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Sunday, February 25, 2018

Ian Wilkie Sarin Articles Review

Feb. 25, 2018
(rough, incomplete)
updated 2/25

Newsweek recently ran not one but two opinion pieces by Ian Wilkie, described as an international lawyer, terrorism expert, and risk analyst who claims to be a CW expert to some degree, commenting on Syria sarin allegations. These made some waves but that I didn't notice right away. First I saw this the other day: Where’s the Evidence Assad Used Sarin Gas On His People? (Feb. 17) On first review I found parts of it exciting and others good. Then I saw his earlier piece along the same lines (Now Mattis Admits There Was No Evidence Assad Used Poison Gas on His People, Feb. 8) and some reviews, and consider it a mixed offering.

Scott Lucas at EAWorldview refers to the earlier piece, calling it "one of the worst pieces published about Syria’s 83-month conflict." Lucas mainly cites an analysis by Eliot Higgins over at Bellingcat that's at least as mixed in its worth. I'll consider this here as I do my own belated review of both of Wilkie's Newswwek articles and Higgins' review. Wilkie makes a number of valid points, especially in the second article. But as Higgins shows, he makes some serious errors as well. Let's start with these.

Misreporting Mattis: Wilkie writes:
"Secretary of Defense James Mattis made it very clear recently that “aid groups and others” had provided the U.S. with evidence that was insufficient to conclude that President Bashar Assad had recently used the chemical weapon Sarin against Syrian civilians. In other words, the Pentagon does not believe what has been presented to it as evidence, chiefly because of the dubious provenance of the providers."

This is read as including at the time of the "recent" Khyan Sheikhoun attack in April of last year. That would be a strange admission I wouldn't expect, even from a Trump appointee and especially after Trump ordered missil strikes in response to that incident. It turns out he didn't make any such admission. In the full statements, he was asked to clarify the point and did - he says the Syrian government used sarin in 2013 ("in the previous administration, when they were caught using it") and then despite apparently giving up their CW program, "they used (sarin) again during our administration." (CNN report, Defense transcript) He also said "groups on the ground, NGOs, fighters on the ground have said that Sarin has been used ... We are looking for evidence. I don't have evidence credible or uncredible." That was referring to newer allegations of sarin use since Khan Sheikhoun, branching off of a discussion of recent reports of chlorine attacks in the last weeks. It does show that reports of sarin attacks - which have been lodged recently - aren't always borne out by the evidence to the military's liking, for what that's worth.

Mattis should have said there's no good evidence for any use, but - little surprise - the functionary of the US military-industrial complex did not say that. But strangely, Wilkie uses the same characterization in both versions, despite Higgins' explanation intervening. And many have recycled the reading as true - Mattis has leaked the truth of no evidence (for example here). So we have a bad launch point for this review and some people led astray, but there are some valid points still worth considering...

Misreporting Del Ponte: In his first article but not the second, Wilkie writes:
“Chemical weapons are abhorrent and illegal, and no one knows this more than Carla Del Ponte. She, however, was unable to fulfill her U.N. Joint Investigative Mechanism mandate in Syria and withdrew in protest over the United States refusing to fully investigate allegations of chemical weapons use by “rebels” (jihadis) allied with the American effort to oust President Assad (including the use of Sarin by anti-Assad rebels).”
It's true she's blamed rebels and not the government for sarin use, back in mid-2013, and later quit the investigation in 2017. But I could find no sign of a connection when I looked, and she publicly blames Syria now, despite prior statements. She'd say both sides have used CWs but mainly the government, and she's strange. Higgins gives a few juicy counter-quotes of her blaming the government and citing Russia's obstruction of "justice" as her reason for quitting. Score one more against Wilkie.



Phosphine? Gareth Porter's valuable work is cited by Wilkie, but not one of the better parts of it. As Higgins notes "Gareth Porter’s article relies heavily on ignoring the tests by the OPCW that detected Sarin in samples from both the impact site, and the indications of Sarin use from biological samples taken from victims." No, in fact he acknowledges the tests, just not that they detected sarin. He relied on noting that but that it was called "sarin or a sarin-like substance," taking it as maybe not very sarin-like at all, and maybe phosphine. (see here, AlterNet gray zone)

But that was wrong. He spoke to unnamed experts, who are presumably valid, but  didn't know the more recent developments in testing (not that recent either - the fluoride ion reactivation test has been used since 1998 or so) - allowing for precise identification down to just a few chemicals, not including phosphine or any other likely poison. (see this reflected two ways in my review, with the updated top part winning). This test, along with others, was reportedly used in both the Ghouta and Khan Sheikhoun attack investigations.

So yes, they found sarin, not phosphine. How much, what kind, and how it got there are still unknown. It's not clear if it's the main thing that killed people, nor that it's what people saw and smelled and videos show as a whitish fog over the town. All we know is it's in environmental samples (Terrorists can release sarin for real, soil and debris can be tainted to mimic a release), and biological samples/test subjects. As it so happens, the OPCW has made it so fake survivors can test positive with just a few molecules of sarin in their blood - a fairly safe method of fakery. they don't ask about amounts and just collect possibly meaningless positive results. (see here)

So sarin turning up doesn't prove much of anything in itself, except that there was sarin involved. Someone has it, and someone - likely with some rational motive - is somehow getting it into the people of Syria.

Strong Points
Now onto some of the wheat buried in the chaff:
Wilkie describes himself as "as a counter-terrorism practitioner and cleared contractor" with prior military training against CW use, nowa terrorism expert "well versed in their technical characteristics to the point that the former Central Intelligence Agency Counter-WMD chief has interviewed me on the record about chemical and other WMD."  He's "working on a book about the potential uses of WMD by terrorists entitled "Checkmate: Jihad's Endgame.""

Regarding his early training, he calls "Tabun and VX, ... even more lethal than Sarin" As I hear it, he's mixed up here - VX is more deadly than sarin, but Tabun is less deadly. It's a small point - possibly just a little sloppy there, and still valid expertise with important points to make.

Impure Sarin: Wilkie writes:
"MilSpec Sarin is clear, odorless and invisible. The “Sarin events” in Ghouta and Khan Sheikhoun  did not employ military-grade Sarin munitions. They produced dirty yellow, chlorine-smelling  clouds, which suggest either: (a) manufacture by other than scientists of the Syrian Scientific Research Council or (b) an “accidental” bomb drop that hit stored chemicals on the ground, but not (c) delivery of military grade munitions against rebel military targets."
This has been an area of interest to me, of course. I still can't say for sure if Syria's military sarin was pure (MilSpec or military grade), but most likely. If so, it would be colorless and odorless like water. In a vapor it wouldn't be invisible, but white like fog. No one has claims a clear link to Syria's military sarin, as surrendered and surely profiled. Certainly no one has claimed that Syria made dirty sarin with the properties described. But as far as I know, they could field impure sarin, either as their regular method, or to "frame" the "rebels." The other side would use impure sarin almost certainly (if they could use any, and had to make it themselves).

