What Happened in Homs, December 23, 2012?

The First Bodies Tossed Across Obama's "Red Line" in Syria, Part 2:
What Happened in Homs on December 23, 2012?
Adam Larson aka Caustic Logic
February 11/12, 2017 

    The first two real-time reports of a deadly chemical attack came at about the same time, in late December, 2012. These came from the government and from the opposition, each blaming each other for two separate incidents, one in Damascus and one in Homs. 

December 22: Just Lies?

    The first incident was reportedly on December 22, in Daraya, in the southwest Damascus suburbs. There had been a report on the 6th of poisonous gasses "thrown" by government forces in Daraya, with no word on casualties (presumably no deaths). That was the first noted CW-related claim following US president Obama's December 3 re-iteration of his "red line" threat/offer. 16 days later, pro-government sources reported, a group of Syrian soldiers was in Daraya and had toxic gasses fired at them. It's said the shells produced a greenish-yellow cloud (like chlorine, or like the type of sarin to hit Khan al-Assal the following March). Within less than an hour, seven of the soldiers had died. (that's too vague a time frame to say if chlorine/etc. or sarin is more likely, but an informed probe later decided the former, a non-persistent irritant, was used) (ACLOS) 

    The report was mostly ignored, dismissed as Iranian propaganda (Press TV's report is the most-seen), and/or eclipsed by the following day's events. The alleged attack of December 23(ACLOS page, under revision) might offer a glimpse of the Syrian rebel CW false-flag industry, with a relatively ambitious true start after the weak first effort of the fall (see part 3 for the very first bodies we know of being tossed - upcoming). 

Dec. 23: First Reports
    Clay Caiborne's compiled tweets and articles. - cites Al-Jazeera reporting "Seven people have died in Homs after they inhaled a poisonous gas sprayed by government forces," citing activists. ABC News (Australia) cited the famous Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reporting "six rebel fighters were killed yesterday on the al-Khaldiya-al-Bayada frontier by a poisonous gas" The SOHR's even-less-credible UK-based rival Syrian Network for Human Rights weighed in with "reports from three eyewitnesses on Sunday" he passed to NBC News: "He said field doctors in Homs were seeing patients “losing consciousness, experiencing severe shortness of breath and vomiting.”

    One activist reported to Al  Jazeera "medics are saying it's something similar to Sarin gas," while an Australian ABC news report translates the doctor as saying "It's definitely a poisonous gas, but we don't know what type it is ... It is definitely not sarin." 

    From the start, experts agreed, and decided something less serious and perhaps non-lethal was responsible ... except maybe for the dead people? With years to sort it out, the picture is not much clearer. So let's see if we can clarify it here.

Two Stories from State Dept. Contacts

    This is a little complex, and perhaps a good to go way is outline how the various claims line up with the two distinct versions of events handed to the US state department consulate in Syria. Foreign Policy Magazine's The Cable reported in mid-January on a released State Department cable that showed the competing cases and contradictions. 

    One group of contacts basically described the nerve agent sarin. That kills instantly in small doses, and marks a straight line to a war-worthy CW claim. 

    The other sources, seeming a bit more credible and more trusted by the consulate, suggest a usually non-lethal incapacitating agent was used. It could be the agent dubbed "BZ," invented by the US military during the Cold War, or in regional context, the purported Iraqi-made imitation "Agent 15," or something akin to those. For shorthand, I'll used BZ. As I gather, this causes confusion, delirium, muscular relaxation or paralysis, and maybe strange behavior. It was designed to make an enemy incapable of fighting for a time, but without killing them. Apparently Syria was using it, and it can be fatal.

    Here are the cases in some detail, citing The Cable, with supporting claims from other sources.

Homs doctors/BASMA* describe sarin: A colorless but pungent-smelling gas was released, in 3 areas (Old City, Bayada, Khalidiya), at night, using an unclear method. They said "most victims had pinpoint pupils, also known as miosis," and it responded to atropine: "two doctors in Homs ... said that they used Atropine on the victims and that it improved their conditions, which would mean that BZ was not the gas used," and sarin might have been. 

-- Supporting: Raji Rahmet Rabbou, an activist in Homs, told Al Jazeera "We don't know what this gas is but medics are saying it's something similar to Sarin gas." But the effects reported include "nausea, relaxed muscles, blurred vision, and breathing difficulties," which is not very consistent.

-- Supporting: Mousab Azzawi, chairman of the London-based Syrian Network for Human Rights and a doctor, told NBC News that his organization had received reports from "field doctors in Homs" and ""to our understanding, this is similar to poisoning with pesticide," he said, although he was not aware of any pesticide that could take the form of a gas." Sarin is liquid and forms a vapor or mist, if not a gas, and is similar to pesticides, an organophosphate.

-- Supporting: "...but two doctors who treated victims on the scene told The Cable that the gas was colorless but that several victims reported a pungent odor." (colorless describes military grade sarin, but is unlikely to be described reliably, in a confusing night-time attack, and more likely to be made up - a pungent odor IF from sarin means it's not military grade stuff)

-- Against: videos show no one with sarin symptoms, like miosis (pinpoint pupils) or the messy SLUDGE syndrome.  One man's pants are soiled, but only at the knees, from when he collapsed in the mud.

* BASMA = an opposition media project. The name means "fingerprint," as this news report explains, and it's "run out of an office in Istanbul where Syrian activists write and produce reports for a Facebook page and the Basma website. A promotional video explains the goals of Basma: "to support a peaceful transition for a new Syrian nation that supports and guards the freedom of all of its citizens." The Website has since died, but the Facebook page still exists in 2017.

Consulate contacts/SLN describe BZ:
This version has a white cloud causing, as a Syria Life News  Syria Life News (SLN) reporter told the consulate staff, symptoms including: "burning eyes, temporary blindness, relaxed and numb joints, unresponsiveness, nausea, unconsciousness, difficulty breathing, and temporary paralysis affecting the spine." "The consulate’s contact also reported that most victims had dilated pupils, which contradicts the account the two doctors." One contact told the consulate "Atropine worsened the condition of the patients ... which would be consistent with the theory that a BZ-like compound was used," and would basically prove it wasn't sarin. Both the breathing problems and the eye irritation might be unrelated to BZ itself, but seem to come in conjunction with this symptom set.

-- Supporting: SOHR cited white smoke  but symptoms were: "severe dizziness and headaches, some even suffered from epilepsy" which sounds different.
-- Supporting: the field doctor who decided "it is definitely not sarin," maybe after treating with atropine and finding it made the problem worse.
-- Supporting: Dr. Al-Fida, CNN: "labored breathing, disorientation, hallucination, nervousness and lack of limb control."
-- Supporting: "The Local Co-ordination Committees also reported the use of "bombs containing gases" in Homs. "These gases lead to muscle relaxation, severe difficulty in breathing and the narrowing of the iris..." (which should be a dilation of the pupil). (AFP via news.com.au)

- Against: I don't think BZ is known to tear up the respiratory tract like we see (below) or like described, causing breathing problems, nor is it known to burn the eyes. This could be impurities, additives, or a separate gas loaded into a second shell/grenade. Somehow, this may be two poisons mixed.

Differences on Delivery Device
    Two methods were reported to the consulate. The Cable: "Initial reports said a regime ground vehicle was the delivery method, but later reports said a number of short range missiles were fired into rebel-controlled civilian areas, the cable states." BASMA "couldn’t confirm the delivery method because the gas was dispersed at night and caused mass confusion," and perhaps there was no incoming rocket sound.  It seems both claims came from BASMA, requiring the confusion note. Apparently they didn't like the original story, so that ground vehicle version is of some interest.

    The SOHR heard the white gas came from a "grenade," apparently tossed by hand, and likely from that "regime ground vehicle." As ABC reported, SOHR said "[It] discharged white smoke and would disperse quickly once the grenades were thrown by regime forces. This weapon is unidentified and has not been used before."  The original statement is apparently in Arabic somewhere, quoted in a few news reports, but using different translations. Some say these were "bombs," or "canister bombs," or "grenades" is used in two cases. All agree these bombs were "thrown" (not dropped, launched, or the like), so that they "hit a wall," and it was "during street battles." None of these cites a vehicle involved, so apparently SOHR didn't hear about one. But still, that's my guess.

