What Happened on March 19, 2013?

The First Bodies Tossed Across Obama's "Red Line" in Syria, Part 1:
What Happened on March 19, 2013?
By Adam Larson, aka Caustic Logic
February 5, 2017
last edits Feb. 12, Nov. 2)

Let's re-visit a pivotal day nearly four years ago, when news broke of the first  undeniable and seriously deadly use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. March 19, 2013 witnessed the first clear crossing of then-U.S. president Obama's “red line.” And it happened, or tried to happen, in three places at once, across Syria, on a particularly loaded day. 

As usual, this takes some good explaining, and runs a bit long. A good skim might suffice to get the main ideas.

"Red line," of course refers to Obama's threat to intervene military against Syria's government if it was believed to have used or was planning to use its feared chemical weapons. As I noticed at the time, this could be an appealing invitation to rebels: create the impression of an Assad gas attack, and you can get military help.

That threat was first issued by Obama on August 20, 2012, exactly one year (almost to the hour, adjusted for time zones) before the infamous Ghouta alleged sarin attack of August 21, 2013. No clear attack reports emerged at first, but a reminder in early December was followed by Syria's only chlorine factory being seized by Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda), and a slew of small-scale CW allegations from both sides (7 Syrian soldiers reported killed near Damascus on December 22, and 6 civilian men and a rebel fighter in Homs, on December 23).

These alleged attacks were dismissed at the time, and then there was a pause in accusations of three months before the events in question. So to start, chemical attacks were not an everyday event at this time, but had barely happened at all, and it was months earlier. So it would be odd if not just one but two, or even three, incidents should occur in one day.

The Ides of March Window of Opportunity

The days surrounding March 19 feature an odd abundance of invitations to rebels to cross the “red line,” sharpening the motive consideration to their disfavor.

On the 15th, the armed rebellion had its symbolic two-year anniversary, with chances for everyone to mark the occasion. That day, the U.S. treasury issued a decree allowing US citizens to ignore sanctions and directly finance the Syrian rebels. On on March 18, as Britain and France continued lobbying the European Union to lift the arms embargo, Secretary of State John Kerry announced that "the United States does not stand in the way of other countries that have made a decision to provide arms" to the rebels.

Further, the top U.S. military commander in Europe - Adm. James Stavridis - said that NATO was laying out plans for possible military attacks on Syria, if an adequate reason should surface. Of course, president Obama had already offered one clear-sounding path to make this happen.

On the 18th, the Turkey-based Syrian National Coalition finally elected what they called a new Prime Minister of Syria. With a few dozen votes cast, Ghassan Hitto, a naturalized U.S. citizen and member of the Syrian American Council from Texas, was chosen. CNN reported that the council "said the decision should assuage the Obama administration's concerns about who would lead Syria should President Bashar al-Assad be deposed. "This question has now been answered," the council's statement said." (see ACLOS for citations) Hitto would resign in June after failing to form a workable government there in Turkey, but that wasn't known on March 18.

Considering confluence of other people's decisions, it's clear that the morning of March 19 was an especially poor time for Damascus to cross Obama's red line of its own accord. Conversely, it would be a very opportune moment for any rebel provocateurs to do it for them.

The only question, in some minds at the time, is whether they had the capability. Western leaders acted like this could be known in the negative. But we now know at least some – like Jabhat al-Nusra - and perhaps other opposition groups did have the capability to produce sarin, chlorine, and other chemicals. They probably had this in both the Aleppo and Damascus theaters, and they might have at least thought they had it in Homs as well (see below).

What Happened in Khan al-Assal, Aleppo?

From Syrian Radio and TV coverage of the attack

Ironically, the first solid news of the feared chemical attack came in the form of a Syrian government announcement on March 19 that their forces had been gassed by "terrorists" in a town just west of Aleppo.

Khan al-Assal is a majority Shi'ite town that was overrun by opposition forces sometime in 2012. By this time, they still occupied a nearby police academy, but otherwise had just been chased out by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Alex Thomson of UK Channel 4 News reported the area “has been in government hands since 17 March.” That victory was tainted by the CW attack that came around 7:00 or more likely 7:30 am on the 19th.

According to Syrian officials, the attackers – reportedly with Jabhat al-Nusra, although no one claimed responsibility - were about 5km to the north, in Kafr Dael. They used a certain rocket, locally made and dubbed Bashair-3, loaded with chemicals. It landed about 300 meters from an SAA checkpoint, with a deadly plume – said to be yellow-green in color - drifting on the wind into nearby homes to the south.

farm animals killed by the sarin plume in Khan al-Assal

Some people dropped dead or paralyzed while other suffered difficult breathing, heart problems, foaming at the mouth, confusion, pupil constriction and vision problems, and loss of consciousness, besides a strange itching. At least 12 and perhaps 22 or more civilians were killed, including a treating physician at one of the involved hospitals. Dozens more were seriously effected, and a reported 16 soldiers, or just one, were killed (that's a point of confusion). A UN report issued in December found one soldier and nineteen civilians were killed, and another 124 people were seriously effected but survived. (see UN report and ACLOS page for more details and sources)

Syria demanded a UN investigation, but this was complicated and stalled by Western powers (see below) so the work was only done by the December report. In the interim, Russian scientific tests showed sarin was used in the Khan al-Assal attack, a "cottage industry" kind, in line with the delivery method.

Military grade sarin appears and behaves just like water; it's colorless and odorless. But improvised stuff usually has a shorter shelf life, besides an impure smell and varying color. The smell might vary and be hard to describe. "Like burning nylon" was reported by gassed soldiers in February, 2015. (link) Wikipedia says “impure sarin can smell like mustard or burned rubber.” In Khan al-Assal, people reported a chlorine smell (early reports), but also a sulfur-like smell (UN report), perhaps mustard-like.

There's also the yellow-green cloud in Khan al-Assal, which sounds like the color of chlorine, oddly enough. I've heard sarin and chlorine can't work together in the same munition - the sarin would be neutralized. But perhaps this was just its color, and its smell was something hard to place – it might smell like chlorine, to one seeing the color. It's also possible, if unlikely, that something else was added to obscure the bad sarin smell, or just to sow confusion and make it easier to dismiss (an industrial accident was proposed by some, upon hearing chlorine mentioned)

Whatever was used, we should wonder was this a direct chemical attack on the army, with no concern to outside opinion? Maybe. Was it a rebel screw-up? A reasonable target in their own turf nearby was just missed? It's hard to see what else they would be aiming for; the nearest target of note if the SAA security post missed by 300 meters, while the rebel-occupied police academy was reportedly over a kilometer away.

The attack might have been unapproved, an official mistake from Jabhat al-Nusra's point of view. But it was probably at least some commander's conscious choice. And as we'll see, it seems to line up with the plans of other groups across the country.

Obviously, gassing soldiers and the civilians they were guarding is not the clearest way to cross the red line and get Assad blamed for a CW attack. But rebels alleged just that, saying a regime fighter jet or a scud missile was seen delivering the poison (both were reported but both cannot be true). It was presumed this was an accident, as they were trying to gas rebels at the police academy, or Sunni civilians somewhere.

