Mapping Sarin-Related Activity in Jobar, 21-24 August, 2013

February 22, 2020
incomplete
last edits Feb. 25

Likely launch site for 21 August's "volcano" rockets
Who was in control?

Initially, the August 2013 Ghouta chemical massacre was blamed on the Syrian government partly from the "fact" that the rockets though to deliver sarin nerve agent were fired from a military base fully under government control. That basis was destroyed (in January, 2014) by the work of MIT scientists Richard Lloyd and Ted Postol's finding the rockets could not have flown nearly the required distance (nearly 10 kilometers); all activity in the easten area would be within 2km, or about the area HRW happened to fill with the compass to prove their fake point. So things were left hanging and remain that way. The big question that emerged and never clearly answered: if the blamed rockets could only fly about 2km, then from whose side of what font-line were they fired?

The real question is who fired them, but … (the "volcano" rocket seems to be a government weapon despite DIY appearance - but copies could be seized, or fabricated in a different DIY process - these options have never been ruled out. In government hands its main use had been as an incendiary, fuel-air, or conventional explosives, mainly or totally in the Damascus area - except the handily red-numbered ones that tend to appear in connection with alleged sarin attacks, before and including 21 Augusr.)

... the area alone might be able to prove that, as the original claims tried to do. I always stayed uncertain; loosely following the work of others at the time (including "Sasa Wawa", Eliot Higgins, Charles Wood, others), it seemed like the firing spot would be roughly font-line either way, and lines can be penetrated. The review I just made only clarifies this point for me, but also narrows down the straight map reading. The security scene remains somewhat uncertain, but this below is pretty well-agreed by everyone for this small area, on 23/24 August.

Probably all this area had been opposition-held until offensives over the summer, with the bus station only cleared during August (Bellingcat has some apparently good review). So the green area would likely be a bit smaller and less established three days earlier, except at Thome checkpoint, which should have been active to some time on the 21st (probably after the chemical attack called in around 2 AM, but possibly taken out earlier, as in to allow the rocket launchers to pass west undetected). For all these reasons - and because it can hardly change the status of the firing spot - I'm not going to try and guess-draw what the situation was in the first few hours of that day.

Setting the firing area (so far)
I see people around leaping to erred conclusion, hopping back off them or staying out of pride, and sometimes I do that (only the former, I hope). This seems like a good subject to practice the opposite approach and crawl to the conclusion. This still isn't gospel, but my try at placing the best results yet, when I decided to re-visit the issue in 2017, and was lucky to have Michael Kobs and others step in (partial coverage here). One person involved was Chris Kabusk, who had worked with Lloyd and Postol, and had some handy tips like prior mappings, computer models, rare images. Kobs kicked my ass, and was able to get usable ranges for 5 impacts, in a graphic I show below (dubbed: roof, embedded, garage door, sheeps, wall).

Note embedded (also "impact #4" to the UN-OPCW) and garage door ae both lines, not ranges, and the same basic line. That almost seems too lucky, and I didn't verify garage door (placement or direction), but I'd guess that was good work like the rest and that red line is pretty exact at 314º, serving as the best guide. (as I recall roof was easy to get a broad reading for, sheeps and wall were a bit tricky with deflection involved, and the other field impact was so tricky we couldn't agree if it fit at all or showed a second firing direction more like 344º. )

The river/creek dividing red and green, in Kobs' graphic, runs across the widest pat of the yellow diamond shape, with just the tip in government turf. That also roughly marks the volcano's outer range. The best fit should be quite close to that line, on whichever side.

My old version to summarize was never meant to be exact, but was more inadequate than I realized, to be replaced with the area indicated above (and again at right) unless/until that's improved further. Considering the established maximum range of the "volcano" rocket of ~2 to 2.25km and where the paths best intersect, there's a fairly long but narrow area centered on a clear NW direction of approximately 315º bearing from impact #4. I let the other clues pull Kobs' line one degree clockwise, and add some wiggle-room (2-3 degrees on each side) for good measure. The bigger variable is distance out, and that's hard to set by visuals alone. Considering open areas needed (white-shaded), and rooftops being only so likely a place, across the river in government turf is no fit for distance and a lack of such areas, unless it was on the bus station's roof. But logically, using close to maximum range makes sense, as it puts them launch closer to, arguably in, the green area. Allowing a wider and longer box (gray), the bus station's lot is a possible fit at the farthest range. There are some streaks with arcs that appear, and seem worth some review (I don't know they would have an innocent explanation). In a pinch perhaps that adjacent field would fit?

