<< Douma Chemical Masscare
June 1, 2019
last updated June 3
Regime-change enthusiast Clay Claiborne has now piped in on the OPCW leaked engineering report making some news lately (my own 'overview' post - will be better in time). This, he contends is probably not an OPCW product and doesn't matter, and could even be part of a Russian disinformation campaign. In fact, once he put that down in words, I suspect he's almost certain of that by now, a day or so later.
Not that his take is important, but it could cause some confusion. And it seemed like untangling that in advance also helps to explore a couple of relevant issues. The article is called Lies, damned lies, and engineering sub-team reports https://claysbeach.blogspot.com/2019/05/lies-damned-lies-and-engineering-sub.html
Claiborne speculates "It was never OPCW's report, hidden or not. It was [signing author Ian] Henderson's report" deceptively "imitating" OPCW forms to make it look like theirs. This loaded distancing opens the way for Clay's phase two: the Russian disinfo conspiracy theory. He highlights this from the Russian report analysis NV759 "there is a high probability that both cylinders were placed ... manually rather than dropped from an aircraft." Why?
"...because I want you to notice how similar it is in logic, and even wording, to the conclusion that Henderson's engineering sub-team report came to. Promoting that view by quoting a Russian source would be a daunting task. Selling it out of a first “suppressed” and now “leaked” engineering sub-team “dissenting opinion” is the smart move."It's all, or might be, "a smart move" by some plotters. Huh. So Ian Henderson was maybe an insider agent, helping the Russians, Assad, whoever exactly to pre-seed their loony claims as having the OPCW stamp. He notes that the translated science words come out pretty much the same in English - manual, etc. They should be using, or someone translating to, different words for the same things, unless there's a conspiracy?
In fact the similar reasoning could mean that it's REALITY and CLEAR, HONEST THINKING that gets all these disparate sources agreeing: Henderson and co. within OPCW, outside experts like the structural engineer cited by Peter Hitchens, several independent "conspiracy theorists," and Russia's analysts at several points. The dissenters: someone with higher authority in the controlled and politicized OPCW, and a whole lot of people who've put their trust in the former.
Claiborne rules out such a view because he knows, somehow, that it's the watchdog at the Hague that, "like most science-based investigative bodies, applies the best science to the known or knowable facts and presents its conclusions at the end of the investigation." Now if that's his basis for such unhinged theorizing, it's simply his uninformed, faith-based opinion.
An Unofficial Document?
Skipping all the "history" distractions for now anyway, even skipping his pointless opinions about Robert Fisk's reporting on Douma, let's cut to the EST report. Most of his time there is spent on - as it turns out - a side-issue about how the document we see appears to be unofficial, not a proper OPCW product.
For example: "It wasn't done on anything like official stationary, it has no OPCW logo." Are these known to be standard for internal reports of sub-teams? Maybe Clay found out it is standard, maybe he's just presuming. He lists a lot of issues like that, grasping for straws even; he complains how "All references to the FFM team are in third person." Indeed: it never says "we," always this external "FFM" or "FFM team." The FFM's reports, in contrast, refer to themselves as "the FFM" or the "FFM team." So … no problem there. He notes the report is "not signed by any OPCW employee(s) with title ... (nor) indication of employment." No, but we find out he's a long-term employee of the OPCW, apparently off-and-on. And this seems to be some of his paid work, that may or may not be of value or relevance. This point counts for little.
Still, the bulk of issues Claiborne raises may well constitute a valid point. He takes issue with the header "OPCW sensitive, do not circulate," noting how it would have to circulate (depending...). And compellingly, Claiborne adds that "OPCW Sensitive is not found in the OPCW Declarations Handbook 2013, which was revised in 2017 and is current, as are OPCW RESTRICED, OPCW PROTECTED, and OPCW HIGHLY PROTECTED." He links to that handbook, and while I didn't verify his reading, I'd guess he's right on this point.
Update June 2: I may hav misread the point here. Qoppa999 helped me notice the obvious - sensitive is not one of the classifications, because this is UNCLASSIFIED, as it also says right there. The handbook says (and Clay notes now, and maybe noted before) "In addition U is normally used to include information which is not considered confidential (Unclassified)" - all forms should be marked HP, P, R, or U. If left blank, they call it U. Those are their four class-and-non-classifications. I didn't see anything for or against adding "sensitive" to unclassified. Clay's point was Henderson did this to avoid getting in trouble for using one of the heavy classifications, but still suggesting secrecy to the outside viewer, I guess?
We might also consider how the timing leaves little time for inclusion in a real process; the final report was set for release March 1, 2019. With nearly a year to get there, they should have had all science in hand long before that. But these points are only submitted on February 27, two days prior to the last minute.