L: Mystery grenade from April 29 incident. R: JaN policeman spots one

    The munition is not shown, neither rocket nor grenade. But if it's the latter, it might look like this mystery grenade used in chemical attacks five months later, in April, 2013. These were at the time never-before seen. Rebels said they were dropped from a helicopter by regime forces on at least two deadly occasions But otherwise they're used exclusively by Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, as far as anyone's seen. The pro-rebel blogger Eliot Higgins (aka Brown Moses) had to acknowledge this on May 8 when he was sent the photo shown at far right. No one knows where they're made, but Turkey seems likely. (ACLOS)

    These known sighting were in northern Syria, Aleppo and Idlib provinces, again in April, 2013. Could they be used in Homs this early? Well, after the above link to al-Nusra was noted, along with the strange helicopter story and other story problems, rebels in the Damascus area showed a number of these grenades on video, on May 24.  What luck! These were just then captured in Irbeen, they said, from government forces (who allegedly got them from Iran). Brown Moses was pleased. There's no proof they didn't actually borrow these from their local al-Nusra friends.

    Government ownership claim aside, these grenades might be spread wider in space than thought, and maybe in time. This might be what was used back on December 23, as part of the operation anyway, tossed not from a helicopter but from a moving car or truck - a "regime" one, of course.

Fatalities:
    Whatever the poison(s) or delivery method(s), both of the consulate's info streams seem to agree the event was singular, it was done by the regime, and it killed a total of seven people.   "BASMA and SLN contacts reported to the consulate that seven people were killed by the dispersed gas and 50 more victims were treated in a field clinic."    

World Reaction: Up and Down
Dismissal

    The story was initially greeted with much enthusiastic "worry" that "Assad" was about to get "himself" bombed. The timing of this matches the later report that the Saudis flew someone to UK in winter 2012-13 to be tested for sarin exposure (Wall Street Journal). This is the most prominent alleged attack NOT by rebels, among a very few such known incident in this span. That would mean the subject was allegedly connected to this alleged sarin attack.

    But for all we know, he's a Jihadi who volunteered to sip (slowly) some diluted sarin, to get their positive result with minimal side-effects. And no clear sarin connection was found, or was never publicized anyway. And it seems this attack was probably not done with sarin - at least, not the parts we've seen.

    Some incident involving a chemical gas is widely credited as happening, but experts in Israel and the West at the time swiftly decided it was nothing important. No banned substances were used, and the event did not constitute a crossing of the "red line" set by President Obama. As NBC News reported on the 24th "The gas is thought to have been a concentrated irritant, but not one of the deadly chemical weapons stockpiled by the regime of Syria president Bashar Assad." 

    After a couple of weeks to look into it... experts decided on a "super-strength tear gas" or a riot-control agent, or something, was responsible, somehow. A Dr. Abu al Fida, "who treated about 30 of the approximately 100 people who were affected by the mysterious gas, told CNN for a January 14 report how, as they put it, 

    People who were further away from the source suffered labored breathing, disorientation, hallucination, nervousness and lack of limb control, al Fida said. But those closer to the source of the gas had much more severe symptoms, including paralyses, seizures, muscle spasms and in some cases blindness, he said. Six people were killed by the gas, the doctor said.

Fatality Questions

    Six people died. Or seven. As an official told CNN: "if you breathe in an entire canister, that can have a severe effect on your lungs and other organs."  But why would 7 men each stand there and inhale a whole canister (as the example goes)?

    The question is especially sharp here; As an article at Medscape states flatly "By definition, incapacitating agents are nonlethal. BZ has a high safety ratio. The dose required to produce incapacitating effects is roughly 40 times less than the fatal dose." It  seems very rare, as in, it makes little to no sense these 6-7 people died from it. 

    If they had, the article suggests it would be through hyperthermia (overly-high body temperature), or some zany and dangerous behavior (not in 7 cases). And these are only somewhat possible, after a ridiculously high dose. Such a thing could make sense if we propose it happened in a small enclosed room. But no one has proposed that, and even if you had someone in a gas chamber, why would you opt to use BZ instead of, say, the exhaust pipe from one of your trucks?

    Anyway, if this gas or vapor was spread at random, from a rocket or grenade, it makes no sense to alleged that was BZ. Maybe that was fired somehow, but it's probably not what killed anybody. So far, there's no good explanation offered as to how they wound up dead. It seems like an opposition top secret, lidded over with a couple of failed explanations, taped together with general apathy. And so the issue sat for just a few weeks.

Failed Revival
    But after March 19, 2013, the picture changed abruptly. On the 20th, the Syrian government was demanding an investigation into a fairly obvious terrorist chemical attack the previous day. It seems Syrian soldiers and civilians they guarded were the targets, and at least 20 were killed. States opposed to Syria's government immediately demanded other incidents had to be probed as well, and this was one of two added first. On March 21, representatives of France and the  UK informed the Secretary-General about it, and the next day Qatar also reported  it. So they had to insist on looking at this, and a March 19 attack in Damascus area, as equally urgent as investigating Khan al-Assal.

    More allegations, fresh ones and cold cases, were added into the summer. This plus more slowed the process, but it did continue, and in December, 2013, the UN and OPCW managed to issue a report (PDF). Having by then 16 alleged incidents to look at, they found seven were credible enough to weigh in on, and four of those were lodged by the Syrian government against the foreign-backed militants.

    For the other nine claims, all added by pro-rebel states,  "The United Nations Mission did not receive sufficient or credible information" to declare much of anything, with months to send it in, and after several visits to Turkey and Syria by the mission. These probelematic or too-vague allegations included "Homs on  23  December  2012," and the other urgent first addition, "Otaybah on 19 March 2013." For these nine incidents, nothing further was said.

    And so the issue has sat for the last three years.

The Victims Assessed

    With no secretly-submitted evidence from member states, just what's publicly available, how much credible information can we see? To start, as usual,we'll lean away from words and focus on the visual record, as well as getting a little more specific about who died vs. who lived, and things like this, which sometimes helps see the shape of an alternate narrative that's likely closer to the truth than we ever got at the time.

Surviving Fighters

    I don't think I ever really watched the videos until, now. First, survivors in the clinic, mostly or all fighters, or all adult males, anyway. 

The choking is real: blood in the airways

     One video shows a particular young man suffering genuine-seeming problems breathing. like a fish out of water, eyes wide, gulping breaths, leaking fluids at times - needs the nebulizer,. In another one, we see more patients,  2:35 does not want the inhaler, gulping breaths, strange behavior 2:50 red face, red, teary eyes staring, they each get their eyes rinsed. This video shows the victims have blood in the lungs or airways - drainage tube is inserted through the Islamist's nose, and is soon filled with pink froth (screen grab at right). 

    Suggested: an irritant, causing eye irritation as we see, and the tissue damage in the airways behind that choking. Some patients may also display a delerium or paralysis as with a BZ-type agent. And so this is a better fit than sarin - no SLUDGE syndrome evident - the consulate/SLN version above seems to explain what happened, at least, to the men in this group, if there was also a nasty irritant involved.

...
State Department cable
All (SLN and BASMA) agreed the contested chemical killed seven people. They would disagree on how that happened, physiologically, since they disagree on the poison. But that doesn't matter. They agree it was the regime.

    The seven dead were buried and videos of their burial "clearly show the absence of visual injuries," the cable stated. 

    They will have suffered chemical injuries, which often leave signs. Which of the two versions, if either, did these support? The question was dodged.

    Here, we'll take a bit of a look at what seems like a third and different case... I'd like to compare these to what a BZ or Agent 15 death look like - could not even find a source. But I can't say the clinical signs are wrong, since I don't know what to look for. What does an atropine overdose look like? That was said to be tried, but worsened the symptoms. What if they worsened to the fatal point? I may come back to this.

The Fatalities

    As noted above, there's a little variation and vagueness in the reported death toll. First of all, it was known and reported from the start, and only rose, if at all, by one victim. The SOHR heard at one point 6 people died, and they were all rebel fighters. Others said 7 died, and they were simply people.

 
VDC query: 7 victims

    All these are adult males, no women or children were effected that badly, with this random-dispersal rocket strike.  The SOHR heard there were 6 dead rebels, but by this, one is a rebel fighter, and the other six are civilians. As far as I know, it's not explained how and why these guys all wound up together with those surviving fighters, nearest to the rocket's impact, or whatever.

    In fact, it's reasonable to presume these were all fighters, likely gassed by the government, in a way that should have been non-fatal ... so okay, it's still reasonable to note that this is odd. The SOHR heard that, but then everyone else seemed to agree it was just people. Even gender isn't usually given. I initially presumed these were fighters, and the issue therefore didn't seem as urgent. But looking back after learning more, I urge caution with that conclusion. The SOHR claim might have been a guess, not based on any clear info. These might be (mostly) non-militants, who wound up dead in this militant-run area.

