February 20, 2020
(edits Feb. 22)
A bit late, I decide I should take the time to consider how "One chemical weapons report should not whitewash a decade of Assad’s crimes" as Muhammad Hussein argued in a February 7 article of that name at Middle East Monitor. This recaps the OPCW findings of a chemical attack in Douma with two chlorine cylinders that somehow caused 43 civilian deaths and hundreds affected all across town. "The international community considered the matter to be closed," writes Mr. Hussein, ignoring that attribution of responsibility and measures towards accountability remain. So it's an open case in that regard, which is just why it stings so much when the last year's leaks have allowed us to see how that sausage was made.
That does risk re-opening the findings themselves and up-ending plans at accountability until it could be properly directed. So these peeks at the process undermine the case against the Syrian government, Hussein writes, "to the delight of the Assad regime and its Russian allies." Among those:
The Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media has now been established. According to its website, the group is “entirely independent, open to academics and independent researchers and is not aligned to any state or non-state actor.” There has since been a plethora of reports and accusations that it is actually funded by Russia to promote pro-Assad propaganda, and that it was created to cover up war crimes by Syrian and Russian troops.I've seen some suggestions of this, perhaps direct accusations, I forget. A "plethora?" Perhaps. All wrong, as far as I know; the Working Group was created by the academics involved to filter and consider the alternative claims, apply knowledge and expertise as possible, raise questions and potential answers that are stronger than before. They question official narratives partly because so few others do (and do it well). They do smart things like invite me on board, not for the PhD I lack, but because I know my shit.
As far as I know the WGSPM is not funded AT ALL. All work seem to be voluntary, any expenses paid from pocket by members. There's no donate link, no donors, no partners, financiers, no income, close to zero expenditures, no staff, office space, anything - just research and ideas some people would rather ignore by imagining we're paid liars so we must only lie.
2) the Working Group has no funding of any sort – the total expenditure of about £500 up to June 2019 on website and publicity has been covered by founder members out of their own pockets.
http://syriapropagandamedia.org/public-statements-and-media-appearances/working-group-response-to-media-smears
Regardless of who is funding the Working Group, the fact remains that it includes Assad apologists ...
3) the Working Group does not take any position for or against the Syrian government.
http://syriapropagandamedia.org/public-statements-and-media-appearances/working-group-response-to-media-smears
(I personally support the Syrian government, but I just contribute research. I don't apologize for any crimes - I flat deny the ones I do, have always considered the rest unclear, but seeming more and more dubious as the precedent for falsehood grew. One could lazily assume that bias (and not the opposite) distorts my research. But one could not demonstrate this.)
And does Mr. Hussein lodge any protest when Western and allied government fund blatant propaganda regarding Syria, even "apologizing" for their sponsored militants by quite possibly blaming their crimes on the government, on a routine basis?
… who are, as one European diplomat put it “unwittingly and naively acting as agents of propaganda for the Russians, or actively support[ing] Russian disinformation.”There's one anonymous coward diplomat who can lick my balls, to borrow a phrase and speaking for myself only. He or she baselessly accuse the WGSPM of serving someone else's political agenda, maybe knowingly, maybe paid, and so we should be discounted at best. He or she IS paid by a state to push a political line that includes this sort of attack. He or she IS NOT PAID to offer a balanced assessment of what we do. Their politicized words should, of course, be discounted as a meaningless reflex.
Though the regime and Russia may have won the propaganda war against the opposition and its supporters for now, the “independent” group of academics and other Assad apologists want to legitimise the crimes of the Syrian regime by sweeping them under the carpet.What a strange statement. He agrees the truth as we see it "may have won" against the propaganda, in contrast to OPCW leadership and most other anti-Syria activists who stand by the US-UK propaganda. We and the rest have made a carpet here, if one of lies, things can be swept under. That's not the kind of confidence they're encouraging.
Nevertheless, if there is some doubt about the identity of the Douma culprits, ...
Officially, NO. Why does he ignore the memos? It's not even good to hypothesize like that, with things as fragile as they are.
