(more pictures and notes added, May 6)
I've written several things about this now about the May 2-3, 2013 Al-Bayda and Baniyas Massacres in Syria, starting with the pages and talk pages at A Closer Look on Syria for Al-Bayda Massacre and Baniyas Massacre. The most comprehensive and devastating summarization of this was sparked by an annoyingly dishonest Channel 4-Human Rights Watch mockumentary, a detailed refutation which I got published at Global Research as Answering Britain's Channel 4's Whitewash of Another Syrian Rebel Massacre (and note it was even chosen to re-publish later, and featured elsewhere like Hands Off Syria.) This set of detailed articles are cited in that, in their original place at the CIWCL site which became un-workable. So, a bit late to mark two years since this hideous event, I'm re-publishing them here.
We can add this crime spree to the list of well-established rebel atrocities like the Houla Massacre, Daraya massacre, the August 2014 Latakia Massacres, many or all of the notorious Homs Massacres of 2011-present, the massacres of Aqrab, Sadad, Ma'an 2012, Ma'an 2014, etc...---
Added for this posting is a couple pictures in the article, and a larger section of images with fuller notes at the bottom.
Added for this posting is a couple pictures in the article, and a larger section of images with fuller notes at the bottom.
"Targeting Specific Communities" in Syria, Case Study: The Baniyas Massacres
By Adam Larson
June 17, 2013
last edits August 11, 2013
"Specific Communities" as a Diagnostic of Guilt
The Syrian government's early June victory against rebel forces in the crucial border town of al-Qusair is a turning point in favor of eventual government victory nationwide. Perhaps for that reason, it has been loudly condemned; even before the campaign really started, the U.S. Condemned the dropping of leaflets instructing civilians how to evacuate safely, and U.N. Human Rights High Commissioner Navanethem "Navi" Pillay was predicting, on May 10, there would be massacres of civilians there. In the end, none were credibly reported, but Pillay's office said she was worried about military build-up around the city, and "feared further atrocities if the area was overrun." From what she heard, "local people clearly fear a possible repeat of last week’s killings of civilians." 
|A dozen mostly-adult males, in the most famous|
scene from the Al-Bayda massacre,
The fact of there being at least two big massacres reported over two days caused fear of #3 and beyond, and thus mass flight of thousands, as reported. There was stern world condemnation of what some termed a policy of genocide, and plenty of experts proved willing to explain Assad's sectarian strategy in this Alawite heartland. Navi Pillay for one was "appalled at the apparent killing of women, children and men in the village of Bayda, and possibly elsewhere in the Banias area," and felt that the killings "should spur the international community to act" to stop the fighting and hold criminals to account. 
That action, implicitly, should be directed against the Syrian government, which Pillay considered the guilty party. Aside from obviously partial opposition demands to do so, there was one bit of evidence which she cited for that decision: the attacks "seemed to indicate a campaign targeting specific communities perceived to be supportive of the opposition."  It's not certain what information she's drawing on here, but a helpful Los Angeles Times report citing her statement explained what she presumably meant:
"Although the coastal region is largely Alawite, the minority sect of Assad, the districts targeted are made up mostly of Sunni Muslims, who make up a majority of the Syrian population and have led the uprising against the Assad government." 
That is, her argument seems just his crude: "Specific communities" = the nation's majority. Essentially, the government's forces were attacking Sunnis in general, who are perceived (and correctly, she might suggest) as opposing them. But if that were true, of course, the war would have been over long ago; Sunnis make up as much as 75% of Syria's 22 million people. It's closer to the truth to say only a small portion of them, augmented by very many Sunni foreigners, make up the force the rest of Syria is up against.
Moving from the general to the specific, indeed we see the complication of one type of region in another sort of province. And some will be dazzled enough by that dynamic to succumb to sloppy thinking like Commissioner Pillay seems to be indulging in. However, it wasn't entire cities at large that were targeted, but specific people and locales within them. And at the more telling level of homes, it wouldn't be the first time if the details in Tartous pointed to the targeting of specific communities that support the government and/or don't toe the rebels' narrow religious line.
The Houla Massacre Precedent
The infamous "Houla massacre" of May 25, 2012 is often given as the best example of the Sunni-terrorizing massacre Pillay speaks of, and the parallels between this and al-Bayda/Baniyas are strong, as we shall see. However few people realize it, that's a chilling observation. A recent report assembled by this author showed how the best evidence and clearest thinking over the last year actually supports the "government version" of events, the one swiftly bypassed in favor of the "rebel" version blaming the government. 