Not surprisingly, Western leaders and their professionals have tended to credit this dubious claim, with as little detail as possible. So this might potentially have worked, even on its own. But most importantly, Khan al-Assal was not the only alleged attack of the day. It was, and was perhaps meant as, just one part of a bigger picture. And in that bigger picture we might see a more workable logic to the the allegation.

What Happened in Otaybah, Damascus?

"it was dark. It emitted a very foul smell." Look who's talkin'!

Just after 8 am on the 19^th, the first videos were being posted, from the rural Damascus suburbs, of a separate alleged CW attack. This was in Otaybah (alt, Uteybah, Ateibah, etc. - Arabic: العتيبة ), a ways east of the capitol, and then occupied by opposition forces. The Cham (Syrian) Media Organization of al-Ghouta interviewed bearded survivors who seem to be Islamist militants. They described a rocket impact that emitted “something like water, but it was dark. It emitted a very foul smell,” and caused serious medical problems. One "martyr" is seen in this clinic (seems dead or comatose), apparently a fighter as well. (see newACLOS page).

In another video, a rebel doctor says “The cases we’re getting that are still alive are exhibiting asphyxiation, spasms, slow heart rate, very low blood pressure.” He makes it sound like there are many victims he's seen, and “most cases we’re getting are deaths.” (via Robert Mackey, NYT blog)

But opposition records eventually reflected only seven people killed, with six known at first and one added later. These are: the man who looks like a fighter, five civilian men, and an infant boy. Records suggest two of the civilian men men (or teenagers perhaps) were brothers, and the other three men were also brothers or relatives, with a rare, Aramaiac name, suggesting they were from a Christian family. The baby, listed late, seems unrelated, but is said to be from an internally displaced (IDP) family. They fled from, were driven from, or kidnapped from Harasta, only to have a baby die in Otaybah.

The gender imbalance, with few if any females killed, along with those other clues, are all frequent features of the victims of all sorts of alleged Syrian government crimes. These and other frequent clues suggest the victims could actually be pre-selected and gender-segregated hostages of the terrorists.

With that in mind, whatever was in some rocket, or left molecules in some dirt, may be irrelevant. The victims would quite likely be gassed the simple way, efficiently in some enclosed space, probably at basement level, with whatever is on hand and fatal.

Furthermore, five of these seven victims are shown on video or photos, and none appears much like a sarin victim, although it can't be ruled out. Besides the oft-cited miosis (contricted, pinpoint pupils), sarin will usually trigger the SLUDGE syndrome - Salivation, Lacrymation (tearing eyes), Urination, Diaphoresis (sweating), Gastrointestinal upset (often causes diarrhea), Emesis (vomiting). I credit Denis O'Brien, PhD, for pointing this out to the U.S. congress and to ACLOS at the time of the Ghouta incident (the signs would also be lacking there, on a larger and clearer scale). It's a messy scene I don't think is in one single Youtube video of this, Ghouta, or any CW attack in Syria.

The Khan al-Assal attack victims should display the SLUDGE, but the attack was not shown on video, and some details may have been left out of reports. But Otaybah victims were shown; three of the men are seen full-body on video, in unsoiled clothes. This might be sarin anyway, or something else, like chlorine perhaps.

The Abu Kheir brothers, I think, display mild cyanosis (a purple hue first evident in the lips and the beds of the fingernails). This can happen with sarin or many other things. They do not seem washed off (no wet hair), and so it seems they died this cleanly, with no fluids pouring out.

Hasan Qashishe, on the other hand, died with a yellow-ish layer of apparent mucous or perhaps vomit from his mouth and across his face, later crusted with dirt. He has squeezed shut eyes that could be damaged and swollen, though that's not obvious here. He may display cyanosis (purple face) under the crust. His two apparent relatives that also died are not shown. 

 

The unidentified apparent fighter looks a bit like Mr. Qashishe, with no purple evident. He seems to have yellow mucous or fluid across his face, almost like he was hanging upside down as he coughed it out. He also has white crumbled material, varying from clumps to dust, dried on to this and on his clothes. This white stuff might be from a local limestone gravel, for example. Or it could be DIMP powder, used to fake out crude tests for sarin. It shouldn't have worked here, but they might have tried it anyway (minor point). 

So two men display cyanosis, and two others have yellow stuff across their faces. This might be the result of two or more different poisons used, or the same one used two different ways.

(None of these cases is very clear as to what it was, but they may fit a common pattern I've been following that extends wider and get clearer in spots. Men or older boys who seem like captives, with cyanosis, skin burns, and chemical damage to the eyes, coughing mucous and also blood up their faces, as if hanging upside-down – this is a phenomenon, of which this might be a part, to be explained finally in a follow-up report …)

The Otaybah incident was reported at the time, but made little mark in the news. With no hint of the apparent sectarian kidnapping aspect, Western leaders brought it quietly to the UN's attention almost immediately; France and the UK included it on a short list of two fatal alleged CW attack by Damascus that the UN needed to investigate, besides Khan al-Assal.

Within a few weeks, samples were said to test positive for some kind of sarin, or at least an organophosphate (the class of chemicals sarin, some common pesticides, and other chemicals belong to). Questions remained: were the tested samples from Aleppo, or Damascus, or neither? Were they soil or blood samples? Stories differ. It matters because, for example, biological samples cannot tell if it was military-grade or improvised sarin, whereas soil samples can. (see ACLOS:British MI6 Operation) Further, contaminated soil or tissue can be gotten anywhere, by people with access to the contaminants, to captive people, and to dirt.

Let's say there was sarin in the rocket(s) described by the rebel survivors. If it had a foul smell like they said, it's more likely to be stuff improvised by their own terrorist allies, the same stuff used that day up in Khan al-Assal. Further, if it was dark in color, then obviously it's not military grade sarin, which is clear just like water.

Also note that no details ever surfaced on the type of weapon used to deliver that dark fluid. Later claims have said it was a regime scud missile, but no one ever showed remains from it or even described it, that I know of. So what happened here remains unclear, but it certainly smells bad in itself, and especially coming alongside the Khan al-Assal incident.

Coordinated Terrorist Attacks?

The Otaybah attack apparently happened around 8 am or earlier, and probably not much earlier. Compare this to Khan al-Assal, happening at around 7:00 (UN witness) to 7:30 (official sources) or perhaps around 8:00 (somewhere else), all sounding rounded-off. 7:30 seems the best option, which means the two events happened very close in time, most likely within minutes of each other.

The incident in Otaybah was most likely later, and it's possible it was launched in reaction to quick news of the attack up north; an obvious rebel crime needed to be "complicated" by an obvious regime one. But some preparation time would be needed, the time gap is unknown, and it might be so small they happened basically at the same time. Logically, in that case, we could presume it's no coincidence, and the Khan al-Assal and Otaybah incidents were planned to line up.

