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Sunday, August 5, 2018

Witness Profile: Moaed Dumane

August 5, 2018

Just a quick post since I already did the research. This is a minor witness, not widely-cited or seemingly central to things. But he does seem to be a liar. 

https://www.newyorker.com/news/as-told-to/a-survivor-describes-the-chemical-attack-in-syria

"Moaed Dumane, a twenty-seven-year-old media activist and political-science student who works with the Syrian opposition," spoke with reporter Fariba Nawa before he left with those who preferred Islamist-controlled Idlib over government-controlled Douma. Dumane almost surely means Doumani, which is sometimes a real name, but on a guy from here, it's likely a pseudonym, meaning "from Douma." Abu Hamza al-Doumani, for example, is a made-up activist name.

"He has lived in the besieged rebel enclave for nearly all of Syria’s seven-year civil war. He said that thirty-three members of his family were killed in executions by Syrian government forces in 2012, including his father, his brother, two of his uncles, and many of his cousins. He was shot in the hand and survived by playing dead beneath the bodies of his relatives."

But this fighting age male miraculously survived, got to live and speak for everyone else. Huh. 33 family members killed. Well, these should largely have the same last name as he (brothers and sisters, father but not mother, brothers' kids but not sisters' kids, etc.). The Douma-based VDC lists:
* No one named "Dumane" killed in the whole war
* 5 Doumanis killed in 2012 by all causes, in all areas: none from Douma 
* 172 of all names from Douma, field executed in 2012 - 21 women, 7 boys, 6 girls,  138 men/left blank. Of these:
** 5 named Koubaitari, 6 named Safadi, no name repeated enough to be his 33-member family. Other names are less common yet.
** But nearly half the entries, 56 total, are unidentified (all men/left blank). Probably one of those is a single family of 33 representing the bulk of those the ruling Islamists didn't bother naming. But I see no day where 33 are listed as dying. The worst days are Aug. 17 (12 killed, all UNID) and Sept. 4 (19 dead, all UNID). These do total 31, but no 33+ on any single day. Were they killed in 2 big shifts, and never named, despite this media activist? He happens to be a member of the most-killed yet unnamed family in Douma massacre history, who survived that purge to tell that and other tales.

Or are they named? Somehow I forgot to scan page 2 until after checking an old ACLOS page.
http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Douma_Massacre_(early_July)
directs to still active alleged witness video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOdg3G4ttUQ
14 family members attacked June 28 for no reason, Shabiha killed 10 dead, 2 were wounded, 2 unwounded - the guy speaking seems to have no hand wound, but he has a bandaged foot, and might be the or a survivor - might be about 21, here in 2012, to Moaed's 27 in 2018. He says 2 nephews bled to death (are these among the 2 wounded or 10 killed?) - named Mahmoud Salem Temeh and Nizar Temeh. This appears (varied spelling) in the VDC's database for June 28 Douma executions. The names given don't appear, but some entries are unnamed sons of Alaa and Yaser Tomeh - none from a Salim - But it's not 10, 12, or even 14 dead, but 19 just named Tomeh, or unnamed wife of one, +10 others named al-Roub, Sleik, Restum, Awad, and Smadi, should include a wife or two, and perhaps are all interrelated. (Smadi appears as the name of a woman victim of the Douma chemical attack on April 7, 2018). The 29 are 16 men, 8 women, 3 boys, 2 girls. same day, all causes, 70 killed in Douma, those 29 plus 51 killed by shooting, shelling. 4 men named Al-Slek killed by shelling - app. related to Sleiks massacred, who are perhaps related to the rest killed - 29+4 = 33 possible family members killed in a rather targeted massacre.

So that might be Moaed's story, or maybe he's the other of 2-4 survivors, while the other fighting-age guy the same age with a wounded foot also survived - or maybe this just can't be correlated with anything on the record.

Anyway, he also survived the Douma chemical attack and told the tale.
“On Saturday, heavy shelling and air strikes started in Douma, targeting everything that was moving. I was with my family and the neighbors in the shelters. The Assad regime was attacking us. Several barrel bombs fell from a helicopter, and then there was a strong, strange smell."