It's likely this was not requested by the FFM and might, as suggested, be penned by Henderson personally (perhaps in agreement with others). I and most of us can only speculate as to why, but consider it might be an unofficial internal message, which could be stated like: "please postpose releasing that report, and re-consider your approach vis-à-vis the engineering science. I/we still stand by it. You shouldn't just erase and replace it like this."
That would be an important wrinkle in the story and our understanding of the document we see. But as for divorcing its important content from the OPCW FFM's investigative process - which was clearly the author's intent - it probably means nothing.
What did the original(s) look like? When was this assessment first submitted? What place did it originally have in the FFM team's work? I presume Claiborne has no idea. I've never seen it. I'd like to. (Placeholder at right). But with a bit of study we can see how it's likely reflected in a couple of mysteries about the FFM's investigation timeline, and their final report's content.
Evidence for Relevance
This report is called "the result" of what signing author Ian Henderson refers to as the "FFM engineering sub-team." (hereon: EST) It's not clear when this first EST assessment was - or would have been - submitted. But the FFM's interim report in July said work was ongoing to reach a "competent" engineering assessment on issues including trajectory, metallurgy, structural engineering, etc. They were apparently just deciding that in early July, and it wasn't until October to December that they commissioned and received these findings, from parties that sound external to the FFM, and were not even called a "sub-team."
The notable delay of months might have been spent first waiting for the EST's assessment, received perhaps in May, then considering it, debating and finally rejecting it, and then agreeing on a new course, all prior to the July repot. That could mean the EST was in fact the portion of the team originally tasked with these questions; the delay was caused by an awkward switch from plan A to plan B.
Add June 3: Brian Whitaker heard that "Henderson and others did go to Douma to provide temporary support to the FFM, but they were not official members of the FFM." That would be involvement early on, in late April, 2018. There, they might have taken their own photos, done their own measurements, etc. The later-consulted experts did not even go to Douma. They and EST both could draw on photographs and other materials the FFM gathered.
To Claiborne, the EST assessment seems like just one guy's fringe view, and probably wrong-headed. It didn't have to be considered, and probably shouldn't have been. But the FFM apparently did consider it, arguing against some of its points - and poorly - in their final report. Explaining how the damage lines up with the cylinder impact alone, they close with a seeming non-sequitur; the fire in the room seems to be deliberately set. What does that have to do with the impact damage? Ah... as I explained here, that "scorching" was noted in the Henderson / EST report as suggesting an explosive impact caused the damage. And in the point right before that, the FFM refers to a "hypothesis" to just that effect, which they were able to rule out.
It does remain possible - in a stretch - that they were considering the same points for another reason. But let's consider it as if; presuming the same four contested points were raised in the original EST report and/or executive summary, these should be the points the FFM had to contend with:
- extreme roof-rebar damage
- spalling (cracks from shockwaves)
- scorching of upper walls and ceiling
- possible fragmentation pattern
(a fifth point is disputed by no one - the FFM agrees with EST, the Russians, and all outsiders that there are extremely similar holes in other roofs nearby in Douma. Most of the are presumably NOT caused by falling gas cylinders but by mortar shells and the like. FFM just presumes that's not relevant; two different processes must have cause such similar results. So it's at least somewhat debatable.)
Of the four points, the FFM didn't even touch on the spalling, nor (crucially) on the drastically bent-in rebar of the impacted beam, which probably required a powerful, expansive blast wave to occur. They happen to be right on one of the two they did address, but the other is baseless and grossly wrong. This clear and unqualified "absence" of fragmentation marks (primary or secondary) was never established at all. In fact the presence of both kinds is better-illustrated and close to a universally obvious fact, even if it remains just as slightly-debatable as nearly anything can be, in the wrong hands. (all explained at the same blog post linked above) (below: strong evidence the FFM shows and also ignores - just to outside the red circles, a pattern of densely-packed punctures, some going clear through the wall.)
The FFM don't explain how "this hypothesis" of an explosive weapon is one proposed by the FFM's engineering sub-team. But they do engage its points as if they mattered somewhat, and can be seen arguing it down partially. This is clearly not the proper way to present and consider two internally competing hypotheses. But it counts as a kind of mention or reference - a likely proof of existence, as well as of unfair treatment.
Conclusion: it must add up, somehow
Clay Claiborne makes some valid points here about likely unofficial origin of the leaked report we've seen. But that has limited relevance, and his core points remains contrary to the available evidence. It still seems the EST's findings were relevant, valid, and wanted - until the FFM leadership saw the result. Sometime by July, they decided on a re-do of the engineering details more in line with the political demands placed on the Fact-Finding Mission.