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Update 2-12: The big list of alleged attacks I'm compiling (PDF link: forthcoming) has two preview events in the area, 5-6 days before, suggesting it was planned to do something here, and not improvised at the last moment. Records suggest no one as acknowledged as dying in either of these.  In Daraya, on March 13, something happened,  U.S. sources told UN investigators, but they "did  not  receive  sufficient  or  credible  information." On March 14, French paper Le Monde reported, there was an incident in Otaybah. These could condition people to accept the next claim, five days later, where people are said to die.
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This would clearly mean both incidents were by the same party, or allies on the same side, which only makes sense anyway. And as explained above, it's the opposition side that has the best motive, besides the impure kind of sarin everyone seemed to see and smell.

That terrorist attackers operating across the country from each other would use the same kind of poison is less obvious. And even if they both used sarin, it would probably be a different quality in each case. In one case, a yellow-green cloud was described, and in the other a vapor of dark colored fluid. In both cases vague or varying bad smells were reported. Both incidents have allegedly tested positive for sarin, and the record suggests it was all impure terrorist-made stuff.

And these attacks happened, it seems, within minutes of each other.

And What About Homs?

At a less clear time perhaps later on, a third CW allegation of March 19 was lodged, this time in in the central city of Homs. This has subsequently been ignored by everyone, but was caught and noted here at ACLOS at the time, and it's seemed relevant ever since. The detail is scant, so I can share it all here.

The opposition Local Coordinating Committees (LCC) reported for March 19: “Homs: Several cases of asphyxia were reported in Baba Amr due to releasing toxic gases by the regime’s forces on the neighborhood." No further details were given. The gas and delivery method are not described, but it caused breathing problems at least. The other incidents had this, but most would, whatever the poison.

The Baba Amr district, at the southwest corner of the city, was the prime rebel hotbed in Homs, but under heavy attack and about to fall. Reports were already calling it a ghost town by March 11. By the 19^th, soldiers would have been holding some areas, as they worked towards pushing out the last rebels on or by the 24th.

The rebels of Baba Amr would flee south by then, perhaps with some captives, and then find many dead bodies in a brutal string of “Assad massacres” around Abel from the 25^th to 29^th, totaling about 100 people of several families, including some women and children (ACLOS). Were some of these meant to die in the gas attack? (note: rebels also found a few massacres, of only men and boys, after fleeing Baba Amr the first time back in February, 2012 - ACLOS.)

So both sides were present and either side could have been the targets here. But still, being besieged Baba Amr, this would have looked better for the “red line” case than Kahn al-Assal did. But it didn't stick.

A same-day Debkafile report (now premium content) declared that the nerve gas Agent 15 was used in the Aleppo attack earlier that day, and reported "extensive preparations" for more chemical use by the Syrian army "in the northern town of Homs." They cited "Western intelligence agencies" for telling them about a boosted military presence in Homs, with forces "issued in the last few hours with chemical warfare gear."

That was filed Tuesday, March 19. The exact time is unclear, but it would be hours later then in Syria; these “preparations” quite likely came after the incident reported by the LCC. There's no mention of that from Debka, but this “gear” is quite likely gas masks. The SAA might have just been taking precautions against more terrorist incidents like the one in Aleppo, or that plus an actual gas release in the area.

Otherwise that I've seen, there's no report mentioning such an incident in Homs on this day, either in the following weeks or in the intervening years. It's not clear why it was briefly reported and then never repeated. It could have been a fluke industrial accident or, quite possibly, something went wrong with this false-flag plan, or with some other plan it was a part of.

The Whole Picture: A 3-Part False-Flag Event?

So there were three reported attacks or "releases" of chemical agents the same day, with at least two seeming coordinated. As such, it seems quite likely three events were planned for this same day. We can see they were set for Aleppo, Damascus, and Homs - Syria's three largest cities, spread north, south, and middle. What better way to show what a threat Assad is to all his people and all of Syria?

They also chose a great day to cross the red line in a spectacular, nation-wide manner. But oddly, it seems they may have chosen this formula:

* Aleppo: gas SAA soldiers and mainly Shia civilians, blame the army anyway: that will be supported by:

* Damascus: gas some rebel fighters, most non-fatally, and fatally gas some gender-segregated Christian hostages, call them just civilians, blame the army. This was maybe meant to be bigger and clearer.

* Homs: unclear, but the army was blamed for a gas attack. No soldiers were reported hit, but they were getting gas masks, it seems, afterwards. Maybe this was meant to kill a few rebel fighters and several civilians, but it seems to have fizzled out short of its goal.

The reason behind this plan seems clear overall, but why attack an army position as part of it? As mentioned above, it could be a accident, but to me that seems unlikely. Perhaps they hoped the package of three attacks would clarify the regime must be behind all of it; whatever one thinks, they clearly gassed their own - presumably by mistake.

If that had worked, maybe rebels hoped to make it work as they gassed soldiers again and again. Eventually the powerful could decide it's not a coincidence, and Assad was intentionally killing his own - probably in a bid to make rebels look bad, which of course would fail. Consider the spin we'd likely hear if the plot worked: sarin was found in all three locales, recovered and tested, and they'd insist it was possibly military grade. Or the military used improvised stuff to implicate the rebels. But by the scale and nature of the attacks, it must be the government – terrorists are incapable of synchronized attacks, or something. And so, again, “Assad” gassed his own. Air raids hitting SAA soldiers or civilians afterwards would seem little issue in this light. They should be happy to be on the path to freedom from the clumsy rule of chemical Assad.

So collectively, this might have seemed a good enough plan to roll with. But the Homs attack failed somehow, and the Otaybah one fared little better. Only the supposed regime accident really made the news, with the help of Syria's announcement and demand for a probe. With that looking like a rebel attack, and with the danger that could get even clearer, there was likely a fear that the whole 3-attack idea would be exposed as the work of rebel provocateurs. So they dropped all of it they could at first, and the Homs part at least stayed quiet for good.

Put to Action: The Same Plan?

So the three-city CW false-flag plan - if one existed – was stillborn. The Aleppo portion looked bad, Otaybah was vague and seemed connected, and the Homs part had apparently already been called off by day two. The picture of a coordinated chemical attack by “Assad” against his people didn't come together that day.

But Western sponsors had their experts on the case, and they managed to paint about that same picture anyway. In time, all publicly agreed Assad must have fired those sarin rockets in Damascus, and obviously in Aleppo too, presumably hitting near a checkpoint on accident. They seemed less convinced than usual, and offered caveats, speaking of caution in light of the Iraq war's WMD claims and so on. But collectively, they held this impression aloft before the global audience, as Obama and crew used it as a basis for issuing threats. 

Leaders and experts who know to say they have no doubt it was the "regime" say just that. But from how they say it, and from what we can see, it seems the evidence does not say the same thing. Russian tests found the Aleppo attack used improvised sarin in a rebel-made rocket. It seems likely western intelligence had their own look at these samples, or found the same signs in one or both locations. Unlike Syria and Russia, western intelligence claims to have samples from Otaybah, but the results are shrouded in the same vagueness. (see ACLOS:British MI6 Operation)

With total confidence, Western powers knew from the start the presses needed to be halted for something. The UN-OPCW probe was called for on the 20^th, and before the day was out the UK and France, with U.S. support following, were clear it would have to stop, and resume on a different track. The next day they added Otaybah, and the alleged incident of December 23, 2012 to the list of what the UN should investigate.