Note: chlorine's smell should not be "strange" to most people, especially after years of reported incidents across Syria. By experience or repetition, everyone should be aware what it smells like, and describe it as "like cleaning products" or something. This could mean nothing, or be a clue to some special knowledge.

"We, my friends and I, who document atrocities, couldn’t move closer to the area because of continued shelling. After the bombardment subsided, we went to check out where the barrel bombs fell, then we saw a lot of families in their homes who couldn’t escape."

How many people did they see in how many homes? We saw 35 bodies in a few apartments in one building.

“Their pupils were narrow. Most victims were women and children. It was a horrific scene. The smell was extremely strong. The dead were moved to makeshift medical clinics. Most were dead from suffocation. The attack didn’t stop that night but the next day. The medical clinics were bombed, and most were completely destroyed. The locations that were shelled were the homes of civilians, far away from front lines."

The locations also seem to be where no bombs fell that day, but where activists Moaed might know seemingly dragged two chlorine cylinders into place and set the gas flowing.

Swept Under the Rug part 2

Swept Under the Rug
The Plot to Delay the OPCW Douma Probe and Manipulate the Evidence

Part 2: Scrub Marks?
August 5, 2018

In Swept Under the Rug part 1 we looked at the minor delays in the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) investigation of the Douma chemical incident of April 7. That delay was unfairly blamed on Damascus and Moscow, allegedly used to buy time and scrub the crime scenes of clues. Now we turn to what was and wasn't found once they got to Douma and, as best I can, to what it actually means.

No Sarin: That's A Problem

With the release of the OPCW's interim report in July (PDF link), we have some information from the scene that might contain clues of any meddling. We finally learn that all the environmental and biological samples so far tested (not all of them, but about one in three) suggest chlorine exposure - Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid, etc.

There are some questions raised by other researchers and activists about these "chlorinated compounds," which I'll make a separate space to consider. Not knowing for sure, it seems their findings confirm a chlorine release, despite the lack of specificity. If so, headlines declaring chlorine found are premature - as the BBC acknowledged changing one - but the gist is probably accurate anyway. They likely have confirmed it or will in time.

But the tests come up negative for the expected sarin nerve agent, its breakdown products, or anything similar.
2.5 The results of the analysis of the prioritised samples submitted to OPCW designated laboratories were received by the FFM team on 22 May 2018. No organophosphorus nerve agents or their degradation products were detected, either in the environmental samples or in plasma samples from the alleged casualties. … Work by the team to establish the significance of these results is ongoing. 
Technically, one organophosphorus nerve agent surfaced; the commercial pesticide malathion. This likely means nothing as it's so common, but in context, it could be extremely relevant… a dedicated post to explore that is forthcoming (comments best saved for there, after I make my case).

Anyway, the report explains how 31 samples were selected for first analysis - those deemed most important and/or fragile (see point 8.6). By the report's annex 3, these are 11 biological samples (blood and plasma) and 20 environmental samples. The latter showed chlorine-related compounds, unexplained explosives residue, and other things of no clear consequence (including a flame retardant found in some fabric). But over and over it says for all 31 samples "No chemicals relevant to CWC have been found" or "No nerve agent related chemicals detected."

As I explain here, that's a big problem for the opposition's claims, because chlorine alone can hardly explain 35 people dropping dead on site. Sarin or similar very well could, if it even makes sense to deploy it along with chlorine (which is an open question of some importance). But it now seems there wasn't any sarin. Not everyone acknowledges it, but this doesn't add up.

MediaLens ran a good analysis of the problem. "It is worth reiterating again – as media responses to the OPCW's latest report, conspicuously, have not - that chlorine was not a sufficiently deadly agent to cause either the claimed level of carnage or the claimed level of Western moral outrage. " Activists reported symptoms of nerve agent, the death toll and appearance of sudden death highly suggested it, and in fact U.S. government officials claimed they had blood samples showing an unnamed nerve agent.

