Warning

Warning: This site contains images and graphic descriptions of extreme violence and/or its effects. It's not as bad as it could be, but is meant to be shocking. Readers should be 18+ or a mature 17 or so. There is also some foul language occasionally, and potential for general upsetting of comforting conventional wisdom. Please view with discretion.

Sunday, September 18, 2022

The "Militarization" of the ZNPP, Part 1: The Battle of March 4

September 18, 2022 (rough, incomplete)

A week into the Russian invasion and not far from Crimea, their forces moved to seize control the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), Europe's largest. Russian control would, for one thing, deny the facility to Ukrainian forces who might have launched attacks from there, and the Russians couldn't respond without risk of a meltdown or other radiological event. And it could allow for the opposite. among other possible ulterior motives. 

The Hill would report Feb. 26: on worrying reports from Ukraine’s ministry of internal affairs   that "Russian forces have aimed one of their deadliest weapons, a multiple rocket launcher called “Grad,” at the nuclear power plant," apparently for no good reason.  Russia's Defense Ministry claimed general control on the 28th, but this was denied by Energoatom, the state utility running the plant (Daily Sabah).

Ukrainian nuclear regulators reported on March 2 that, the night before, "as a result of rocket fire, the communications network of the Zaporizhzhya NPP SE was damaged. ...The troops of the Russian Federation made repeated attempts to capture the Zaporizhzhya NPP, but the heroic efforts of the residents of the city of Energodar and the territorial self-defense forces managed to stop the advance of the Russian troops to the site of the plant."

On March 2 the head of Energoatom, Petro Kotin reported that the Russian military asked to just visit the plant and take photos there. to show their commanders as evidence that Russia controls it. But he and others didn'y buy that, and people were in the way. From the 28th and increasingly to March 3, some well-equipped "residents" or "every day Ukrainian citizens" formed an impressive blockade of the roads in Energodar, the city built up around the ZNPP.


Some blockade participants were attacked with a grenade and gunfire on video, though it's not clear what's happening off-screen. The barricades were attacked, with a huge fire captured on video chasing people back. Whatever happened there, the roadblocks were overcome before the Russian army got its access to Energodar and then to the nuclear plant, arriving around midnight on the 3rd. 

NPR published a detailed report on March 11 Russian attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant more dangerous than first thought : NPR "On March 3, the nuclear plant was preparing for a fight. A news release posted to its website just hours before the assault described the facility as operating normally, with its assigned Ukrainian military unit ready for combat."

Ukrainian forces were at the plant, perhaps inside its boundaries, preparing for a battle there, among the delicate machinery and dangers of a nuclear meltdown. But no Western leader thought the plant needed to be "demilitarized" back then. Ukrainians had every right to fight from there and risk a meltdown that could harm people across Ukraine, Russia and Europe. It's their country, right? So with no complaints, they set to defending the plant their way.

"Just before 11:30 p.m. local time, someone began livestreaming the plant's security footage on its YouTube channel. The livestream rolled on as Russian forces began a slow and methodical advance on the plant. The column of armored vehicles, led by the tanks, used spotlights to cautiously approach the plant from the southeast along the main service road to the facility."

Full video as linked: Прямая трансляция пользователя Запорізька АЕС - YouTube - it's over 4 hours long. I watched long parts intently, but probably didn't see everything relevant. As the NPR article summarized:

"Around an hour and 20 minutes later, one of the two tanks that led the column was struck by a missile from Ukrainian forces and was disabled. That marked the beginning of a fierce firefight that lasted for roughly two hours at the plant. "

So the Ukrainian side started the shooting, albeit when the Russian invaders tried to enter the nuclear plant. This is what's seen, by a camera mainly facing east, over the area the first Russian vehicles entered. They arrive from the east on Promyslova Street, where it turns right at the plant's edge, or continues inside the plant, under no given name. This image uses a frame where a descending flare has the camera switch to day mode with color.


That tank was only struck after at least 4 misses or warning shots. These shots started just as the first tank approached the boundary, and they come visibly from the right (= roughly south). These can be seen in the video at 1:21:23, 1:21:47 1:21:54, and 1:22:12. Some shells hit objects (deliberately?) off-frame, sending up puffs of smoke. The first tank makes it in, but finally the 2nd tank is hit at 1:22:33 = 12:48 am. Soldiers run out, as it continues with secondary explosions. Somehow, this unit seems to inch forward over the next minute so it's off frame, and later it's just not in the way.

NPR: "Immediately after the tank was disabled, Russian forces returning fire appeared to hit a transmission line connected to the plant's main electrical substation. The IAEA says two of four high-voltage lines were damaged in the attack. Lyman says that these lines are essential to safe operations at the plant." 

That can be seen at 1:23:17 amid intense return fire to the right. The column slowly pushes forward after this. Over the next hour or so, some tanks are within the grounds and others lined up Promyslova Street to the east. Flashes that might be tanks attacked or attacking (I can't really tell) occur frequently, amid other visual effects. At 1:15:38 for example is the search light pointing into the camera. Many other flashes at the back of the line, in the dark distance, seem to be blasts with cascading sparks that appear in the dark with no glowing arrival to show direction. Depending on what's what, the Russian column might take a couple dozen hits from unclear directions. 

But in other cases, the direction of fire in this video can be seen. It's mostly, but not all, from the Russian column.

NPR: "Around 1 AM Heavy weapons fire from the rear of the Russian column flew in the direction of the Unit 1 reactor building. It's unclear whether the Russian troops were deliberately trying to strike more sensitive sections of the plant or whether they were returning fire from Ukrainian forces off camera."

This fire is seen at 1:24:30 (12:50 AM), to the left+forward = northwest, roughly towards reactor 1, 2, or 3. Although it's strange to think the Russians shot at the reactors just to risk a meltdown, it is visually unclear if the fire was provoked; there was no visible attack I noticed from this angle, before or after. But the shot was preceded by some sparkling blasts amid the column. Other shots are fired in this basic direction in the long parts I watched. e.g. 1:37:40-1:38:20 5+ shots to the left, 

Firing from the left against, the Russian column, is first seen, I think, at 1:25:43. That angle = roughly north, perhaps reactor 6 area, more likely an office building in the middle of the compound, or maybe outside its grounds to the north. 1:25:49 maybe the same or return fire TO the left - 1:25:53 (0:51) from left - 1:28:22, 1:28::56 to left.


Different fire from the left, higher up and more from ahead can be seen at 1:29:17 (or bottom frame above). That's still not quite reactor 1 area, but maybe around reactor 3 or the office building. 1:31:37 unclear - 1:33 heavy firing to the left after a cluster of explosions amid the column that seem to come from nowhere, but maybe from the left. 

1:56:22 a middle tank shoots a nearby car in the outer parking lot, with a sparkling impact that set off its alarm - searchlights along the parking lot's edge, a tank shot passes over at 1:56:59 - more searchlight panning - then 1:57:17 1st tank fires left, hitting the ground behind lot, near outer pipes - another shot ricochets off the fence (?) at 1:57:27 - more lights, then a shell explodes just past the fence at 1:57:38. I suspect that all had some good reason.

At several points, tank fire to the left is followed by light smoke drifting over from high on the left. The camera pans that way around 3:45 (3:12 am) - looking over special building 1 and reactor 1 - the fires are around north half of SB1, near reactor 5 or 6, and high enough around the block/dome of reactor 1 or 2 that it almost has to be something on there smoking, but lightly. Lower middle: looks like the elevated passage to reactor 1 has 2 holes punched in it, on the left (nearest the reactor).  

NPR: "The afternoon after the battle, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine reported that the reactor compartment of Unit 1, which lay in the direction of some of the Russian fire, had sustained damage. It also reported that two shells had landed in an area used to hold old nuclear waste that lay to the north of the battle. Later statements by the regulator and the IAEA reported further damage to the power transformer for the Unit 6 reactor."

1:26:50 shooting to the right + ahead - 1:27:36 unseen impact near camera, causes shaking, then nearby smoke - likely from unseen forward tanks, but maybe for good, unseen reasons. 

Lower right area is first visible at 1:34:37 - searchlights are panning over it intently for some reason - previous attacks from here possible - light smoke - 1:36:50 training center 1st visibly hit? Smoke increases. 1:43:25 1:43:52 training center hit from a further back in the Russian column = from the east - no provoking fire that I noticed. Combined frames below show the trajectory.