    Also from the clinical signs they exhibit, it's not clear they ever did wind up in the same spot as, or suffer the same poisoning as those fighters. It's not even clear that all these dead guys died in the same manner and place as the rest. I think we have at least two different poisons here, and at least two, and likely three or four different pools of affected people. Considering the two different stories of what happened, and noting both might have (sort of) happened, we might now be glimpsing a third and/or fourth segment to the day's chemical shenanigans. This is where the actual deaths happened, in at least one manner that's worthy of some thought, considering the lack of a good explanation thus far.

* Alaa Asad al-Hasan "al-Sharkse"  Non-Civilian, from Bayada, merchant and member of "FSA" - Known as (Abu Asa'ad al-Sharkasi), "Martyred as a result of exposure of toxic / chemical gases thrown by military forces, leading to suffocation. reports to be validated." Video (still at right) - notes: possible eye damage, yellow color? Minor burns or bruises on the forehead? Otherwise, nothing obvious. Clearly, he's been washed for burial, so any mucous, etc. is gone. I have no guess what killed him.

VDC name check (Arabic) "Al-Sharkse" seems to be a fighter nickname; it only appears with 3 entries, all fighters - the other one from Homs was with Jabhat al-Nusra, killed in 2015. 104 Hasans from Homs. That's too many too look at right now. Most recent before him: a misplaced SAA soldier killed in Damascus. What if they were related? Could that - and failing to be clear about it - land this guy in some Islamist gas chamber? It's possible. And that's just a thought exercise.

* Bassam Abu al-Rous civilian, from Rabee Arabi Neighborhood, age 25, unmarried, student. An image of him alive shows him in Saudi-style robes, holding an AK-47 as if firing it) Video (still at right) - notes: mild cyanosis? (purple color - usually shows especially in the lips), and the color seems a little splotchy. Clearly, he's washed for burial, but possible mucous traces remain in his nostrils.

VDC Name check: (Arabic) - 6 al-Rous from Homs to die so far, most with photos. He and the two before all sport beards and the checkered headscarf, others appear Islamist and tended to die with FSA. Others look secular/beardless, and died under torture in regime prisons, date unknown. Hmmm...

* Ehab Asi civilian, from Bayada - video - (still at right) - notes: purple color, in patches? Staining? Bruising? Cyanosis? Possible eye damage (puffy lids). He doesn't seem washed, but no sign of fluids. His hair might "stick up," as if he were hanged upside down for a while and it crusted that way. It may not be an important point here, but it's a real phenomenon I'm watching for, and it's something no Assad missile can do to people who wind up gassed in a rebel-controlled area.

VDC name check: Arabic search - from Homs - 14 total, all civilians except the last two, in 2015 and 2016 (the usual vague "FSA"). It says the civilian majority mostly died in one-off shelling and shooting (by the regime side, of course), but a 42-year-old Asi woman and 85-year-old Asi man were singled out to be massacred by pro-government NDF militias, in Karm al-Zaytoun, 2014-04-09 (VDC lists 15 Homsis field executed this day, previously missed at ACLOS)

* Saber Mando civilian, Bayada - video -  (still at right) - notes: same color issues (cyanosis?), mostly across the forehead. Hair may "stick up," in a crusted way. The victim is fairly thin, may have been ill or deprived of food for a time prior to dying, but maybe he was just a thin guy. Starvation and illness/neglect can easily get extreme when someone is stuck in an Islamist group's dungeon, for example.

VDC lists 33 killed from Homs province with this name. Through 2012 several Mandos were killed in some of the grimmest Homs massacres, with one centered the family of a doctor named Mando, in February. Then there was this sole CW victim in December, then in 2013 some Mandos with the FSA start dying in clashes. Then later Mando civilians around the Houla-Rastan area die at random from "warplane shelling," because rebels are in charge there, as those elsewhere hardly get listed (order is mostly restored in Homs).  

The other three fatalities have no videos or photos.

* Unidentified, civilian (this is likely the 7th person the SOHR didn't hear about, and it seems maybe no one got a name for.
* Ahmad Walid Hamadi, civilian
* Satouf Ibrahim Hamadi, civilian

   It's interesting that the last two have the same family name. This is common, and probably means they were related. The different middle names suggest different father's names, so they're cousins, not brothers. Cousins sometimes might join the opposition together, but here they wound up together in this small pool destined to die. 

    They may have even joined, or tried joining, some rebel faction. But maybe the issue was their refusal to join, or their family at large - and if so, then also these other families - running afoul of someone, having the wrong religion, etc. Maybe some men were kidnapped, then at the right moment, gassed quietly and logged as CW deaths, and used as the first corpses publicly tossed across Obama's Red Line.

    The overall video record suggests: resp. irritant and maybe BZ on the surviving fighters, maybe the same or different for the one who died, and something else, more acute that causes cyanosis, perhaps in a gas chamber, for the civilians.

    Finally, two thoughts on the numbers: In relation to the alleged December 22 attack in Daraya, where 7 soldiers were killed. One possible readin of the Homs incident is it was the government's revenge. A decent script would have sarin, not BZ, in the active role. But it might help clarify the tit-for-tat impression if exactly seven people died in "revenge."

    Then I note we have a record  - a questionable one - of one rebel and 6 civilian males, for seven dead in an Assad CW attack. Almost the same formula emerged in the Otaybah incident in March, but the rebel-looking man was also listed as a civilian, and the last male was a baby and added late. The inclusion of a fighter and otherwise all adult males reported adds to the impression they must all be fighters, who "got gassed" or gassed themselves on accident, and maybe it's not clear or a big deal, and we move on - that's how I felt at first. Glad I was spurred to finally look closer.

Amnesty's Dubious "Human Slaughterhouse" Report

Amnesty's Dubious "Human Slaughterhouse" Report
Looking for the Truth Behind the New Mass-Hanging Report
by Adam Larson aka Caustic Logic
February 8/9, 2017
(last edits Feb. 10)

Note: for this newsworthy story, a rushed rough version of a complete article, which I'll finish as soon as I can. (still rough but finished enough, next day - some edits and addition day after)
---

The widely-respected but notoriously gullible Amnesty International (USA branch) has again raised the alarm on crimes against humanity committed in the Syrian conflict. Again, as they've heard it and as they find, these crimes are by the insanely brutal Assad regime or, here, "the Syrian government" (for balance). 

Human Slaughterhouse: Mass Hangings and Extermination at Saydnaya Prison (PDF link) is a "chilling" report explained by this AI press release, and that's getting has hyped in the media, like by the UK Independent. 

The newly revealed crimes are said to have occurred at the notorious Sednaya military prison (the report uses the spelling Saydnaya), north of Damascus. They find an estimated 5,000-13,000 mostly innocent political prisoners have been hanged to death, besides badly abused, from 2011 through 2015. Surely more have been killed since, and they would remind us, more yet face this horrible alleged death in the future, unless we act.

Anyway, Amnesty (or AI) spoke to several supposed former inmates, supposed former guards and even officials, and self-described family members of other prisoners. That's a lot of words to pick and choose from, and it seems they just chose most of it because they liked the pickings. They heard about the terrible conditions in Sednaya's white building, and mind-numbing abuses in the even-worse red building. There, people were systematically tortured and killed, and only released if they saw everything and have contacts through to folks like Amnesty International (20 of their 31 alleged prisoner witnesses claimed to have been held there).

The unsupported verbal evidence behind AI's "findings" could be, as many will presume, a true record of events. But my money is on it being some mix of these three things:

1. Jihadist fiction (these sources could be well-connected crypto-Islamists in the midst of their information jihad against Syria)
2. Real; but spun and exaggerated evidence of normal execution for death penalty crimes (like treason, terrorism, kidnapping, murder, etc.)
3. The same victims already heavily promoted as seen in the "Caesar photos," basically just re-cycled with a new story.

It feels to me like some kind of shell-game, perhaps conflating two real things with some fake ones, etc., to create another false picture that helps keep the "pressure on Assad," and block any chance of peace and reconciliation. Even more importantly, these new allegations might help conceal the scale of terrorist crimes against Syria's people by re-branding them - as such allegations have always done - as more horrible crimes of "Assad".

1. Jihadist Fiction?

They say medical care was denied, and anyone reporting illness would be beaten, in the spot that hurt if he told them what it was. So illness went untreated, amid starvation, beatings, torture, and and other abuses. In this climate, one death per cell per day was expected. In fact, one supposed former inmate said that when his cell had no one die for 3 days, guards beat them all so severely that 13 of them died.