NBC News, April 12: "The U.S. now has blood and urine samples from last Saturday's deadly attack ...The samples suggested the presence of both chlorine gas and an unnamed nerve agent, two officials said." It's unlikely tests could detect chlorine exposure (see below), so they can't likely show this plus sarin. "The officials said they were "confident" in the intelligence, though not 100 percent sure." With this confidence aired, on April 14 president Trump ordered the launch of missiles at Assad's alleged nerve agent factories (recently cleared by the OPCW, however) and, less mentioned, Syria's well-defended airfields. Soon U.S. officials were specifying sarin was the nerve agent, but not citing blood or urine tests - just "information" suggesting it (DoS briefing, 4-17), and deduction from reported symptoms (DoD report, 4-18). Was the talk of samples just a confident prediction? If so, the confidence seems ill-placed. The OPCW tested several people who claimed to be exposed in the same incident, and none showed that alleged nerve agent result.

No Sarin Traces Rally Means No Sarin

Some people - if they acknowledge the evidence is broken at all - will decide the Russians or Syrians broke it, by removing the traces of the necessary poison. But one CW expert didn't think that was likely, when he spoke to the Guardian for an April 17 report: "Jerry Smith, who helped supervise the OPCW-led withdrawal of much of Syria’s sarin stockpile in 2013 … said it was likely that residual samples of nerve agent would remain for at least another week, even after an attempted clean-up." Read literally, that would be at least until April 24 - 17 days after the incident. Investigators arrived April 21 at one site, and on the 25th at the other. By Smith's assessment, they would be likely to turn up such clues then, if they ever existed. But as far as we know, he's no expert in regime-blaming, where different standards of science seem to apply.

In contrast, British CRBN expert Hamish de Bretton-Gordon is a stalwart regime-blamer, and tells Josie Ensor at the Telegraph (July 23): "He believes a nerve agent was likely used alongside chlorine ... but that the material had badly degraded in the two weeks it took inspectors to get to the site." A lack of "timely access from the (Syrian) government" was the problem that led to this suspected erasure of the evidence. But as we've seen, if it was simple delay to blame, it wasn't Syria or Russia behind that. (snippets via Malika on Twitter).

So experts disagree - all sarin traces are either likely to vanish from the site within 14 days, or likely to persist for at least 17 days. This isn't possible to call with certainty. My prior research has little or nothing on delayed environmental samples, but there is this: My list of impure sarin incidents includes two attacks against Syrian soldiers in the days after the 2013 Ghouta attack, and in the same basic area (Damascus Suburbs). 8-24-2013 Jobar, and 8-25-2013 Ashrafiah Sahnaya. In fact, the Jobar attack was just meters from the apparent firing area for the Ghouta attack's rockets. It was rebel-held, just then being contested and hence the attack by cornered Islamists. At right is the firing spot (approximate - explained) compared to the 8-24 incident location, per UN report, p. 62. (Yes, I'm suggesting rebels there fired the sarin-linked rockets blamed for the absurd Assad attack as reported)

No one died in either attack, but some soldiers were seriously affected. Plasma samples were taken by the Syrian Government on the day of each attack, and at least 4 from Jobar and 5 from the other attack tested positive for Sarin signatures. Those nine samples from the two cases were re-tested by UN-OPCW investigators on September 26 and 28, about a month later (as explained in the UN report linked above). These were DNA matched to the same soldiers earlier tested, and found mostly to be negative. But one sample from the August 24 incident still tested positive, and that's enough to suggest they all did, like the Syrian tests had said, but the signs had mostly faded by then.

So by this, about a month out, signs will sometimes appear in the body (probably a high-exposure case), but usually will not. Three weeks seems like a rough but fair outer limit for detection in most cases.

That's inside the body, with metabolic activity breaking it down, and only byproducts (if telling ones) actually found. Just laying in the environment the decay should be slower and simpler. I had picked that up somewhere... but it could be about the same, or even faster, depending. I can't get more specific at the moment, but it seems likely both of these estimates above are short, one out of caution and one out political expediency.