By mid-2012, armed rebels ran the general Houla area except Taldou (the southern town of the Houla region). They controlled Taldou too, as of May 26. In between, security posts were overrun, vacated, and torched. And around 100 local men, women, and children were shot and hacked to death in their homes, presumably by killers from whichever side had the upper hand that afternoon.
In that sidelined "government" version, the dead - aside from a few rebel fighters and something like 30 soldiers and police - were comprised of Shi'ite converts (the Abdulrazaq families, former Sunnis, with over 60 killed, including at least 38 children) and government supporting Sunnis (the al-Sayed families). The latter included retired officer Oqba al-Sayed, retired police officer/colonel Muawiya al-Sayed, and his son Ahmed - a soldier on leave with a broken leg. At least some Sayeds, reportedly, were relatives of the new Peoples' Assembly (parliament) secretary, chosen in an election the rebels had firmly rejected.
By various sources on both sides, and available visuals, the victims had heads smashed, throats cut, eyes gouged out, etc. The government took note of the Taldou terrorists' "Algerian killing style," as seen from their peers in the 1990s, with the intent to mutilate bodies to use them to project terror. 
Such specifics aside, this rebel attack version of events is jointly supported by many of the witnesses, much video evidence, and considerable logic. It does run counter to what rebels and other alleged witnesses and survivors reported, but of course it would. If it's true, we can deduce that the anti-government crowd - the hundreds who hit Taldou, at least - were not keen on reforms, democracy, compromise, sectarian accord, or Human Rights. Nor would they be much worried about honesty with outside powers, whose military support they seek, as the supposed champions of values they clearly possess little of.
See: Taldou. Truth.
The Al-Bayda Incident: Background
Now we turn to the May 2 of this year and the first and best-illustrated of the two reported Tartous massacre, in the hilltop town of Al-Bayda, a few kilometers south of the coastal city Baniyas. The reported death tolls there range from 50+ to over 100, as well as crazy numbers like 800. The most reliable estimates - with names - seems to be something around 70.  Whether killed soldiers/Shabiha or rebel fighters are included in any of the varying tallies is unclear, but opposition reports make it sound like all victims were civilian. A few fighting age men were seen executed in the main square, with others killed in batches of 5-12 around town, some with heads brutally smashed-in. At least two other heart-wrenching scenes showed numbers of women and children gathered into single rooms and cut down, largely in the neck. 
As in many other such cases, the massacre in Al-Bayda came about the same time (either before or after) a battle between rebel and government forces. Several sources say it was a late April attack on a checkpoint that spurred loyalist fighters - alternately given as soldiers or Popular Committee/National Defense Forces fighters, aka "Shabiha" - to try an early morning raid on al-Bayda on May 2. Opposition activists said the rebels had few to no fighters there, but the roughly 40 attackers seem to have been ambushed by some reasonably effective team. A generally-agreed seven of them were killed in fighting, and the rest - around 30 - were taken prisoner by the rebels.  These had apparently come in a few white vans, one later seen burning in the city square, and a Hyundai Porter pick-up, frequently used for Syrian security forces, also abandoned in the square. 
It was this early clash, most agree, that brought the larger army presence of later in the day. Those beefed-up authorities either cleansed al-Bayda of the militants, seizing the considerable weapons cache shown on TV, or alternately, planted the weapons and rampaged around killing scores of innocents just for having the right religion. "Genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" have been used to describe the campaign around Baniyas. An Alawi militia commander overseeing the al-Bayda operation announced on May 2 his hopes to "cleanse" all Baniyas of "traitors." "Traitors" was generally read by the opposition as all Sunni people, and so "cleanse" became evidence for genocidal intent, just as they reported the follow-up massacre in Baniyas itself. However, it's more likely that he meant only to ruthlessly scrub out the armed terrorists, who are usually, and with some evidence, accused of committing massacres like the one that just happened. 