The latter allegation was from Homs, and had been dismissed at the time as a tear gas mishap (ACLOS), but suddenly people decided it was urgent again. And so the UN and OPCW were tasked, on March 21, with probing something very much like the Damascus/Homs/Aleppo attack rebels had apparently planned for March 19.

The anti-Syria coalition seemed less interested in the Aleppo part of this than they were in any other part, and kept adding new incidents that also must be probed. Following the events, it seemed to me they repeatedly showed hostility and bad faith to Syria, and simply got UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to agree with their intransigent position. Ban helped keep the onus on Syria to allow the CW "inspectors" - partly the same ones sent to Iraq before war was launched there in 2003. They would investigate all these incidents in some order, as well as Syria's CW stockpiles and facilities, in hopes of somehow “securing” them. (Monitor)

In this climate, Syria formally refused the project after all on April 8, with UN envoy Bashar al-Jaafari declaring that Western powers had “torpedoed” the investigation. New alleged CW attacks began in earnest at this time, and were added to stalled queue. More claims were published of experts with guarded certainty sarin was used, here or there but more than once. Israeli experts weighed in acting more convinced than anyone: it was happening, it was systematic, and it was the regime.

It seems the intelligence agencies of were closely following events though their opposition proxies, seeing the videos and reports, collecting samples where possible, from whoever, and cautiously spinning this data. Seeing the soldiers in Homs getting gas masks, they spoke of “extensive preparations” for an Assad crime.

In fact, they may well have known all about the 3-city attack plan, as if embarked on a joint project over it. It could be the spooks were so in love with intended picture for March 19 that they had to push a new version of it even after the original plan had fallen apart. That's about what they did, at first chance by March 21. The case was pushed forward into the summer, still trailing dead bodies from the Khan al-Assal attack. They were just made to trail further and further behind as accusations were added.

"As a matter of priority," they did this instead

With some struggle and much delay, Syria was able to get the UN-OPCW investigators inside the gates of Damascus on August 19. This force arrived just in time to serve as a trojan horse, getting sidetracked by one more accusation, the grandest of them by far, in East and West Ghouta on August 21. Hundreds of bodies (officially, 14 hundreds) at once were dumped across Obama's red line, as a first birthday present. (Sorry, I just cannot get over that). The investigators took a while to collect soil samples with traces of some kind of sarin, and then had to leave without looking much into Khan al-Assal or anything else. As with Iraq, it was "inspectors" out, war plans in.

Conclusion

All this acceptance of opposition claims added to the perceived moral reasons for more “pressure on Assad.” The flip-side of this is it also added to the motive for terrorists – if they were the ones behind it – to keep it up. And of course the attacks kept coming, up to August 21 and past, and to the present day.
In fact, a little-noted recent attack would be the second largest so far, if true. Some 93 people or more were reportedly killed at once, in ISIS-held turf in Hama province, by sarin – not the usual chlorine of recent years. ISIS and others claim this was dropped on several towns at once by Russian jets, back on December 12. I had popcorn ready, but it got stale. Hardly anyone noticed. (ACLOS)

But between this first big plan of March 19 and its 27 dead, the follow-up reminders of mid-2013 and the second big plan of August 21, and the reminders and efforts since, the death toll has added up. Many hundreds of Syrian citizens, perhaps several thousand now, have been killed either in chemical attacks or in gas chambers so far. In my well-researched view, probably all of those – civilian, military, and rebel alike - were killed by Islamist terrorists, cashed in on false-flag incidents in pursuit of regime change, or at least more support to themselves.

As always, the paramount importance is on ending this conflict once and for all, with the clearest truth possible informing as just a peace as possible. I hope this closer inspection of March 19, the humble start to this one horrible sub-pattern, will help more people grasp the true nature of the unprecedented crimes committed against Syria's people in this ongoing regime change campaign. We must, as US rep. Tulsi Gabbard says, stop arming terrorists. Furthermore, we must stop giving these terrorists a free pass to launder their crimes as reasons to keep arming them. This bloody racket must end as soon as possible. 

<Add Nov. 2, 2017>I had forgotten about this twist I now add here. James Miller, Enduring America report, 3-22-2013: "Two competing stories have featured in the last 48 hours over Tuesday's "chemical attacks" near Aleppo and Damascus. The first is a statement posted yesterday from the Syrian opposition in which they claim that Echothiophate, a chemical often found in insecticides, was used in both incidents, having been delivered by a Scud missile." US-based Syrian Support Group  statement via Twitter (and shown below): Echothiophate was used in both attacks, dispersed with a scud missile fired from Damascus in both cases. They didn't hear anything about another Scud landing in Homs. It's noted the "FSA" has no missiles capable of carrying chemical weapons, which along with the wide scale of the attack was supposed to prove this was a regime plot.

Miller finds the poison to fit with reported symptoms: bradycardia, vasodilation, nausea and vomiting, and bronchoconstriction. He thinks a smell like chlorine was reported, when it should be like rotten cabbage. I haven't heard chlorine, just "foul," which fits. (Chlorine odor was first reported in Aleppo, apparently in error?) So was this the poison all along? It's been claimed or suggested samples from the Ateibah incident later tested positive for sarin, and everyone agrees Khan al-Assal was a sarin attack. 
And as Miller had to note even at the time "US declared no SCUD launches were detected. " (citing CNN) Oops. A little lack of coordination there.
By the time of a December UN report (PDF), only Khan al-Assal was under discussion, and the conflicting stories they heard were a surface rocket from the north, as the Syrian side always claimed, and a fighter jet, as multiple opposition-supplied witnesses also told them. ("according  to  other  witness  statements  to  the  UNHRC  Commission  of  Inquiry,  an  overflying  aircraft  had dropped an aerial bomb filled with Sarin. ") <end Nov. 2>
 

Aleppo Convoy Attack: UN Report

Aleppo Convoy Attack
Assessing the UN Report 
Adam Larson aka Caustic Logic
January 8, 2017
last edits (re-org, cleanup, clarity) Jan. 11/12

The United Nations Headquarters (New York) Board of Inquiry into the Urm al-Kubra convoy attack completed its report. On December 21, their Department of Political Affairs (DPA) released a summary of it; the full report and detailed reasoning is internal. It basically supports the claim that the convoy was attacked by Russian and/or Syrian air forces. I did a quick review of the summary here at ACLOS, which I've finally expanded below.

Deciding on an Air Attack

The summary heralds in a by-line "UN-Syrian Arab Red Crescent aid convoy attacked from the air." They believe it was all from the air, apparently without any ground attack aspect. They claims they didn't leap to the conclusion, but based it on direct evidence, including "satellite and ground imagery, videos and eyewitness statements."