Those chosen for execution, having already been convicted in their mock "trial", and maybe sentenced to death, are told they're going to a regular prison. Once fooled like this, they are instead, cruelly, dragged beneath the red building and  beaten until past midnight, then transferred to the white building around 3 am usually, and "brought into a room in the basement and hanged." 

They call the mass-hanging ritual "the party," and call dead bodies "the goods." They deal in death and love it! Wicked people ... Okay? This is a story of cartoon villainy, written by dimwitted Jihadists who lack subtlety in their narratives, and transcribed by AI. It might better be called "Humorous Chatterboxes: Extemporaneous Mass-Fabrication of Horrors at Saydanaya Prison." Like so many bogus claims over the years, this outlines a satanic campaign of extermination, waged by the inclusive and secular Syrian government against the pure Sunni uprising ... that will prevail, Allahu Akbar!

Starvation Evidence? The claim of systematic starvation of the prisoners is not entirely verbal. It's supported in the report by photos - at least three named activists who were detained at Sednaya and later released are shown before and after, extremely thin, as if badly starved for some time. If these really all match up (I'll presume so), that's better evidence than usual. It gives me slight pause. 

But I notice they all seem either too happy or proud of their astonishing weight loss - almost like people who had just won a hunger strike, and granted early release by the government to avoid having a death on their hands. Who knows? They might have been arrested partly for lying their asses off about the government, and might be repeating the crime now. Because it seems that other than a few crash diets, all we have is a lot of words from clearly partisan sources of the kind we should know all too well.

2. Normal Execution for Death Penalty Crimes?

There is a legitimate death penalty for some crimes, like treason, terrorism, kidnapping, murder, etc. It might be done by hanging, or I've heard they still use firing squad in Syria. This is bound to be used, fairly or unfairly, in this conflict situation. Is that who's getting hanged? 

According to the people AI talked to, no. These are just innocent people. The trials are all shams. The word trial jacketed in "scare quotes" in AI's report - as they otherwise call the killings "extrajudicial" (that is, done without a trial). But they do explain how the innocent were tortured into confessing to such a death penalty crimes, before their "trial."

"...during their interrogation in the branches of the intelligence agencies, they “confessed” under torture to the most serious crimes, such as killing a member of the Syrian military. As a result of their high-level confessions, those held in the red building are usually subjected to a “trial”

So if the government counters these were judicial killings, based on evidence including confessions, this could be how the opposition crowd would explain it. It was all a bogus process. The system was rigged, man!

No Opposition Fighters Here? It was July, 2011, the report explains, when "the first group of detainees arrested for their involvement in the unfolding crisis in Syria" were sent to Sednaya's "red building." This was back when it was all peaceful, except in some places - like almost everywhere, including the Damascus countryside.

And in 2015, Amnesty spoke with 20 who were in the ominous red building, "five who were part of the Syrian military at the time of their arrest and 15 who were civilians." None were opposition militants, in case they acknowledge there were any. "The remaining 11 were detained in the prison’s “white building”, including nine who were part of the Syrian military at the time of arrest and two who were civilians." (they heard the white building was mostly for military and red mainly for civilians.) Again, no rebel types, FSA or Al-Qaeda, appeared at least among those Amnesty heard from.

So the people held and killed are members of the military, and civilians - like it seems in the "Caesar photos." There are no actual armed insurgents included. Huh. By this agreed narrative, all claims of militant activity here were to be extracted under torture, and be untrue by definition. The regime wanted it that way, to ensure they got only unjust death here. That's "the party," where you get "the goods," that are only sweet enough once they've been thoroughly marinated in evil. This helps clarify the unacceptable immorality of it all. In fact, it's a bit too clear, isn't it? That might be Wahhabi fiction for you. (this obviously goes back to point 1 as well).

It does clash with the picture formed in this segment from an earlier Al-Jazeera program: the prisoners in Sednaya were 98% Islamists, perhaps including activists but also high-risk militants, requiring extra security. Only a few people were in for non-revolutionary crimes. It's not clear how many were activist Islamists, which AI acknowledges, vs. militants, which they don't. So did Amnesty only hear from the Islamist activists, from the other 2%, or from people who weren't there at all?

(See also this account from a former prisoner who contest's Amnesty's version I didn't work in here.)

3. The "Caesar Photos" Victims Recycled? 

I note this story is similar in many ways to existing claims that thousands of detainees had been killed, by August 2013, in various prisons around Damascus. That was "proven" with gruesome smuggled photos first revealed in early 2014, coupled with the story told by the supposed photographer, code-named "Caesar." We've all heard about this.

In my analysis of the evidence (largely collected here at the Monitor), these people did die in Syria and were collected at military hospital 601 (garage area, middle building on the north side). But they were probably never imprisoned by the government.

Rather, it seems more like  terrorists abducted and killed these thousands of men and older boys, who were religious, political, or military enemies of theirs. Said terrorists probably held thousands of such people at any time, abused and starved them, and finally exterminated them and dumped the bodies. They also, I suspect, scrawled numbers on the bodies blaming different branches of Syrian military intelligence, and giving a high but mostly consistent "prisoner number" to each.  

It seems to me the government, for its part, found and documented the bodies, before burying them in graveyards they have to operate for such things. It seems the bodies got individual graves, and I suspect the photos were meant for retrieval, whenever a victims was finally identified. The numbers were simply left as found. And "Caesar," I suspect, dishonestly used his position to take his own unofficial photos geared towards "confirming" the terrorists' message, and making the process look just as evil as the 'mass prison torture' painted in behind it.

But whatever ... there are many similarities, from abuse type, basic number, and others I needed to explore. For example, the phrase AI chose for the report's title, "human slaughterhouse," is just the effect "Caesar" says he wanted to create with the first of numerous group photos he staged, like the one above, to "make the place look like a slaughterhouse."

Amnesty on Overlap: Maybe: AI isn't even sure if this is or isn't the same thing, at least in part. Two different passages in the report, with their footnotes, explain:

* "The bodies of the victims are then taken from Saydnaya to Tishreen Military Hospital, where they are registered by hospital officials there ... according to former prison authorities from Saydnaya, the bodies are not photographed at this stage by the Military Police, because it is not necessary for the authorities to confirm or register their cause of death. 110" Note 110: "Accordingly, these victims would not be among those in the photographs smuggled out by “Caesar”."

* "The medical report is then sent to the forensics department at Tishreen Hospital. There, the body is photographed by a member of the Military Police and a death certificate is drawn up based on the medical report. 159" Note 159: "Accordingly, those who die as a result of torture and other ill-treatment at Saydnaya may be included in the photos smuggled out of Syria by “Caesar”."(emphasis mine)

So ... the bodies were not photographed at Tishreen, but then they were, so these people might or might not be shown in some of those photos "Caesar" smuggled out. Well, that's about as clear as mud.

Looking at different sub-themes in comparison, we see a somewhat mixed picture, but mainly it seems this is supposed to be a new allegation of systematic abuse. It's related to and similar to - but not part of - the system supposedly documented in the "Caesar photos."They're supposed to jointly illustrate a larger picture of near-holocaust proportions.

Different Prisons: The December, 2015 Human Rights Watch report makes it sound like each military intelligence (MI) branch had its own prison, with branch 215 and 227 killing the bulk of victims at their two facilities, and the others like 216, 235, Air Force Intelligence, military police, etc. killing a combined few hundred more at their places. I'm not actually sure if everyone agrees on this claim, but it seemed so.

However, I've noticed that the same abuses and tortures were being done at all these different prisons at the same time - that is, they probably were all in one place (again, not government-run), and the terrorists there arbitrarily made up the branch divisions (an example below - every prison was an eye-gouging spree at the same time).

According to HRW, Sednaya prison is included as a minor contributor. I've seen most of the photos, and just one token Sednaya victim s noted: "sporadic views" folder, 003-1-2012-Sednaya Prison (given in Arabic). He doesn't appear hanged, but has white foam coming from his mouth. It says this is January, 2012. There are some photos (just a few I've seen, as labeled) from Tishreen hospital, where it's said Sednaya sent their "goods."  These seem to be six in number, all logged in March of 2012. Here's one - take a look at that neck. Is this a Sednaya basement hanging victim?

To say that place alone produced so many, in context, means this is news, and that number should be added, minus perhaps a small overlap, to the "Caesar photos" tally. But of course, that claim is in question here.