But again whichever side of the river it might be pinned to eventually, this spot is not so good for proving blame; there's a crossing right there (yellow) into the bus station grounds or, for the other side, from there straight into that black boxed area.

What possibly happened there: Liwa al-Islam alleged launch video - strange case, a number of details and theories … it's not certain they even show the actual launches, so it's not clear if the area needs to share the seen details, and which details: the truck with rocket is in a field, apparently oriented near-parallel with its furrows, but it's not fired in that scene. One firing is seen (detached, with (same?) truck parked aside), apparently next to a row of trees, maybe with a pole (composite view I just made at right). And why did they light this up to be seen, just so disputed 3rd parties could stumble on and leak the video? Etc. People have been over this, probably best at the old Who Attacked Ghouta blog (first explained here, enhanced views and further discussion here - but the "geolocation" here is based on picking open areas along a firing line that didn't pan out in general - some commenters thought it was filmed clear across the country by regime stagers, and that's possible, AFAIK.)

24 August alleged sarin attack  
This is now covered in a page at A Closer Look On Syria. As related in a Dec. UN-OPCW report "on 24 August 2013, a group of soldiers were tasked to clear some buildings near the river in Jobar under the control of opposition forces," or so they were told. Around 11AM they seemed to be winning a clash when "approximately 10 meters away from some soldiers, an improvised explosive device (IED) reportedly detonated with a low noise, releasing a badly smelling gas." It's not clear from what direction it was supposedly launched. The bad/foul smell is the same in all other credibly described sarin cases. 10 soldiers were effected badly enough to evacuate to a field medical point "with breathing difficulties, blurred vision and with strange symptoms not further specified." Four of them were barely conscious.  The report continues to describe symptoms and treatments consistent with sarin exposure, blood tests said to show it, later OPCW work to verify those samples and confirm sarin still in one soldiers' blood a month after. They were too cautious to say how the sarin got there, not confirming the militant attack story, just passing it on. (See also SW report analysis)

So allegedly, terrorists were launching sarin 3 days after the Ghouta sarin attack, and the sharp tip of that point is the location. The report's Figure 7.2:

This maps out as shown above, something like 300-400 meters east of the apparent launch spot for the Ghouta massacre's alleged sarin rockets. (note a dated image was used here - the one I've used became available later, and shows the actual scene one day earlier)

Opposition CW Facility
"The United Nations Mission was also presented with two metal canisters discovered by Government soldiers during the offensive operations in Jobar on 25 August 2013 in the immediate aftermath of the incident and in close vicinity of the site of the alleged incident. These presented similar characteristics with the IEDs claimed to have been used to disperse the chemical agent in the Jobar incident on 25 August 2013"
But the incident was on the 24th, so it's not clear if these were found on the 25th or on the same day that's just given wrongly in this paragraph.

Jean Pascal Zanders:
http://www.the-trench.org/syrias-cw-declarations/
"They had an internal fill capacity of up to approximately 4 litres (see figure below). The two metal canisters are the ACW Syria declared to the OPCW."
(ACW = abandoned chemical weapons, referred to by UN chief Ban Ki Moon here: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-chemicalweapons/two-abandoned-cylinders-seized-in-syria-contained-sarin-u-n-idUSKBN0FC1U420140707)

The UN-OPCW report gives several reasons to disregard the findings - e.g. sarin traces at the lab were useless because there had been mine-clearing operations, they couldn't verify custody of the evidence, what was in the lab vs. planted there, etc. Zanders would hear from people involved the sarin in the two ACWs proved the government had made it, must have planted it, and attacked its own soldiers with it, if anyone attacked them at all. (January 2016 - https://www.the-trench.org/syrian-soldiers-exposed-to-sarin )

I wanted to map this, but nothing I've seen gives or easily allows a geolocation. Some videos and a photo of OPCW inspectors give some clue, but not enough for me. "Close vicinity" is ok for now.