… there is no doubt whatsoever about who is responsible for numerous other crimes against the people of Syria since 2011 and even earlier.Incorrect. I know there are doubts, holding some of them myself. I've explained many of them quite well. I'd be happy to show my work on whichever specific subject M. Hussein asked after. I give a brief answer below to the points raised in Hussein's article. First, his closing:
Why is this fact being ignored by the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media if its members are truly “independent”? One chemical weapons report should not whitewash a decade of Assad’s crimes against his own citizens.
One episode of black paint being partially washed off ("whitewashing") is adequate reason to wonder if pervious instances were the same. Having already found prior reports to be dubious also helps. Just sticking with the CW record for now, the one undeniable feature here is a difference between the Douma story that has dramatically fallen apart vs. years of other allegations that are still accepted by official bodies as Syrian government crimes. Hundreds of allegations spanning years were never (yet) questioned to such a thorough degree, with no leaks or whistleblowers previously (that I recall). We hear over and over that 98% of the more than 300 CW attacks in Syria are by the state (the other 2% by ISIS). (That was tallied by GPPI in Germany; problems with their methodology were briefly considered in this post.) I'm working on an article to explain why Douma was so different, but first, back to the specifics in Huseein's article:
Although the group also claims that it “is committed to the upholding of international law and human rights norms,” it has proven otherwise by neglecting to recognise the previous chemical attacks which contain firmer evidence of Assad’s involvement.
Mr. Hussein here doesn't even know what we have and haven't considered, collectively or individually. I've looked into chemical weapons allegations as much as anyone, starting in late 2012. That's a 12 at the end, not a 13, 14, 15, 16, or 17. I was even watching for these allegations before I knew of any; on the third of December I first noticed our brilliant president Barrack Obama issuing (for a second time, but the first I noticed) his "red line" threat and/or offer - if he should get the impression Assad has used CWs, he might give the rebels military help. My first thought was there would be such reports any day. I watched and instantly noted the first two to make news on 6 and 8 December, 2012. Check for "alleged chemical attack," at A Closer Look on Syria, or at my blog Monitor on Massacre Marketing to see how little consideration was paid by this independent researcher with the WGSPM.
With others at ACLOS, I followed further cases into 2013, writing this article just weeks after Khan al-Assal - note positive review by Eliot Higgins back in the day ("when I say this piece is a good round up of reports of chemical weapon use in Syria, it's not something I say lightly") but read the 2016 updated version if anything. That last notes the intense irony of the massive Ghouta incident that year, which I've considered in some detail, some of that here and more below. I was honored to work on that with the late Denis O'Brien, PhD in neuropharmacology, author of this amazing report.
I with various others followed the long pause after Assad failed to get himself overthrown even then - through the years of low-key chlorine allegations with all kinds of strange, implausible details, up to the re-emergence of sarin reports in late 2016, just ahead of my now-dated March 2017 overview of "138 alleged chemical weapons attacks in Syria and 159 Question Marks over Government blame." Than Khan Sheikhoun happened, Douma, a few other incidents between and since, also considered.
Just formally at the WGSPM site, in briefing notes and working papers, there is ... actually not that much dedicated to prior attacks, now that I check. Out of not that may papers published, there might be some points included in other articles there, besides several specifically on Douma, there's just this one soverview of Douma and other attacks back to 2014: * http://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/briefing-note-the-alleged-chemical-attack-in-douma-on-7-april-2018-and-other-alleged-chlorine-attacks-in-syria-since-2014 * related points in this report on official investigations
* and while we're here, "epistemic" is a word I didn't even know to use until recently. It's a good one, especially in context. More people (including myself) should have a closer look at this paper by WGSPM colleague professor Tim Hayward
But back to Muhammad Hussein's ignorance on the subject - he continues:
The 2013 Ghouta attack, for example, was a prime example, with Human Rights Watch reporting that the sarin gas used made the regime the most likely culprit, ...
The WGSPM hasn't formally revisited this subject, but some of its members have. HRW at the time published this graphic to support their findings, based on two firing directions they learned of, both pointing to a regime missile base 10km away. That should elicit a nod of agreement by the athor, and it would seem solid, but ...