I've looked at the damage to that building, thinking the fire came from the northwest (well from the right, for the left side damage in the image below), not from the east. But it's not clear just what's hit in those frames. I didn't notice any fire on a right+back trajectory, but the foremost tanks will have been just NW enough to explain what I see. Another plausible part of the explanation: some kind of snipers on the 3rd floor.


At 1:53:22 and 25 - shots fired FROM ahead and the right - both hit the pavement, with a visible puff, in between the first 3 tanks. At 1:53:50 the Russians return fire this way.


In review: Russian forces seen shooting many directions, many times, but they also take fire from 4 visible directions:
* from the right, disabling a tank
* left low, hitting far back
* left + fwd + high, hitting far back 
* right + fwd, hitting near 3 tanks in the front
* and likely other hits came invisibly from these and other directions.

I haven't seen visible fire from any buildings of the plant to explain the repeated shelling of those buildings. But one of the bigger questions is fire from inside the plant early in the battle, as it was first being provoked. The zoom setting crops off all the foreground where this would be seen, just showing from the perimeter road and past for the first 13 minutes of shooting (1:21:23-1:34:47).

3:12:10-40 training center burning fiercely - several shells into the nearer part of it gets this burning too, amid new firing on distant targets to the right/south - fire crews arriving and stopped outside the plant, at 3:24:30 (2:50 am) -  3:24:56, 3:25:48 - more glowing shells fired high and to the right - at 3:28 they fire trucks leave, turned back - it's still a battle zone. The Russians did come to occupy the plant ... but again, Ukrainian defenders fired the first and several other shots in this battle.

Thursday, September 15, 2022

Ukraine's Systematic Shelling of the ZNPP? August 25-28

Ukraine's Systematic Shelling of the ZNPP? August 25-28

Posted September 15, 2022

(rough, incomplete) last edits 9/29

August 25: After weeks of shelling and drone attacks, the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) was running just 2 of six reactors, units 5 and 6. IAEA inspectors were preparing to visit the plant in a Russian-brokered deal Ukraine had long frustrated. And then fresh shelling commenced.

Clashing Reports

https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/09/ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf

• On 25 August, Ukraine reported that the ZNPP had temporarily lost the power provided by its last remaining operational 750 kV external power line. In the course of the day, the ZNPP lost power from this connection at least twice. The 750 kV power line was subsequently restored. During the power outages, the ZNPP remained connected to a 330 kV line from the nearby thermal power plant that could provide backup electricity if needed. Ukraine also informed the IAEA that as a result of the cuts in power delivered by the 750 kV power line, the ZNPP’s two operating reactor units had been disconnected from the electricity grid and their emergency protection systems triggered, while all safety systems remained operational. All six units remained disconnected from the grid also after the power line was restored. 

Shelling isn't mentioned as the cause, but it did happen suddenly like that.

• On 26 August, according to Ukraine, ZNPP staff began connecting Units 5 and 6 to the power grid. Power to the ZNPP was supplied by the Ukrainian energy system. Shelling damaged the water pipelines passing through the overpass that connects Unit 2 of the NPP with the special building designed for handling radioactive waste and for decontamination. The communication line with the radiation control sensors located in the special building and the ZNPP telephone line were also damaged. ZNPP operational staff commenced repairs of the pipelines.

Nothing is listed for the 27th, and no shelling on the 28th, before:

• On 28 August, an assessment of the damage caused by shelling on 25–27 August indicated that shelling hit the area of the plant’s two so-called special buildings, both located about 100 m from the reactor buildings, as well as one overpass area. Those buildings house facilities including water treatment plants, equipment repair shops and waste management facilities. Damage to some water pipelines at the site was later repaired.

•• On 27, 28 August, what? Russian sources reported Ukrainian attacks: rockets fired around reactor 6 special building 2, and spent fuel storage on the 27th,  a drone attack on spent fuel storage, on special building 1 on the 28th, as 6 projectiles landing near reactor 6 and its pumping station, This is almost totally absent from the IAEA report.

Russia's UN Mission, August 27
"We circulated among #UNSC members a letter regarding presentation by the @mod_russia on the shelling by the AFU of the #ZNPP on August 27.
Three shells landed nearby the specialized b.2, where the storage facility of the nuclear fuel as well as hard radioactive waste is located."

https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/cities-ukrainian-nuclear-plant-shelled-88969112
Aug. 28: Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov said Sunday [Aug. 28] that Ukrainian forces had attacked the plant twice over the past day, and that shells fell near buildings storing reactor fuel and radioactive waste. "One projectile fell in the area of the sixth power unit, and the other five in front of the sixth unit pumping station, which provides cooling for this reactor,” Konashenkov said, adding that radiation levels were normal."

"The U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency also reported Sunday that radiation levels were normal, that two of the Zaporizhzhia plant's six reactors were operating and that while no complete assessment had yet been made, recent fighting had damaged a water pipeline, since repaired."

"In another apparent attack Sunday [the 28th], Russian forces shot down an armed Ukrainian drone targeting one of the Zaporizhzhia plant's spent fuel storage sites, a local official said. Vladimir Rogov, 
a Russian-installed regional official, said on the Telegram messaging app that the drone crashed 
onto a building's roof, not causing any significant damage or injuring anyone."

https://twitter.com/Andjela_Sipovac/status/1563530508079771650
Aug. 27, around 5 pm in Ukraine, a Russian statement translated to Serbian in a series of tweets, then to English, includes: "During the past day, artillery units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine shelled the territory of the station three times. It was fired a total of 17 shells, four of which hit the roof of the special building number 1, where 168 assemblies with American nuclear fuel of the Westinghouse company are stored. Another ten shells exploded 30 meters from the dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, and three exploded in the zone of the special building number 2, which houses the storage of fresh nuclear fuel of the TVEL company and the storage of solid radioactive waste. The shelling of the nuclear power plant by the Ukrainian artillery was carried out from the area of the Marganec settlement of the Dnipropetrovsk region. During the counter-battery fight in that area, an American howitzer M 777 was identified and destroyed. 

Daily Mail, 30 August: "The Russian-installed city authorities said two 155mm shells fired from the city of Nikopol in Ukrainian-held territory exploded near a spent fuel storage building at the plant, the agency added." 

"In return, Ukrainian authorities accuse the Russians of setting up military installations next to the reactors and using them as nuclear hostages from which to shell Ukrainian positions."

They didn't even deny the attacks? Twitter search for ZNPP over Aug. 25-28: ZNPP until:2022-08-28 since:2022-08-25 - Twitter Search / Twitter - Russia had photos of fresh damage (see below) and a story to explain them. Ukraine had barely any allegations and zero images I could find. One exception at least: Hromadske, 8/27: "Over the past day, the Russian military has repeatedly shelled the ZNPP site, the damage is currently being investigated, Enerhoatom reports." 

Otherwise, Ukraine didn't even publish any denials I could find; instead, they were eager about claims by some plant employees that the Russians were torturing them, to hide the facts in advance of the AEA visit. They didn't explain how cameras were also pressed into spreading Russia's lies.

Cameras Not Lying: Special Building 1
What we can see is fresh damage in "the area of the plant’s two so-called special buildings, both located about 100 m from the reactor buildings, as well as one overpass area. Those buildings house facilities including water treatment plants, equipment repair shops and waste management facilities." - probably just refers to the whole area of the buildings, but specifically, Special Building 1, - 3 roof impacts, a later one included for reference, along with alleged UAV crash site, and damaged overpass indicated entirely, now knowing the spot, but suggesting the red box - two unusually large dark spots appear with some odd light patch at a familiar angle, in an area that fits the pattern otherwise.  


Impact A is across from reactor block 2 - B is similar but different; at B, the green lines of acute damage curve with the red curve of burnt area - But at A, the green curves against the same red arc. This had me confused how to read them, but the satellite view's similarity in burn arcs is so clear and consistent, it suggests there's a minor detail at play, like the roof's waves or ridges - A is on an up-slope vs. B on a downslope, for a drone coming from the northeast. At A, the upslope catches more of the fireball, for more burn marks to the front.