General Abuse Similarities: The report declares at one point "the government is deliberately inflicting inhuman conditions on detainees at Saydnaya Prison through repeated torture and the systematic deprivation of food, water, medicine and medical care." These are all just what happened to the "Caesar photos" victims - sporadic torture and other injuries, badly infected, as their bodies wasted away from lack of food or care. In most cases, their heads were apparently shaved at least once near the end, and that seems to be it.

The link is noted in the report, with the "Caesar" story cited as a precedent. It's one that's in the process of being torn down. All these signs of horrible abuse - and they are very bad - will in the end implicate the foreign-sponsored proxy terrorists in Syria.

Alleged Coverup Similarities: As with the "Caesar photos," numerous sources told AI that the victims were explained by official papers citing cause of death as heart attack or breathing failure, natural and innocent, irregardless of the facts. Here they point out how clever this is, for being technically true.

Previously, I've seen a handful of supposed official death certificates that say heart attack. That could be true in those cases, or they could be forged. Either way, there's no proof this is really said for everyone, and the notion is in fact pretty dubious.

Interesting note: the coverup goes way back, allegedly. The earliest entry in the "Caesar photos" library is elderly Mahmoud al-Zoubi (as explained here), who was among those killed in the same incident that killed famous child martyr Hamza al-Khatib, in rural Daraa on April 29, 2011 (or a month later as they say - see here for full story). Sheikh al-Zoubi's death certificate is shown on a video, claiming he died from a heart attack - brought about by vicious torture. Authorities would say that was by the same Islamists who killed the old man, Hamza, and the others, before they found the bodies unidentified the night of the 29th. But it's shown like an admission by authorities that they tortured him to death. And it's an admission they supposedly have avoided with that lame heart attack story.

Hospital to Mass Grave: Whether hanged, killed otherwise, or died from starvation and neglect, the dead prisoners (or "the goods") would be "transferred to Tishreen Hospital for registration, and finally brought to mass graves located on military land near Damascus. ... Most of those hanged and secretly buried had been subjected to enforced disappearance in Saydnaya. Their families still have no information about their fate."

Put another way, as terrorists came to control ever-wider areas, many people disappeared, into dungeons, we think ... and that might be. And the government never told them about it, or handed over the body.

It's said the bodies of those who died or were executed at Sednaya were sent to Tishreen Hospital (and as noted, perhaps photographed there, or not). This is not the Hospital 601 the "Caesar photos" were taken at. But it sounds like they were then sent to the mass graves/official cemeteries outside Damascus that the bodies from 601 were sent to. This suggests to me the same reason; authorities could not find the families for this many unidentified bodies. So I suspect the same basic story as the "Caesar photos" applies here, anyway (to the extent there are these bodies passing through Tishreen hospital, which seems likely enough).  The claim that photos were not taken is likely false. That should be standard for unknown bodies. That source just wanted to be clear there's no chance of overlap or recycling here. But other sources didn't get that memo.

Compared Body Counts: Amnesty's estimate range of 5,000-13,000 killed at the prison is based just on what people said:

On the basis of evidence from people who worked within the prison authorities at Saydnaya and witness testimony from detainees, Amnesty International estimates that between 5,000 and 13,000 people were extrajudicially executed at Saydnaya between September 2011 and December 2015. 

This is probably based on the numbers they gave, like "13 men died in our cell on this day," extrapolated and averaged somehow over time. (They actually explain it, as noted and panned by "b" at Moon of Alabama) But of course those words might have been fictitious to begin with.

The "Caesar photos" are said to show some 11,000 tortured detainees. and the body numbers run about that high (at least to 9,994, with most numbers unseen). I suspect this is an unidentified body number. Anyway, it seems some 10-11,000 passed through, but the photos only show about 60% of these (6,600-6,700), and only most of these are clearly prisoners - of someone with no regard for modern human rights standards (mainly you can tell by the intensive abuse, starvation, and neglect, besides the mysterious mass extermination). However, it's odd how none of them I've seen wears a prison uniform - they're in street  clothes or naked, or in non-uniform underwear, like people kidnapped by terrorists would be.

So, ...  maybe 4-5,000 of the "Caesar photos" victims were detained, or the full 6,700, or maybe the full 11,000 bodies suggested by the running numbers. This yields a broad range of 4,000-11,000, at the time "Caesar" fled with his photos, in August, 2013. HRW decided Sednaya produced 5,000-13,000 with another two years and four months added. That stands out as strangely similar, but it could well be its own different number, just on the same grand scale.

In this case, however, there's no photo evidence for so many bodies. Precedent says there could be, but it's not proven. And of course, even if there are, pivotal questions remain (see above and below) .

Thoughts on Prison Death Rate Variance: Amnesty's report states:

According to the Human Rights Data Analysis Group, a non-governmental organization that uses scientific methods to analyse human rights violations, at least 17,723 people were killed in government custody between March 2011 and December 2015, an average of 300 deaths each month.

The Caesar photos were supposed to show how 6,600-11,000 detainees were killed just in the Damascus area up to mid-August, 2013. My analysis of the provided dates on these photos suggests most of the unidentified bodies rolled in between November, 2012 and the last days between August 14 and 20. With about 9,000 bodies logged in this span, that's an average of nearly 1,000 bodies a month, just in this large corner of Syria. (again these are largely abused prisoners, but appear to have other kinds of unknown men included, and there are lots of missing images, about 40% of the total that might look far different, like including women and children, more rotten bodies, etc.)

So ... having "Caesar" there to document it makes the death toll rise dramatically? ... Full timeline below (see here for H# and "H# insertions" explained). Top line is months, bottom line is body numbers.

 The major red span broken down:

Neck Issues: The Caesar photo victims don't tend to look like they were hanged by the neck until dead. They do often show signs of being suspended upside down, by their ankles, for long spells. That's roughly the opposite. And they frequently have abrasions, burns, ligature or collar marks on their necks. At right, alleged prisoner #963 of branch 215 from the February 2013 folder.  (cropped and rotated - original at SAFMCD). It seems he was hanged upside-down, with bands of mild acid wrapped around his neck, perhaps to keep his head down as low as possible ... that and his yellow mucous issue are among the many strange things I'll be coming back to soon.

Anyway, this is a point suggesting there's some separate pool of people who have been hanged. There may or may not be some proof forthcoming, but this is the opposition's leading story as to how it happened. As usual, by regime evil, allowed by the world.

If that's so, any overlap between these big pools should be minimal. But mainly this exercise seems to be about taking "Caesar's" story for all those bodies, tying it as a precedent to this mass party-hanging of innocents story, having that be be seen as supporting the first claims, etc. It's similar to how non-incriminating quotes from the "Assad files" (smuggled documents) were spun together with scenes from the "Caesar photos," by partisan alleged witnesses (explained here). It's an ongoing informational circle-jerk. You can pile falsehood upon falsehood for a hundred years, but there's never a point where it becomes true. But if it supports an officially sanctioned regime change campaign, plenty of people will line up, and get paid, to assure everyone what the activists said is definitely true.

What Happened on March 19, 2013?

The First Bodies Tossed Across Obama's "Red Line" in Syria, Part 1:
What Happened on March 19, 2013?
By Adam Larson, aka Caustic Logic
February 5, 2017
last edits Feb. 12, Nov. 2)

Let's re-visit a pivotal day nearly four years ago, when news broke of the first  undeniable and seriously deadly use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. March 19, 2013 witnessed the first clear crossing of then-U.S. president Obama's “red line.” And it happened, or tried to happen, in three places at once, across Syria, on a particularly loaded day. 

As usual, this takes some good explaining, and runs a bit long. A good skim might suffice to get the main ideas.

"Red line," of course refers to Obama's threat to intervene military against Syria's government if it was believed to have used or was planning to use its feared chemical weapons. As I noticed at the time, this could be an appealing invitation to rebels: create the impression of an Assad gas attack, and you can get military help.

That threat was first issued by Obama on August 20, 2012, exactly one year (almost to the hour, adjusted for time zones) before the infamous Ghouta alleged sarin attack of August 21, 2013. No clear attack reports emerged at first, but a reminder in early December was followed by Syria's only chlorine factory being seized by Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda), and a slew of small-scale CW allegations from both sides (7 Syrian soldiers reported killed near Damascus on December 22, and 6 civilian men and a rebel fighter in Homs, on December 23).

These alleged attacks were dismissed at the time, and then there was a pause in accusations of three months before the events in question. So to start, chemical attacks were not an everyday event at this time, but had barely happened at all, and it was months earlier. So it would be odd if not just one but two, or even three, incidents should occur in one day.