Al-Bayda's Leading Sunni Family – 36 Victims
Usually with these surprise massacres in un-cleansed areas, certain families are singled out, like the Abdulrazaqs and al-Sayeds in Houla. In al-Bayda as well this was the case; here the family Biassi (various spellings) was the main focus of cruelty. The opposition Syrian Center for Documentation of Violations (SCDV) lists 70 massacre victims total, all given as civilians; at least 24 of them seeming to be members of this extended family (see below).  Rebel historian and alleged survivor "Ahmad" spoke to Reuters, for a late May report, of 36 Biassis killed.  Representing over a third and perhaps more than half of those killed, clearly this "specific community" is worth a closer look.
|Sheikh Omar Biassi, government loyalist tribute image|
This unfortunate family was headed by sheik Omar al-Biassi, aged 63, the imam of al-Bayda's main mosque, although by one reports he resigned two years ago.  Usually conflicted, this case is clearer than most – everyone agrees that sheik al-Biassi was a government loyalist. Initial opposition reports name him and some relatives, but make no mention of his significance. Later on, rebel body mover "Omar, of nearby Ras al-Nabeh" mentioned seeing the body of "the village sheik, Omar al-Bayassi, whom some considered pro-government."  He was said to be a rejector of the violent uprising.  He was a member of the National Reconciliation Commission, "a known advocate of interfaith dialogue and national unity" and "a true Syrian patriot," Voice of Russia heard.  Reuters heard from anti-government activists "sheikh Biyasi … was a government loyalist who alienated local people with his political views." "Ahmad" would have been one of those alienated, but he was only sad to see how "even though [Biassi] always opposed the protests, they still killed him." 
(note Aug. 11: the stricken part was a mix-up: a possible relative Ahmad Biassi has this story - see second article below)
The activist reasoned that "whoever killed those soldiers" in the early ambush "also killed the 2 [Biassi] families."  In fact, at least one source says sheik Omar was tasked that morning with negotiating for the release of the captured "Shabiha." As Syria Truth reported (from Arabic), the situation "prompted the army to assign the imam to negotiate with the gunmen for the release of the hostages." They answered with a resounding no, presumably killed the captives, then also "resorted to killing the sheik and his wife (there is information saying they were killed in a slaughter, but it is uncertain)." 
|Skeikh Biassi, anti-government activist photo|
At least sheik Omar's son as well is mentioned in other sources, and included for good measure was his sister's family, the activist's sources heard: "The other family that was killed was his sister - Manar Biaasie, her husband and their kids."  The New York Times pulled heartstrings with two specified victims: "Moaz al-Biassi, 1 year old, and his sister Afnan, 3."  For a possible further detail, one opposition-supplied family member cited a husband-wife couple, allegedly her aunt and uncle, killed with their three children; all were "slaughtered in the neck." 
More details: An early short list of victims in Arabic featured "Omar Nassiriyah aka Omar Biassi," prominence not mentioned, and "Manar Albiassi" and "Zakaria al-Shawish," given as married to each other and killed together, with no mention of children.  The SCDV lists 22 Bayyasi and Bayyasa names, including Manar Ezzadin and Omar Aziz ("known as Omar Naser"), plus Omar's wife and a daughter, names not given, and a son, Hamza Omar Aziz.  There's also the "Fattouh Bayyasa" sub-family, apparently related by marriage, with four children and four adults (including mother Safaa Ali Bayyasa) listed as killed there.  With all Fattouhs and Mr. Shawish added, there are 24 names of those killed on the 2nd, identifiable as kin of the imam.
The same database shows at least two more dying in the following days; on May 4, Isma Bayyasi, adult male, died in al-Bayda from "shooting" - not field execution - "by regime forces sniper's shot." Then on May 6, somewhere in Banias, one Fahima Yasin Bayyasi, female, age 20, was also killed by "shooting." 
All-in-all, alleged survivor "Ahmad" told Reuters, "the Biyasi family suffered some of the worst losses, with 36 documented deaths," all or most of them visually verified by Ahmed himself. There is a lot of detail he shares, from his "meticulous notes" on the bodies he personally discovered in situ, correlated with available videos he almost seems to be just describing. 
All this will require more analysis for fuller understanding, but so far familiar patterns seem evident. The opposition activists have informants embedded, it almost seems, with the angel of death's own battalion. As usual, the "Shabiha" left their victims behind unguarded, it almost seems with phone tips to rebel videographers, in hopes of having their crime exposed to the world. As with Houla and so many other scenes of so many other heinous crimes, the degree of access these "activists" enjoy is rather suspicious.