Tohme Checkpoint
Bellingcat early article in 2014:
"To the south of the underpass checkpoint, between Zamalka and Jobar, is Tohme checkpoint. The checkpoint is mentioned in a number of videos posted before and after the August 21st Sarin attack, and on August 22nd the checkpoint was reportedly destroyed by the opposition, … This video, published on September 6th by Orient News, mentions Tohme as a staging point for tanks used directly after the August 21st Sarin attacks
"On the eve of the chemical attack on Zamalka, rebels observed the presence of more than 15 armoured vehicles at Tohme checkpoint. Immediately after the chemical attack these vehicles made a breakthrough and reached a strategic point near Zamalka Bridge, exploiting the rebels’ busyness with helping the victims of the chemical attack.
The regime’s capture of the Southern Bypass would have enabled them to completely separated Jobar from East Ghouta."

I pondered the imagery and clashing locations - one map Bellingcat cited (right) has Tohme indicated as regime-held, along with the highway in between. On the night of 20/21 August, probably so (my map is for 3 days later). But it's placed far south, once scaled - at the (pedestrian bridge?) near the bottom edge of my new map, beneath "technologies." You can see how different that is from the better placement I have.

Bellingcat gives a different spot where local roads pass under the highway. Somehow I thought it should be on the highway, where only the purple-marked vehicles stay parked to check the few vehicles breaking the apparent rule of no civilian traffic here. At the underpass makes sense. There seems to be an object blocking the road previously, and there were apparently soldiers based in those buildings, which were reportedly bombed sometime ON 21 August, and the buildings do seem different + damaged when seen on the 23rd.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gt7kRZiGwio
Tohme buildings were stormed in Zamalka in response to the massacre and killed the shabiha

"With the help of God Almighty" Tohme checkpoint was destroyed on August 21, 2013 in a joint attack by Al-Bara Brigade and the Al-Nusra Front - "blown up by Al-Bara Brigade through a tunnel, and then another explosion was detonated by BMB, booby-trapped by the Al-Nusra Front, on August 21, 2013, and on August 24 2013, the Al-Bara Brigade stormed the buildings. Surrounding the bombing, killing the remaining regime forces and combing the buildings, seizing some weapons and ammunition, and thank God. In response to the chemical massacre of about 2AM on 21 August, completed on 21 August suggests some quick tunneling, or a pre-planned "response."
Survivors held out for thee days until al-Bara mopped them up and seized some weapons on the 24th. Four dead soldiers are seen, mostly missing their shirts, seeming variously executed and then deliberately burned. One appears shot in the chest and also has his head missing (appears more torn off than cut off?), then all the skin burned off his upper body.

Tohme Attackers
We know a bit about Jabhat al-Nusra.

Liwa al-Bara - "enmity brigade" - formed in early 2012 by Abd al-Nasr Shmeir, a captain who defected from the Syrian Army - it was allied with al-Nusa Front, would later form a coalition called Faylaq al-Rahman - Qatari-backed, "moderate" (not global-jihadist OR seeking an Islamic state in Syria), but remained allied with Al-Qaeda affiliate al-Nusa Front though its name changes. Faylaq al-Rahman would become the dominant force in inner East Ghouta (Jobar, Zamalka, to Kafr Batna sometimes ally but frequent enemy of Saudi-backed Liwa/Jaysh al-Islam, especially in 2016, following the death of JaI founder Zahran Alloush.

Aaron Lund: "In August 2012, [Shmeir] headed an armed group known as the al-Bara Battalion, which made headlines by kidnapping forty-eight Iranians on pilgrimage to the Sayyeda Zeinab shrine; Shmeir claimed that they were Iranian intelligence officers. The Iranians were released in October that year in a murky deal that involved a prisoner exchange and reportedly also a large ransom payment.53 These funds seem to have helped Shmeir remain independent of Alloush and develop the al-Bara Battalion into the much-larger Failaq al-Rahman network, which was created in late 2013."
https://tcf.org/content/report/into-the-tunnels/

2016 contention and clashes:
http://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/567063-damascus-rebel-group-beset-by-internal-rift
http://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/566833-damascus-rebels-jaysh-al-islam-running-assassination-cell


https://alshahidwitness.com/different-actors-fighting-ghouta/
"The group controls much of central and western parts of east Ghouta – Jobar, Zamalka, Ayn Tarma, Madirah, Kafr Batna, and Marj al-Sultan. The group’s leader is Abd al-Nasr Shmeir, a captain who defected from the Syrian Army in early 2012.
Faylaq al-Rahman is allied with Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is mostly made up of members of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate (also known as Jabhat al-Nusra). The current bout of rebel infighting largely originates from the hostility between the HTS and Jaish al-Islam."