So the point can't be certain, but impure suggesting rebels, they are suggested. The stuff recovered after attacks from 2013 forward is only 60% pure, according to French intelligence (re: Saraqeb, 4-29-13). Russian intel calls it impure "cottage industry" sarin lacking stabilizers, made by terrorists and delivered in a locally-made rocket (re; Khan al-Assal, 3-19-13). And the nature of the impurities can be mapped, as Wilkie partly does. My analysis of all known incidents of verified or likely sarin use (29 cases from December 2012 until last year - any newer cases worth listing - and I doubt it - haven't been yet) is a useful reference that goes further.

Wilkie describes a chlorine smell in Khan Sheikhoun, but I'm not aware of any such reports.
<add later on 2/25>This was reported in the JIM final report that I didn't notice or forgot about (thanks to Andrew, via comment):
"70.... In addition, open sources reported that chlorine might also have been released, as indicated by the smell of bleach. While the Mechanism could not rule out the possibility of the use of chlorine, it focused its investigative efforts on the use of sarin"
This is strange - there are some claims (see here) that the bombs (4 chemical ones) contained sarin and chlorine - which should not mix well, and basically cancel each other out. How else chlorine was also released would be a hard question to answer. But still, this is a smell reported in addition to other smells, not instead of them.</end 2/25>

From what I've seen, in this attack especially and in general, the smell is more often reported as (in order of frequency) foul, strange/hard to place, like some organic decay. It tends to be described as pale yellow to white in color as Wilkie notes, which is a another problem. It's also reported as caustic and irritating to eyes, lungs, and skin., as he didn't note So it's similar to chlorine in description, except for the smell, and for the sarin-like symptoms that are inconsistent with chlorine: paralysis/seizures, miosis, loss of consciousness, frequent death, and secondary contamination.

Some cases that seem to be sarin - but not KS that I know - have chlorine smell reported, possibly in confusion (for example Khan al-Assal, 3-19-13, with prominent chlorine worries coloring perceptions) or because there are two or more varieties of sarin or possibly another poison involved in the various cases. At least once case involves blue smoke instead of yellow. But the broad, prevailing description as lodged by people from both sides - opposition witnesses and soldiers and civilians in government-held areas - yellow, caustic, foul-smelling.

General Lack of Evidence: 
Wilkie

"If America did, for example as it alleges in an official White House report, have evidence it calls "our information" regarding the Shayrat airbase “Sarin attack” being prepared, then why not show this?
The intelligence community was more than willing to show Khrushchev’s missiles, but they have no ability to share evidence with the public about Assad today? This defies credulity and calls the "evidence” provided in the White House memorandum into question."

Indeed - in fact, Shayrat's supposed preparations - if they existed - would be ultimately to one or another of the two jets blamed for the attack. And as I noted, those can be proven to not connect to the ground events. In fact the only evidence yet provided linking that base or any preparations, is what allows us to see that they can't possibly connect. Ha! 

As I've explained elsewhere several times, radar records from US or allied radar were shown at a military press conference. The track shown is inexact but not distorted, once mapped out, and is probably reliable. It shows that only one of the two blamed jets passed anywhere near the town, and even that's too far off to matter - at least 3 km south of the sarin impact (5km according to the JIM, who verified the track with another nation's records), and almost as far south of most other bomb impacts. Below is an approximate mapping, deliberately fudged a bit north to be more than fair. 




And it was flying roughly west-to-east (unless I read it backwards, then w-e), so its trajectory can't help a bomb drift north as it falls - it'll fall almost straight down with a slant to the east (or E-SE). If so it would be dropped some ways back on that red line, have a lot of forward drift (probably more than possible), and a lot of time for ... something ... to push it far north as well. Only wind can explain any north drift - and no wind can explain 3-5 km of it (or even likely the lesser amount required if dropped earlier).


Therefore, it's highly debatable if not impossible that these jets can have anything to do with the impacts. In fact, the sarin spot and the two northern impacts have damage patterns suggesting they were hit by rockets fired from the north, not bombs slating in from the south (this still needs a clearer explanation somewhere... some of it's included/buried here and maybe visible in the crater images here).

"Russia and Syria offered the U.S. and U.N. investigators access to the Shayrat airbase, but inspectors refused to go and take samples." 

I believe they went later and found nothing, but it's not clear they'd know exactly where to look. A lack of looking or of finding is worthy of note, but not conclusive. More important to me is the disconnect with the jets the rules out the relevance of anything one might find at that base. 

Other General Points Higgins Didn't Address
not covered: impure sarin clues, policy of Taqiyya, western eagerness to use bogus CW claims for regime change efforts, improper collection by biased Islamist groups, ... extreme lack of motive...

"Chemical weapons (CW) are ghastly, immoral and a red line since even before that term was made popular. The impetus to use chemical weapons is not a strong one since the world will not sit idly by when people anywhere are killed like poisoned rats. President Assad knows this. He is under the gun, as it were, and under the glare of thousands of cameras. His motivation not to use CW is immense."

True! But as usual, we hear that our enemies are suicidal morons, besides pure evil.  The anti-motive got more immense right before he allegedly used them in 2013, exactly one year after Obama issued his "red line" threat-offer, and just as UN-OPCW investigators had landed in Damascus, at Syria's invitation...to investigate Khan al-Assal.  that was the moment he chose to kill over 1,000 innocents right next to those inspectors, so they couldn't get to Khan al-Assal, having to investigate the huge sarin attack that almost got Syria bombed instead. Obviously!  


"The best way to analyze chemical weapons events in Syria is to try to discern who is providing evidence, why they are presenting evidence and what that evidence comprises."

Yes, exactly!

"Since the United States’ false Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) presentation in the U.N. Security Council led to an illegal, unjustified war in Iraq, it is only prudent to question the motivations of people accusing others of WMD war crimes and demanding regime change based on these allegations."

True!

The evidence comes from
"regime change boosters such as the White Helmets (a UK government-backed, soldier-founded medical charity”), the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (a one-man propaganda shop whose founder is in contact with multiple Islamic State commanders) and tiny bellingcat who made an obvious call on MH17 and used that investigative “coup” to push for yet more interference in the affairs of nations deemed overly pro-Russian or pro-Iran."
"Never once have these propagandists analyzed evidence objectively, preferring to shoot the messengers such as myself by making ridiculous comparisons to tragedies like the Sandy Hook school shooting in America and misguided theories surrounding them."

Conspiracy theorist ... everyone knows this was a conspiracy by Assad and Russia to screw up trump's stated non-intervention policy, by using an identifiable sarin bomb and making it slant way north and release sarin that pushes exactly upwind to kill too many people with the wrong symptoms, in places rebels chose to not let us see. That's the real conspiracy crying for justice. Anything else is just a theory and presumed loony because das komissar's investigators did not report it as fact.

"The importance of the evidence source is critical in Syria because the jihadis arrayed against Assad ascribe to a doctrine of deception called taqiyya. Taqiyya fully supports and condones behavior such as chemical weapons “false flags” to gain advantage against infidel enemies on the ground."

True and always ignore by Higins and co. I don't think I've ever used that term Taqiyya, but I've heard it around and the concept is central to my work. Wahabbi-inspired Sunni Islamists feel authorized to lie to infidels (anyone watching the news in some minds) besides to kill, kidnap, rape, and abuse them in any way they please, as God's chosen people. They lie like they breathe. I wish they did less of both. 