The board apparently didn't get to visit the site at all. Their investigators visited Syria December 5 to 9, visiting Damascus and West Aleppo. But they report they were not cleared to visit the site, as the government couldn't assure their safety, which the SARC convoy attack suggests is quite true. But that might have yielded little anyway, they state, as much damage had been repaired. (point 4)

As for what they did look at, the satellite views sound convincing, but it seems they actually aren't (see way below). The video evidence could be strong, but it's unspecified what they found so convincing in it. "Witnesses" speaking words in the midst of an information Jihad can be of little value. However, the board got "corroboration" from "Member States" (the most influential states are hostile to Syria and Russia and could easily lie), "open-source research" (if done right, like we do, this can be useful...) and "other witness interviews." Yes, unreliable words were corroborated by other unreliable words. Supposed eyewitnesses interviewed in Turkey (approved Jihadist proxies of the Erdogan regime) provided much information. (point 7).

They do claim to have looked at "over 370 photographs and videos" - apparently far more than we've found in the public record, and they list these separately from "open-source information." (possibility: the available visuals were double-listed here)

From all this, they decided "the SARC compound was subject to an attack from the air, using multiple types of munitions deployed from more than one aircraft and aircraft type. " Also, "The munitions used included non-precision unitary bombs and/or smaller blast-incendiary air-to-ground weapons, which could have been missiles, rockets or sub-munition bomblets." (point 27) This sounds somewhat vague.

Actual weapons remnants were not considered, due to chain of custody questions. This may, and should, include concerns the fragments presented were simply planted, as the most famous example "proving" Russian guilt apparently was (the OFAB-250 in the warehouse - see my analysis here).Therefore, to their credit, they don't blame anyone based on the debris rebels claim to have found, but they also avoid weighing in on the planting issue and its implications of rebel cover-up and thus likely rebel guilt.

And, as if they needed more reason, the board also claims they reached the conclusion by deduction: "the Board considered and rejected the possibilities that the incident was caused by direct fire or ground assault... or by ground-delivered improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or by indirect fire, ... (or) that it was a staged or hoax event." This left no option but the air attack they had those other reasons for. (point 28) Just how they did that and how valid their reasoning was remains unclear; it could be circular, elliptical, or other.

Narrowing the Blame to the Bad Guys
Well, it's not Based on Motive
From the evidence I've seen, this could be an air attack, at least in part. But considering the lack of clear proof either way, we should make a large note of the fact that motive does not point to Russia or Syria. As I explained here, it was al-Nusra linked rebels who had the most to gain.

A Russian-drafted plan was in the works, with the US promising to partner with Russia against Al-Nusra as well as ISIS, but it depended in part of not having this aid convoy attacked. Such linkage had Islamist activists declaring such aid "humiliating," and part of a US-Russia-UN plot. And when the convoy was attacked at the last moment, with someone tearing off these signs of conspiracy (see below), the US blamed Russia, cancelled the deal, and so left al-Nusra protected from any such expanded bombing (in Aleppo, that didn't save them from losing anyway - Russia and Syria did it on their own soon after this, to much protest from the West).

So Russia is accused of the attack that scuttled their own deal, with the deal and that question mark glossed over in most reports. Why did they do this? To stop some medical aid getting through, or just to be evil again, or what? It's unclear and doesn't seem to matter. But in fact the counter-motive for Damascus or Moscow are so strong, we should demand extra-good evidence for such an irrational crime. And this hasn't been provided yet.

The inverse also applies; rebels and their coalition protectors had so much to gain, they should be considered the prime suspects until the evidence rules them out. From the motive perspective, Al-Nusra allied terrorists would be the logical culprits. If an air attack aspect truly were proven to be part of the picture, we should suspect rebel-supporting coalition aircraft. They might well be unofficial, off-the-books, maybe even  Russian-made SU-24s flown by Ukrainians out of Turkey, if that's possible, or simply the versatile predator drone the Russians claim they observed.

But here's an oddity; the UN Headquarters summary at least does not address the issue of motive, giving the reader a very poor basis for deciding between various competing claims and conflicting evidence. Here's what the board did with that purchased wiggle-room:

...Because No One Alleges It?
First, they make due note that almost any aircraft, be it Syrian, Russian, or coalition, was technically capable of the air attack; only flightless local terrorists were off the hook. But having not considered motive, they found this rationale for deciding it was "highly unlikely" to be the coalition side:

38. The Board further noted that no party had alleged the involvement of International Coalition Forces aircraft and, as such, their involvement was highly unlikely.

That's the entire point 38, with no other reason given. Now, let's consider...

Russia's military has previously suggested a Predator drone run by the coalition was in the area at the time, while all of their own craft were elsewhere. Unlike the Americans, they even showed a partial radar track for it (right, and meaning unclear - it came from the north and looped around the site?). It's unclear if they retracted this, or what.

Among the materials the board considered is mentioned "air tracks shared with it by the government of the Syrian Arab Republic." (point 7). The summary doesn't show, describe, or discuss this track any further, but here we have it: Russia shows one. Syria does. But there's no mention of air tracks provided by the coalition side to support their claims. This is consistent with, but doesn't prove, coalition side guilt.

Furthermore, the board knows Russia and Syria both deny involvement, which implicitly blames the coalition. That might sound weak, but the reverse was decided in the same manner; ""We know it was an airstrike and not one from the coalition. We don’t know if it was Russia or the regime," the only others flying over Syria, a senior (US) official said." (Washington Post)

Did the coalition provide some proof of that, or is that implication still their basis for blame? If it's the latter, we learn that trick works one way - when the US and allies are leveling charges against Syria and/or Russia - and not the other way around, even when the others have radar data to back their claims. This seems consistent with how the UN usually handles such differences between member states.

More on Which Bad Guys
The board also notes the Syrian Air Force may not have been informed of the convoy's location, whereas they're sure everyone else (Russia, coalition, opp. forces) were made aware. (point 25) This leaves open the option that Damascus did it, even on accident. But many experts have insisted it had to be Russia, due to the "sophistication" of the strike, happening in the early evening dark, for one thing.

They heard very specific allegations that three Syrian helicopters, some unknown jets, and one Russian jet were all involved, and found this possible, but unlikely.

39. The Board stated that it had received reports that information existed to the effect that the SAAF was highly likely to have perpetrated the attack, and even that the attack was carried out by three Syrian Mi-17 model helicopters, followed by three unnamed fixed-wing aircraft, with a single Russian aircraft also suspected of being involved. However, the Board did not have access to raw data to support these assertions and, in their absence, it was unable to draw a definitive conclusion. Moreover, the Governments of both the Russian Federation and Syrian Arab Republic denied all allegations of their involvement in the incident.

40. The Board noted in this connection that there were technical issues pertaining to a hypothesis of the incident being a result of a joint Syrian Arab Air Force/Russian Federation strike. The Board had been informed that that the Russian Federation did not conduct joint strikes. A high degree of interoperability and co-ordination would also be required for two air forces to operate in the same airspace, targeting the same location.

Why they included this is unclear, but I've already seen one reader declare in comments the report found three Mi-17s, three Syrian jets and a Russian jet were responsible for the attack, and therefore it was super-proven (RT reader, 22 December).

