said there is "no place for hate speech" on its platform.
"We take this incredibly seriously and have worked with experts in Myanmar for several years to develop safety resources and counter-speech campaigns," a Facebook spokeswoman told the BBC.
"This work includes a dedicated Safety Page for Myanmar, a locally illustrated version of our Community Standards, and regular training sessions for civil society and local community groups across the country.
"Of course, there is always more we can do and we will continue to work with local experts to help keep our community safe."
"Safety" sounds good, but "counter-speech campaigns" ...

Sounds aside, this may be an example: "Last July, (Facebook) gave the example of policing use of the word "kalar", which it said could be used both innocuously and as a slur against Muslims." They had some problems sorting out which was which, but think they have it right now and only remove the slur instances. I guess because it refers to the darker skin color of Rohingya Mulsims "kalar" is seen as akin to "nigger" over here. I don't know ...

One hopes they aren't blocking use of Bengali, another preferred term for people who reject the term Rohingya, which was invented to lay claim to the land (from Rakhine, aka Rohan).  I'm using that for shorthand but ...  Are we forcing people to use the name the Bengali Muslims insist on being called and grant them a victory in their campaign? That sounds political.

The mentioned "inciting hatred" - not even violence - was the cause for Facebook just now banning the right-wing Britain First party, now disbanded in the UK. Its leaders were already kicked of Twitter and in physical jail (not "FB jail") for harassment. Specifically, they had agitated against Muslims too, so they're bound to have made some good points then, but maybe not in the right way, etc. (NBC News) Facebook's official statement on this is worth considering as a precedent:


"We are an open platform for all ideas, and political speech goes to the heart of free expression," said Facebook in a statement. "But political views can and should be expressed without hate. People can express robust and controversial opinions without needing to denigrate others on the basis of who they are."


This is the spirt of the policy (spelled out in more detail somewhere) that you should be able to follow and still speak your mind. It sounds reasonable enough...

They'll have rules. We can't demand anything, but would be reasonable to insist the rules allow fair self-expression. This should be the case, unless Facebook or the others have ulterior motives hiding under their public words. And it should not be like targeted sanctions against the "racist bad guy" social media users in this special and likely fake crisis. It should be applied evenly to both sides. Sometimes at least it is. I've seen haters against the Buddhists peddling false evidence and spouting blood libel get their posts removed and entire accounts banned (on Twitter at least). But broadly so far, everyone  can still speak their mind, within limits on a private platform, etc.

For those users worried about their voices being silenced in this effort ... it might be, depending, through no fault of your own. But it becomes more likely if you go against the spirit-grain they're hoping to achieve. So here's some advice that should allow you to carry on within the spirit of Facebook's policy and probably just about everywhere else. (This is my own version, which I follow and find works so far to keep me out of most trouble.

* Basically, think of yourself as a global citizen with some responsibility for the content of the global discussion. Even if you're there casually or drunk or whatever ... if possible, be professional. Which, in context, means things like these:
* If you're trying to educate people about what you think are the facts, take care about those supposed facts. Try to be skeptical even if you like what it says. Verify when possible, check for alternate views. If you want your word to be kind of like news, try to keep it from being fake.
* Try to maintain a humanist attitude even as you deal with issues of serious inhumanity.
* Avoid speaking from hate like you would (I hope) avoid spanking a child in anger.
* Speak from anger only with great care.
* Try to attack the problems with the people and not the people, even if all they seem to have is problems (what they do, not who they are...)
* Be careful about who among the Muslims you're talking about - the babies at least, and even many of the men have no blood on their hands - avoid sloppy thinking and conflation. (see further notes below) *
* Don't threaten to kill people or things like that

But for those trying to deal with this ... As I've suggested, emphasize how very many Muslims in Rakhine state did NOT take part in the crisis last year, did not burn their villages, run off and spout false stories, and have not participated in murders and other violence. Some were killed for this moderation by the other Muslims who insist on violent crisis and an Arakan solution. These loyal Muslims at the very least deserve better than being lumped together with terrorists in a kind of "Muslims are evil" attitude.

Getting philosophical here... underneath it all, even the ARSA terrorists killing their neighbors  are as "not really good or bad" as everyone. If they must be killed or violently stopped - and that is frequently the case - so be it. But this is sad. They were all born blameless babies at one point.
I've always maintained such an attitude and so far I've never been kicked out of anywhere. (I also haven't quite reached a threat profile where you're more likely to be info-assassinated).

* (further notes on "who among them") That last is a tricky issue, especially sharp here - in how militant poisoned Muslims tend to pop out of partly innocent communities. The other side could stand to understand this, but hardly anyone outside of Myanmar is telling them, so they largely just don't realize.  In Myanmar as elsewhere, they hide among the community. Much of the community conceals them willingly. Others ... don't dare defy that trend. The nasty ones, with the actions no one could blame your for hating - they keep coming out and killing others, infidels, year after year. Their education tells them this is okay and encouraged. All they needs is a few guns, a couple of crude IEDs, and some swords and sticks to overrun a village or a security post or both. Then they melt back in and claim repression, causing problems for the government.

This will be tricky stuff for anyone to know and sort out who's who and decide how to deal with it. Simply tolerating it as the cost of a multicultural society imposed on them by ling-term squatters who claim the land as their own. There will be a strong and natural tendency to want that whole community gone to somewhere Muslim or Bengali. Some will be happy at seeing them flee and hoping they stay gone, and wish the government HAD really chased them away as alleged. Few people in the world can understand the kind of frustration they're dealing with.

BBC and the rest ask why do Buddhists hate Muslims over there? They answer: because they have a different religion  and the Buddhists think they don't belong. Uh, no ... they hate them collectively because the Muslim Bengali communities are so riddled with total assholes no one should have to deal with, and they're tired of just being scared of them. That thinking isn't the most laudable, but it's understandable. Following on that, many people want the Rohingya Muslims gone, mostly because they hate and fear them, and also... because they don't belong in the first place (or so runs their thinking). It's clearly the more important part of that picture that's generally left out or de-emphasized.