The Ides of March Window of Opportunity

The days surrounding March 19 feature an odd abundance of invitations to rebels to cross the “red line,” sharpening the motive consideration to their disfavor.

On the 15th, the armed rebellion had its symbolic two-year anniversary, with chances for everyone to mark the occasion. That day, the U.S. treasury issued a decree allowing US citizens to ignore sanctions and directly finance the Syrian rebels. On on March 18, as Britain and France continued lobbying the European Union to lift the arms embargo, Secretary of State John Kerry announced that "the United States does not stand in the way of other countries that have made a decision to provide arms" to the rebels.

Further, the top U.S. military commander in Europe - Adm. James Stavridis - said that NATO was laying out plans for possible military attacks on Syria, if an adequate reason should surface. Of course, president Obama had already offered one clear-sounding path to make this happen.

On the 18th, the Turkey-based Syrian National Coalition finally elected what they called a new Prime Minister of Syria. With a few dozen votes cast, Ghassan Hitto, a naturalized U.S. citizen and member of the Syrian American Council from Texas, was chosen. CNN reported that the council "said the decision should assuage the Obama administration's concerns about who would lead Syria should President Bashar al-Assad be deposed. "This question has now been answered," the council's statement said." (see ACLOS for citations) Hitto would resign in June after failing to form a workable government there in Turkey, but that wasn't known on March 18.

Considering confluence of other people's decisions, it's clear that the morning of March 19 was an especially poor time for Damascus to cross Obama's red line of its own accord. Conversely, it would be a very opportune moment for any rebel provocateurs to do it for them.

The only question, in some minds at the time, is whether they had the capability. Western leaders acted like this could be known in the negative. But we now know at least some – like Jabhat al-Nusra - and perhaps other opposition groups did have the capability to produce sarin, chlorine, and other chemicals. They probably had this in both the Aleppo and Damascus theaters, and they might have at least thought they had it in Homs as well (see below).

What Happened in Khan al-Assal, Aleppo?

From Syrian Radio and TV coverage of the attack

Ironically, the first solid news of the feared chemical attack came in the form of a Syrian government announcement on March 19 that their forces had been gassed by "terrorists" in a town just west of Aleppo.

Khan al-Assal is a majority Shi'ite town that was overrun by opposition forces sometime in 2012. By this time, they still occupied a nearby police academy, but otherwise had just been chased out by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Alex Thomson of UK Channel 4 News reported the area “has been in government hands since 17 March.” That victory was tainted by the CW attack that came around 7:00 or more likely 7:30 am on the 19th.

According to Syrian officials, the attackers – reportedly with Jabhat al-Nusra, although no one claimed responsibility - were about 5km to the north, in Kafr Dael. They used a certain rocket, locally made and dubbed Bashair-3, loaded with chemicals. It landed about 300 meters from an SAA checkpoint, with a deadly plume – said to be yellow-green in color - drifting on the wind into nearby homes to the south.

farm animals killed by the sarin plume in Khan al-Assal

Some people dropped dead or paralyzed while other suffered difficult breathing, heart problems, foaming at the mouth, confusion, pupil constriction and vision problems, and loss of consciousness, besides a strange itching. At least 12 and perhaps 22 or more civilians were killed, including a treating physician at one of the involved hospitals. Dozens more were seriously effected, and a reported 16 soldiers, or just one, were killed (that's a point of confusion). A UN report issued in December found one soldier and nineteen civilians were killed, and another 124 people were seriously effected but survived. (see UN report and ACLOS page for more details and sources)

Syria demanded a UN investigation, but this was complicated and stalled by Western powers (see below) so the work was only done by the December report. In the interim, Russian scientific tests showed sarin was used in the Khan al-Assal attack, a "cottage industry" kind, in line with the delivery method.

Military grade sarin appears and behaves just like water; it's colorless and odorless. But improvised stuff usually has a shorter shelf life, besides an impure smell and varying color. The smell might vary and be hard to describe. "Like burning nylon" was reported by gassed soldiers in February, 2015. (link) Wikipedia says “impure sarin can smell like mustard or burned rubber.” In Khan al-Assal, people reported a chlorine smell (early reports), but also a sulfur-like smell (UN report), perhaps mustard-like.

There's also the yellow-green cloud in Khan al-Assal, which sounds like the color of chlorine, oddly enough. I've heard sarin and chlorine can't work together in the same munition - the sarin would be neutralized. But perhaps this was just its color, and its smell was something hard to place – it might smell like chlorine, to one seeing the color. It's also possible, if unlikely, that something else was added to obscure the bad sarin smell, or just to sow confusion and make it easier to dismiss (an industrial accident was proposed by some, upon hearing chlorine mentioned)

Whatever was used, we should wonder was this a direct chemical attack on the army, with no concern to outside opinion? Maybe. Was it a rebel screw-up? A reasonable target in their own turf nearby was just missed? It's hard to see what else they would be aiming for; the nearest target of note if the SAA security post missed by 300 meters, while the rebel-occupied police academy was reportedly over a kilometer away.

The attack might have been unapproved, an official mistake from Jabhat al-Nusra's point of view. But it was probably at least some commander's conscious choice. And as we'll see, it seems to line up with the plans of other groups across the country.

Obviously, gassing soldiers and the civilians they were guarding is not the clearest way to cross the red line and get Assad blamed for a CW attack. But rebels alleged just that, saying a regime fighter jet or a scud missile was seen delivering the poison (both were reported but both cannot be true). It was presumed this was an accident, as they were trying to gas rebels at the police academy, or Sunni civilians somewhere.

Not surprisingly, Western leaders and their professionals have tended to credit this dubious claim, with as little detail as possible. So this might potentially have worked, even on its own. But most importantly, Khan al-Assal was not the only alleged attack of the day. It was, and was perhaps meant as, just one part of a bigger picture. And in that bigger picture we might see a more workable logic to the the allegation.

What Happened in Otaybah, Damascus?

"it was dark. It emitted a very foul smell." Look who's talkin'!

Just after 8 am on the 19^th, the first videos were being posted, from the rural Damascus suburbs, of a separate alleged CW attack. This was in Otaybah (alt, Uteybah, Ateibah, etc. - Arabic: العتيبة ), a ways east of the capitol, and then occupied by opposition forces. The Cham (Syrian) Media Organization of al-Ghouta interviewed bearded survivors who seem to be Islamist militants. They described a rocket impact that emitted “something like water, but it was dark. It emitted a very foul smell,” and caused serious medical problems. One "martyr" is seen in this clinic (seems dead or comatose), apparently a fighter as well. (see newACLOS page).

In another video, a rebel doctor says “The cases we’re getting that are still alive are exhibiting asphyxiation, spasms, slow heart rate, very low blood pressure.” He makes it sound like there are many victims he's seen, and “most cases we’re getting are deaths.” (via Robert Mackey, NYT blog)

But opposition records eventually reflected only seven people killed, with six known at first and one added later. These are: the man who looks like a fighter, five civilian men, and an infant boy. Records suggest two of the civilian men men (or teenagers perhaps) were brothers, and the other three men were also brothers or relatives, with a rare, Aramaiac name, suggesting they were from a Christian family. The baby, listed late, seems unrelated, but is said to be from an internally displaced (IDP) family. They fled from, were driven from, or kidnapped from Harasta, only to have a baby die in Otaybah.

The gender imbalance, with few if any females killed, along with those other clues, are all frequent features of the victims of all sorts of alleged Syrian government crimes. These and other frequent clues suggest the victims could actually be pre-selected and gender-segregated hostages of the terrorists.

With that in mind, whatever was in some rocket, or left molecules in some dirt, may be irrelevant. The victims would quite likely be gassed the simple way, efficiently in some enclosed space, probably at basement level, with whatever is on hand and fatal.

Furthermore, five of these seven victims are shown on video or photos, and none appears much like a sarin victim, although it can't be ruled out. Besides the oft-cited miosis (contricted, pinpoint pupils), sarin will usually trigger the SLUDGE syndrome - Salivation, Lacrymation (tearing eyes), Urination, Diaphoresis (sweating), Gastrointestinal upset (often causes diarrhea), Emesis (vomiting). I credit Denis O'Brien, PhD, for pointing this out to the U.S. congress and to ACLOS at the time of the Ghouta incident (the signs would also be lacking there, on a larger and clearer scale). It's a messy scene I don't think is in one single Youtube video of this, Ghouta, or any CW attack in Syria.