So, anyway... like US officials in the immediate aftermath, but with a bit less certainty and more diplomatic wording, the investigators think it was Russia or Syria, not likely both, and they don't seem to really know or care just which. This seems more like an interest in getting someone more specific off the hook than an effort at truth, which would be consistent with the dubious reasoning they provide, and of course with coalition side guilt.

Terrorist Pirates who Also Blame Syria-Russia 
The board heard that the area (given as Urem Al-Kubra) was at the time of the attack "under the control of armed opposition groups, with Jaish al-Mujahideen being the predominant group in the area."  but they heard others, including Nour al-Din al-Zenki and Jabhat al-Nusra had a "presence in the area." (point 13) It's been reported that Al-Zenki - commanded by child-beheading scum and allied with al-Nusra - were the predominant force. That could be wrong, they may have slightly different ideas of the relevant area, there may be no one clear answer, and it matters little; criminal psychopathic terrorists ran the area.

The rebels of Jaish al-Mujiheddin (JaM) clearly ran the area just to the east, the passage to Urm al-Kubra from Aleppo, if not the immediate warehouse area. JaM "provided an armed escort to the convoy to its destination" starting from the moment they passed the first non-government checkpoint (point 19) until they arrived at the SARC compound,  at 13:45 as the board found. "[T]he armed escort provided by Jaish Al-Mujahideen then ended and responsibility for the security of the convoy passed to the local police, which had a station nearby."  (point 23).

That would be JaM's mortar truck seen by a Russian military drone in Khan al-Assal. It was driving out ahead of the stationary convoy, possibly to get positioned to fire on the trucks later on. The board mentions this truck, but saw no proven connection between that and the convoy attack. The board "could not find any material link with the incident." (point 41) There is and can be no proven link, but as far as I can see it hasn't really been ruled out either. The board claims to believe it was exclusively an airstrike, which would rule out a mortar's involvement. But perhaps that call wasn't really as strong as it's made to sound by the DPA in this public summary.

The board heard that JaM decided the trucks should move only five at a time, ostensibly to not block traffic (point 21). Then when the first sub-group was sent along - with or without an escort is unclear - something odd happened. As the board heard it, anyway, they were:

 ...met by masked armed men, who wanted to take some of the supplies on the convoy. A dispute then ensued between these men and the SARC Urem al-Kubra team. Following the dispute, three trucks were diverted by these armed men. One of these was fully offloaded, while the remaining two were partially offloaded. The three trucks were then allowed to proceed to the SARC compound in Urem al-Kubra. (point 21)

Just what they stole isn't explained. But clearly, Jaish al-Mujahideen did nothing to stop this piracy, with all its armed escorts and coordination with other terrorist groups. That is, if they weren't behind it, their allies were, and they wrote off on it. This piracy-related dispute adds to the rebel motive to kill those people and blame their enemies for it. JaM's post-incident press release makes no mention of it. And note there's no piracy incidents with pro-government elements to suggest they're to blame.

And here's a though: If these militants or allies (probably including local police) controlled the area, they could wait until the convoy and the aid workers were all gone, and pilfer the warehouse at their leisure, without creating a scene. Why the rush to grab stuff at first chance? One possible reason: the pirates, and presumably their allies, knew that convoy and its material would be destroyed shortly in a false-flag attack. They might all want to stay away from that scene, if possible, and run the show with mortars and artillery, to look a bit more like fighter jets. And any aid of value might get damaged.

How was this story reported to the UN investigators? By a survivor? (it seems possible there were none - see below) Or was this incident called in to headquarters, and that's why it was known? Could there have been a more serious, second confrontation the team never got to call in, before they and all their workers and drivers died?

The Jihadists in charge - thieving, perhaps murdering and lying - and their provided alleged witnesses and political backers, have their story of what happened. To the UN HQ investigators, who seem to have been looking for the same story, these Islamist claims are taken as credible evidence to decide it was some kind of bad guy air attack, with no motive and no troubling precedents like the JaM-approved pre-attack looting of the precious UN/SARC Aid.

Other Points
Death Toll:
Previously, it seemed about 31 people were affected, with at least 10-12 killed and about 20 injured but surviving, at least initially. It was never clear if anyone escaped both death and injury - that 30-32 might be everyone involved with the convoy that remained at the time. Later, credible reports said at least 20-21 wound up dying, and Jaish al-Mujiheddin, describing themselves as part of the "Free Syrian Army," declared that in the end perhaps everyone did: "12 humanitarian aid workers and 19 civilians, including (all?) the drivers of the aid convoy" eventually died, "for a total of 31 dead." They don't say if anyone at all lived. (see press release, ACLOS table)

If all inside witnesses died, except maybe one all-seeing "miracle survivor" to tell "the true story" ... this suggests local forces, not passing air forces, decided the death toll and wanted control of the narrative. What the UN report adds on the issue is of little help dispelling this possibility:

31.   At least ten individuals died, including five drivers who had been part of the convoy and the head of SARC Urem al-Kubra.  At least 22 individuals were injured, including a further five drivers.

"At least 22" surviving + "at least 10" killed = at least 32 total, when other sources put it at around 30-31 total killed and injured. Maybe they mean it was 32 total, and since 10+ died, then at most 22 survived.  This sounds like they didn't get a clear picture themselves, and decided to use the lowest agreed number of dead, given as at least, with as many as two thirds surviving or, as far as we can tell, no thirds.

Consider also:  "The United Nations sought to retrieve the bodies of the drivers who had been killed, Mr. Egeland said. But the rebels didn’t let it. And there was no Mr. Barakat to help." (NYT) So there were perhaps no independent autopsies. It might well be that all inside witnesses to the attack died and were buried away by JaM and allies. 

Damage Mapping

29. A total of eight possible major impact points within and near the compound were identified by the Board, with further multiple smaller impacts to the northwest.  The southwestern, southern and eastern walls of the compound were damaged and buildings collapsed.  Extensive damage was also done to a wall on the opposite side of Highway 60.

30. The Board found that 17 trucks from the convoy were involved in the incident.  Eight of these suffered significant fire damage, some being completely consumed.  A car, identified by witnesses as being used by the Head of SARC Urem al-Kubra, was also involved in the incident and was heavily damaged.

From open-source research with photos and videos (see ACLOS, scene analysis), we have: 5 impact areas clearly identified, perhaps 9 or more, in and adjascent to the warehouse, its parking lot, and around the highway to the south. There are 7-9 badly damaged trucks, of 13 trucks or trailers present, plus the car, and a pickup truck at least, not all clearly part of the convoy. First a graphic by me from video and photos, with the 5 clearest damage areas numbered (these are partially analyzed at the link above).

Satellite imagery shows more impacts mostly to the northwest that don't feature in videos and photos from the scene. Below are seven areas of apparent damage identified by ACLOS member Paveway IV on a TerraServer preview image, besides 9 in the central area.  Note: this was a tentative call, may suggest too many points of damage, apparently misses at least two known impacts that aren't obvious here.