1) accepting this rocket tube (below) is no more than 8 degrees from parallel with that wall, when it's clearly at more like a 45 degree angle or even closer to perpendicular. In no view is the rocket tube/red line close to parallel with the green line. This means the UN-OPCW report was at least 30 degrees off in claiming the un-bent tube "pointed precisely in a bearing of 285 degrees that, again, represent a reverse azimuth to the trajectory followed by the rocket during its flight." 30 Degrees off is NOT "precise," but that's the line HRW cited to pin this blame. What a lucky and egregious error! (explanations at the above link)
2) One has to accept this impact just LOOKS 30 degrees different than it should AFTER it flew on that line for about 10KM, or some five times its established maximum range. All efforts to model it agree it's aerodynamically impossible to fly more than 2 to maybe 2.5 km in a stretch (see Lloyd and Postol, confirmed by Eliot Higgins+cohorts, Sasa Wawa, others on both sides).
3) The same rocket with the same max range had several copies (reportedly 12, at least 7 or 8 seen) all landed in this basic area, with widely varying angles that, best we can read the clearest ones, seem to converge about 2 km out. It boggles the mind to imagine that many rockets 5x maxing out their ranges to land at askew angles that happen to create that other impression.
HRW - they may not watch closely, or double-check or review their errors, but the do hit and run, score political points, get paid, get trusted. And here all they had to was fail to check a politicized (error?) handed in pre-packaged by someone who should be even more trustworthy than HRW, not less so (either the OPCW's investigators, or management, or someone on the UN end of the project, or in the report editing).
* partial firing directions explanation: http://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2017/08/ghouta-firing-directions-masterlist.html
* the best readings converge about 200M out, in a certain area
* about 250-500M to the east of that spot is where an interesting event happened just 3 days later:
** https://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/01/analysis-of-second-un-report.html
** https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/report.pdf
* More to come on this …
** 22 Feb: Mapping sarin-related activity in Jobar, 21-24 August, 2013
Okay, maybe there are some doubts about Ghouta - and the Khan al-Assal attack said to use the same exact kind of sarin (same perps). And Douma. But that can't just erase the entire 'well-documented' record, as Mr. Huseein continues his argument:
"... as was the UN’s conclusion about the 2017 Khan Sheikhun attack."I didn't ignore that report. I called it meaningless and explained. It's based on terribly-sourced information, the best of which was the OPCW findings full of absurd decisions and fudging to let the claims stick. They laundered some lies, plain and simple. the closest jet to Khan Sheikhoun at the time was 5 km distant, almost surely too far to have dropped a bomb at the sarin crater, impossible to have dropped that plus the 3 conv. bombs allegedly dropped by TWO jets directly above the town. The wind would disperse any sarin the opposite way from what was elaborately claimed (based on careful analysis of all video views for a single direction that explains all movements of smoke plumes AND FOG FIELDS. No one has adequately challenged the findings - check for or add to challenges here). There ae also disturbing questions about the fatalities of this attack, as there usually are.
The Assad regime’s countless other crimes against humanity and against the Syrian people have also been dismissed by the group: the torture, detention, forced disappearances, displacement of huge numbers of civilians, and the ongoing bombardment and destruction of areas which have not yet submitted to the regime.
I did take careful note of an example hospital bombing; Al-Quds, Alleppo, after it was reported reduced to rubble. I've heard torture claims, but words don't campae to visual proof like the Caesar torture photos are touted as - I've collected and examined all but a few of the nearly 7,000 images, included much analysis here - See Fail Caesar masterlist. Needless to say questions were raised. Nabil Sharbaji seemed like a telling case among the few who've been identified. The vast bulk who never have been may NOT fit the general story given.
And let's not forget how it all started - the suppression of Peaceful protests, as revealed in the Assad Files. I took an extra-detailed look at that - see 21st Century Wire article. And who can forgive the in-home massacres of civilians so prolific in 2012, like the infamous Houla Massacre of 25 May? See the conspiracy theory debunk here where I asked for it. 16 Douma youths slaughtered with knives in August? Is it any wonder they finally turned to Muslim Brothehood, Al-Qaeda, and Islamic State?
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