If we're lucky, and we often are with these idiots, the liars will make mistakes in their story-writing that prove it to be a fabrication. They might blame jets that were too far away, having no other jets to blame. And they might make other mistakes, like 'pulling a Postol' - they get a correct wind reading - FROM the southwest - and use that to map their story with a fancy spread of victims and stories as if the wind were blowing TO the southwest. I think we were that lucky. The green range below is a well-centered estimate from correlating all video views of smoke plume and especially ground fog drift - all but a few signs clearly agree on a northeast direction (from the southwest), with the couple of counter-clues having explanations within that. (see here). Purple is what the opposition and its supporters say, later verified many times as their story, and that of several teary-eyed locals recounting what must be fake stories told on video as they walk to locales geo-located in the purple zone. In fact this case stands out for the clarity of the mapping provided or made available and its consistency in suggesting a certain sarin spread. It's not usually this clear at all. 
They aren't just wrong but 180 degrees wrong, which is interesting in its ease of achievement. See the often-brilliant Dr. Postol explaining how he did it here. The direction he first read backwards (from taken as to) was a valueless prediction, by the way, so both his southeast and northwest directions lack a sound basis. His observation elsewhere that the video shows partly east is correct, but he's not sure the video is from this day, since it clashes with records...).



... and a bunch of good points like these Wilkie didn't even know to make, like the compelling clues that the victims in Khan Sheikhoun were actually hostages of the Islamist forces, passed off with false identities after their chemical extermination. See my article at The Indicter for a good starter. 

A point I'm glad he skipped: the overplayed early hospital admissions claim. This sound good - dozens of patients admitted too several hospitals or rebel clinics, often far away and all too early, before the attack even happened, up to about an hour before and continuing for perhaps not as long as it should after the event. This is possible, but the time difference of just about an hour, and the total lack of reports or images from this hour time-frame makes me wonder. If it's real, wouldn't there be some sign of it, some hint we would have picked up on? ("We" collectively have looked at the record in a lot of detail - Qoppa999 is a good part of we and agrees there was never any hint of this missing hour of admissions like too-early videos nor tweets. So I wonder... did it ever exist?

Is this a record of the first few dozen admitted in the first hour AFTER the planned false-flag incident? Did someone just mess up the times on a batch of hospital records, shifting the time back? That could be accidental, but reasons aren't clear (little reason for DST confusion so late, no time conflict with Turkey at the time) ... and it could be purposeful, to give us a false lead and distract us from better leads. Or maybe they screwed up very badly, and gassed about half or more of their victims an hour before the jet ever passed nearby, left the records of that and handed them to the CoI who mentioned it.

I know they screwed up some things very badly, but still ... not everything, I should think. I propose caution with that point, and don't put any of my own weight on it, even as I refuse to rule it out entirely.

Mixed Points and Higgins Fails
Volcano rockets: The rockets used in the 2013 Ghouta attack, Wilkie feels, are a "type favored by insurgents. Higgins is partly right to say this is "totally untrue." The type of rocket used, known as the “Volcano rocket” has been well-documented, and is known to come in two types, explosive and chemical. The chemical variant of the munition has been documented at not only the impact sites of the August 21st 2013 Sarin attacks, but in previous attacks against opposition areas and positions as well."

That's not really known. It's a fair enough reading though: red letters correspond to alleged sarin use, but sometimes suggest FAE detonation instead... It's also seen on video fired by guys in uniforms, who could be genuine military or costumed imposters/defectors. Same applies to a video of guys dressed a Jaish al-Islam militants in gas masks, firing the same things on what they say is the night/morning of August 21. Is that too obvious to be them, or too obviously too obvious to not be them sowing just that image? ("we was clearly framed!") I'm still not sure if the military has these or doesn't, or Jaish al-Islam does or doesn't. They were fired from an area either side could access. Motive 100% favors the Islamists over the government, for reasons most people actually know and just ignore.

Interestingly, the Islamist opposition people documenting a prior use of the Volcano rocket in Adra seem capable of applying fresh nerve agent to a dog just for the sickening visual effect. (see here) 

No KS Visit: "Likewise, Khan Sheikhoun was deemed too dangerous to inspect, even though American and English “experts” were in regular contact with the White Helmets on the ground, one of whom, Dr. Shajul Islam, is an accused kidnapper of Westerners." Suggestive juxtaposition, but worthwhile. Maybe it's a fear of kidnapping or dying themselves in a false-flag chemical or "regime sniper" attack (ie a tacit admission that terrorists move freely in the western-sponsored "liberated" areas). I would be. Either that, or they don't want to investigate and this is the excuse...

But they say it's ... "yeah kidnapping and stuff in part, but mainly because anywhere rebel-held is dangerous, barrel bombed by Assad, shelled, snipered, gas-attacked, Shabiha-masacred, etc. on a daily basis." (paraphrase) It is unsafe, and it's hard to prove this is not their real worry. And further, an on-site visit is no magic key to getting the true story anyway. Sites can be tampered with and witnesses can lies. Investigators can consider this or not as they decide what to frame as fact. It can be very helpful in the right hands, but the hands here may not be so right. 

Sarin Persistence: Wilkie: "these people would all be dead if they had come into contact with real military-grade Sarin." I take this as a point that may be valid but is too unclear to put much weight on - I feel it's overrated.

But Higgins' response isn't that great either. He notes that sarin evaporates relatively quickly, but it depends on temperature. In fact pure sarin will spread and evaporate just like water. It will spread as a fog of droplets, dampen what it can, then evaporate like dew would. (impure sarin would act like this, mixed with ... whatever taints it - harder to say.) Sarin fails badly in outdoor attacks at noon in the summer, but works in early morning events like this. "According to local weather reports, the temperature in Khan Sheikhoun on the day of the attack would have started at 7°C and raised to 23°C," Higgins decided. I'll have to check, but by "local reports" he probably means online localized predictions, either from reliable reports of wind and temperature (at somewhat nearby airports, at the top of the nearest hour, etc.), or from historical trends prediction, depending. Such records are very limited in their usefulness.

Video of the event is more reliable, if it offers clues. It does. The air at the cave hospital is unusually shielded from the sun, so should be a bit colder than average. Here, it's cold enough people are shivering and you can see their breath on video. That's probably about 4 or 5 degrees celsius or below, not 7+. Any evaporation here would be at that rate. That's at about 7-7:45 am, within an hour of the incident around 6:45.

Still, Higgins' 7 degrees is better than the CoI's call; "Data  based  on  historical  weather  forecasts" (the less reliable method) suggested to them "the  wind  speed  was  just over three kilometres per hour from the southeast, that there was no rain and practically no cloud cover, and that the temperature was around 13 degree Celsius." Duh.

Higgins used a graph from a Norwegian study - valid as far as I know but its exactitude and authority aren't certain. By this, at 15 Celsius ("summer"), sarin evaporates within 30 minutes. But at -10 Celsius ("winter"), it takes 8 hours. We're looking at around 5 (not 7, and not 13). I'm not sure how accurate the chart is or how to calculate a middle time, but 4-5 degrees should be a bit closer to 30 minutes than to 8 hours, but pretty much in the middle. Maybe 3-3.5 hours persistency? And decreasing a bit during that time as it warmed, to come out less in the end. 2.5-3 hours?


At the Al-Rahma cave "hospital," (Islamist death center) people exposed are hosed off some, but then handled with bare hands by people standing in the rinse in sandals, all seeming to suffer no ill-effects. This is from minutes to about an hour after the attack. I have this scene at right of apparent faker Abdelhamid al-Youself being helped up timed to around 7:30 am (see here - this photo is probably 7:33 or so) Yousef says he ran through three different sarin-affected area across town to find nearly everyone else in his extended family dead, before he... passed out. Here we can see he (almost certainly, by visual details) was getting up again about 45 minutes after the attack, safe to handle. A few hours later, he finally checked on his own wife and kids...

That's all troubling, but the rinsing makes it seem at least distantly possible. It wouldn't likely convince even a well-informed investigator inclined to believe the opposition story. Sometimes it seems nothing can convince anyone of anything new.... 


Less troubling are the appearances of unprotected people at and even in the crater with no protection. These are seen starting around 9 am, and mainly around mid-day and later. I'm rusty on the exact details of that. Most such footage is from hours later after the temperature warmed, or even from the following day. And further, I see suggestions of wetness in a spray pattern to the south and a wiggle to the north, like from a dripping hose moving back and forth as a truck slowly moved down the road. This suggests the crater area was hosed down after the event, which would disrupt the evidence, and spread the contamination. But it would also lessen the danger in any one spot, and speed up the evaporation by spreading it out.

By and large and long before these articles by Wilkie, these appearances of unprotected people are cited as if they should be dead, but that's not true or at least not certain. The fancy hazmat suits professionals wear would be precautionary overkill, not necessary for survival to anyone with common sense and the luck to avoid a surprise encounter with the initial deadly fog.

To make such an argument more solid, get specific: For example, identify a time-stamped and/or solar-timed too-early image of someone sticking their unprotected hands into shaded soil that seems splashed by the blue-black-seeming fluid around the crater taken as the sarin. Depending on the time and exact science, that could come close to disproving sarin. Sandaled feet with no socks inside the crater would remain dangerous ... not sure how long. I'd stay out all day to be sure, or get socks and watch my toes... Someone walking on the surface up to the crater and breathing the air even with no mask is probably no issue even just an hour later. Unless they're completely barefoot. 

I haven't tried much to pin down such points of proof. I couldn't well call just where on the troubling spectrum each scene would fall. How early is too early? Does this oily-looking blue-black stuff evaporate slower than water? Most others can't do this either, so you can't just see a lack of hazmat gear or even sandals entering a sarin area ever as a clear basis to cry foul.


Regime Chemical Fingerprint: Higgins: "Porter does not address a key piece of evidence, that chemical tests by the OPCW show that not only Sarin was used, but it had marker chemicals that linked it to the chemical weapon stockpiles of the Syrian government." Generally speaking, there is no chemical fingerprint that can prove whose it was. A method can be adduced, but well-informed people could copy or simulate someone else's recipe. As noted, no one has linked the obvious impurities to Syria's stocks, just Regime chemical fingerprint to other attacks using this dirty sarin, all of which have the same clues suggesting terrorist authorship, none of which have been answered. They're not clear precedents to call on to prove each other, but they're treated like that anyway. 

Soviet CW Bomb: Higgins says analysis by Porter and Wilkie "ignores that objects recovered from the Khan Sheikhoun craters matched filling caps from Syrian airdropped chemical bombs:" Higgins still pushes this? They looked at the cap inside out to make this dubious call of an easily identifiable CW-specific bomb the USSR apparently never exported. Here's his Bellingcat associate Timmi Allen showing that finding, having it rebutted, and having no answer.

HRW passed this on with no improvements in their report, and later the JIM investigators argued the remnants looked like parts of "a  Soviet-era  chemical  bomb. ... Although  the  Commission  is  unable  to  determine  the  exact  type  of chemical  bomb  used,  the  parts  are  consistent  with  sarin  bombs  produced  by  the  former Soviet Union in the 250kg-class of bombs." (see here) That's probably a veiled reference to the same debunked Bellingcat claim it was a KhAB-250 (250 kg). Later in their final report, the CoI considers less clearly that the debris was somehow "uniquely consistent with Syrian chemical aerial bombs." They don't explain their reasoning or specify a model or a source, but it's likely the same earlier finding just stumbling head like the zombie of a well-built football player. Higgins now cites this second JIM mystery statement as the reason he now thinks this was a regime bomb - not specifically what he and friends said at first, to which the JIM probably referred...

Also, whatever it is (could be a plug/cap from any number of weapons), it appears planted in the crater. Most other munition debris is unseen, probably removed as incriminating. They have just 2 pieces that happened to land right inside the crater, as if to clarify themselves? Either way, to wind up at this spot, any sarin bomb CANNOT have fallen out of a jet 3km south of town. It got there some other way. Maybe it was welded onto a rocket tube and fired from the north? Or simply planted.

At this point, it's unclear why Higgins is complaining that people ignore this regime sarin bomb remnants claim. If I were him, I'd be happy to let this failure go into quiet retirement.

Sunday, February 11, 2018

Gu Dar Pyin Massacre: Mass Grave Location

February 11, 2018
rough, incomplete

Background (may move and expand)
As I was wrapping up part III of Fake News and Massacre Marketing in the Rohingya Crisis for The Indicter, a new massacre story emerged and got a  decent starting analysis at the end of section 3.5. In review, ...
This cites an AP report of Feb. 1 By Foster Klug heralded: “AP confirms 5 unreported Myanmar mass graves” http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/ap-confirms-previously-unreported-myanmar-mass-graves-52755289 – Version with video: http://www.chron.com/news/crime/article/AP-confirms-5-previously-unreported-Myanmar-mass-12541732.php
at least 75 and perhaps 400 people were killed, innocent Muslims butchered by bloodthirsty Buddhists here in GuDar Pyin. But only so many (unclear) had been found in mass graves, some with faces and flesh burned away with some blue acid the soldiers brought with them: "The faces of the men half-buried in the mass graves had been burned away by acid or blasted by bullets. Noor Kadir could only recognize his friends by the colors of their shorts."

The Government found no mass graves of civilians, according to statement. As the Irriwaddy reported on February 3:
According to the government’s statement, 19 ARSA militants were killed in fighting after about 500 militants attacked security officials with firearms, knives, slingshots, and darts. Officials buried the bodies of the dead militants systematically and opened a criminal case under counter-terrorism Article 50 (i) at Nyaung Chaung police station. 
That would seem to run up against this video record. The raw video is of the most interest, but only snippets were shown. Luckily a pro-Rohingya activist posted five videos on Facebook. These show five bodies clearly, and parts or traces of a few others. The central scene, closes we get to seeing a "mass grave" is three half-buried bodies of fighting-age men. And that same scene was already shown on video back on August 31, at Rohingya Blogger, where we see there's at least a fourth body not seen in the later footage. These four bodies will be analyzed more elsewhere, but for reference, these are numbered in the order seen here in Aug. 31 video:

1. red shirt, black mask (like ARSA fighters wear), buried from the abdomen down, abdomen wound and shot in the left eye?
2. lone head set near buried body with only bare legs partly sticking out (presumed one victim, beheaded)
3. long-sleeved blue shirt, hands raised (rigor mortis?), buried up to the chest, no clear wounds
4. yellow shirt, buried up to the chest, head blown open

Are These Included?
I've had back and forth thoughts on this. As the article puts it, these four "seem executed, with one even beheaded. If this is another Inn Din, it seems to be uglier yet." (then I saw Inn Din was pretty ugly and includes a beheading...) But I'm not sure if these are militants, as the mask suggests, nor who killed them. Wouldn't they take a militant's mask off to maybe see who he is, long before killing him? Sure, and they might put it back on... who knows why.

But they could be civilians, with the mask added - by soldiers to justify the killing by making them look ARSA, or by the ARSA types who killed them, also just for the suggestion. At Inn Din, they went to great lengths to obscure the fairly obvious fact that the ten killed men were ARSA fighters. Why suggest that here if it weren't true?

First, it's better to have them seen as any kind of Rohingya if the victims were actually Rakhine civilians or others ...  Secondly, consider this scenario: 19 ARSA fighters were killed in this one clash, besides those wounded. That's because they lost badly, perhaps because the base they attacked was well-prepared, as many reportedly were based on last-minutes tip-offs. They had an unusually high number of Rohingya men buried here as a background issue and a source of anger. They also have someone who tipped the authorities off, leading to this great defeat. Or so they suspect, but it's hard to be sure or to say who it was. Still, they might go spy hunting in any accessible area, round up 4 infidel men they hated anyway, and execute them here as spies.

Considering the background loss, they might get clever and put one in the mask of a fallen comrade, even before shooting him dead. This would help sow the idea that these were the killed fighters the government will have to admit to. They leave them with faces unburied so we can see this, but smear mud on the faces of the others, and especially the eyes ... so we can't see their distinctive Rakhine features. They pour some blue crap to claim it's acid, so after the dogs eat their faces away, they can show that and say that's what the acid was for (it does't stand up to scrutiny, as I'll try to explain). 

Now the government had to admit to burying 19 killed attackers, but the ARSA guys have video we're to take as proof that ... the fighters were executed, and even beheaded, rather than killed in action, then buried sloppily with weird acid sludge to slowly dissolve them. Or if possible, they'll say these were civilians too, or who knows, but...

They'd also say these are the cleaner or unclear cases the killers left visible - to cameras. Aside from some other scenes described but not filmed ... somehow the regime limited the activist to filming just this scene, another with 2 bodies, and just a couple others with half a skeletal body and some partial ribs, somehow, almost all after everyone was reduced to bone. Somehow they delayed all recording in those cases, and somewhere they've still kept from view are the hacked-up babies and charred elders people describe seeing, but that no one filmed.

The central question to me at the moment was also posed by reporters at the Irriwaddy:
"The statement did not elaborate on whether security forces buried the ARSA casualties in the Gutar Pyin graveyard or in other locations.”
So it’s not clear if the bodies we see, improperly buried in a non-cemetery location, are the same ones they refer to. That mask suggests they were fighters, but it's not proof. So this is the most important question, perhaps. The government may get clearer on this point - may or may not locate this scene and give their own explanation for it - the cemetery location isn't clear for reference, but "near" a cemetery is a relevant locale, by the claims. Ominously, this is where the Inn Din victims were also buried. 

Location
I haven't yet tried to geolocate anything in Myanmar - it's mostly fields and some trees, little that's distinct. Here there's no clear sunlight to establish directions... maybe, by correlating the earlier video with time-stamps, or something, I could find to solar angles and use shadows to set the directions...

general area, at the alleged one, is pretty clear - explained here
https://twitter.com/CL4Syr/status/959050979030155264
* Location on Wikimapia (currently in-labeled)

Scene A: Perhaps the only scene we'll consider here for now, is the one with four bodies. In the September 6 (?) video, from Ro Nay San Lwin on Facebook, we would see them in reverse order of numbering (as in analysis, elsewhere) - #4 isn't shown - need to correlate where he was - the first one seen here is #3, which must be just hidden behind those leaves on the right - it's just a few steps in but not visible until we get close, and see he's now headless, the sunken foot end of his grave flooded with rainwater, one hand missing and the other laying flat (rigor mortis faded?). Body #2 is visible from the start, boxed in red. As we get closer, we can also see the spot where #1 with the mask is, near the fence's corner (another wet gap in the grass there). More is seen, but this is where get our best stray frames with possibly adequate scenery clues. 

Directions, provisional (see below): we're facing northeast, so there's a line of trees to the north (left), open fields ahead to the right (ne and east), mountains seen in the distance to the northeast, blocked by some very large trees to the E-NE. This is from noting mountains will be seen in 2 directions - smaller ones very nearby to the west, or large ones further away to the east. These look semi-distant, and maybe a wider, deeper range like we see further inland (east). The north aspect of this northeast presumption is explained below.

Scene B ...briefly, another video shows bloody mud where people were killed, but no longer are. It's behind some row of little banana trees (?), and amidst a small or middling patch of other lager trees, apparently including at least one tall palm tree (glimpsed in a view ahead not included here). Looking back (right) might be southwest - we see open fields for a ways in that direction

This scene is most likely just off to the left side in the upper view, just behind those (banana?) trees along the left, with other trees including a palm further to the north or NE.  Between the small trees, we're looking out over a similar field, and maybe the same one. Near the likely path at the far edge of the near plot, there are a couple of little indents - possible where these bodies are. We might see on the right the gap in the hedges they walk through. There is a bit of a fence visible on the far left, but I can't verify if there is or isn't a collapsed section in the middle, or a lone little tree a ways inside the corner to match it to the above scene. The line of distant homes and trees is similar between scenes, but that, like everything here, if pretty common and generic. The grass in the field appears lusher in the view from scene B, but we don't know if they were filmed at the same time or after some growth.



From scene (or scene view) A: the distant mountains - with the right comparison work, the arrangement of these can say where it's filmed, or at least give a line of sight. I tried with Google Earth's terrain feature and low level-views and got a good lead. One mountain pops out as having the small, sharp-edged shape in the middle here - not an absolute match, but compelling. That's a bit southwest of Sanmyaywa, or several miles to the northeast of GuDarPyin. (38 km, heading ~45 degrees, from village center). 

The e
xact angle of view to this peak would vary a bit from positions outside of town, as this seems to be. (it would be a view more to the east if you're further north, or if south of the village, more of a north view). Just what explains the larger-seeming but more rounded peaks to the left and right, not so clear, and depends on the angle of view - the ones on the left may be nearer, the larger appearance suggests that, as does the haze difference, but this is unclear or slight - I could not find any angle of view that clearly explains this arrangement of peaks, with most lower peaks not coming trough like they truly would from the ground. Above I included a screen grab of a view from well south of Gu Dar Pyin and looking almost north, as one example. Better views might (or might not) be found closer to the village.  For example, from a bit north of the pin below, we might look up a ravine, with a long hill crest to the left and to the right, the peaks currently under the line.

Whatever the line of view to whatever peak, it will be about the angle of the field orientation here (edges and fences), and about the angle of that line of banana trees. If I have the right hill pegged, that should run somewhat northeast, depending how far it is from village center.

One possible area is just northwest of the village across some fields, 500m northeast of village center. Small square plots, Trees to north/NW, open fields to east and south... 2010 images shows strange round mounds now gone or unclear ... two homes on a hill next to this. (AP: "A handful of witnesses confirmed two other big graves near a hillside cemetery, and smaller graves scattered around the village.") Still, a few things about this spot don't seem quite right - the angle of fields is too north to match the line to that sharp peak, for one thing. The field division isn't right (but can change in years - last image is Jan. 11, 2014). Big trees too near on the right, etc. Really, I think it's just a similar spot. So if only to help visualize what I was looking for, here's that spot:

And maybe I don't even have the right peak to point to. I leave this undone and out there for anyone with better tools, local knowledge, etc. to possibly place this footage so we can see what that means. Like, is it just outside a Buddhist village 4 men vanished from at this time? (Is there such a place? Where is it, so we can narrow our search there and find or maybe rule out a match?)

To consider, from AP report:
Almost every villager interviewed by the AP saw three large mass graves at Gu Dar Pyin's northern entrance, near the main road, where witnesses say soldiers herded and killed most of the Rohingya. A handful of witnesses confirmed two other big graves near a hillside cemetery, and smaller graves scattered around the village.
...
Mohammad Younus, 25, was crawling on his hands and knees after being shot twice when his brother carried him to some underbrush, where Younus lay for seven hours. At one point, he saw three trucks stop and begin loading dead bodies before heading off toward the cemetery.
...
In the days and weeks after the attack, villagers braved the soldiers to try to find whatever was left of their loved ones. Dozens of bodies littered the paths and compounds of the wrecked homes; they filled latrine pits. The survivors soon learned that taller, darker green patches of rice shoots in the paddies marked the spots where the dead had fallen.
...
Bloated bodies began to rise to the surface of the rain-saturated graves.
"There were so many bodies in so many different places," said Mohammad Lalmia, 20, a farmer whose family owned a pond that became the largest of the mass graves. "They couldn't hide all the death."
...
On Sept. 9, villager Mohammad Karim, 26, captured three videos of mass graves time-stamped between 10:12 a.m. and 10:14 a.m., when soldiers chased him away, he said. In the Bangladesh refugee camps, nearly two dozen other Rohingya from Gu Dar Pyin confirmed that the videos showed mass graves in the north of the village.
(by inclusion, it's suggested the video cited here with beheaded body #2 is what this refers to - those legs are shown in the AP video report)

Inn Din Massacre: Review of Reuters Special Report

February 11, 2018

I've written about the Inn Din massacre here in January and then at the Indicter. Now the story has evolved with a long-awaited Reuters report:
Massacre in Myanmar A REUTERS SPECIAL REPORT How Myanmar forces burned, looted and killed in a remote village
By WA LONE, KYAW SOE OO, SIMON LEWIS and ANTONI SLODKOWSKI Filed Feb. 8, 2018, 10 p.m. GMT
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-rakhine-events/

This is the investigative piece their reporters Lone and Oo were working on when arrested in December. They remain in jail now on debatable charges. Two other reporters including Simon Lewis helped wrap it up. The report poses as a case-closed super-expose, and it does feature a lot of useful information. But some of it's uncertain and some of it is surely untrue.

The report claims Buddhist locals agree with Rohingya ones that there was no ARSA attack, and that they all happily helped burn the Bengali (Kalar) areas with the intent to drive them out, even though some homes had people still inside. The Reuters team heard that this happened at Inn Din and one other location they got admissions for. They also heard about the looting and re-selling of property.

I doubt the gist of such claims, whoever they're from; in general, I find the government's claims of a fake crisis with Rohingya burning their own villages compelling. It's not proven, and may not be the complete explanation, but I suspect it is the main story - even if every claim in this article is true. And it seems odd how only these two journalists now in jail had the magic to get so many admissions when such things are usually denied. How many secret ARSA supporters are there inside the military? I wouldn't think many. How many corrupt people willing to be bribed to tell a bogus story, most of them anonymously? I would suspect there are a few. Either way, this much-quoted witness sounds dubious:
A medical assistant at the Inn Din village clinic, Aung Myat Tun, 20, said he took part in several raids. “Muslim houses were easy to burn because of the thatched roofs. You just light the edge of the roof,” he said. “The village elders put monks’ robes on the end of sticks to make the torches and soaked them with kerosene. We couldn’t bring phones. The police said they will shoot and kill us if they see any of us taking photos.”
But much of the information at least is valid - some of it is photographic (some photos were allowed!) and seems to tie together. We do know there was a grisly mass execution in this case. Perhaps at Inn Din they made the whole story true, burning and looting included (but with no huge massacre of everyone on the beach, as alleged at Tula Toli). If that's the case, it opens the possibility of the same in other areas, but comes nowhere near proving it. I may look deeper into these claims in a section at the end, but for now, I leave it at maybe, and turn back to the details of the central massacre everyone agrees was committed by security forces and Buddhist locals.

At the start, even if all the side-claims here are true, there's still little reason to accept the rest of the ridiculous record of allegations against Myanmar's military and Buddhist community, or take this as a good precedent. Amnesty International’s regional director for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, James Gomez, called the government's“grisly admission” just “the tip of the iceberg” of crimes in their "ethnic cleansing campaign.” (see here) But interestingly, as Gomez failed to note, the admission did NOT confirm what Amnesty's investigators had learned. He was in a very weak position to talk, having their own work just undermined (see below). And I contend it's most likely the entire iceberg, and not just the tip of it. As I noted earlier, only this case stood out for signs of real evidence and having a realistic story, while "other alleged massacres are of a vastly different character and scale, with scores or hundreds of civilians, even babies, killed with utmost cruelty and for no reasons. So [far] these are also lacking in evidence like bodies found. These Myanmar will probably continue to deny, and perhaps they would be right to do so."

Either way, even with this clearest massacre yet, there are key parts that are probably not true. One oddity at least pops out here: Witnesses say Abdulmalik (the religious leader) went back to the village with some sons "to collect food and bamboo for shelter" but came back (alone?) with soldiers and Buddhists following him. "Abdul Malik walked towards the watching Rohingya Muslims unsteadily, with blood dripping from his head. Some witnesses said they had seen one of the armed men strike the back of Abdul Malik’s head with a knife."

Later and more certainly, he was also beheaded (see below). In between, he was arrested with the others, and shows no sign of a head wound (man #6 and #2 in each of the photos below - sweat but no blood on his shirt, no other sign). How did that come to be? Where did his sons go?

Otherwise, this article comes out fairly well ... compared to the ones before. The rest of this post will address the following three important but under-reported points about this story.
  • The men were probably militants involved in attacks
  • "Witnesses" have given false stories to deny militancy
  • The killing was illegal and brutal, but it was provoked 

The men were probably militants involved in attacks

As mentioned, Reuters hear clear claims of no serious ARSA attack:

"Three Buddhist and more than a dozen Rohingya witnesses contradict (the government's) version of events. Their accounts differ from one another in some details. The Buddhists spoke of a confrontation between a small group of Rohingya men and some soldiers near the beach. But there is unanimity on a crucial point: None said the military had come under a large-scale attack in Inn Din."

"The Buddhists spoke of a confrontation between a small group of Rohingya men and some soldiers near the beach." Implicitly, the Rohingya people, who claim to have been right there on the beach, didn't mention such a thing. Why? Who's lying?

Rohingya refugees still insist the men were innocent civilians picked at random. The report agrees with others before that "The dead men were fishermen, shopkeepers, the two teenage students and an Islamic teacher." And definitely, not a one of them was also a recent or long-term recruit to ARSA. The local Islamist beard style, their fitness and fighting age? Reporter Simon Lewis says in the attached video (2:15) soldiers "picked out ten men, apparently at random." Not even because they looked kind of like fighters? Come on, look at these guys.



Of the three story versions outlined below, stories #1 and 3 are unclear on the number killed: at least 7 or so vs. 10-15. If the Reuters version is correct, the men were summoned in front of everyone, with no reason for ambiguity on how many. But if they were arrested in the field, like hiding out after escaping a rout, it might be unclear to outsiders how many had grouped together to be nabbed in one spot. They might be left guessing who among those missing wound up somewhere else or died in fighting, etc. They did seem to know from the start that the bodies were buried in or near a cemetery, but they apparently didn't get a clear body count.

Consider also how they've been listed. In December, Rohingya blogger published story version 2 that had the right number and a list of names to go with it. But there's a problem here as well - only eight identities line up with what Reuters now reports, with two others swapped out with different men.




The new list is preferable in all regards - rounded off ages, etc. Here we see they go at least as young as 17, not 20. Every age above 30 seems rounded to the nearest five even here. But two entries don't seem to match with the previous list. Was that just a pretty good guess as to who was in the group of ten, after everyone scattered at random following the clash? The bad guesses were more 25-year-old non-fighters. #7 Bangu sounds like #4 Nur Mohamed, repeated via his nickname, age rounded down to look different. Names are still incomplete. Abdul isn't a name - it would translate "servant of the." It needs an obbject. Religious leader Abdulamlik just has no last name given. Same for Abdulmajid, Abdulrahman, and both Abdulhashims. However in some cases the U __ might be their last names.

And consider what their job was supposed to be, as pious Muslims of the Rohingya community. As International Crisis Group reported in December: "ARSA initiated the attacks via a WhatsApp audio message delivered shortly after 8pm on 24 August. It instructed cell leaders to mobilise all male villagers over the age of fifteen, assemble in pre-planned locations with whatever sharp objects were available and attack designated targets." What made these guys decide to refuse that call? Unexplained. All good Rohingya were supposed to fight. But these weaklings just sat there camping with the women and babies until they were dragged away on September 1?

They do seem unusually slow here. Those claiming an attack say it took a week after that call. But by the Rohingya (and some Buddhist?) accounts, they never did attack and were never going to. Why? Obviously, because to strengthen the genocide claim, they need to be more innocent and harmless Muslims who just "watched their Buddhist neighbors dig a shallow grave," knowing they were the victims of blind hate.

"Witnesses" have given false stories to deny militancy

As I outlined in the earlier articles, there were three distinct opposition versions of the story reported between October and January, where it seemed at least two must be untrue.

V1. First Amnesty International heard in October that 5+ men, primarily if not totally, were shot randomly as they ran from their burning homes. The bodies were left behind, and "several" or all were buried individually by family in some kind of cemetery.

V2. Then as photos of bound captives emerged in December, survivors said the ten men were arrested while camping on the beach, then killed and buried in secret, presumably by their killers.

V3. AFP reported in January the men were “slaughtered” after showing up for a “meeting” the army and Buddhists had asked for, and were dumped in a single grave in the Buddhist cemetery, as we understand the locale – not a place Rohingya Muslims would be likely to bury their kin, as told to AI.

Here, it's a different version, but one that just might fuse #2 and 3 into one story, for only 2 stories total, and one re-iterated three times now. Rather than camping on the beach on their own, we hear them men were part of a big group of civilians sheltering there after their homes were burnt (burnings in the "days" following the 27th). On the 1st, Soldiers "plucked the 10 from among hundreds of men, women and children who had sought safety on a nearby beach." They "beckoned with their guns to the crowd of roughly 300 Rohingya to assemble in the paddies, Rehana Khatun, 22, the wife of Nur Mohammed, said “they pointed toward my husband and some other men to get up and come forward ... We heard they wanted the men for a meeting. The military asked the rest of us to return to the beach.”

So they were summoned for a meeting, from the beach, camping with everyone. Okay, maybe they do have the story more consistent since December, so only version 1 is clearly out. But the fact that there's an out story is a serious problem, casting boubt on later versions, even if they do stop wiggling around. If this fused version 2+3 is true, then why did several people agree on a different story before that?

Amnesty's October report: 7 alleged witnesses described killings on an unclear date "several days" after the 25th. Their witnesses "identified five family members who had been killed," and recognized an unclear number of others. It could be 10, but that's not set. "The Myanmar military appeared to target Rohingya men in particular," even though the violence was random - shooting them as they fled their burning homes. AI witnesses heard nothing of arrested people, just 5+ killed, mostly or all men, and left were they fell. One man says he left his handicapped mother behind in their house, only to have it burned down with her inside (possible accident).

Now we learn in much detail how 10 men were arrested, and then killed. They're all seen in photos bound before the act. No one reports mass shooting at random in the Reuters report. The village was empty when burned by most accounts, except one or two homes where people were still inside for some reason. One man was said to be killed for having a phone on the 28th. Hundreds of others were just left alone on the beach, and later were able to flee the area.

Amnesty cited Jamil, 52, who "said his cousin Zafor Hossain was hit by a bullet in his side as the two men attempted to run to a nearby hill."

The later-provided lists give no such victim name - neither Zafour nor Hussein appears.

Jamil "buried his cousin in a graveyard on the edge of the village, before going back to the hill." The report mentions that "several" other witnesses, of seven total, described "burying their loved ones" - perhaps in that same cemetery - after finding them where they fell. Mentions of burial like this are unusual - if soldiers kill people, usually the bodies go in a pit, they say. If they wind up in a cemetery, someone caring must have done it. So here, it's family.

But now we learn the Buddhist killers buried them in their Buddhist cemetery, not a likely place for Muslims to bury their own. They all went into one big grave.

These are TWO different stories: 5+ randomly shot, buried by family vs. 10 arrested and killed, buried by the killers. Why did AI's 7 witnesses report one of these massacres and not the other, why does everyone else do the opposite, and why are the two stories so similar? As I propose, because they've been lodging false stories based on what we or they know, and come up with new versions to fit the expanding evidence. that would mean all of the told stories are untrue. 

The killing was illegal and brutal, but it was provoked


The Reuters article mentions the alleged attack by 200 ARSA fighters on the 31st, if only to deny it. Three Buddhists they spoke to agree with the 12+ Rohingya witnesses that there was no serious attack. They disagree on other points, like if there was a minor fight near the beach, maybe after which the attackers blended in with the civilians camped there... "but there is unanimity on a crucial point: None said the military had come under a large-scale attack in Inn Din," suggesting the government reports of that were lies.

The January 10 military statement on the killings was apparently a gold-mine of details, some cited variously in different reports. UPI's report quoted the statement as saying "This incident happened because ethnic Buddhist villagers were threatened and provoked by the terrorists." Here, as in most reports, the nature of that is unclear. But it's exposed in a sub-story that's mostly been ignored.

Radio Free Asia reported on the statement in more detail. Cited by UPI, this gives more background. On August 25, the day the general offensive began, the ARSA men had killed a Rakhine farmer named Maung Ni, and later broadcast messaged from their mosque loudspeakers “about slashing the throats of Myanmar soldiers and occupying the region.” 200 ARSA fighters attacked security forces on the 31st, but they were chased away except the ten they managed to capture. “Although the soldiers should have handed over the 10 men to police,” the RFA report rightly notes, they took them to the cemetery, and brought in villagers including Maung Ni’s sons. The condemned men “were ordered to get into a pit in a ravine between two hillocks. An ethnic Rakhine villager cut them with a sword and four soldiers shot them, the statement said.”

It was an ugly revenge killing. But the often-ignored flip-side to that is they had something to get revenge over - a grievance. To hear most "news" reports, there was nothing at all to provoke this, just blind hate motivating Buddhists to massacre a select few of their neighbors. And this is the story everywhere. The new Reuters report, to its credit, mentions this motive. But perhaps out of instinct, it also had to cast doubt on something it barely mentions:
On Sept. 2, the men were taken to scrubland north of the village, near a graveyard for Buddhist residents, six Buddhist villagers said. The spot is backed by a hill crested with trees. There, on their knees, the 10 were photographed again and questioned by security personnel about the disappearance of a local Buddhist farmer named Maung Ni, according to a Rakhine elder who said he witnessed the interrogation.
Reuters was not able to establish what happened to Maung Ni. According to Buddhist neighbors, the farmer went missing after leaving home early on Aug. 25 to tend his cattle. Several Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya villagers told Reuters they believed he had been killed, but they knew of no evidence connecting any of the 10 men to his disappearance. The army said in its Jan. 10 statement that “Bengali terrorists” had killed Maung Ni, but did not identify the perpetrators.
It's true there can hardly be a known link to the ten they managed to nab after an attack almost a week later - it's communal revenge. "You kill one of ours, plus whatever else, we kill ... hey, these ten of yours."

And it may not be verified, but there are credible claims Maung Ni was definitely murdered, and it was clearly by Rohingya militants, as the Reuters report dances around clarifying. Activist Rick Heizman visited the slain man's wife (or so she says, convincingly), and recorded a video interview (on Twitter, Youtube, with English subtitles). She says Maung Ni went to check on the cattle after lunch on the 25th, with a long walk through some woods involved. Since we hear ARSA never launched an attack, even on the 31st, and definitely not on this day, there should be no clear cause for worry about walking the fields. And there should be no militants preparing for an attack in the woods for anyone to stumble upon.

But his widow says the hapless farmer happened upon a group of "hostile Bengali Muslims" who surrounded him. His two adult sons had maybe worried and set out to join him even before that. She says they were just a few minutes behind until they caught up and encountered the same mob. Unable to reach or even see their father, and under threat themselves, they just ran. His wife says she ran the other way, towards the scene with two other local men. But the Rohingya men had swords and spears, and were "yelling terrible things and frightening us all to death," so they too turned back. Everyone ran to the monastery for safety as Bengalis marauded the village and stole their property. They had to cower there for days. 
His widow says Maung Ni's body was found in the woods on a later day, after the family was escorted there by soldiers to have a look. The date isn't clear, and it's not clear if "in the mud" means buried or hidden, or just left there. The manner of killing isn't specified, but from this part of the Reuters report, I'm guessing the Muslims cut off his head. Based just on a murky disappearance, the report states:
One of the gravediggers, retired soldier Soe Chay, said Maung Ni’s sons were invited by the army officer in charge of the squad to strike the first blows. The first son beheaded the Islamic teacher, Abdul Malik, according to Soe Chay. The second son hacked another of the men in the neck.

A graphic photo (included with Reuters report) show the man identified as Abdulmalik (with shirt) had his head completely severed. They chose the teacher of Islam, this religion of peace, to take the return blows to the neck. Hm. As these things go, that seems pretty appropriate. It's not clear who was hacked in the neck by the other brother before they switched mainly to soldiers shooting to finish it off. One witness told Reuters some victims were still alive and making sounds as they were callously buried. I hope this is an embellishment, but it sounds plausible, considering. 

Conclusion

The Reuters report notes this on the government's response:
In its Jan. 10 statement, the military said the two brothers and a third villager had “cut the Bengali terrorists” with swords and then, in the chaos, four members of the security forces had shot the captives. “Action will be taken against the villagers who participated in the case and the members of security forces who broke the Rules of Engagement under the law,” the statement said. It didn’t spell out those rules. ... Tun Aye, one of the sons of Maung Ni, has been detained on murder charges, his lawyer said on Jan. 13. Contacted by Reuters on Feb. 8, the lawyer declined to comment further. Reuters was unable to reach the other brother.

This is taken as a crack in the façade of denial over the broad record of genocidal crimes. It this what we should expect once the secrets of the Tula Toli massacre, for example, come to light? Insiders admit how they slaughtered 1,800 villagers, murdered children in front of their mothers before raping them and burning the houses they were in? No, that doesn't seem likely.

How about the Kha Maung Seik Massacre? There, ARSA still flat denies their fairly obvious responsibility for murdering 93 Hindu civilians and kidnapping 18 others on August 25, just after the ARSA offensive knocked out security. This was no execution of captured fighters, but people marched out of their homes, including women, babies, the elderly. The ARSA-types and their supporters across the globe were last spotted weakly blaming the military and Buddhists, then dropping the subject as much as possible once their best witnesses were rescued and started telling a different story, and half of the well-hidden bodies were found. (see here).

And by the way, Simon Lewis - involved in this Inn Din report - still has an unfinished lead there. He had spoken to some pretty Hindu women rescued by Muslims who swore Buddhists killed their Hindu husbands for refusing to help them kill Muslims (see his article here). You can't make this shit up - they really are making this shit up. They've got 45 bodies found in that case, refugee camp testimony, another religious group co-targeted and sure to join forces now with ARSA. One wonders why Lewis dropped that hot lead with no comment, to pursue this one instead...

Evidence of further crimes

Pressed for time, this is the part I'll lave off, at least for now. To return to, time depending: did Buddhists and the military also torch homes, loot property, etc.? Or was it just the brutal execution of captured fighters? It's important to get that right, but raising these three points seems more like "my job" that no one else would do well enough if I didn't.

Related tweets
general promotion
#Myanmar #InnDinMassacre Review of Reuters Special Report: 3 main points:
1 The men were probably militants involved in attacks
2 "Witnesses" have given false stories to deny militancy
3 The killing was illegal and brutal, but it was provoked

@Reuters
"Reuters was not able to establish what happened to Maung Ni" and heard there was no ARSA attack. So they found no reason for the Buddhists to attack or kill any Rohingya, they're just hate-filled racists.

@Simondlewis
I got the assessment of that Reuters piece re: #InnDinMassacre. Valuable add, gives me SOME pause (some of that put off for now). http://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2018/02/inn-din-massacre-review-of-reuters.html … Any response? Note my note on your unfinished work re: #KhaMaungSeikMassacre. Don't get too distracted from that.

(Antoni Slodkowski, Reuters Myanmar Bureau Chief, co-author with Lewis, Lone and Oo)
I already showed Simon, but here's my review of your special report.