The resolution isn't the best here, but we don't seem to see any large craters of the kind "expert" Lars Bromley suggested should appear:

"With our analysis we determined it was an air strike and I think multiple other sources have said that as well," Lars Bromley, research adviser at UNOSAT, told a news briefing.

"For air strikes, what you are usually looking out for is the size of the crater that is visible and the type of crater," he said. (Reuters)

The light dot where my #4 is in the highway (not indicated beneath, between the bottom red boxes) - this is the biggest and only crater I've seen outside the warehouse. It's maybe a meter wide, shallow, and was filled-in immediately with this lighter-colored earth. There might be other craters, aside from the one inside the warehous, but they probably aren't any bigger, or they'd be more obvious.

So ... we all agree mostly on the scene fairly well. Some trucks are unaccounted for, there's evidence for a number of violent blasts, but still no clear reason to support the illogical blaming of Russia and/or Syria. Yet, that blame keeps being supported, as if in a widespread effort to repeat it into being true.

Aleppo Convoy Attack: Did the Russians Slant Gravity?

Aleppo Convoy Attack: Did the Russians Slant Gravity?
September  29, 2016, last edits October 8
moved January 3, 2017 from How we Can Know Russia Did Not Bomb the Aleppo Aid Convoy

Note, Jan. 3: Besides moving this from its original spot, I've decided (back in October) this isn't the best leading argument I thought it was. (see postscript below) But it is what it is, a possible supporting clue. It might be as valid as it seemed - which was pivotal, a smoking gun. And it has some side-issues of importance either way.

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Recently I addressed the September 19 SARC convoy attack that killed a reported 31 people (and that might be everyone) with a post How we "Know" Russia or Syria Bombed the Aleppo Aid Convoy (21st Century Wire re-post of version 1) With the West blaming Russia and Russia and Syria blaming terrorists, there are many aspects to the case slowly coming into focus at the ACLOS (A Closer Look On Syria) page Attack on Red Crescent convoy in Urm al-Kubra and its talk page, besides in some spots linked below.

I'll leave most aspects alone here and lead with this clue. It's a forensic argument, but a fairly simple one that clearly illustrates the fraudulent nature of the Russian airstrike narrative. While this point is obvious once you see it, it seems everyone has failed to notice it until now.

First, this regards the same scientific proof the anti-Russia media hordes have already run with. The remains of a Russian-made gravity-driven bomb, of the model OFAB-250, were seen inside a blast crater at the attack site. This 250-pound bomb has a distinct tail section that, if twisted and crumpled, would look just like the thing found inside the warehouse where trucks were unloading. It's under a hole in the roof such a bomb could tear. We've established that the hole wasn't there yet on the afternoon before the attack (Russian drone footage proves this), so it most likely happened during the infamous attack.

A Russian bomb found at the site looked like clear proof, likely to play into any slanted UN investigation, and picked up quickly by some like The UK Independent,  several Ukrainian outfits like UAToday and UNIAN, and the Daily Beast: This Is How Russia Bombed the U.N. Convoy (filed under "GUILTY AS CHARGED" - see right), besides mentions elsewhere.

These all cite Bellingcat, Elliot Higgins' open source investigations group, widely used to lend a science-like sheen to the blatant propaganda claims of the Atlantic community and its local terrorist proxies, in Syria, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Others had noticed a distinct shape half-buried under some boxes, at the crater's center, but it's Bellingcat that apparently got the White Helmets to send a clearer image of the tail section, still in situ but with debris removed. With this, they published Confirmed : Russian Bomb Remains Recovered from Syrian Red Crescent Aid Convoy Attack 

How the fragment looks doesn't matter here - everyone agrees on what it probably is. There was such debris and, Bellingcat implies, it was found in a way that "confirmed" the existing claims of Russian guilt. So this is perhaps the best answer to how we "know" Russia did this with aerial bombardment. One of their bombs is in the crater inside the warehouse.

Below is the graphic Bellingcat produced and that's been widely reused to prove Russian blame, as well as to question it. To start with, I don't question anything in this image - this is an accurate and useful tool. We'll refer to it below. It does not confirm Russian guilt: rather, it strongly contradicts it.

Yellow shows match from OFAB to the debris seen - Magenta arrows point from entry hole to the OFAB tail fin in the crater - green box just helps clarify its there, even if not visible from this angle.

There is a decent argument that this tail section is from a bomb that detonated somewhere else, and was simply planted here. If it was un-exploded but buried, as some have presumed, why would the White Helmets half-excavate it like that just for a photo? It's dangerous. And if it detonated and was thus inert, then why are there intact cardboard boxes just inches away, still mostly stacked together properly? (that's part of why some have presumed this was a "dud.") (see ACLOS discussion of the scene)

These are good questions, but to me they seem secondary to the main problem, now that I finally see it.

It's Slanted, Dummy!

The OFAB-250 bomb has no propulsion system. It doesn't fly. When first dropped, it'll have some of the jet's momentum, but once it starts plummeting, that's all it does, for 20,000 feet or so. If one were to punch through this roof as seen, it would do nothing but plunge into the ground directly beneath the hole.

But looking at Bellingcat's proof graphic above, a curious thing - the magenta line of arrows does not go straight down, does it? For some reason the crater is not directly beneath the hole. It's off by a good distance, around a meter.

This might be no bizarre mystery. Consider that any projectile launched from the ground will arc up to a highest point and then back down on a gently curving diagonal track like this, as it traverses its horizontal distance (basic illustration at right - purple is a gravity drop, magenta again shows the slanted descent, traced back into its full arc.)

A mortar shell or rocket will also cause directional damage reflecting both its direction of flight and angle of descent. The pattern of damage on the walls and truck, boxes and people would tell us where it came from. We can already see the basic descent angle  The detonation blast moves radially from the magenta line, perpendicular, so basically its bottom edge runs along the yellow line in Bellingcat's graphic above. Note burn marks on the pillar starting at that line. In fact, the way the magenta and yellow lines meet at 90 degrees in that image is rather helpful to see why this is no Russian-dropped bomb. 

Here's my version (all lines and locations approximate: photo rotation/perspective distortion and 3-D effect are minimal and not considered). As above, purple is an OFAB-250 drop angle (zero), and magenta is the evident angle (app. 25-30 degrees from vertical). (see ACLOS posting with discussion). As we can see, the angle Bellingcat traces to the the crater's center is correct enough.

30 degrees or less off from vertical is fairly steep, suggesting the projectile was fired from nearby. This would be to give it a relatively vertical angle, but it's still not enough to mimic a dropped bomb very well.

What I think happened: some locally-fired rocket or mortar shell * was able to pierce the roof, hit the center of that crater, and only then detonate. This suggests unusual weight and penetration capability (the noted steep descent angle would help with this) as well as some kind of delay fuze.  These features both seem unusual and might be something new (though I'm not the most read-up on weapon trends).

 * The general blast pattern is similar to rocket impacts I've studied, so I feel that's more likely. But some mortar or artillery shells operate on similar principles, and I don't know enough to exclude these.