Ignoring Community Specifics as Diagnostic of Mental Corruption
As to why the regime killed its own loyalists here, and kept picking them off for days, activists didn't and perhaps couldn't explain. "Even though [Biassi] always opposed the protests," said "Ahmad," "they still killed him" and also eradicated his seed in a very targeted and specific way. Presumably, they would have us believe, the only reason was the family's religion, and their general prominence in that religious context.
Sheik al-Biassi was a leading Sunni to be sure, and would have spoken for the sane majority who reject evil. And he was slaughtered with his kin by – it seems – the rebel terrorists, to send a message to those who might get in their way next time. We should all be "appalled at the apparent killing of women, children and men" in al-Bayda, to quote Ms. Pillay: it "should spur the international community to act to find a solution to the conflict." Further, "those responsible for serious human rights violations," and it's reasonably clear who that was in al-Bayda on May 2, should be "made to account for their crimes," not handed more weapons, as the Western powers and their clients have been allowing for two years now.
If the al-Bayda massacre was a rebel operation, the reported follow-on massacre in the Ras al-Nabi' district of Baniyas falls into suspicion of being the same. And if any families can be seen targeted in both towns, it strengthens the connection. It does seem that happens here, at least per the opposition SCDV martyrs database. Any of these could just be two families of the same name, or related: Taha (4 members killed in Bayda, 11 in Baniyas), Khaddam (a man in Bayda, a man, two women, a boy and a girl in Baniyas), Lolo (an adult male in each massacre), Othman (4 members in Bayda, one in Baniyas), and, if Dahbash and Debesh are the same name/family, an apparent father-son set was killed in each massacre.  Following from the Biassis, one family we have the most information on, these common threads suggest that the same rebels, with the same mysterious gripes against certain families, carried out both massacres.
But Navi (the naïve?) already said the government should be blamed for this, because the "specific" victims were "perceived to be supportive of the opposition." She should explain now by whom they were perceived that way, and how accurate she thinks that perception was. Clearly it was not from accurate victim specifics of the al-Bayda massacre, as the opposite case is much better illustrated there.
Rather, the perception comes, at least in part, from the dangerous myth that Syria's Sunnis at large have risen up, and are collectively suffering massacres in return. This myth has been aggressively fostered by the opposition from the beginning, and continues even as semi-credible reports recently said at least one in three victims, of around 100-120,000 killed, were of the demonized Alawite sect. This came from the usually gospel Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, no less, passing on calculations (which are open to debate) of as many as 41,000 Alawites, military and civilian, snuffed out by Sunni extremist rebels since 2011. 
And the myth has always ignored the majority of Sunnis - likely a vast majority - who still support the government as the party of sanity. In fact, it seems to be those most visible among the Sunnis in that support, and their families, that are being wiped out - along with the Alawite "enemies of God" - for breaking this poorly-written rebel script.
And where are the "world community's" Human Rights gatekeepers, like Navi Pillay, as these crimes occur time and again? Playing logic games about vague "specifics," to cover for their blatant covering for the perpetrators, and to enable continued punishment of the victims, it seems.