The Khan al-Assal attack victims should display the SLUDGE, but the attack was not shown on video, and some details may have been left out of reports. But Otaybah victims were shown; three of the men are seen full-body on video, in unsoiled clothes. This might be sarin anyway, or something else, like chlorine perhaps.

The Abu Kheir brothers, I think, display mild cyanosis (a purple hue first evident in the lips and the beds of the fingernails). This can happen with sarin or many other things. They do not seem washed off (no wet hair), and so it seems they died this cleanly, with no fluids pouring out.

Hasan Qashishe, on the other hand, died with a yellow-ish layer of apparent mucous or perhaps vomit from his mouth and across his face, later crusted with dirt. He has squeezed shut eyes that could be damaged and swollen, though that's not obvious here. He may display cyanosis (purple face) under the crust. His two apparent relatives that also died are not shown. 

 

The unidentified apparent fighter looks a bit like Mr. Qashishe, with no purple evident. He seems to have yellow mucous or fluid across his face, almost like he was hanging upside down as he coughed it out. He also has white crumbled material, varying from clumps to dust, dried on to this and on his clothes. This white stuff might be from a local limestone gravel, for example. Or it could be DIMP powder, used to fake out crude tests for sarin. It shouldn't have worked here, but they might have tried it anyway (minor point). 

So two men display cyanosis, and two others have yellow stuff across their faces. This might be the result of two or more different poisons used, or the same one used two different ways.

(None of these cases is very clear as to what it was, but they may fit a common pattern I've been following that extends wider and get clearer in spots. Men or older boys who seem like captives, with cyanosis, skin burns, and chemical damage to the eyes, coughing mucous and also blood up their faces, as if hanging upside-down – this is a phenomenon, of which this might be a part, to be explained finally in a follow-up report …)

The Otaybah incident was reported at the time, but made little mark in the news. With no hint of the apparent sectarian kidnapping aspect, Western leaders brought it quietly to the UN's attention almost immediately; France and the UK included it on a short list of two fatal alleged CW attack by Damascus that the UN needed to investigate, besides Khan al-Assal.

Within a few weeks, samples were said to test positive for some kind of sarin, or at least an organophosphate (the class of chemicals sarin, some common pesticides, and other chemicals belong to). Questions remained: were the tested samples from Aleppo, or Damascus, or neither? Were they soil or blood samples? Stories differ. It matters because, for example, biological samples cannot tell if it was military-grade or improvised sarin, whereas soil samples can. (see ACLOS:British MI6 Operation) Further, contaminated soil or tissue can be gotten anywhere, by people with access to the contaminants, to captive people, and to dirt.

Let's say there was sarin in the rocket(s) described by the rebel survivors. If it had a foul smell like they said, it's more likely to be stuff improvised by their own terrorist allies, the same stuff used that day up in Khan al-Assal. Further, if it was dark in color, then obviously it's not military grade sarin, which is clear just like water.

Also note that no details ever surfaced on the type of weapon used to deliver that dark fluid. Later claims have said it was a regime scud missile, but no one ever showed remains from it or even described it, that I know of. So what happened here remains unclear, but it certainly smells bad in itself, and especially coming alongside the Khan al-Assal incident.

Coordinated Terrorist Attacks?

The Otaybah attack apparently happened around 8 am or earlier, and probably not much earlier. Compare this to Khan al-Assal, happening at around 7:00 (UN witness) to 7:30 (official sources) or perhaps around 8:00 (somewhere else), all sounding rounded-off. 7:30 seems the best option, which means the two events happened very close in time, most likely within minutes of each other.

The incident in Otaybah was most likely later, and it's possible it was launched in reaction to quick news of the attack up north; an obvious rebel crime needed to be "complicated" by an obvious regime one. But some preparation time would be needed, the time gap is unknown, and it might be so small they happened basically at the same time. Logically, in that case, we could presume it's no coincidence, and the Khan al-Assal and Otaybah incidents were planned to line up.

---
Update 2-12: The big list of alleged attacks I'm compiling (PDF link: forthcoming) has two preview events in the area, 5-6 days before, suggesting it was planned to do something here, and not improvised at the last moment. Records suggest no one as acknowledged as dying in either of these.  In Daraya, on March 13, something happened,  U.S. sources told UN investigators, but they "did  not  receive  sufficient  or  credible  information." On March 14, French paper Le Monde reported, there was an incident in Otaybah. These could condition people to accept the next claim, five days later, where people are said to die.
---
This would clearly mean both incidents were by the same party, or allies on the same side, which only makes sense anyway. And as explained above, it's the opposition side that has the best motive, besides the impure kind of sarin everyone seemed to see and smell.

That terrorist attackers operating across the country from each other would use the same kind of poison is less obvious. And even if they both used sarin, it would probably be a different quality in each case. In one case, a yellow-green cloud was described, and in the other a vapor of dark colored fluid. In both cases vague or varying bad smells were reported. Both incidents have allegedly tested positive for sarin, and the record suggests it was all impure terrorist-made stuff.

And these attacks happened, it seems, within minutes of each other.

And What About Homs?

At a less clear time perhaps later on, a third CW allegation of March 19 was lodged, this time in in the central city of Homs. This has subsequently been ignored by everyone, but was caught and noted here at ACLOS at the time, and it's seemed relevant ever since. The detail is scant, so I can share it all here.

The opposition Local Coordinating Committees (LCC) reported for March 19: “Homs: Several cases of asphyxia were reported in Baba Amr due to releasing toxic gases by the regime’s forces on the neighborhood." No further details were given. The gas and delivery method are not described, but it caused breathing problems at least. The other incidents had this, but most would, whatever the poison.

The Baba Amr district, at the southwest corner of the city, was the prime rebel hotbed in Homs, but under heavy attack and about to fall. Reports were already calling it a ghost town by March 11. By the 19^th, soldiers would have been holding some areas, as they worked towards pushing out the last rebels on or by the 24th.

The rebels of Baba Amr would flee south by then, perhaps with some captives, and then find many dead bodies in a brutal string of “Assad massacres” around Abel from the 25^th to 29^th, totaling about 100 people of several families, including some women and children (ACLOS). Were some of these meant to die in the gas attack? (note: rebels also found a few massacres, of only men and boys, after fleeing Baba Amr the first time back in February, 2012 - ACLOS.)

So both sides were present and either side could have been the targets here. But still, being besieged Baba Amr, this would have looked better for the “red line” case than Kahn al-Assal did. But it didn't stick.

A same-day Debkafile report (now premium content) declared that the nerve gas Agent 15 was used in the Aleppo attack earlier that day, and reported "extensive preparations" for more chemical use by the Syrian army "in the northern town of Homs." They cited "Western intelligence agencies" for telling them about a boosted military presence in Homs, with forces "issued in the last few hours with chemical warfare gear."

That was filed Tuesday, March 19. The exact time is unclear, but it would be hours later then in Syria; these “preparations” quite likely came after the incident reported by the LCC. There's no mention of that from Debka, but this “gear” is quite likely gas masks. The SAA might have just been taking precautions against more terrorist incidents like the one in Aleppo, or that plus an actual gas release in the area.

Otherwise that I've seen, there's no report mentioning such an incident in Homs on this day, either in the following weeks or in the intervening years. It's not clear why it was briefly reported and then never repeated. It could have been a fluke industrial accident or, quite possibly, something went wrong with this false-flag plan, or with some other plan it was a part of.

The Whole Picture: A 3-Part False-Flag Event?

So there were three reported attacks or "releases" of chemical agents the same day, with at least two seeming coordinated. As such, it seems quite likely three events were planned for this same day. We can see they were set for Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs - Syria's three largest cities, spread north, south, and middle. What better way to show what a threat Assad is to all his people and all of Syria?

They also chose a great day to cross the red line in a spectacular, nation-wide manner. But oddly, it seems they may have chosen this formula:

* Aleppo: gas SAA soldiers and mainly Shia civilians, blame the army anyway: that will be supported by:

* Damascus: gas some rebel fighters, most non-fatally, and fatally gas some gender-segregated Christian hostages, call them just civilians, blame the army. This was maybe meant to be bigger and clearer.

* Homs: unclear, but the army was blamed for a gas attack. No soldiers were reported hit, but they were getting gas masks, it seems, afterwards. Maybe this was meant to kill a few rebel fighters and several civilians, but it seems to have fizzled out short of its goal.