Whatever its main action, the blast apparently caused a sort of fireball, occupying a space that's hard to explain.  The shape marked in orange is a cross section of the 'forward' half of this. If we take that orange area and extrude it radially around the magenta line, it makes sort of funnel-shaped area that's the best place to look for damage. We can see where a rolling fireball scorched the surfaces at random spots within that zone, including on the back wall just one small patch at its furthest reach. 

Shrapnel

Shrapnel marks should occur in the same basic area as the fireball, but with a wider scatter pattern. On the walls and truck (so anywhere in this photo) we see few if any clear marks. The densest band of shrapnel would mark the columns on the right-hand and inner faces, form an arc high along the back wall and/or  across the ceiling, angling down across the truck's side (higher at the back end, lower near the middle-front) and into the boxes. The right-hand wall would be marked near the bottom if at all, and into the boxes there and the ground. 

The resolution on these areas is not the best, as they're mostly a ways across the room, and most of them are smoke-stained too. Only the nearer pillar is sure to show it, and might, partly (a few marks at the top). 

Of course none of this material is made of cardboard or flesh, so lighter shrapnel might leave mark you could see only with a magnifying glass. The people are not here to look at, thankfully. So let's look at the cardboard. Here's the most detailed view I could find of how it gets torn. (new window for fuller view)

Considering the above, low damage along front wall is expected. The picture below is from a similar view to the others but closer to the crater and looking more towards the front wall. The truck is off-frame to the left. I dropped blue dots where I saw a mark or tear like the ones above.

From left to right these start higher, shift lower, get denser, and then get jumbled or no longer there in the immediate impact area. This possible shrapnel is looking light, sharp, and not too energetic (smaller blast than usual perhaps). This seems unusual, and perhaps new, like the delayed detonation after an unusually good roof-piercing. Also, I marked a few small soot/scorch marks of a lesser 'fireball' on this side of the detonation (blue circles). The fire had less space to form here. The wall doesn't seem scorched at all.

Flight Path:

Anyway, this pattern seems to fit perfectly with the other angle of impact clues.

Looking at the crater and the roof hole, it's hard to say which is closer to that nearest pillar line. They both seem fairly close, maybe 1/3 of the way between the rows. If they lines up exactly, the line between them would run perpendicular to the front wall, or straight into the building from across its front lot. But this isn't very exact.

The orange shape cross section in my graphic above marks out a plane, which should be about on the fireball's longest axis. This suggests it's also on the projectile's flight path - it expands more in this direction because it's detonating while moving with kinetic energy, which it got from traveling inside the rocket/shell along that line.

So, tracing that line along the ceiling from the furthest smoke stains to the nearest and then to center of the hole should be the basic trajectory. It's close to straight into the building, with a slight angle from the west. The building's rotation from north roughly cancels this out, putting the source of fire almost due south. This is traced in orange below, and the flight path extension runs back in gold:

The range could be wider, but not by much. The distance out on this line is unsure, but my eye is drawn to that road area (an old airstrip?). That seems kind of nice and open, accessible area to work, just about exactly 800 meters from the roof hole. But I might be biased - in my experience, 800m south is a good place to fire false-flag rockets from. It could easily be closer, or a bit further, but in this direction.

Summary / Whodunnit

There may or may not have been aircraft involved in this attack. But whose that would be remains open to question, despite Western assurances only Russian or Syrian jets could possibly operate there.

Consider: there's no room in the Russian blame story for local artillery (rocket/mortar) strikes as part of it. Most activists say there was jet bombing, jet machine gunning, and helicopter barrel bombing involved. Some also specify surface missiles/rockets were used, all fired by government forces. These could produce such an arc if they were close enough, but they weren't - rather, they were kilometers away to the east in Aleppo. This angle could also come from a jet-fired missile, But this can't be either of those, according to the allegations; there's a gravity bomb sitting in that crater. 

Local rebels covered up this local strike, planting that tail assembly and calling it a Russian bombing, so clearly it's themselves or allies they're covering for. The area all around is reportedly under control of Harakat Noureddin al-Zenki, "moderate Islamists" who formerly received US military aid. They've since been cut-off, but might still cooperate with Washington if asked. Al-Zenki was recently accused of launching a chemical weapons attack in Aleppo (August 2, ACLOS), and earlier had two top commanders openly partake in the abuse and beheading by knife of a captured boy (al-Zenki promised the killers were arrested, but they were seen out with guns two weeks later - again, see ACLOS). Is this another crime to add to their rap sheet? 

So, if there were jets or drones or helicopters coordinating with this, they would be someone on the rebel-terrorisits-NATO-coalition side, not the Russia-Syria side. They would be doing it secretly, to frame Russia and Syria. The official denials fit with that perfectly, as does the information warfare to follow - insistence on Russian guilt and demands for a no-fly zone in response. So if this was, as alleged, an "airstrike" - even in part - it's all clearly part of the same team effort with the terrorists who fired into the SARC warehouse that night. The aim of this effort is, at least, to undermine all efforts to engage the Islamist forces that prevent a return to peace in Syria. At most, it's the start of an all-out effort to put these terrorists in charge of all Syria's land and people.
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Postscript, Oct. 3: I left a comment at Bellincat's article, but they refused to approve it. Other newer comments are approved, but not mine. Past precedent already showed Higgins and co. refuse to review or even acknowledge work that trumps their own. Truth-based investigators should have no trouble considering an alternate view, but these guys avoid the truth every time it runs counter the kind of findings they're expected to come up with. This or them is another "open-source" disinformation hit-and-run against Syria.

Postscript Oct. 8: I've decided this isn't the best leading argument I thought it was. It didn't seem to phase Bellingcat's sleuths or much of anyone else so far, and in fact I can't prove that is significant. To clarify, the bomb wouldn't fall absolutely straight down. It would start with the jet's forward momentum, and that would fade  away, but not completely. How much would remain at the end? That depends on the laws of physics (known but difficult for me to measure and calculate), the speed of the jet, and the altitude dropped from.

For reference,  I did a rough measure finally and decided the descent angle we see is around 20 degrees, not 25-30. A good range is 18-22 degrees from vertical. All directional clues (shrapnel marks, fireball spread) remain consistent with this. If that could be an OFAB-250 detonation (it can't) then this could be it coming in at such an angle.


In follow-up discussion, ACLOS member Resup provided this handy chart (can't verify but looks logical) of a model object (cannonball) of the same weight as an OFAB-250 dropped from a jet traveling the speed of sound (measures are in meters - y axis is altitde from 0, drop point, x axis is horizontal travel during the drop). At a standard altitude of 3,000 meters or more, the angle at ground level (-3000) would be effectively vertical, like I said.

But if it were lower, say 1000-1500 meters, the angle could easily be in the range seen. This would raise some logic problems (aren't they worried about Anti-Aircraft fire?). But it could be done, and so even with tons of math to get an exact speed/altitude required, people could just say "fine, they did that then."

So this can only be a supporting point to the multi-point case that this is a fake, staged scene. "And furthermore, there's such an incoming angle that the notion of a gravity bomb is questionable."