ACLOS = A Closer Look On Syria, a research site where the author's research is done
 Press briefing, United Nations Office at Geneva, May 10, 2013 http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/F540CE03B72CB7DDC1257B6700369815
 ACLOS: Al-Bayda Massacre: http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Al-Bayda_Massacre Baniyas Massacre: http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Baniyas_massacre (see "discussion" pages also)
 Los Angeles Times, May 10, 2013 http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-united-nations-atrocities-qusair-syria-20130510,0,6028835.story
 Official Truth, Real Truth, and Impunity for the Syrian Houla Massacre of May, 2012. PDF report, 79 pages, published May 15, 2013. Citizen's Investigation into War Crimes in Libya. PDF download page: http://ciwclibya.org/reports/realtruthhoula.html
See also summary article at Global Research: http://www.globalresearch.ca/syria-one-year-after-the-houla-massacre-new-report-on-official-vs-real-truth/5335562
 The "Graying" of the Islamist Houla Massacre http://ciwclibya.org/syria/thegrayingoftheislamisthoulamassacre.html
 ACLOS: http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Talk:Al-Bayda_Massacre#Where_are_the_Shabiha.3F
 ACLOS: http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Talk:Al-Bayda_Massacre#Hyundai_Porter_pickups
 Syrian Center for Documentation of Violations, Martyrs, Banias:Beida, May 2, 2013 http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/martyrs/1/c29ydGJ5PWEua2lsbGVkX2RhdGV8c29ydGRpcj1ERVNDfGFwcHJvdmVkPXZpc2libGV8ZXh0cmFkaXNwbGF5PTB8c3RhcnREYXRlPTIwMTMtMDUtMDJ8ZW5kRGF0ZT0yMDEzLTA1LTAyfA==
 Reuters, May 28 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/28/us-syria-crisis-village-insight-idUSBRE94R08H20130528
 An Atrocity in Syria, With No Victim Too Small. By Anne Barnard and Hania Mourtada, New York Times, May 14, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/world/middleeast/grisly-killings-in-syrian-towns-dim-hopes-for-peace-talks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
 Voice of Russia, May 4, 2013 http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_05_04/214684802/Situation
 posted Facebook Timeline photo (warning, graphic) with extended comments Posted by Syriangirl Partisan, May 10, 2013 https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=316418491821439&set=a.118282211635069.19554.100003598729905&type=1 Yalla Souriya, May 4, 2013 http://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2013/05/04/syuria-omar-bayasi-was-al-bayda-mosques-imam/
 Syria: Sunni village 'massacred' in Alawite heartland By Ruth Sherlock, Magdy Samaan, and Richard Spencer, the Telegraph, 6:32PM BST 03 May 2013 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10036680/Syria-Sunni-village-massacred-in-Alawite-heartland.html
 Partial victims list, May 2, Arabic language https://www.facebook.com/Saned.N.N/posts/648416878518109http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Talk:Baniyas_massacre#Families_Hit_in_Both_Baniyas_Massacres
 SOHR, Arabic: http://syriahr.net/index.php?option=com_news&nid=5883&Itemid=2&task=displaynews#.UbSCOUaJM99 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/14/us-syria-crisis-deaths-idUSBRE94D0L420130514http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=419737 http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Sectarianism_in_the_Syrian_Conflict#41.2C000_Dead.3F
By Adam Larson, CIWCL
August 6, 2013
I must qualify the above article ("Targeting Specific Communities...") with an important note: there are a few possible reasons, which we didn't at first know about, that Ms. Pillay's comments might be less "crude" and "sloppy" than I thought. However, they still seem less than admirable in that sense, and remain "dangerous" and borderline criminal in their foolish simplicity. On deeper study (at A Closer Look On Syria), it emerged that the families targeted in the May massacres - especially the Biassis - also have members involved in, or suspected of involvement in, the rebel's muted history around Baniyas. Most famously, a reported 100 local men and boys were briefly detained in mid-April, 2011, rounded up in the al-Bayda's main square and, in an infamous video, stomped on. At least fifteen family names appear on both lists, members arrested in 2011 and others slaughtered in 2013. Of course common family names in the same basic area doesn't always mean too much in the Arab world, but this seems beyond coincidence.
The Biassi family - apparently a large one with many sons - leads this parallel with some 12 arrests and a reported 36 deaths. Furthermore, some of the other familiar-named families suffering deaths in 2013 were from the portion that was married into the Biassis.
So this decimated family was riddled with anti-government activism, and that should be considered alongside the victims these suffered, reportedly at the hands of the same pro-regime thugs who stomped on them two years earlier. But as we know the Biassi family of the Baniyas area is also marked with the public stance of the imam Sheikh Omar, which we can now see more clearly and which is at times harsh. This marks the presence of a rival clique within the family, one with a quieter profile and uncertain size. But it was likely of some influence if this leading member was so solidly in it.
Put simply, we can call these two camps the Sheikh Omar school (pro-government) and the "Abu Ali" school (anti). The following shares highlights of what we've found to describe each camp, it thoughts and actions, in the service of understand what happened to some among this divided mass of a family, and the many others others like it with their own names and histories. Links and further explanations are or will be collected at this spot at A Closer Look On Syria, and elsewhere on that and related pages, allowing this to get done and published.