Alleged crash site of the downed UAV is marked, based on an Aug. 29 Telegram post: "The downed 🇺🇦 kamikaze drone that tried to attack the ZNPP. fell on the roof of the building of the NPP. No infrastructure damage. The intended target was a storage facility for spent #nuclear_fuel." https://t.me/intelslava/36118 and https://twitter.com/owhy3/status/1564887299632300032
The drone:

Its crash site: view on left includes reactor block 1 and then 6 electric pylons that can be found lining up to the south of that. The busy cluster of vent pipes here can only be the elevated middle of Special Building 1, where a dark splatter like this can be made out between matching vents, as marked on the maps here.

The suggested trajectory for impacts A, B and C, shown here on a north-rated crop, is from the NNE. But that's probably because the drone was flying there and fired straight ahead. So impacts A, B and C were most likely hit in reverse alphabetical order before the drone was brought down, fitting in the same line as everything else, and still northeast of most impacts. 

Impact D isn't there yet, only shown as new on September 4 or 5. It happens to have the same basic shape and suggested trajectory, but the relevance of that is unclear. The elevated passage (lower left) reportedly damaged earlier - on the 26th, so also irrelevant how close it is. But note that makes three (3) attacks in this small area in ten days.

Add 9/25: this attack used kamikaze drones or Howitzer cannon, or just one drone plus howitzer cannon ... unclear reports. But next to the southern 2 impacts ...

... a blown-off set of wings like seen on the Polish-made and Ukrainian-fielded "Warmate" drone used in attacks on the plant. The photographed remains of the shot-down one seem to match. Another piece shown compares well to the same found after another drone headed to the plant was shot down on the 31st, and identified as a Warmate. So the downed one probably didn't launch anything - they just carry explosives in the nosecone and destroy themselves on impact - it was probably one of four sent, with the other three hitting their target, the roof of this sensitive building. 



Cameras Not Lying: Around Reactor 6, S.B. 2 
We heard about six impacts at reactor 6 and its pumping station on the 28th, but any damage was initially unclear in the few satellite views I'd seen, In the satellite views from the next day, there does seem to be a dark smudge on the pavement close to the reactor, and a missing vent pipe (?) on the adjacent building (pumping station?) - the others all have three pipes. These might suggest impacts, but perhaps both of these signs are also visible back on August 19. If so, that might be 2 attacks minimum, although any 8/29 attack left even less sign. 


There's no visible damage to the roof of adjacent Special Building 2. But some broken windows in the overpass connecting that to the reactor occurred at some point. These are not visible at all from space, but were photographed by the IAEA team when they visited Sept. 1 and 2 (see report). 

The angled smudge by reactor 6 isn't very clear, but it seems linear. If the trajectory is perpendicular to that, and if it was steady the whole way, then it came from the north, around Chervonohryhorivka. That would explain an artillery shell or unguided rocket, but for a guided missile or drone, it could only show the final trajectory, not point of origin.

Finally, I found some more detail with images, but for an attack the day before, via Russia at the United Nations, @RussiaUN on Twitter, Aug 27. In Ukrainian shelling of the ZNPP that day, "Three shells landed nearby the specialized b.2, where the storage facility of the nuclear fuel as well as hard radioactive waste is located." Three photographs were included - small versions below with where I place them on the map. I think we see 2 impacts, and perhaps the effects of 3, and they're even faintly visible in the shadows and from orbit: one marked red hit under the elevated passage that damaged a tree, perhaps the windows we've seen, plus water-carrying pipes, and windows on the special building and connecting passage. Note that AFVs were seen nearby on the 29th, were probably nearby on the 27th, and were likely the targets of this strike. The other rocket impact (yellow) is almost against the north wall of the special building. No weapon remnants are visible, and the exact kind isn't even stated.

Both impacts suggest the same trajectory - an eyeballed estimate is included for each. These trajectories - not exact but close - point less to Nikopol than to Prydniprovske, a bit to its east. 


Two 155mm shells "fired from the city of Nikopol" also landed near a spent fuel storage in these days, per reports. I haven't seen any images to support that part, but it could be. They would be a bit east of the impacts highlighted above, probably on the same line. We've seen a 220mm rocket - also from the Nikopol/Prydniprovske area - hit next to the storage site back on August 6, with a trajectory that's very similar, but a bit more southerly. Monitor on Massacre Marketing: Ukraine's Systematic Shelling of the ZNPP? August 5-7 (libyancivilwar.blogspot.com)


9/29 Update:
The smudge by reactor 6 IS a thing, of some interest to folks on the ground. Some footage in this WION Sept. 2 video shows IAEA's Grossi with the Russian expert looking at what seems like a strip of concrete rubble with a worse patch in the middle, flanked by the marks of a detonation fireball in extended but light contact (forward side, SW) and a solid stripe more acutely burned on the backside.

This supports the reading I had, pointing nearly to Marganets/ Marhanets (see above). This was said to be the attack origin on the 27th, hitting nearby. "The shelling of the nuclear power plant by the Ukrainian artillery was carried out from the area of the Marganec settlement of the Dnipropetrovsk region. During the counter-battery fight in that area, an American howitzer M 777 was identified and destroyed." 

Likely this is all from the same attack from the same direction, using 155mm cannon shells. Previously, I guessed a NW origin, but the signs could fit north just as well. For impact 3, there are signs of a fireball against the special building's north wall, and the full damage is not shown - For impact 2, damage high up on the tree fits better with a trajectory aiming more towards it, or more from the north. The back of SB2, walkway and pipes (orange) might then require a 4th impact, which might have happened, somewhere under that big puddle.

9/29 add:
there was an August 29 attack also reported! Russian Mission in Vienna, Aug. 30 - https://twitter.com/mission_rf/status/1564707597810368514

"Yet another attack against ZNPP by the armed formations of Ukraine is confirmed. 

On August 29 they used both artillery shells and kamikaze drones

Regrettably Ukrainian attempts to damage ZNPP continue even during the @iaeaorg mission"

4 afternoon photos are included, On the southern roof of Special Building 1, across from reactors 1 and 2, we see a set of UAV wing broken off, some scattered debris, an undetonated (RDX?) warhead broken off, and no sign of fresh building damage. Either it's not shown, or it was only attempted damage. 

Saturday, September 10, 2022

Ukraine's Systematic Shelling of the ZNPP? August 5-7

September 10, 2022

(rough, incomplete) - last edits 9/29/22

I'm finally looking into the swirling allegations over military attacks at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Russian forces are accused of militarizing the site by basing forces there (seems undeniably true to some degree) and launching attacks from there (not so sure, but troubling if so - I'll have some to say on this in another post). 

Attacking from a nuclear plant makes it "impossible" for the Ukrainians to respond, as they frequently say. Yet rockets and drones continue to attack military and other locations well within the compound, near the reactors and spent fuel storage sites, causing frequent alarm. According to Ukraine, Russia is launching these strikes themselves, attacking the same plant they occupy and attack from, just to escalate their orcish nuclear terrorism, even at the risk of "nuking" their own troops first and foremost.  

Let's start here with a few allegations about shelling incidents on August 5-7. 

Clashing Reports

The latest IAEA report (PDF) relates in its annex 1:

• On 5 August, the ZNPP was targeted in shelling resulting in several explosions near the electrical switchboard of a 750 kV external power supply line that caused the shutdown of the electrical power transformer and two backup transformers. One reactor unit was affected. The emergency protection system of the affected unit was triggered, diesel generators were set in operation to ensure the power supply for this unit. This unit remains disconnected from the grid. 

• On 5 August, renewed shelling hit the area of the ZNPP’s nitrogen-oxygen station. Firefighters quickly extinguished the fire; however, the station required repairs.

Video gets split-off below, but this is brief, just kept here under reports, and so the images are more spread out on the page: https://twitter.com/TpyxaNews/status/1555576435997392900 - smoke near power pylons, unfinished building - composite view:

That's probably south of the main control building and training center, at the south edge of the main complex, facing south onto a massive unfinished building stretching further south along its edge. Google Maps street view, 2015:

So this fire is a bit southeast of the main area. I don't have anything further to say on what happened here. Back to reports and such:

Ukraine's President Zelenskyy responded: "Today, the occupiers created another extremely risky situation for everyone in Europe – they fired on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, twice in one day. This is the largest nuclear power plant on our continent, and any attack on this facility is an open, brazen crime and an act of terror.