This whole subject is about scientific findings, but Claiborne has hardly a moment to consider these details. With no science-based reasoning provided, he dismisses the EST's findings as just one theory of what he presumes was a chaotic plethora of them; most of those would be wrong, and need to be pre-sorted by professionals. Claiborne posits as likely that "the purpose of the final OPCW report is to bring clarity, not muddy the waters," and hence their filtration of confusing notions we're best off protected from even hearing.
I guess anything's possible, sort-of. But maybe the OPCW - to use the same terms - didn't want their mud getting watered down or washed away.
As Claiborne explains, "Assad and his supporters" have used the OPCW's lack of clear blame as a "vacuum" they fill with the manual planting theory. He closes with a quick note on how astoundingly unlikely that is, in his sparsely-furnished mind. "Assad and his supporters" make this claim "without giving a minute's thought to the actual logistics of “manually placing” a gas cylinder on a child's bed in a crowded neighborhood."
He has no idea how much thought they gave the subject. He doesn't explain what makes this neighborhood especially "crowded" as to be notable. But there are a host of issues; It's heavy, awkward, with that harness. You might get scratched doing the bed scene. Someone might see you, and expose you, considering... what? The vigorous checks placed by independent media there in liberal, liberated Douma? You might drop it along the way, a couple times, chipping a door jamb or denting the bed frame, and that would give you away in later images, for example. No way could they do that and get away with it, with sharp minds like Clay's and the OPCW's FFM watching skeptically...
They might scratch the paint by pulling it past the broken wire mesh on the balcony at Location 2, or pick a site with insufficient damage (entry hole too small, Location 4), or otherwise choose a scientifically implausible arrangement. Obviously that would be called out by scientists, including in the OPCW *known* to employ only the best practices. And those certainly would not be suppressed. , We'd hear all about it, if that happened. For these reasons, even as we are hearing about it finally, Clay is comfortable presuming it's an outlandish, unlikely scenario, leaving us with little choice but to presume the science must add up, somehow.
Let's up the game now. If he thinks carrying two gas cylinders in is bizarre, consider how - un-noted by Henderson/EST, and by the Russians (I think?), and by Claiborne - the staging would also include dozens of bodies of civilians - including babies. These were murdered - probably elsewhere - and seem to be arranged at Location 2 after transport, probably via the underground tunnels that open near the site.
The people doing that clearly would not want to be caught or filmed in the act. It is an issue. But guess what? They were a well-armed militant group calling itself Army of Islam (Jaish Al-Islam). They ran the area since late 2012. They held thousands of civilians prisoner, after kidnapping them on largely sectarian grounds. Only a small portion of these were finally released in April, others having gone missing. Perhaps 35 or more wound up being the victims shown off on video as chlorine victims.
It's they (Jaish Al-Islam) would put out calls to the public to possibly alter how "crowded" a given area would be, and they were able to enforce that. The event reportedly happened just after sunset. The completed scene at Location 2 is only visible by about 10pm. So they'd be working under cover of darkness. The ruling terrorists could, if they wanted, pull off such an operation effectively unseen (e.g. someone might have filmed the involved trucks moving, in dim light with loads well-covered. It would be evidence, but not proof, and the person releasing it might die.)
Jaish Al-Islam could release some gas in the open as an excuse why everyone had to stay inside or they WOULD die. Staying away from windows and roofs might've been specified. Especially the tunnel entrance we believe they brought the BODIES in via; the FFM heard the gas was so strong there anyone who "tried to go towards" the tunnel entrance in fact "DIED." Somehow, they heard, people died in several basements and out in the streets, besides near the tunnel, and even on rooftops.
The Douma based opposition group VDC - whose founder was app. kidnapped and killed by Jaish al-Islam - reported afterwards the group was preventing independent access to Location 2, only allowing its approved media people in to document the crime scene. So this is not some utopia of transparency.
And with nothing further to base it on, Claiborne directs his readers to focus on Trump, and not Syria, at this moment: "Anyway, back here in the United States, few are paying much attention to these Syrian developments, because we have just received a long-awaited report describing the crimes of our president." So this minor issue, for his readers, could be dismissed so: "Henderson's note is to the FFM Report on Douma, what Bill Barr's 4-page summary is to the Mueller report."
It's all part of a Russian disinformation conspiracy, man. They got their people in there writing all kinds of supposedly official documents, to manipulate our minds, man. They even seem to involve good science and reasoning. Extremely tricky stuff. Good thing Clay's on the case.
Add June 3: an eample of the clear thinking at work here, from Claiborne's article, with notes:
