The OPCW, Power and Lies, a Mental Iron Curtain

25 January, 2020
(rough, incomplete)
daily updates to 29 Jan.
last edit 3 February

On the 20th of January, a rather important Arria-Formula meeting  of the United Nations Security Council was convened by the Russian Federation (with help from China China, who staffed it with Russians and a Syrian that knew the case better. Topic: Implementation of UNSCR 2118: OPCW FFM Report on Douma. The purpose on the convening end was to draw attention to what they see as serious flaws in the investigative work of the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) and its Syria Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), and its controversial investigation of the 2018 incident in Douma, Syria, that led to civilian deaths (accepted as 43 or perhaps more, with strangely credible tallies of perhaps exactly 187). It also led to competing claims and shifting narratives, missile strikes, etc.

Of course, recent leaks and "whistleblowing" activity have raised widespread doubts about that investigation... How much intro do we need here?

This is the room as it was occupied for this meeting - from complete video on WebTV.un.org. (This video, not a transcript, is the main source I'll be citing for comments, noted with "v" and the app. time-stamp of the comment.)

The big bank of tables in the middle that sits empty - I think this is where a Mr. Ian Henderson would have sat, pretty much alone, if he had been there (I also don't watch many UNSC sessions). Veteran OPCW inspector Ian Henderson was given a chance to speak by video (starting at 0:57:26), after his visa to travel to New York and attend in person was blocked, presumably by the United States government. (he only mentions "unforeseen circumstances around my visa waiver status" ) Henderson is already a name known by many as the named author of an internal OPCW FFM engineering report (ACLOS posting) contradicting the findings of the FFM's public final report (issued 1 March, 2019). The assessment by Henderson, working with the FFM's "engineering sub-team" was suppressed until it was leaked to the public, in May, 2019, via the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda, and Media (of which I am a member). This began the stream of leaks that sparked so much controversy and debate about the reliability of the world's only trusted watchdog against chemical weapons.

The information about the Douma incident presented by the panel (including Russians, a Syrian, and Mr. Henderson by video) is generally covered elsewhere. Here I'm interested mainly in how the contested information was received, and the "politics" of that. I don't usually write or comment much on that level of things, the talkers and their fora. But this was just so fascinating once I started reviewing it closer, and so much of what's said clicks deliciously with things I know about, allowing for a possibly amazing review - if I could even get all these issues and quotes, links, sub-topics and intros un-bottlenecked, written, formatted … or close enough to get this up - as usual - "rough, incomplete" (it grows, sometimes to complete)

Ian Henderson: in Review, in Absentia
After being invited by the Chinese delegation convening the session, Henderson says he encountered unclear visa problem that prevented attendance. This is perhaps from being South African (as I hear, but some say British), or perhaps from having visited Syria, and not on what the US considered official work. That could be another way of saying he was not part of the OPCW's FFM, in line with shifting allegations that the man is suspicious and/or didn't matter and his work is flawed. I didn't finish considering that aspect in my last post following up on Bellingcat's well-timed "we need to talk about Henderson." (It got stalled on a question about report timing I'll come back to). But it considers alleged problems with the engineering report he authored; it doesn't seem that was rejected for being wrong. For a more comprehensive but basic review of Henderson and his presentation, see Ben Norton's overview at the Gray Zone, with full video and transcript of Henderson's video presentation.

Jumping in to the heart of what he says, so we can measure the response... At the time of a June, 2018 draft report of the FFM's findings, Henderson explains, numerous team members had "serious misgiving" there had been a chemical attack in Douma at all. A heavily redacted interim report was issued on July 6, and then some half the team (including Henderson) was excluded on or by 30 July. The final report was then slowly churned out consulting a few outside experts whose methodology remains unclear. As Henderson told the assembly “The report did not make clear what new findings, facts, information, data, or analysis in the fields of witness testimony, toxicology studies, chemical analysis, and engineering, and/or ballistic studies had resulted in the complete turn-around in the situation from what was understood by the majority of the team, and the entire Douma [FFM] team, in July 2018" ( my analysis of what was removed or changed between a draft report dated June and the final public report gives some scattered insights - the changes seem quite shady, especially in the toxicology area, which gets its own post)

Credit for Courage?
The US representative, in her statements, would laud "the brave efforts undertaken by the OPCW FFM to obtain the information necessary to conduct its investigation," complaining "Russia would later call into doubt the results," disrespecting that courage. But Ian Henderson - and others, we hear - have the same doubts, and he at least was in the part of the FFM that went to Douma, where people died getting access, and a Russian soldier (or Syrian, accounts differ) was wounded just testing the security scene (more detail below). The FFM team members coming later took far less risk, but some, it's true. And it was these same people - all but one of the Douma team (of unclear size to me) - who were reportedly excluded from involvement in the probe as of 30 July, 2018. Ironically, the fiercely defended public findings are the ones with the notably "brave" people excluded. Russia was the party giving them and their findings a louder voice - after having provided their security while in Douma. The United States was ignoring them, except to (apparently) block their visas, so others could ignore them more easily.

Perhaps related: the public findings were vastly different from those reached in June-July, 2018 by the broader FFM team, as Henderson says. A comparison between the leaked draft report and the final bears this out strikingly (see link above). The changes were done by the other part of the FFM team from the safety of "country X," mainly based on repeated harvesting of alleged witness accounts, and with input from just one Douma team member (a paramedic by training, as Henderson has explained), besides those outside experts in engineering-ballistics and toxicology, who were only consulted starting in September. And as Henderson noted, just how they came to their odd but convenient conclusions is not explained well at all.

Some have heard more than others: Peter Hitchens writes recently "So, who exactly were these experts? The identity of one of the experts is known. It is also known that a verbal account of their consideration, was along the lines of “they say that one of the scenarios may be possible, but the other one very unlikely”. As for the other two experts, it is difficult not to be sceptical." The details of that are secret, and it may not be true, but it's worth mentioning as possibly true - and hugely relevant if so. According to the FFM's final report, their conclusions were "complementary," but that is a relative and thus flexible word.

Barzeh inspections: "another story altogether."
Henderson capped his video remarks by informing the UN Security Council this was not "a political debate" in his mind, even if it was in others'. He followed this by noting - and this is entirely new to me - that he also headed the "highly intrusive inspections" at the very chemical laboratory in Barzeh, near Damascus, which was destroyed in missile strikes in response to the alleged attack in Douma. In fact, he claims to have headed the two inspections prior to its destruction, and the one afterwards (so about the same time, perhaps before, he would deploy to Douma). Again, that was in response to a chemical attack Henderson and others felt may have never happened. He only hints at the irony, conceding the events around Barzeh presented "another story altogether (from the incident in Douma). And I shall now close. Thank you."

That other story, in brief: on 4 May 2017 - shortly after some 90 people died in the alleged sarin attack at Khan Sheikhoun - a Western "intelligence document obtained by the BBC" claimed "chemical and biological munitions" were still being made in Syria, in clear violation of their obligations under the chemical weapons convention. The document claimed this happened at several named facilities, including the one at Barzeh, and that Iran and Russia both knew and approved. (BBC News)

Then the OPCW had a look. They would later summarize the result:

"On 22 November 2017, a second round of inspections was concluded at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC. In February this year, samples were sent to two designated laboratories for analysis. The results of the inspection were issued on 28 February as an addendum to my report EC-87/DG.15 (dated 23 February 2018) and it was noted that the inspection team did not observe any activities inconsistent with obligations under the Convention."

https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/EC/87/en/ec87dg21_e_.pdf

But after the Douma incident on the 7th of April, when it was wrongly believed at least 70-85 people had died in a sarin attack, US military officials decided the Barzeh site and others were active again and bombed them with some 100 missiles. This caused no toxic or biological releases, but was claimed to somehow set the Syrian CW program back years. Syrians denied the charges, saying only permitted, civilian medical products were made there. CBS News had a reporter, Seth Doane, visit the site, where he could only see snakebite anti-venom was produced there. They coldn't be sure what else might be, but "CBS News looked into the OPCW report from Barzeh and it noted the Syrians had delayed the visit for security concerns, but didn't find any red flags."

Removal from relevance, put in context
Anyway, Henderson does seem to be highly relevant to the whole Douma case and everything wrong with it, besides being part of the laudably brave portion of the FFM that was rewarded with exclusion from helping to form those public FFM findings taken as gospel. So naturally, he wasn't allowed to appear. Also, OPCW Director General Fernando Arias, and representatives of its Technical Secretariat (leadership, basically) declined the invitation to come and help sort things out, leaving the Russians, Chinese, etc. in charge of something to be painted as terrible and Russian. (v 1:03:45)

There are further efforts at making Henderson "in absentia" from "credibility" whereby certain parties strive to discredit Henderson as an irrrelevant hack or possibly a Russian agent, along with other vague smears. An article on that is forthcoming, but nothing that ugly turned up in the aria meeting. Representatives of friendly governments mentioned Henderson and/or his findings as relevant, while a slight majority of representatives took the France-US-UK position side ignored those aspect of the "Russian disinformation" altogether (a section on this below/forthcoming) For example ambassador Chalet made no mention or hint of these doubts having any separate reality outside of that clever Russkie campaign.

At least one exception was the UK's Pierce, who did mention Henderson AND his findings, but surmised "Mr. Henderson's papers seem to reflect a personal view." As packaged, it was a view apparently endorsed by an "engineering sub-team" of the FFM, and largely based on work by consulted experts who clearly agreed with their own work. But she misses those details, even as she seems to laud his work in a sense; "of course" such an open, "scientific" process worthy of our blind faith would spur "robust" discussion of multiple viewpoints. In the end the three experts trumped the one, and not that this it was simple majority-mob rule, but the most and best views must have combined, because she concluded "what counts is the final, considered, assessment." (v 2:12:00)

Otherwise, the information presented in the aria session, according to Pierce, were "elaborately constructed arguments," emphasizing the words and the suspicious nature; one does not simply utter such detailed lies on accident! But "those arguments have failed to convince OPCW membership in the Hague, and we are sure that they will not convince member states here in New York. They have been masquerading as fact, and their clear aim is to protect the Syrian regime ...by undermining credible and independent investigations."

Pierce tweet: "Today we heard the Russians trying to deny facts that have been established by an independent body, trusted by the international community to do its work,@OPCW.This is frankly a shameful response to the very real horrors on the ground in #Syria."

USUN tweet:"False accusations leveled here today by the Russian Federation and their briefers are FALSE--a worrying sign that the Syrian authorities and Russia are continuing to target White Helmets for further attacks."

The Mental Iron Curtain and 
the Weighing of Authority vs. Doubt
A central divide emerges here, a newly-formed ridge in the global mindscape, along which the new Cold war's mental iron curtain has been extended. We can see the construction in progress in the course of this session, reflected partly in how to answer this question:

Is the OPCW's recent crisis of credibility (to the debated extent it exists) warranted by any real flaws in the OPCW's or the FFM's investigative processes? Or is that merely an illusion created by "Russian disinformation" with malign intent and no valid basis? 

Opinions and read-out statements differ (some review below - "adherence to the script(s)"). But in whichever way, the question is in peoples' heads now, enabling this historic assembly to take place and start to address any problems that might genuinely be distorting the organization's important work.

Early in the session, Russian rep. Shulgin from the panel mentions an earlier plan for a meeting with "all of the specialists that took part in the investigation" of the Douma incident, but he says the US representative had opposed this quite sternly. He quoted her describing the planned session as "a Stalinist process in the Hague of intimidation and cross-examination." (Shulgin's quote, translated twice - v 0:15:55) It's not clear if it was especially evocative of something Stalin would do, or if the only intent was simply to say VERY, VERY BAD RUSSIANS.

Apparently the US was able to block that formula, but not the one that finally materialized, featuring Henderson alone - the one expert "whistleblower" already publicly named. He wasn't allowed to actually be there, but the meeting happened, and he was allowed to speak, pre-recorded, on the big screen. So we're not in the most extreme kind of "Stalinist" totalitarian control we could be, where all dissent is completely stifled. But this US-led tendency is problematic, and getting worse.

Shulgin's comment might refer to the same Ambassador Cherith Norman Chalet, Acting Deputy Permanent Representative, who attended the 20 January session and delivered some prepared statements. The United States, she said, "objected categorically" to the very meeting as part of "Russian efforts to exploit the platform of the Security Council to further its own political and military agenda in Syria, propping up a murderous dictator at the expense of the Syrian people." And she made it clearer than ever that, despite all the details just presented, the publicized FFM findings were "the facts, full stop." and any other opinion - even one from within the FFM's probe or even its most qualified experts - was wrong, if not outright "disinformation." (remarks begin v 1:25:42 - see also clarified text version: https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-an-arria-formula-meeting-on-syria-chemical-weapons/)

A 2002 Vote of No Confidence 
Using a UNSC session to sow false claims, trying to unfairly influence or control its operations: this is a heavy charge from those defending the public's confidence in the OPCW. It's also ironic or hypocritical, given how the United States has previously forced an OPCW director-general from office, by undermining confidence in the agency's valid work he was leading, because it was complicating their plans for an illegal war.

It was claimed that was for the common good and to save lives, by going to war with Iraq. It wasn't like the Russians do it - to shield Ba'ath party dictators in the Middle East over "credible" claims or even "facts" regarding weapons of mass destruction. José Bustani, a Brazilian diplomat, was the OPCW's first DG ever, who was trying, in 2002, to work with Iraq to eliminate their chemical weapons program. The United States was citing as a reason for war, and apparently, the Bush administration didn't want that reason resolved. It's credibly alleged (but denied) that undersecretary of defense John Bolton oliquely threatened Bustani and even his sons, who were living in New York. (The Intercept).

Bustani persisted in doing his job undeterred until the United States called a special vote of no confidence, at which they arranged a majority vote to remove him, in an effort at improving morale within the OPCW. (48 states voted yes, only 7 opposed, and 43 abstained from the ugly process - State Department tally). Bustani's sons were never harmed, he was compensated by some agency (not the US) for his lost job, and donated that money back to the OPCW. (Wikipedia) And little surprise, he remains skeptical of how the agency has been run since then; after hearing from whistleblower "Alex" at a Courage Foundation panel in October, 2019, Bustani was quoted as saying "The convincing evidence of irregular behaviour in the OPCW investigation of the alleged Douma chemical attack confirms doubts and suspicions I already had." (Courage Foundation)

Bustani was also not present at the arria session, and his story was brought up by no one, that I noticed.

No such episodes are known of since then so that any US/Western control is quieter, and more multilateral. It is widely suspected; there's an image gaining in currency of an agency is so beholden to Western interest to distort their investigative work. While the mechanics of any control remain murky, details have recently come to light (see WGSPM on how the Douma probe was "nobbled").

In that view, the lopsided external influence of the Western powers stymies truth, compelling some honest employees to  find their own ways to get the truth out. Anyone enjoying the fruits of that influence clearly would not invite these whistleblowers to the UN to expose the reality in a proper forum, and might even block them. So naturally it would be down to Russia, most likely, to try and get the dissenters heard.

But then, as things work out, their voices become "Russian disinformation" to many, and can be safely ignored. And they are; ambassador Chalet for one never accused Ian Henderson of knowing involvement in this Russian campaign, she just doesn't acknowledge his existence, let alone his reasons for doubting the FFM's public findings (which is otherwise considered an "attack" on the agency). Like other speakers, she dismissed all such doubts in several ways, including to say "There is no basis for Russia and Assad regime to question the validity of the FFM report."

So in summary: Russia calls for restoring faith in the OPCW, US and allies deny any need to restore it, demand The FFM's public findings were "the facts, full stop." and any other opinion was "disinformation." Essentially insisting on blind faith in the FFM's findings as a moral imperative. Of course she and others would insist that's not because those findings happened to support the U.S./Western position, but because they care about truth and justice, and those findings were "the facts" - like a lot of other completely untrue things have been in the past, but the facts nonetheless.

In contrast, Syria's ambassador Bashar al-Jaafari explained, in contrast, "It is clear that some governments were trying to repeat in Syria what had happened in Iraq ... I mean using false allegations and lies related to the weapons of mass destruction, to find pretexts for acts of aggression and invasion," appealing to International law and urging member states to resist this campaign and to prevent the Western powers from destroying the OPCW the way they destroyed the League of Nations and would eventually destroy the United Nations. (v 1:21:26)

An Earlier UNSC Meeting on Syria CW Allegations
Okay, so the US threatened and removed a DG of the OPCW once, but they aren't alone in attacking the group; "When Russia and Syria dislike the findings of the UN or the OPCW," she said in her remarks, "they use meetings like this one to undercut those organizations and the facts that they provide."

Using UNSC session to sow disinformation and confusion - that's a heavy charge. A more appropriate use of a UNSC arria-formula meeting, in her mind, would include one called on 17 April, 2015 because the US wanted to complain about the slow progress in punishing the Syrian government for alleged chlorine gas attacks, especially one blamed for killing a family of six in Sarmin one month earlier, on 16 March. (State Dep't blog)

This was organized by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Samantha Power, to share uncorroborated testimony by US-supported activists, and a video of three young children supposedly killed in the Sarmin incident. The children, however, showed no sign of exposure to chlorine (red eyes or any sign of irritation). The boy may be the only one alive, but he appears comatose, barely even trying to breathe. This is not a chlorine effect, and more likely caused by a depressant drug (what killed the Talebs?) The two girl victims appear similarly pale but likely already dead. All three were probably poisoned deliberately.

The surviving boy might be murdered on-camera by a militant-affiliated medic who pierces the child's chest several times with a giant hypodermic syringe, twisting it around inside, but never injecting the mysterious fluid in the plunger before putting the needle away (SWEDHR/The Indicter, updates). My own new image below re-shows this now infamous scene as the suspect doctor is putting the syringe away; having stabbed the suffocating baby with it several times, his work was done. But that could be mercy, quicker than the suffocation the boy was doomed to by the almost non-existent efforts to suction the foam from his lungs. (and just now I'm noting the foam is a bit pink by the end - the doctor's needle rampage made it so he's bleeding to death and now drowning on his own blood, as well as being apparently comatose and barely breathing anyway.)

Power bragged that she and her team delivered their misinformation in "as rapid and moving a way as we could do," giving audience little time to think, which goes towards calling it Disinformation - misinformation used strategically to deceive. She also bragged how the audience were moved to "tears." (BBC) Not to take that too literally, but excessive lachrymation interferes with clear vision.

Some further details about this case:

The children were seen dying in two consecutive videos: one was stamped with the logo of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Sarmin Coordinating Committee ("Sarmin" in gold, with the exact flag of Jabhat al-Nusra planted in it). The other was made by the recently-minted "White Helmets." The clinic is full of new blankets with their logo done in their allies' black-and-gold colors. It would look bad to use an Al-Qaeda-branded "snuff film" at the UNSC, so Power and her team probably used the White Helmets-branded film of the same snuffing. (a frame from the other one, then, is used above)

The ventilation shaft the chlorine bomb allegedly fell down to kill those babies (along with their father, mother, and grandmother) is about the same size as the bomb, or possibly even too small. To fit, it would have to be rotated just the right way, in maybe a 1-2 degree range (for a 1:180 to 1:360 likelihood). The UN-OPCW JIM decided that this happened, “improbable as it may sound."

That problem with the opposition-US narrative was worsened by the alleged weapon being unusually large. It was also rather implausible: a giant barrel bomb with flasks of potassium permanganate and metal canisters (that cannot be refilled, re-lined with plastic and re-filled) with hydrochloric acid, meant to mix randomly upon impact in hopes of generating enough chlorine gas to suffocate some innocent babies. An official but limited-run image is shared at right. Most experts agree this contraption, as I'll put it, would probably not work, even if it could be made to function, which seems doubtful. (WGSPM)

More questions with this incident can be found at A Closer Look On Syria (event page, and more yet on its talk page), although some of those points are dated. A more detailed analysis by Michael Kobs is available ...

But finally for now, this and surrounding 2015 chlorine attacks are now seemingly ignored by UN and OPCW-related sources; any recent lists of events blamed on Syria you check (if it's big enough and by them) will have a huge 2-year gap from May, 2014 to April, 2016 (charges against IS continue in that span, but not against the government). That includes the tear-jerking Sarmin incident and dozens of other perviously alleged attacks. For example, of the nine cases revived by the OPCW's new Investigation and Identification Team, none of them is in that span.

Problematic incident were encountered in May, 2014 and April, 2016, and as I just showed in part, serious problems emerged with the central and deadiest event in 2015. If one 'stack of files' should 'accidentally burn,' and it can be a big stack, this would be a good span to accidentally lose track of. But before the 16 March Sarmin incident went on the ignore list, the US was pushing investigators and UNSC member states to emote and act against Syrian government accused of dropping the chlorine bomb on that poor family.

Vasily Nebenzya might refer to this very episode (or to a more recent one regarding Khan Sheikhoun in 2017) at 1:33:05 in the video, right after Chalet's remarks about abuse of UNSC sessions: "I wish the distinguished representative of the United States were able to be here in the room in person when there WAS a disinformation campaign on [something different, misrepresentations?]. I know she wouldn't have changed her statement she read out, but still ..."

No Western representatives appeared moved to tears by the Russian-convened Arria-formula meeting. Germany's rep. did call it "very, very sad fiction" as well as "fantsay," and "absurdity," drawing on the reference to Alice in Wonderland first raised by Nebenzya at the session's start. Thus might any resident of Wonderland complain if they followed that rabbit on his way out the tunnels to Planet Earth and the light of its sun.

More Western (Dis?)information 

A "reality" vs. "the facts" vs. best reading so far 
on probe delay and evidence tampering   
In her remarks, Ambassador Chalet lauded the FFM's public findings as "the facts, full stop" and declared "we must defend the credibility and the findings of the OPCW and the UN from disinformation." At the same time, she spouted falsehoods to the assembled representatives of member states, including at least: "the reality is that the regime sought to undermine the investigation by delaying the entry of investigators to Douma, so that Assad can clean up the crime scene and tamper with evidence."

The allegation she described as "reality" was widely repeated during the delay of several days back in April, 2018, when the FFM was in Damascus but hadn't gotten to the crime scenes. But it was never borne out by evidence. The FFM's final report mention no such stalling, actually explaining how "considerable time and effort were invested in discussions and planning to mitigate the inherent security risks to the FFM team" "unacceptable risks" included "mines and explosives" that could be left, and "sleeper cells still suspected of being active in Douma." This assessment by Syrian and Russian officials "was shared by the representative of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)." It was decided by all Syrian and Russian Military Police would work together to provide security. Then:

"During the reconnaissance visit by UNDSS on 18 April 2018 to assess the first two locations planned to be visited the following day, the security detail was confronted by a hostile crowd and came under fire from small arms and a hand grenade that exploded at Location 2 ...The incident reportedly resulted in two fatalities and an injury to a Russian soldier. ... the planned deployment of the FFM team was postponed until the security situation could be reassessed."

It would be another few days before they could get to the pivotal location 2 on the 21st, and there's no sign of the Russians and Syrians slowing things down - unless one wants to imagine they set up that incident in a false-flag scenario just to buy more time (perhaps she and the Trump administration did conclude this?). Otherwise, it's curious how ambassador Chalet's "reality" clashes with the FFM's "facts, full stop" on this point that seemed important enough to raise during an important UNSC meeting.

And as it turns out, most of those "facts, full stop" are wrong anyway, but less so; all other credible sources (ex: a statement from the OPCW itself) agree this security visit was on the 17th (not the 18th), there were two incidents (one had a crowd, the other had violence), and a Syrian officer was wounded (not a Russian one), and not severely. No one else mentions any fatalities but still, that part might be true (if so, most likely they were among the attackers). https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2018/07/swept-under-rug-part-1.html

But to be fair, Russia's ambassador Nebenzya rebuts Chalet with his own bit of Russian mis/disinformation, claiming the site visit delay was decided by UN security because of the western powers' missile strikes nearby. This is a common claim in Russia but seems to be unfounded. Barzeh is only a few miles away, close enough that it (and all those civilians to be protected there) could be affected by any released toxins. But it was struck on 14 April, three days before the advance mission described above, and probably before they were even discussing the issue of access.

Further, experts have stated that sarin could not be "cleaned up" to the point OPCW investigators would not find it, and on 17 April "it was likely that residual samples of nerve agent would remain for at least another week, even after an attempted clean-up"
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/s,yria-crisis-medics-intimidated-over-douma-gas-attack
The relevant site with fatalities was inspected just 4 days later, and there was no sign at all of sarin, almost certainly because it was simply never there, as so many had falsely suggested, and as 2 unnamed US officials claimed outright; blood and urine samples tested for chlorine and "an unnamed nerve agent" -  but no signs of any nerve agent ever turned up at the attack sites).

Unneeded but neat visual summary of these 4 "realities":

 

Assad "strengthens his position" with Ghouta attack 
Syria's ambassador Al-Jaafari relates an epically frustrating story for his nation shortly before their accession to the CWC and the OPCW (1:06:50 in the session video). A chemical attack on the morning of 19 March, 2013 at Khan al-Assal, Aleppo, killed 25 civilians and plural "soldiers," as Jaafari puts it, besides 110 civilian and military members who were affected but lived (previously I'd heard just one soldier and 19 civilians died, including a doctor killed by secondary contamination). Russian and/or Syrian tests showed sarin was used in that terrorist rocket. Western powers scoffed at this, insisting if it was sarin, the government must have hit their own guys somehow, because no opposition party could have sarin, probably.

It took "4 months and 11 days," Jaafari told the arria session, before a UN-OPCW team came to investigate, arriving in Damascus on the 18th of August, 2013. By then, any sarin remaining at the site would probably be long gone, though indicative metabolites or breakdown products of it would likely turn up. It still could have been a fruitful probe … if the militants hadn't overrun Khan al-Assal over the summer, reportedly killing eyewitnesses and destroying evidence, besides making a site visit impossible for security reasons. But there were things on file and witnesses in and around Aleppo, and they planned to go there and learn.

But then, as Jaafari explains, that team was "about leaving the hotel to go to Khan al-Assal [sic - Aleppo area] when another chemical attack took place - incidentally speaking, incredibly speaking, amazingly speaking" in East and West Ghouta around Damascus. This changed plans so investigators never left the capitol, and started planning to visit sites in both East and West Ghouta instead, where it was alleged as many as 1,7000 civilians were killed with sarin fired in a dozen rockets, in the most massive chemical attack in the world for decades.

Khan al-Assal "has still not been investigated," Jaafari adds. Later, we learned, THEY (allegedly) used the same kind of sarin in Ghouta that was used in Khan al-Assal. Both events are now pinned on the government in many minds, based on that claim alone. So allegedly, they prevented investigation of KAA and implicated themselves for it in one ridiculous move, that also killed many hundreds of innocents (if not the number claimed, at least 3-400 were killed in a manner that was never properly investigated). That came near triggering U.S. military strikes and risked an all-out regime change campaign, having committed all this idiocy far across Obama's "red line." (see my article from May, 2013, with 2016 updates)

To be clear, the Syrians have always denied doing that, and have insisted whatever exactly WAS done, the takfiri terrorists running those areas must have done it (primarily the Saudi-backed Jaish al-Islam, working with other factions, including frequent collaboration with Jabhat al-Nusra). Jaafari had in April, 2013 accused the Western powers of "torpedoing" Syria's request to investigate the Aleppo attack. But it wasn't really sunk until August 21 - just as it almost seemed to be working -by what they see as yet another terrorist attack by the same or an allied group. And it's not even surprising to them how the Western powers and a terrorist attack seem to have the same motive in this area of frustrating investigations into Syria's claims.

The German representative notes "the representative of the Assad government said this CW story didn't start in Douma, and I can only subscribe to this," sort of. No, the story started with, well, not Khan al-Assal as he said - well, maybe, but he chose to pick up at the end in August. That event was mentioned, but "no member, no one in the podium proposed it, refuted it, but also didn't mention it - the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons against its own population." He refers to the French ambassador's statement citing 1,300 civilians killed. and adds "we must never forget this."

It's true Jaafari did not remind the meeting of the huge alleged death toll or the findings that his government was probably behind it. No reminder was needed, he disputes all those details, and the dispute would distract from his point that - as they see it - the Ghouta attack or massacre was done by others to frustrate the government's plans, not to further them. He contests the accepted version, but didn't bring that contest into the meeting. There are in fact amazingly powerful, irrefutable arguments he could have called on, and which I could bring up now, but I'll take Jaafari's lead; considering how much we're already covering here, and how important it is to cover that well, we'll come back to it in another "session" (blog post/article).

France's highly agitated ambassador ignored Jaafari's reference, and claimed "no one contests" that the Ghouta attack was carried out by "Assad" who was at the time in a "bad position" - again, with the OPCW inspectors finally there to look into the sarin attack in Khan al-Assal. And so he "decided to gas 1,300 women, children, elderly people from his own country to put himself in a stronger position." Again, the position was possibly at the brink of destruction, or at least with a bad record and a re-frustrated probe of the Khan al-Assal attack, which none of these critics ever acknowledged. Western powers and terrorist sarin rockets remain on the same side in this regard, going on seven years later; "we must never forget" one part of that story, but if possible we should always forget the other part. Both parts play into the amazing bigger story we'll be coming back to.

Other issues
As a practice in brevity, allow me to say other issues were also raised by the distinguished colleagues, and to then proceed to a final section, which no one is really required to read.

Adherence to the Script(s)
After the panel's presentation, some of the assembled representatives - not all of them - chose to give a statement on their nation's position. None sounded improvised. Many included an almost ritualized absolute statement of their nation's continued and total rejection of any CW worked into most statements somewhere. Some share such exact phrasing to suggest both sides had given out recommended points that people drew on as they saw fit. They also take notes as others speak, may copy lines from each others, etc. and mostly the statements seem unique, if prepared and bearing little relation to the panel's presentation.

Certain subjects are raised in combination by those supporting the Western position in upholding their general script: OPCW findings are fair and balanced, cannot be challenged or questioned, must be trusted as they are - Russia shields Syria over its gassing of its own citizens - they did it in 2013, agreed not to, but 6 years later here we are discussing more of the same - Syria might be in non-compliance with OPCW declaration rules, gaps still need addressed - the IIIM / IIT must go ahead, and accountability is crucial / impunity can't be allowed - support for White Helmets against negative claims about them - other crimes of the Syrian or Russian governments (Salisbury attacks, supposed cyberattack on OPCW, invasion of Ukraine, Caesar photos, attacks on medical facilities, etc.) - conspicuous shows of disrespect.

Note: I made almost zero effort to find the names of any representatives past the one Trump sent. The British one I know from being ripped on Twitter.

- France: perhaps the hardest position of all, or just the very agitated presentation makes it seem that way - Syria is hiding something, not cooperating with inspections, where are stocks of sarin and chlorine coming from? Warns of impending CW attacks in Idlib, etc. v1:34:00
- United States - covered well enough...
- United Kingdom - same...

U.S. ambassador Chalet stops her dull statement-reading at 1:32:56 and starts stacking the sheets together as if to leave immediately. She is gone by the next wide shot of the room at 1:45:36 and doesn't return before the session ends at 3:21:12 - below, noting she's sat by UK's Karen Pierce, a visible anchor, which seat quickly become and remains empty.

Prior to that, at 43:21 she's not even there yet, and a large bald man is sitting in her seat Reactions from the Russian panel (mixed amusement relating to a mustache? confusion/consternation, unclear ...) at 0:56:20, include looks in about the direction of her seat. This is just before Ian Henderson's presentation, which as slow to get started. She's probably there for just 37 minutes, 0:56 to 1:33. I didn't find a single floor shot with her present. (Note at 1:45:36 Vietnam's seat is empty too. But he seems to be standing right there. That might be because he had to keep getting up anyway to allow that display of American exceptionalism. )

That was the "F-UK-US" coalition, basically the writers of the "script" in question, the three whose military strikes on a sovereign nation were "justified" by the findings they for sure still believe in. Other nations who wound up saying about the same, ordered somewhat from hardest position to mildest.
- Estonia: hard position, strong wording used, emphatically praises White Helmets, insists on accountability, blocked so far by Russia's veto - looking at the Russians, "impunity cannot be an option."
- Germany … very astute and keen on referencing things others have said - the one to surely mention the Holocaust-evoking "Caesar photos" - cites 39 witnesses behind FFM's findings, misses that 1/3 of them, taken in Damascus, flatly contradicting the final conclusions. The other 2/3 were in "country x" and had grown from 21 in mid-2018. 5 more were found in October, nearly all miracle survivors adding convenient details. Many others in Douma might have added to the other side, but were never sought out. One side had to be lying, and the FFM decided which one they didn't want to hear any more of. 2:15:36
- Canada, also for Australia, NZ: condemns leaks, trusts findings, "technical secretariat staff put their lives in danger" to get these facts, praises WH, helping OPCW prevent hacks and cyber-attacks (from Russia, obviously), didn't mention anything to crack down on leaks and whistleblowers, but that is the root of the current "problem"
- Belgium: supports the report - full trust in leadership and "the rigor of its internal procedures" as they stand - opposes anyone questioning its findings - opposes impunity - lack of accountability encourages more attacks, threatens the whole world
- Croatia, also on behalf of EU (both express full confidence)
- Tunisia: "The reports of the FFM reports must not be subject to controversy, so that the OPCW can continue its work in an objective and impartial manner" - lack of total agreement with the Western position undermines the OPCW's credibility and ability to hold perpetrators accountable
- Dominican Republic: hopes IIT can get access, identify perpetrators, discover where they get their materials, etc. "ultimate consequences"
- Japan (vaguely on-script)
- Switzerland ...
- Costa Rica ...
- S. Korea/Rep. of: bright kid, sign not lit but present, on-script

14 total plus New Zealand, Australia, EU spoken for

A smaller but sizeable number say something different, which is more interesting.

- Indonesia ("alleged chemical attacks" - "transparent , impartial investigation" needed to prevent doubts, disagreement - few if any digs at Russia or Syria, past must comply, etc.)

- South Africa (reports should be true reflections of the investigation, at least suggesting they may not be that way right now, or they lose credibility - not because of Russian lies - few if any digs at Russia or Syria)

- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: much of the usual included, emphasis on eloquence, and conspicuously trying to take both sides with grandmotherly wisdom - a debatable approach but I think she swings it, in tandem with some vanilla vagueness - accountability is important, Syria must cooperate etc. but also OPCW "must be beyond reproach" (not IS?), urges that standards apply, emphasizing transparency, mentions possible "rigorous scrutiny" it could withstand and shouldn't fear - it should not be politicized - mutual trust with state parties is central to its working right - and she states her government's position as for universal principles for all humanity, against "SELECTIVE uneven and unpredictable truths" ("full stop") ... applications serving "hegemonic power or great power ambitions." Tiny countries often do, especially in support of Western projects like the war on Iraq. Sounds like she's saying "no" to any such deal, from either side. In general terms.

- Vietnam: softly but pragmatically issues a quick agreement to the basics of FFM being trusted to decide such matters, then lodges a question (rhetorical, I think), or a puzzle maybe, to the effect: so how do you check and find out if they are doing their work properly? It seems like a possible scenario in his mind, and - by extension, I'll add it could appear some states were seeking to shield it from scrutiny to protect its corrupted but useful process. He might have suggested their answer to how you check is "you don't. we said blind trust, full stop."

- Niger "truth ... eventually," so far investigations "have not allowed us to establish responsibility for the atrocities committed in a manner which is acceptable to all" - investigations must be inclusive, the lack of consensus, etc. means OPCW's credibility is in actual danger (not just in Russian lies), favors a "serene technical analysis" over shrill political accusations, etc.
- China: thanks panel, naming Henderson as part of it - mentions doubts and controversy, including by relevant experts - valuable information was presented, transparency should be enhanced from current standards, "China opposes hasty conclusions or arbitrary accusations" - again, their feeling were strong enough they - not Russia - convened the meeting. As such they got the first word after the panel's presentation (v 1:22:20), followed directly by the US denouncing the Russian stunt.
- Islamic Republic of Iran: Calm presentation in English - Syria surrendered its CW program, is fighting terrorism, works with OPCW - Syria has been a victim of the CW attacks - Iran knows all about them too - it seems the opposite of truth prevails, FFM reports are sub-standard, politically biased
- Egypt: The Egyptian ambassador delivers a seemingly strange and tangential statement emphasizing non-state actors and terrorists, crediting Syrian claims on some states helping train terrorists in CW use and also moving the terrorists to Libya - (sounds like "country X" in both regards) - but more on topic, the OPCW needs the highest levels of accuracy, yet some relevant reports were ignored, adding to questions raised about their objectivity. Stability and security are mentioned as top goals for Syria, "accountability" not mentioned - likely would say accountability was needed for the terrorist groups they suspect were to blame for the Douma incident, but that can of worms was left unopened for the moment.
- Russia, with the presentation, gets credit for anchoring the list of those not on the western script.
- Syria - in the panel and being their rep, of course Jaafari counts just like the Russians.
10 total

It's not clear what all other states were in attendance but didn't speak. I see signs lit up for but heard no words (directly) from: Slovakia, Latvia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Burundi, Argentina, Greece, Kazakhstan, G(eorgia?), Belarus, and  New Zealand is there with sign lit, but is spoken for by Canada - and they're seated together out of alphabetical order.