Russia must bear responsibility for the very fact of creating a threat to the nuclear power plant. And this is not just another argument in favour of recognizing Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism.

This is an argument in favour of applying tough sanctions against the entire Russian nuclear industry – from Rosatom to all related companies and individuals. This is purely a matter of safety. A country which creates nuclear threats to other nations is definitely not capable of using nuclear technologies safely". (Pravda)

Further attacks came on August 6 and/or 7 - IAEA report (PDF), annex 1, lists attacks on 2 days with enough similarities it sounds like the same story repeated:

• On 6 August, one ZNPP staff member working in the area of the dry spent nuclear fuel storage facility was injured during a new episode of shelling. Ukraine reported that ZNPP staff had restricted access to the ZNPP on-site emergency crisis centre. Communication between the ZNPP and the nuclear regulators was reported to be very limited.

• Shelling on 7 August near the ZNPP’s dry spent fuel storage facility damaged the plant’s external power supply system, injured a Ukrainian security guard, and damaged walls, a roof and windows in the area of the spent fuel storage facility, as well as communication cables that were part of its radiation control system, with a possible impact on the functioning of three radiation detection sensors. A 750 kV high voltage line was shut down as a result of this round of shelling. At the same time, the emergency protection system of reactor Unit 4 was triggered.

This doesn't address who launched the attack(s), but as usual, both sides would blame each other, each seeming to use a different date. The plant managers of Ukrainian nuclear utility Energoatom would report one version dated late on the 6th:

In the evening of August 6, the Russian Federation carried out another missile attack on the site of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and the city of Energodar. "They hit the site of the ZNPP directly next to the Stationary Dry Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SSNF). Apparently, they aimed specifically at the spent nuclear fuel containers that are stored in the open air near the firing sites. 174 containers, each of which contains 24 assemblies of spent nuclear fuel! " - reads the message of "Energoatom". According to him, three radiation monitoring sensors around the SSVYAP site were damaged. "Therefore, timely detection and response in the event of deterioration of the radiation situation or leakage of radiation from containers of spent nuclear fuel is currently impossible," warns Energoatom. (
DW Ukraine on Telegram)

The Russians would report ON the 7th, regarding an attack that might have been the night before. "The administration of Russian-controlled Enerhodar said that Ukrainian forces "launched a strike using a 220-mm Uragan MLRS rocket" towards the ZNPP and that it had "managed to open up and release fragmentation submunitions" while approaching, whereas Ukrainian state-owned plant operator Energatom stated that the Russian forces on 6 August "fired rockets at the site of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and the city of Energodar" hitting next to the ZNPP's facility where spent nuclear fuel is stored. 

https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/ukraine-russia-blame-each-other-for-nuclear-plant-shelling/

Add 9/15: Zveda video of rocket remains, Aug. 7 at 3:00 am: "At night, the Ukrainian Armed Forces struck the Zaporozhye NPP with the use of the Uragan MLRS" The date Aug. 6 is agreed. https://t.me/zvezdanews/88346

If this all of this correlates to one attack, we might see damage from cluster munitions and a spent Uragan engine in the vicinity of the spent fuel storage area. As I explain below, we do see that, and so this probably all correlates. But it comes in two version. Which version is more credible? 

Cameras Not Lying

Rooftop Impacts

As far as I've seen, just the Russian side provided images of the aftermath. One photo comes with that same Euractiv report: "A still image taken a handout video provided by the Russian Defence Ministry's press service shows damage at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station (ZNPP) in Enerhodar, southeastern Ukraine, 7 August 2022. ...


With another Euractiv report, a second photo, apparently taken from the same roof: "A still image taken a handout video provided by the Russian Defence Ministry's press service shows damage at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station (ZNPP) in Enerhodar, southeastern Ukraine, 7 August 2022. [Handout image/EPA/EFE]"

What else is shown in this handout video? I should try and find this. The time on these is mid-morning, consistent enough with events of the preceding day.

Location: not 100% certain, but probably this roof marked in pale blue, roughly 50m west of the spent fuel storage site in question (more than 160 containers lined up in a roofless courtyard). The lines of sight - from the reactor domes, over a wide, near building with a huge smokestack - almost require this is it. The next best fit seems too far out, but is also marked in blue for good measure. (base image: Maxar 8/29 (on Twitter), rotated to app. true north)

The building's details aren't fully clear in satellite views - an external ladder can't be seen clearly, but makes most sense at the NW corner, and might be visible there. The impact by the ladder has a small crater and some fragmentation marks. The other impact is visibly near the SW corner, where a ventilation pipe was damaged. The satellite view doesn't show this object at all, let alone damage to it. 

The damage pattern isn't very clear in either case, and if this is from cluster bombs as reported, they would scatter with their own radial direction from a descending missile or rocket - which might be falling vertically - so their own directional clues don't show the missile or rocket's original direction. 

Rocket Impact

One 220mm Uragan rocket was specified as delivering those bomblets. That's likely the same one seen in this photo - "Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP/File" - unrelated to the August 11 news story it came with, but predating it, and probably just the rocket/missile reported on the 6th/7th. 


The location (explained next) is next to the large spent fuel storage site mentioned - blue-and-yellow panels, gray shack at the gate - over 160 containers inside in satellite views -photo from August 7 with another Euractiv report. And that fits with those reports of the 6th and 7th. 

The fins look like those on a 220mm Uragan as reported. It also looks like a smaller Grad or other kind of MLRS rocket, but the scale seems correct to be 220mm - nearly 9 inches across vs. 4.5" for a Grad. The Uragan is in use by Russia and Ukraine. It's an unguided artillery rocket, which means it should travel on a parabolic arc, and its impact will probably reveal its direction of travel - as it apparently does. https://weaponsystems.net/system/1045-220mm+9M27

Location: views to the north and south pin it ~330m east of reactor 6 's dome, 35m from the gate to spent fuel storage:


Then more exactly on Maxar 8/29 view, rotated to north, + "sharpness" - some extra dirt color may be visible there between the trees, but from space it's not very clear. So here I covered the spot with a crude little sketch of a trench angling alongside these 2 trees nearest the roadway - outer trench and displaced soil in orange and yellow, apparent center of trough = line of travel, marked red. Note how the rocket rests a bit off this line. 

Add 9/15: More updated location - finally seeing a 3rd tree in this outer rows, the satellite view makes more sense. The scale and angle change, but so do the lines between the trees, and these roughly cancel each other out. Trajectory estimate ... yet to re-do, but quite similar to what it was. 

By this, the rocket's tail points to the east or southeast, to Russian-held areas. Flash News Ukraine for one might have known that, or might have just seen the opposite of what a Russian said, which was taken as it came from Ukrainian territory. It's commonly assumed the tailfins will point back to the point of origin, and so the Russian expert's opposite claims are taken by Flash as a joke - he says the rocket turned 180° just before impact! LOL!

I can't make out the few words in Russian, but from the gestures, he seems to say the rocket was spinning until impact, as they're designed to do, and then it bent forward after impact, which is also common enough. At right, one of the improvised rockets used in the 2013 Ghouta sarin attack, with tail bent forward at an angle over its displaced soil. A Uragan is more rigid than this was, but still, he's almost certainly right about what happened. 

As shown above, the soil dispersion is roughly in the same direction as the tail points, But it should be the opposite, if this rocket came from the southeast, as some people think. An air bomb or a missile coming straight down will send dirt evenly in all directions, forming a round crater and a ring of debris around it. But if the thing is moving laterally at all, the blast's residual momentum will add a bit to the spread of debris, displacing the ring of soil a bit forward to form more like a crescent that's "fattest" to the northwest. Instead, we see roughly the opposite.

This impact looks slightly explosive, but may just mechanical - a heavy spent tube angling in after it had dropped its cluster bomb payload, just digging in a ways and displacing some soil with the general shock wave of its impact. That too will be mainly in the forward direction, with very little blown to the sides and none to the back. Yep, that's what we see. 


So the dirt points one way (SE) and the tailfins somewhat the same way - and thus somewhat the opposite way. Soil dispersion is the more fundamental clue here, considering rocket tubes often bend forward on a shallow impact, whereas soil doesn't usually disperse backwards, nor does it usually get moved around to look that way. Therefore, this rocket came - most logically - from the northwest, displacing soil to the southeast, before it presumably bent forward.

And More on the Rocket

I pointed this out in a tweet I forwarded to Flash - "When it arrives, its back keeps moving after the front stops, so it'll flip (and/or spin) forward. That's common. You think it blew out soil 180° backwards? 🇷🇺 violates laws of physics trying to nuke themselves? So smart to catch them?" 

As I would later show it:

Presumably self-appointed, gaslighting gatekeeper K. Johnson - "A Spin of the Wheel" (whoever he really is - I don't care) - and another suspiciously selective expert - JMCSMS with "just under 20 years as weapons tech" - disputed this with varying lucidity. Over and over they insisted I knew nothing, yet agreed with me that usually dirt spreads further in the forward direction: 
"It can be seen the missile threw out dirt/rocks at the front when penetrating the earth. That is probably a combination of blast & the momentum transfer to dirt particles/clumps I was speaking about. The dirt distribution looks much like expected from a grad type detonation." (KJ), "Soil dispersion will be non-uniform because the missile struck at an acute angle to the vertical." (KJ) YES! the difference in angle is NW-SE. It's slight, and perhaps non-explosive, hence the limited spread. 

JMCSMS was less specific, but acknowledged the scene looked "hooky" or "it really doesn't look right" for an impact from the east or southeast, which they both favored. One point raised was "It doesn't look any uxb rocket crater I've come across  - it's too big and elongated." Almost like a dug trench? I agree, and more so the more I look. I don't think there was a detonation at all. If there was - maybe one cluster munition that never fell? Johnson might have mentioned the elongated crater too, but I couldn't relocate it if so. But he did argue against the evident spread he otherwise noted, saying: "Momentum transfer to dirt at the front would likely distribute it further in range, spreading it out more thinly & widely rather than creating a pile right next to the missile body." That could be explained by the dirt being moved around afterwards - OR it being just barely spread by a non-explosive impact.

For his part, JMCSMS steadfastly refused to discuss further until - basically - he had been there himself, by a time machine if necessary, to see the thing as it was, with his toolkit of professional measuring tools. Anything less is just reckless, these gatekeepers pontificate ... whenever they don't like what the evidence has to say.

KJ kept going. He was correct to challenge my starting claim that the rocket engine - seen as short - had "flipped" forward. It would be more embedded and would have to bend to explain what we see, as I soon decided. From there, all he had was a sad effort at gaslighting me. Since the rocket isn't PROVEN to have bent forward, invisibly underground as that would be, he insisted it didn't bend, or at least we should assume that, and so it came from the east. Sage advice from KJ: "The missile is not bent. The dirt has likely been disturbed given the crowd around it. You are wasting your time & looking foolish." 

All the soil ejected to the NW was simply shuffled around, almost 180 degrees! And also I look foolish! Laugh Out Loud there. And at the base, it's been packed under the rocket .. that can't be accidental. In a more lucid frame, he'll suggest the Russians faked it to look like a forward-folded impact from the NW.  And it does look like one! Or it looks "hooky," or however you might put it.

That is physically possible, but it's a pretty stupid conspiracy theory.  Closer views reveal better and better clues that this happened like the Russians say, or they did some quite elaborate staging to cover up - again - their own inherently dubious shelling of the nuclear plant they occupied at the time. 

* note at right how there's a gap between the tube and the packed soil: it bent forward into the dirt as soon as it piled up, packed it on that curve, and finally sprung back a tiny bit when the elastic process was done. 

* the forward hinge on one of the tailfins may have snagged a shallow tree root during plowing and pivoting 

* in the BBC view below, next to the 03:11, roots are pulled forward, and were anchored at that angle when the soil came to rest 

* It's not clear to me if any fins are distorted, or if they should be.


So ... That's the scene and what it says. I can only visually estimate the implied trajectory relative to those trees, but that gives me the red line below, along with a very broad range sure to include the actual trajectory. That Uragan rocket was fired from somewhere in the Nikopol area, or probably nearer to Prydniprovske, or nearby Kamianske or Musiivka - all Ukrainian-held, about 15 km or further to the northwest. 


Combined with the rooftop cluster bomb impacts, I can propose this basic relation. Numerous other explosive impacts are expected in the purple circle, or in a circle or oblong of uncertain size somewhere around there. I've only seen those two.

Update 9/29: more from the Russian MoD video included in some news videos: France 24, Aug. 9 -  WION, Sept. 2.  The impacted roof is seen more fully and looks more like two roofs, one smaller and lower. So I now suspect the vent damage is on the smaller building marked 1, and the other seems to belong where I had it, now numbered 2. 

I can also see 3 impacts on the ground nearby; #3 is along the walkway by the larger building. 
#4 and 5 are impact craters in the grass in front of the guard shack. There are likely 
a couple of others, but just these two are clear. This gives a linear but incomplete area of bomblet dispersion, still all northwest of the rocket shell's impact. 


9/29 later: A new view clarifies the roof impacts are both on the one roof after all. The NW corner hit seen so the whole west wall is visible - at the SW corner, we can see the same outer pipe and matching corner details. The apparent height difference and possible scale differences were illusory, and it's the pink 1 on the above map. Glad I kept it there as a maybe. 

Photo source:  
https://twitter.com/mission_rf/status/1567039319470219265



CNN Turns a Blind Eye to Ukraine's Systematic Shelling of ZNPP

All these clues were present well before CNN would feel compelled, with a 5-author report on August 19, to find nothing that happened on the 5th to 7th as seen above - nor anything between June 19 and August 19 was any big deal, or it wasn't "systematic" enough to worry about, suggesting that it was exaggerated or perhaps made-up by the Russians. Or anyway, it seems like that from outer space.

First on CNN: Satellite images show no signs of "systemic shelling" at nuclear plant despite Putin’s claim

"There are no signs of "systemic shelling" at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, new satellite images from Maxar Technologies show. This counters Friday's claims by Russian President Vladimir Putin that the Ukrainian military was conducting repeated military strikes at the plant."

"The latest satellite images from Maxar Technologies were taken Friday morning. CNN has analyzed a number of satellite images of the nuclear power plant complex located in Enerhodar, Ukraine, and it shows little to no change in damage or destruction since July 19, when a Ukrainian military strike on three tents just under 1,000 feet from one of the nuclear reactors."

I don't think these July 19 images are publicly available to check. If so, I haven't found them yet. But to the extent there's no change, it just as well means no sign of the systematic RUSSIAN-shelling of the Russian-occupied plant alleged by Kiev on several occasions. But really what it shows is secondary to what it misses; photographed roof damage and an embedded rocket engine - at least - actually existed, but as we've seen, they were too small-scale to appear at this resolution. By choosing a view from OUTER SPACE, CNN opted to effectively squint the evidence away. And so they reported how "little to nothing" was actually happening on the ground, among the stored radioactive materials, pipes and devices necessary to avoiding nuclear catastrophe. The flippancy of this report on such a serious subject is essentially criminal.

The damage isn't massive so far, even by now; it's more visible than it was on the 22nd, but still largely invisible from space. But weapons were fired distressingly close to sensitive areas, before and since, several times destabilizing the situation so corrective measures were needed. In the case of the Uragan rocket on August 6/7, it seemingly came from a Ukrainian-held area. As other posts will show, the same hold for at least some other impacts, and perhaps all of them. 

Now, is it systematic? We saw Zelenskyy's response to the August 5 shelling, urging some firm response to Russia's acts of nuclear terrorism and such. An article at EBC Tech, August 7, relates the responses to this Uragan attack from the northwest: "The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi, said that he was “extremely concerned about yesterday’s shelling of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant,"" an act that “highlights the very real danger of a nuclear catastrophe" with global implications.  Grossi called on “all parties” to exercise restraint, and he again insisted on a visit by the IAEA investigative mission to the besieged site. 

As EBC Tech noted and as I think few people realized, "Ukraine opposes the visit by the IAEA mission to the Zaporizhzhia NPP and condemns the idea of ​​a visit to the occupied territories without the consent of the Ukrainian authorities. The Russian invaders actively supported such a visit and even prepared for it." 

Similar reported by BBC, Aug. 3: "The IAEA's director-general said he was trying to put together a mission as soon as possible to visit the plant but this required the approval of both the Ukrainian and Russian sides ...  In June, Ukraine's state nuclear company said Ukraine had not invited the IAEA - and any visit would legitimise Russia's presence there." Al Jazeera, Aug. 8: "In a statement, Russia’s foreign ministry said it wanted the (IAEA) to visit ... but that Kyiv was blocking a potential visit. ... Zakharova also claimed Moscow had done everything it could to facilitate a visit by the UN’s nuclear watchdog to the plant but that Kyiv saw it as “beneficial to keep the IAEA away”." Bloomberg Aug. 8: "Russia told diplomats it’s ready to welcome international monitors" but "Grossi said he needs permission from Ukraine’s government" but he still didn't have it. They would eventually concede, and opinions were starting to shift at this time; "Ukraine’s nuclear utility, Energoatom, wanted "a mission of peacekeepers and experts from the IAEA and other organizations.” They wanted the Russians out, mainly. That plus a site visit was OK by them.

Back to EBC Tech, Aug. 7: The head of Military Administration, Alexander Starukh, is one who would oppose the simple, non-military mission the Russians and IAEA had agreed to. He declared instead “The situation requires a real response, not an expression of concern” nor any Russian-sponsored media stunt to smear the glorious heroes of post-Maidan Ukraine with any on-the-ground facts the IAEA team might discover. 

Kiev had apparently just launched cluster bombs next to the spent fuel storage site, and to that illogical "Russian shelling" of the Russian-occupied plant, the only response they wanted to see was something "real." Direct, international military action against Russia captures the spirit best, but Zelenskyy was pedaling new and "tough" sanctions to cripple Russia's nuclear industry, adding to the measures meant to bring its people finally to their knees.

I think I can make out a system at work behind this, even from this belated and cursory review. 

Wednesday, August 31, 2022

Ghouta Report "Debunk" Efforts: Kostja Throws Some at the Wall

August 31, 2022

(rough, incomplete, flexible)

last update 9/2

For daring to actually challenge our work on the Ghouta chemical massacre, German open-source researcher Kostja Marschke is a relative giant. His efforts outstrip the combined total of all those useless hacks at Bellingcat (whom he emulates - he's not a member), and their weakling allies in and out of Western intelligence agencies. Almost all of these I know of have me block on Twitter, many after zero interaction, and the rest with just a short engagement marked by unsustainably dismissive attitudes on their part. Even as the work has attained some relevance, thanks to Aaron Maté, Saar Wilf and Rootclaim, William VanWagenen and others, the pros like Eliot Higgins have no kind words for our report(s), no specific words, and also as few unkind words as possible. Just a wall of quiet, mainly.

So off the bat kudos to Kostja for not getting that memo, or for having the balls or the cluelessness to even pretend he can debunk our work in its specifics. This allows for a rare challenge our findings always benefit from. So I'll try to give Kostja the benefit of the doubt, mainly, and let the record of flinging and sliding down the wall speak for itself. 

See as needed Monitor on Massacre Marketing: 2021 Ghouta Sarin Attack Reports to explain the subject and its relevance, for the main report and other reference.

Previous Arguments Recap

I noted some of his first arguments in the post Ghouta Reports: First Debunk Efforts. He started with the usual snide, dismissive tone, employed in passing as he announced his refusal to say anything past some insults. The ballistic and video findings so stunned him into saying "I guess we have left the field of evidence now. This is where I leave, too ... There's no real point in engaging much beyond that. Using this video to try and defend Assad is just wishful thinking." 

But for good measure, he did try the standard shortcut of declaring the sarin used was specific to the Syrian government's program, and must have been used by them, whoever fired it from wherever. He pointed to the hexamine link, which I challenged, pointing to my report, Then he complained instead "The more important issue, which is hydrogen fluoride, is not addressed. This is an important bias. This "analysis" was clearly done starting from a conclusion." Maybe I do have such a bias, picked up from J.P. Zanders listing hexamine under "sarin" w/no basis and repeatedly calling it the "principal telltale sign" of regime guilt, Dan Kaszeta calling it a smoking gun for a few random reasons, Eliot Higgins and the NYT et al. repeating that, Kostja Marschke himself leaping straight to it a few tweets back, with no mention of any other chemical clues ... 

A complete answer on this point is still not for me, but I discuss the hexamine issue and the other impurities in the posts A Sarin Blame Shell Game and Whose Hexamine? Report sponsors Rootclaim may know more about that I, but all considered, as they put it: "We addressed sarin composition in our analysis. It indeed increases the probability that the SAA is responsible, but that's of course negligible compared to an actual video showing the opposition carrying [out] the attack right at the intersection of all rocket trajectories."

Put another way, it fails as a shortcut. Islamists DID it, ON VIDEO. That's much stronger than Assad musta diddit, somewhere, because we think it's his sarin. That failed and Kostja eventually decided that if our site match was wrong, there should be plenty of differences to discover, and some specifics were in order to counteract our dangerous findings. The sources were open, and he dove in, and came up with fistfuls.

The Moon is not Visible: In a Twitter thread on our errors, Kostja argued how even if this were our field, "The videos were demonstrably not shot the night of the attack| because "it was a full moon that night, with the moon being clearly visible when looking into southern directions (such as the south-east trajectory the rockets were fired into according to you). ... we know at which direction the camera had to point if your "analysis" was correct. We also know in which direction the moon was visible. But we don't see a full moon, nor any light it shines on the scene. That's because the video does not show the attack."

In the earlier post, I shared others' work on moon position - to the southwest - and considered views of the rockets fired - these are facing pretty much northeast - OPPOSITE of where the moon would be visible. But there is one point where the camera faces anywhere close to the southwest - at the D30 cannon in video 1,  0:30 forward - seeing 2 street lights (were those ever placed?) - probably not looking at quite the right angle or quite high enough to say, except maybe as the shell is fired and the scene is full of smoke. 

As for the moon's ambient light, this probably existed, but it would be invisible on most 2013-era smart phone cameras, at least compared to the floodlight nearby. So this point failed, and it was down to challenging the site identification.

Yellow Vegetation: Soon after my "first debunk efforts" post, Kostja made a breakthrough regarding the vegetation aspect of our site match; even if every detail corresponded, this replica field must be somewhere else with a yellower version of this field's trees and grass. I thought I had at least started a blog post on or including this, but apparently not. Some review from scratch is past due. 

Initial tweet, asking for Eliot Higgins' view: "In a still from the enhanced version of their video, the vegetation is yellow/brown-ish. There are small pieces of vegetation that are also green. Yet in their satellite images of the alleged location, the vegetation is green."


Next, he added "The satellite image is from 3 days after the attack, so the grass didn't turn green in the meantime." And he asked a good question: "Do you think it's the illumination that turns the grass yellow, or do you think the video was shot elsewhere?" 

Higgins replied "I was kinda done debating this one 7 years ago, but that certainly looks yellow to me." He gave no answer to the good question, but he would not want the video filmed where we decided. Lazy fuck had to get back to some video game, I guess. Here's some partial record of where he was happy to leave that "debate."

So I'll answer Kostja's question. Indeed, the light seems key to what we see here - as it is anywhere. The foliage in the videos variously appears black, dark gray, orange and then dull magenta (as seen at right) during rocket ignition, and finally yellow. That's a good one to stop on, since it actually happens in nature. But even sampled later, the exhausts glow seems to have a clear magenta cast to it, I believe you would correct this by shifting light the opposite color - which is green. 

But so far, my efforts to "correct" the grass to green require making everything greenish. And noting there is some green visible, it can't all be from a yellow or magenta cast. Some vegetation is yellower than others. But then notice that the green bits are closer up, farther from that rocket glow. The light here is dimmer, but a mix of exhaust glow, moonlight, and residual floodlight, which might yield a more balanced light than what floods over the grass and trees.

But also let's clarify what we'd be seeing, what span we're looking across in that brief moment. August 23 view on Google Earth, which we'll use heavily in this article - lines of sight from about where we estimate the camera was (may be a bit different), the main green field is under the ignition plume and beyond that, not visible. If we were on the main open platform, we'd look mostly north across bare earth or maybe yellow scrub, like the video shows. But if it's further west like this, some greener vegetation was closest, some big enough to cast shadows, and then pat that we'd see some of that scrub and maybe some of the actual crop.

So accepting that the nearest plants should be green in real life, and noting the very nearest ones even APPEAR green, but seem very few ... I propose in the main view, the ground slopes down just past the platform, and pretty sharply at first, so only the tops of the shrubs at the very edge appear. The rest of that sizeable green stuff angles down out of view, flattens, yields to yellower grass that's soon visible again - some of it's quite tall, with heads illuminated in the magenta view above. 

And I just noticed that by this line-up, there's some other thing past the platform - in red - roughly where there's a thing in the satellite view. See below regarding the size of this thing.

Recent Round of Efforts 

When Aaron Maté bumped the subject on the Ghouta attack's anniversary, to rep. Ro Khanna, there were some who stepped in, Kostja being one - report co-author Michael Kobs engaged him and then he started me off with some general questions for Michael and I. Soon he had "some thoughts on the matter. Hope to write them down soon." Instead he presented them maybe prematurely, with others coming as they occurred to him in rapid succession. I won't be linking most of the tweets, but I think I have the right gist anyway. 

He tried for a better form this go-around. Aug 26 "Look, I clearly take your geolocation effort seriously," and he wouldn't call all of it laughable. But as soon as it seemed possible, he was back to saying things like " I think it's now quite clear that your geolocation project is debunked in its entirety." (Aug. 27). What mighty works allow total refutation of visual research of some actual quality? I've summarized his specific claims in this overview image  - some points here aren't his arguments so much as implications of them, added for smart-ass effect. But the last 6 are his several new or standing lines of argument as I follow, which I'll briefly explain and rebut below. Note 9/2: I mixed up the colors on the last 2: object is dark red, canopy in pink, continuing off the platform.


First, his initial replies to an earlier version of this graphic, select stray points: 

Red: he agreed with the implication. Green: "I think there's white object throwing a shadow," rather than a "burned area" as I said or, put better, a darker, likely burned or smoke-stained area covering some 1/3 of the field. I asked him what that meant, but he didn't answer. I'll disregard that as something confused. Yellow was still "Important point. Will elaborate further." I didn't notice anything to change the analysis above. 

"White: I haven't subscribed to your trajectories." Of course not. Kostja adds his own zero to the total of zero serious refutation of this work the naysayers can provide. None of them can show it wrong because it's right, but for some reason none of them can agree with this best analysis. That's the part I know better, but what Kostja wanted to challenge happens to an area I'm less conversant with; the video - satellite match setting the apparent launch spot.

As I explained to Kostja, most of the work analyzing and modeling the launch spot was done in a long, vigorous process (by direct messages on Twitter) that I was not involved in, as I've said here due to a "social media snafu" that somehow blocked my invitation  from arriving, I thought the work hadn't begun, while Michael Kobs and the others must have thought I was just flaking out on it - so I missed most of that work as I did my own report. I never even saw the main discussion, just the parts copied into a new PM thread Michael started for my benefit. Even now I'm not informed enough to speak for everyone in my responses to the other points - new and specific - covered one-by-one below.

Wall vs. Rise

Marschke's leading point so far is how our matching of fields is ruined by the presence of a wall in the satellite view where we have in the video a "ditch" next to a raised level to the east. Responding to my overview graphic: "Dark Blue: It's very clearly a wall. It casts a shadow with a [width] of almost 1 meter from space & can be clearly seen as a wall in 2012 images" 

In the attack videos, a D30 cannon was situated at the northeast corner of the field , which in one video is approached from the east, through some mid-sized trees and over a line ... distinct, sharp-edged, possibly even concrete, like the lip of a wall, but at ground level - his headlamp light falls across, casting a shadow before illuminating ground further west, making a linear shadow. It doesn't seem wide, but it's foreshortened here. The sun would do the same, whenever it shone from the east. That could be because this ground level is higher than the other. 

A floodlight on the truck in the other field provides the main light. Neither light falls in the ditch, the darkest strip here. Therefore: raised level and a ditch are in the video.  

Most clearly, from the opposite view looking back at the trees - see any view of the rocket launch above -  they have some centimeters of dirt beneath them, on a raised ridge (or "wall") as I first thought, or on a continuous raised level, as we now agree. 

But Kostja thinks there's a shadow-casting wall there in the satellite version. He centers this on a joint impression of 2 walls meeting at a right angle, and then tends to conflate the two a lot. Here I trace one in red and one in pink, Red: he and I are agreed on a wall or narrow earthen berm here with 2-3 shrubs planted along its crest (see Feb. 2012) - it and its shrubs variously cast clear shadows to the north, - but the pink "wall" running south is what matters, and it's debatable at best. 


Like the north mound, the west edge has a brighter-lit apparent crest at the northern start, suggesting it's elevated. All traced in red above right does look like 2 walls. But this seems to fade away quickly for the western wall, as if the mound slopes down to a flatter profile. It would be this flatter part seen in the video - the edge might rise to the north or right, if it were like in the satellite view. And I think it might. Here - about 0:20 in video 1 - the weeds may just be taller, or the ground might rise a bit towards that mighty "wall" - towering atop a RAISED LEVEL, next to a trench or ditch.

Comparing what we see (left) and what Kostja seen (right) - Seen from space and with sun from the right (east), the shadows of these two scenarios should look about the same, especially if the wall were a bit lower. He specified at one point "I don't think it's a high wall, but if it's high enough to throw a shadow on a satellite image," But see, according to us, the rise would cast about the same shadow. So ... what?

The test would be how a wall would also cast a shadow in afternoon sun from the west, while our raised level would not. Unfortunately, between all views in Google Earth, most views have the sun from the southeast or once from straight above, making for shadows running mostly along the possible wall, and a bit to the west... only one view has sun barely from the west and might allow for this test. Kostja located this view, from December, 2017, enhanced view below. "Here, in this image from December 2017, the sunlight comes more from the west - and the shadow is thrown to the east. This is a wall. A ditch doesn't throw shadows." But the "wall" that matters (app. at the pink line here) is long gone by then, although that northern ridge we agree on remains (red). 

KM: "this image posted by Adam really puts the final nail into the coffin of your "elevated area/old foundation"-theories. The sunlight is from the south-west in that view, yet there is still a shadow." East of the pink line? No. This is years after the area was all torn up and rearranged. The ridge marked red remains, but now nothing in particular corresponds with the pink line, and THAT is the line we have video of an Islamist cameraman stepping across.

It's not the red line, or the blue area marked above either. That came up because of an error, I now think, in our main report (PDF) p. 41. We indeed identified that line as being the ditch under discussion. All agree it's a trench (crude topographical cross section in green FWIW). It's not the same as the ditch in question, being in a different spot and not on the same line as it, further from the trees, or about where there had been a "road." - plus it was only dug sometime between the images of August 2013 and January, 2014, where it has a markedly vaginal character - in this 2017 view and in 24 images between it looks much the same - starting at that pin, it's not at the spot we're considering, again marked with a pink line. The only trace of that might remain: what looks like a residual span of ... some kind of ditch.


Kostja, Aug 26 "I don't think mistaking a wall for a ditch on satellite photos is "laughable". I don't think that getting the spot of that wall wrong by 5 meters is "laughable", either. Yet it's still crucial because it implies a mismatch." Indeed, the match shown on page 41 is a "mis" kind. But there's also the separate spot where he sees a "wall" and we see a raised level next to a ditch, some meters north of this brain fart. By the satellite views, just by visuals, seeing a wall or a rise makes enough sense, and I'm not sure either can be ruled out. But to see something so linear that could go either way - right where the video has that instead of regular ground - all in all, that's a match, not a mismatch. 

No Paved Lot

Our analysis includes a paved platform just south of the field, or the main, uncovered part of it - smooth gray, no detail, with a straight, sharp edge that casts a mild shadow in spots, and may have some bushes growing just at its edge, but nowhere on it - here as seen on satellite 2 days after the attack vs. in the video taken, we think, of the attack itself. 

Note the exact span of pavement is probably different in each image, with the video taken further west in the "canopy" area discussed separately below. For now we're discussing this main, rectangular area.

Responding to my overview graphic, Kostja said: "Orange: Plants don't grow on concrete. Plants grew there." In another tweet: "If you go on Gogle Earth Pro and check some historical images of the area (specifically 2012 and 2014), vegetation in that area consistently happens. So either it was [paved] only in 2013, or it wasn't paved at all." Later, to his credit, he would concede ..."I agree that it looks paved in August 2013, but that might just be an optical illusion. It's really hard to tell from satellite images." And for 3 images in a row it has this appearance - Feb. 2013, Aug. 2013, and Jan. 2014, for a span of 11-16 months. But before and after, he says, it was earth with plants on it, so Occam's razor therefore requires it was probably the same all along. 

As I first argued it ... 2012 and before, whatever, but in January 2013 the same area LOOKS concave as if excavated and maybe rimmed with a timber frame in advance of concrete pouring. With a basement? Noting the dig looks rather deep. Hm. In February, it looks filled or covered with concrete, and stays that way to at least January, 2014. After this, by June, it's clearly NOT concrete, with plants growing all over.


But in fact, the vegetation before is pretty debatable, and the smooth lot or platform existed in a very similar form for years, from first usable view in Google Earth in June 2009, and in the 4 sample images from 2012 compiled below. It's worth considering that earth packed like concrete could look the same from space, and maybe fit the video almost as well, except for the audio of heels on pavement (video 2, 0:45). 

The two dark spots along the edge have never been clarified - we've taken them for bushes, but they might be something more solid and permanent - perhaps a permanent absence: two drainage pits? Whatever these are, the suggested green seems to center around these, especially the one on the right. From space, it's hard to say if this is some vegetation that comes and goes or something else like a puddle that forms after heavy rain, etc. In May, it looks suddenly overgrown. The same happened in May, 2011. It's a seasonal thing. This is an issue with little to no no sign in the 2013 pavement, even as these dots remain. But then there's no view for May.

All this might suggest a dirt or gravel lot in 2012 and before, or a concrete lot with problems that might explain why it was briefly re-paved. Why that was again undone in 2014 is a remaining mystery. It seems possible to me that clues of the chemical attack remained, and this all represents some kind of cleanup. Otherwise, any of a few more mundane reasons could account for the change. As everything else stands, this question is no basis to rule a mismatch.

No Tree 2

Next, we turn to the trees east of the "wall" or on the raised level east of the launch field, Marschke disputed two of these trees, then just what we called tree 2, the northernmost one. Responding to my overview graphic: Purple: "Trees" don't disappear in winter & "Trees" have shadows. This doesn't." 


Actually, deciduous trees can seem to disappear in the winter, as viewed from outer space. With the leaves all gone, its branches can easily be invisible, and the trunk might vanish too, or might appear as a faint dot, etc. Slender shadows not appearing is even less strange. 

Here I circled tree 2 in yellow, in February (top) and August, (below), showing how it might cast a shadow (white line) despite being invisible (green), maybe due to its light-colored bark. 

In Google Earth views, every winter it vanished and then comes back in the spring. He proposed instead this was an oval-shaped plot of crops planted every spring, or - since crops are usually grown in rectangular plots - some low-level deciduous shrub. If it were tall enough, you'd call that a tree, but he rules out tree height because it casts no shadow across the "wall" just north of it. There is some shadow right up TO that mound, and maybe a little up its side, seen here foreshortened, and maybe even at its crest, but washed out due to the higher reflectivity here. But at the crest of the "wall" there's no sign. 

But where there's no wall to cut off the shadow, it runs wider, on scale with other apparent trees, as shown in the 2 views below. Top view: sun from the usual southeast, wall cut-off (red) - reflective and raised sidewalk cuts the shadow of the building's roofline (blue), as I suggest that wall does for the tree's shadow - bottom view: sun from straight above, seen from the south - the wall doesn't matter here - fully tree-sized shadow beneath tree 2 - here called tree 1, oops - which is clearly a tree, not some oval of tall crops.  It's one of those our Islamist cameraman walked past as he came to film the launching of the Ghouta chemical attack.
Missing Canopy 
What we've been calling a "canopy" over the western part of the concrete platform - it seems to narrow and turn a grayer color, while more beige concrete is seen in the video - I don't think the point was agreed - not explained in the report that I saw, but labeled on page 40, and included in several of Michael Kobs' 3D models, like on pages 45 and 48. This was decided on just from satellite views, with questions I'm still sick of hashing over - what casts a shadow on what, what's a building, a canopy, a platform, a ramp, what's shadow or vegetation, or plants on a downslope or what ... 

I tended to agree some cover is how the platform continues here, but looks different from space ...  But the more I compare views today, the more I doubt this and suspect it's always been pavement, just a different color and shape, and the video's beige color is - surprise! - a bit misleading. So far, I still can't explain everything with one 3D answer, but I'm all right with that. So to start, I'm not wedded to our prior conclusions on this point. 

Kostja thinks the video proves there is no such canopy, and I would be fine with that. But even here, the evidence is inconclusive. He assumes its corners must have vertical supports and these would appear in the video, but they don't appear so they weren't there. But as one of Michael's 3D models of the view shows, the video view at launch is approximately in the red box here, and excludes this canopy and any supports. The view tracking the rocket up also seems set to miss it (to say for sure is very tricky). Furthermore, as I show in yellow, there might have been horizontal braces instead or, depending on the material, other ways of keeping a canopy up. In fact Michael modeled it with horizontal braces.
 

Beneath that model view is another view Kostja noticed, from the actual videos, a different moment, where the truck cab is visible. According to the above model with its green lines, one vertical support should be visible here, but up to the frame's edge (red), it's not visible. This can have 4 explanations: the model is a bit off and the support is just off frame - there's no vertical support, but some other kind - there's no canopy, but our site match is correct anyway - there's no canopy and it means we got the whole site match wrong. Kostja takes option 4, and I'll take any other. As noted, I'm leaning to 3 right now, but that was different yesterday and might change again. 

Rectangular Object Too Small

In the last image above, I traced a red box and possible platform edge to go under the canopy. Now we turn to that rectangular object. He can see it lining up with a wheel of the loading truck - or perhaps not the right one. "That object doesn't even have 20% of the wheels height. You think that is visible from space?" He might have meant the lower of 2 black rectangles shown here. 


The other rectangle - if it starts at ground level - appears at least as big as the wheel, but it looks bigger in comparison because it's closer. We had noticed this larger one, and taken it as the boxy object along the platform's edge, helping confirm the location and set the line of sight. The smaller one may be the edge of a raised part of the platform, as I sketch it below in 2 possible spots, or maybe it's part of the object, as noted above, possibly glimpsed at rocket launch. See how its shadow seems to extend at the west end, nearly filling the space between blue lines. That's what the other rectangle does.   

FWIW this object may have been movable and moved. It - or something about the same size, but perhaps whiter - first appeared in mid-2012 a bit out in the field (see above under "no paved lot") It's moved to this spot by January, and stays there in February and August. There's no sign it was moved in between views, but it could have been, and that might explain any difference in the view (if that comes up).

What is it? I don't get out much, but maybe an electric generator? to run whatever, like floodlights, or a pump to manage the seasonal flooding?

Review

Vegetation color: likely down to just the nature of the light 

- Wall vs. rise: not testable, but that unclear linear feature appearing just where the video has one is a general match 

- Unpaved lot: pre-2013 vegetation is unclear, maybe consistent with prior paving, and either way, there are signs of new concrete work in 2013 to go with the following appearance of concrete, regardless of how it looked in mid-2014 and later 

- Tree 2: plain stupid. Tree shape and color, casting a tree-height shadow, seeming to "vanish" in the winter all says deciduous tree. 

- Missing canopy: not terribly relevant, but some good points raised, and he might even be right - on the absence of a canopy, not on that mattering.

- Object too small: evidently wrong, and likely just momentary confusion he already abandoned of his own accord. The presence of such an object, on the other hand, is one of the many strong points in our matching of this field to the one in that video of the Ghouta false-flag chemical attack. 

There were some other passing quibbles and maybe a few serious arguments I missed in all the noise. But these six alleged mismatches have all failed. A review of them has helped identify one relevant error, and to question another finding of middling relevance. Along the way, I - with Kostja's help - might have improved the site match in a few ways (depending how my new thoughts stand up to scrutiny). This might be why the true professionals refuse to engage our work seriously, and leave Marschke a relative giant among the turd-hurtlers. Nothing kills it, every challenge just makes it stronger, and any informed observer should know why that is. The "expert" response will continue to be ignore these findings, claiming they don't matter, it was a long time ago, etc.