The "Abu Ali" School
Twelve Biassis were among those arrested in the raids of mid-April, 2011, and at least one member (possibly among those detained) seems to have been planning very ambitious "protests." A confession aired on May 23 claimed one "Abu Ali" Biassi was the "defense minister" of an "emirate" planned for Baniyas in these first days. The "emir" was a local, Sheikh Anis' (? - انس ) Aarot. All were paid and provided weapons from outside, explosives, rifles and pistols from Lebanon. Rahman Mosque was their warehouse. There was a plan of minister Biassi's to rig explosives at the Baniyas refinery and the thermal station, to be blown up on the orders of the ministers. They had the explosives, the captive driver says, but this was apparently where they were busted instead.
One young man given as Ahmad Biassi was shown on a video of this time, in the al-Bayda square, holding his ID card and perhaps announcing his defection or anti-government beliefs. Ahmad was reported in May 2011, by the BBC and others, to have been arrested and tortured to death in a government prison. He appeared on Syrian state TV swiftly refuting that; he claimed to be alive and free, never was arrested, and was surprised and disturbed to hear otherwise.
Thus this Ahmad may present a transitional clique, people who supported the rebellion in its heady "Arab Spring" beginning but came to reject its brutality and deceit and become fence-sitters or even government supporters. There is a victim of that name (Ahmed Mohammed Biassi) killed in 2013, but it's at least as likely to be a different but related man as it is to be him. * More raids and arrests came late in 2011, on December 5, with a Mustafa Biassi and Mohamed Biasi, among others, arrested. An Ahmed Biassi from Baniyas, visibly not the kid mentioned but probably related, died fighting with the FSA in Aleppo in September, 2012. But things remained fairly quiet around their hometown into the following year, until just before the massacres of May 2013.
* 2015 note: I finally listened, and the 2011 Ahmad speaks a middle name more like Abdul... something, I forget, not Mohammed, so not the same guy reported killed, unless the record is fudged.
A Mustafa Ali Biassi, politics unknown but aged near 50, was reported arrested on May 1, as rebels bagen various operation in the area and security forces started a crackdown. Then -perhaps that night - came the massacres with so many members snuffed out, "fierce clashes," more arrests, and a time of calm. There were more arrests and fighting July 20-22, and a reported mini-massacre of a Biassi-related family (Fattouh). A young Mohammed Mustafa Biassi was arrested then and confessed on Sama TV, on the 27th, to helping plan attacks on police and military. He also told how his cornered group nearly tossed one of their "poisonous boms" at approaching soldiers but feared they would die as well. (if only they had long range rockets like the guys nearer to Turkey!)
The Sheikh Omar School
And so this prolific family's entanglement with the extremist uprising is clear, but there is still the other clique. Again, this is of unknown size and fervor, we have so far only Sheikh Omar making a few appearances to give it a voice we can hear at the moment.
That spokesman was described by loyalist admirers as "a member of the National Reconciliation Committee and a known advocate of interfaith dialogue and national unity" and a "true Syrian patriot," as Voice of Russia heard. These are not values the rebels like. Opposition activist Ahmad cofirmed to Reuters "sheikh Biyasi … was a government loyalist who alienated local people with his political views." New York Times heard from a rebel who spotted the body of "the village sheik, Omar al-Bayassi, whom some considered pro-government."
The site Islam Syria reported that among those massacred were "Baathists partisans ... including the imam of the mosque of Sheikh Omar Biasi. That Baathis appeared on (some TV channel) and pointed to the Mujahideen calling them armed terrorist gangs." It's probably a different video, shown by SANA, that the CIWCL located and had translated. In it, Omar shares some of his views at a conference featuring Catholic priests in the sparse audience. The video is not dated, but in it he says something like "We believe that resolving the crisis in Syria, which was safe and stable, will be done by dialogue, for the ship with its captain Bashar al-Assad to reach safety."
On April 3, 2013 - one month before the massacre - An "Omar Biassi" spoke up on a discussion forum, "think(ing) about how we can save the country" and "weep(ing) over the country." It's not certainly him, or even supposed to be, and the text is hard to translate. But this Omar mentions how "the state's uncle (Assad?) held traitors accountable" but this increased the "bleeding of the people." Of that, they had "two years and as much as we (can bear?)" "The only solution," he seemed to feel, was to "kill them." "Syria ... victorious, God willing." Another comment said "I agree with Omar Biasi," calling the rebellion a "poison" that "kills (Syria) from the inside." He or she clarified Biassi's position; "Syrian officials have proven their failure time and again" to stop the violence, but still "now is a great opportunity to put all the corrupt and traitors in prisons or graves." The imam's stance at the rebellion's outset isn't clear to us yet, but Ahmad told Reuters "he always opposed the protests." The earliest mention yet found says that in the hours before the December 5, 2011 arrests, someone - reportedly pro-regime militias - set fire to sheikh Omar's car. It might instead have been fellow Biassis. Other relatives may have been involved later when, one month after Omar apparently called for the general death of the rebels, he and a lot of his family were killed instead.
So Navi Pillay could point to the the prominence of the Biassi family in the local opposition as evidence they (plus the 14+ other families with names appearing on both lists) might be "perceived to be supportive of the opposition." But this too, barring better specifics yet, would still be sloppy. The most prominent victim with the clearest political stance still remains Sheikh Omar Biassi, the imam of al-Bayda's mosque. He and his views alone proves there is another camp, firmly anti-opposition, with the inverse corollary about who would have a reason to kill them.
This mysterious clique lost at least one prominent member, to the unknown number killed - possibly zero - from among those who had signed on with the rebellion. *
As the rebel narrative goes, even though this martyr for his beliefs always opposed the protests, was a perceived Baath-party supporter, alienated "local" (rebel) people, apparently called for them to be killed, and finally called them terrorists in a TV interview, Islam Syria reported. They elaborate "after the end of the interview (how long after?) they (who?) dragged him to the arena (Which arena? Straight from the TV station?) and slaughtered him with his wife and four children.... Then they demolished the mosque of the village, and set fire to it" and blamed the same fictitious "armed gangs of terrorists" Omar had just pointed to.
He and the other victims pleaded, it was learned somehow, "we Baathists like you, but they replied all of you are dogs and agents of Israel and America" and cut them down. And therefore, Islam Syria's ridiculous story continues, "it is clear and evident to the Baathists among the Sunnis that they are being targeted with death too," that even - that especially - "stand(ing) with tyrants" will not protect them. Their imminent mass-defection should be expected any day, if this is at all true.
map of the scene with victims in the open marked in red
curbside victims (see top image) from a distance to
the south, composite view, from Al-Khabar TV
Victim Ahmad Othman, seen where he was killed pre-dawn, and again after sunrise where someone else says he was killed (re-arranging bodies to create false narratives, not a good sign)
Sheikh Omar's son Hamza Omar Biassi, seemingly sliced open
We're not sure who took this odd night-time photo of little Hamza Fattouh-Biassi
Rebel photo of charred bodies, still smoking heavily, the fire clearly just now extinguished. Time: unsure but important. To me, it looks like around dawn, but early enough there's still no direct sunlight on the ground here.
Safaa Ali Biassi was married to Abdullah Fattouh, per VDC records, and was mother of little Hamza (see above) and 3 Fattouh-Biassi girls. She's named in Channel 4's program as the woman shown in the video at this point, body arranged as if cradling Hamza (as they say - I'm not certain - if so, he's not wearing the same jacket as in the photo above). She wears glasses, askew here. She's probably been shot, with the hole in her jaw being the exit wound. Note that there's no blood - she's been dead some time and washed off already. This seems to be the case for all the victims in this horrible display of around 30 slaughtered women and children.
To me, the woman named as Safaa appears to be pregnant with a fifth child, and far enough along that it can be called with moderate confidence. There should be a well-developed fetus in there. The bottom frame lets you make your own call. It might be an important point, because we may have both a report and a photo of that massacre victim. The photo shows a well-developed but not-yet-ready fetus, wrapped in white as another martyr of the al-Bayda massacre. But I don't need to post it here.
We have no other info on how many pregnant women were killed here that morning of May 2, but rebel sources are clear it's at least one, and they'd better hope more than one. Safaa was clearly dead but apparently intact beneath her clothes when filmed, by rebels. In contrast, prominent massacre expert "Omar" "from Ras al-Nabi," cited among the horrific sights he saw in Bayda, "a fetus ripped from a woman’s belly," as the New York Times reported. If that was Safaa, it apparently happened after rebels were filming her executed body, but before other rebels were still able to see the aftermath (or did he see the actual act of ripping?). It would leave little reason to doubt they controlled her body even before her execution, when she was alive. And that would suggest the same for the rest of the victims too. And where, in that situation, would the villainous "Shabiha" step in and do the actual killings?