The reason behind this plan seems clear overall, but why attack an army position as part of it? As mentioned above, it could be a accident, but to me that seems unlikely. Perhaps they hoped the package of three attacks would clarify the regime must be behind all of it; whatever one thinks, they clearly gassed their own - presumably by mistake.

If that had worked, maybe rebels hoped to make it work as they gassed soldiers again and again. Eventually the powerful could decide it's not a coincidence, and Assad was intentionally killing his own - probably in a bid to make rebels look bad, which of course would fail. Consider the spin we'd likely hear if the plot worked: sarin was found in all three locales, recovered and tested, and they'd insist it was possibly military grade. Or the military used improvised stuff to implicate the rebels. But by the scale and nature of the attacks, it must be the government – terrorists are incapable of synchronized attacks, or something. And so, again, “Assad” gassed his own. Air raids hitting SAA soldiers or civilians afterwards would seem little issue in this light. They should be happy to be on the path to freedom from the clumsy rule of chemical Assad.

So collectively, this might have seemed a good enough plan to roll with. But the Homs attack failed somehow, and the Otaybah one fared little better. Only the supposed regime accident really made the news, with the help of Syria's announcement and demand for a probe. With that looking like a rebel attack, and with the danger that could get even clearer, there was likely a fear that the whole 3-attack idea would be exposed as the work of rebel provocateurs. So they dropped all of it they could at first, and the Homs part at least stayed quiet for good.

Put to Action: The Same Plan?

So the three-city CW false-flag plan - if one existed – was stillborn. The Aleppo portion looked bad, Otaybah was vague and seemed connected, and the Homs part had apparently already been called off by day two. The picture of a coordinated chemical attack by “Assad” against his people didn't come together that day.

But Western sponsors had their experts on the case, and they managed to paint about that same picture anyway. In time, all publicly agreed Assad must have fired those sarin rockets in Damascus, and obviously in Aleppo too, presumably hitting near a checkpoint on accident. They seemed less convinced than usual, and offered caveats, speaking of caution in light of the Iraq war's WMD claims and so on. But collectively, they held this impression aloft before the global audience, as Obama and crew used it as a basis for issuing threats. 

Leaders and experts who know to say they have no doubt it was the "regime" say just that. But from how they say it, and from what we can see, it seems the evidence does not say the same thing. Russian tests found the Aleppo attack used improvised sarin in a rebel-made rocket. It seems likely western intelligence had their own look at these samples, or found the same signs in one or both locations. Unlike Syria and Russia, western intelligence claims to have samples from Otaybah, but the results are shrouded in the same vagueness. (see ACLOS:British MI6 Operation)

With total confidence, Western powers knew from the start the presses needed to be halted for something. The UN-OPCW probe was called for on the 20^th, and before the day was out the UK and France, with U.S. support following, were clear it would have to stop, and resume on a different track. The next day they added Otaybah, and the alleged incident of December 23, 2012 to the list of what the UN should investigate.

The latter allegation was from Homs, and had been dismissed at the time as a tear gas mishap (ACLOS), but suddenly people decided it was urgent again. And so the UN and OPCW were tasked, on March 21, with probing something very much like the Damascus/Homs/Aleppo attack rebels had apparently planned for March 19.

The anti-Syria coalition seemed less interested in the Aleppo part of this than they were in any other part, and kept adding new incidents that also must be probed. Following the events, it seemed to me they repeatedly showed hostility and bad faith to Syria, and simply got UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to agree with their intransigent position. Ban helped keep the onus on Syria to allow the CW "inspectors" - partly the same ones sent to Iraq before war was launched there in 2003. They would investigate all these incidents in some order, as well as Syria's CW stockpiles and facilities, in hopes of somehow “securing” them. (Monitor)

In this climate, Syria formally refused the project after all on April 8, with UN envoy Bashar al-Jaafari declaring that Western powers had “torpedoed” the investigation. New alleged CW attacks began in earnest at this time, and were added to stalled queue. More claims were published of experts with guarded certainty sarin was used, here or there but more than once. Israeli experts weighed in acting more convinced than anyone: it was happening, it was systematic, and it was the regime.

It seems the intelligence agencies of were closely following events though their opposition proxies, seeing the videos and reports, collecting samples where possible, from whoever, and cautiously spinning this data. Seeing the soldiers in Homs getting gas masks, they spoke of “extensive preparations” for an Assad crime.

In fact, they may well have known all about the 3-city attack plan, as if embarked on a joint project over it. It could be the spooks were so in love with intended picture for March 19 that they had to push a new version of it even after the original plan had fallen apart. That's about what they did, at first chance by March 21. The case was pushed forward into the summer, still trailing dead bodies from the Khan al-Assal attack. They were just made to trail further and further behind as accusations were added.

"As a matter of priority," they did this instead

With some struggle and much delay, Syria was able to get the UN-OPCW investigators inside the gates of Damascus on August 19. This force arrived just in time to serve as a trojan horse, getting sidetracked by one more accusation, the grandest of them by far, in East and West Ghouta on August 21. Hundreds of bodies (officially, 14 hundreds) at once were dumped across Obama's red line, as a first birthday present. (Sorry, I just cannot get over that). The investigators took a while to collect soil samples with traces of some kind of sarin, and then had to leave without looking much into Khan al-Assal or anything else. As with Iraq, it was "inspectors" out, war plans in.

Conclusion

All this acceptance of opposition claims added to the perceived moral reasons for more “pressure on Assad.” The flip-side of this is it also added to the motive for terrorists – if they were the ones behind it – to keep it up. And of course the attacks kept coming, up to August 21 and past, and to the present day.
In fact, a little-noted recent attack would be the second largest so far, if true. Some 93 people or more were reportedly killed at once, in ISIS-held turf in Hama province, by sarin – not the usual chlorine of recent years. ISIS and others claim this was dropped on several towns at once by Russian jets, back on December 12. I had popcorn ready, but it got stale. Hardly anyone noticed. (ACLOS)

But between this first big plan of March 19 and its 27 dead, the follow-up reminders of mid-2013 and the second big plan of August 21, and the reminders and efforts since, the death toll has added up. Many hundreds of Syrian citizens, perhaps several thousand now, have been killed either in chemical attacks or in gas chambers so far. In my well-researched view, probably all of those – civilian, military, and rebel alike - were killed by Islamist terrorists, cashed in on false-flag incidents in pursuit of regime change, or at least more support to themselves.

As always, the paramount importance is on ending this conflict once and for all, with the clearest truth possible informing as just a peace as possible. I hope this closer inspection of March 19, the humble start to this one horrible sub-pattern, will help more people grasp the true nature of the unprecedented crimes committed against Syria's people in this ongoing regime change campaign. We must, as US rep. Tulsi Gabbard says, stop arming terrorists. Furthermore, we must stop giving these terrorists a free pass to launder their crimes as reasons to keep arming them. This bloody racket must end as soon as possible. 

<Add Nov. 2, 2017>I had forgotten about this twist I now add here. James Miller, Enduring America report, 3-22-2013: "Two competing stories have featured in the last 48 hours over Tuesday's "chemical attacks" near Aleppo and Damascus. The first is a statement posted yesterday from the Syrian opposition in which they claim that Echothiophate, a chemical often found in insecticides, was used in both incidents, having been delivered by a Scud missile." US-based Syrian Support Group  statement via Twitter (and shown below): Echothiophate was used in both attacks, dispersed with a scud missile fired from Damascus in both cases. They didn't hear anything about another Scud landing in Homs. It's noted the "FSA" has no missiles capable of carrying chemical weapons, which along with the wide scale of the attack was supposed to prove this was a regime plot.

Miller finds the poison to fit with reported symptoms: bradycardia, vasodilation, nausea and vomiting, and bronchoconstriction. He thinks a smell like chlorine was reported, when it should be like rotten cabbage. I haven't heard chlorine, just "foul," which fits. (Chlorine odor was first reported in Aleppo, apparently in error?) So was this the poison all along? It's been claimed or suggested samples from the Ateibah incident later tested positive for sarin, and everyone agrees Khan al-Assal was a sarin attack. 
And as Miller had to note even at the time "US declared no SCUD launches were detected. " (citing CNN) Oops. A little lack of coordination there.
By the time of a December UN report (PDF), only Khan al-Assal was under discussion, and the conflicting stories they heard were a surface rocket from the north, as the Syrian side always claimed, and a fighter jet, as multiple opposition-supplied witnesses also told them. ("according  to  other  witness  statements  to  the  UNHRC  Commission  of  Inquiry,  an  overflying  aircraft  had dropped an aerial bomb filled with Sarin. ") <end Nov. 2>