Furthermore, if a time delay cast any serious doubt over the findings, so there may have been sarin at the site at one point, the OPCW should have mentioned this. They don't mention this, so implicitly, all samples were gathered within what they consider the time frame of detection.

Just two weeks out, the chlorine signs turn up uniformly, but not the sarin ones. So what, if anything, was scrubbed? The methods and details of any cleanup being unclear, we can't say for sure, but probably nothing. It could be the crime scene was found just as nonsensical as the Islamists left it; some non-lethal chlorine was released, 35 people with non-red eyes allegedly dropped dead in piles, and Assad is to blame.

The Incomplete Site Search
The OPCW report mentions how during their visit to location 2 (the crucial 35-bodies site), Syrian authorities "did not provide the access requested by the FFM team to some apartments within the building, which were closed at the time. The Syrian Arab Republic representatives stated that they did not have the authority to force entry into the locked apartments." (point 8.10)

In fact their access may have been quite incomplete. "8.11 The FFM had full access to other areas of interest within the same building, namely the balcony where the cylinder had allegedly impacted, the apartment directly below this, and the basement of the same apartment block." All listed samples are from levels 3 (balcony), level 2 (apartment beneath that) and level -1 (the basement). None are from the floors in between (levels 0 and 1 as they'd say, or floors 1 and 2 as we do here). These were perhaps entirely un-accessed. Two samples were collected at level 0: both concrete found in the street outside the building. Inside on the ground floor, and on the level above, is where all but 7 of the 35 bodies were found on the night of the attack. Chlorine supposedly made people drop dead on the spot in those spots. Did it mix with something here? Perhaps no clues were gathered at all to help shed light on that.

There's also no mention of samples taken from the stairwell. That would be the gas' spread route down to the victims, and 3 bodies were found there that night. It was surely accessible to the FFM, used to go from the basement to the top. Heavier traffic there is more likely to disrupt the clues, but the corners might have been worth testing.

Whatever the doors to whatever areas, the OPCW says the Syrians claimed someone locked them and they had no authority to force entry. Considering the gravity of the situation, with chemical "inspectors" flying into a war zone and Syrian officers getting wounded trying to get them to the site, with acts of war already carried out based on someone's impression of this crime, and with the mileage made of any possible sign of obfuscation from Damascus ... it might have been wiser to suspend that rule. They could be forgiven for breaking down enough doors in an abandoned building to get a clear scientific picture, and leave as little as possible to speculate over. They'd be denounced for brutally kicking-in doors, but that's life.

Because valid or not, this will be reason enough for some to write-off the whole investigation. It could be concluded the scrubbed up sarin traces were piled and swept under a rug in one of these rooms, and they've probably been moved since, now hidden Raiders of the Lost Ark style along with Iraq's vanished WMDs.

But then, any inconvenient scientific findings can be ignored with no reason at all. We'll come back to the locked doors.

Blood-Scrubbing?
Now who has ever accused Russia and Syria of holding inspectors up so they could finish removing sarin traces from the blood of the victims? No one. That sounds pretty stupid. Such talk always refered to the attack sites. But what else can explain the absence of that required sarin even in the bodily fluids of people who swear they were gassed just the same way?

According to the OPCW report's annexes, plasma and blood samples were collected from April 17 to 30, directly by their Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), or mostly handed in by coded sources of unknown reliability - probably Islamist activists in league with the former administrators. Apparently, none of these tested for sarin either: "No organophosphorus nerve agents or their degradation products were detected, either in the environmental samples or in plasma samples from the alleged casualties."

The definition of "casualties" isn't clear except that, as the report explains, none of those actually killed is included. Apparently none of those was sampled - at least not reliably enough for their standards - prior to burial. At report time, the OPCW still hadn't exhumed any decaying bodies, but hoped to in time. Perhaps they alone also show (showed) signs of sarin? Not likely, but we're left wondering.

There is precedent - Moadamiya, Aug. 21 2013. UN-OPCW investigators found no reliable sign of sarin in the environment, but an almost total positive for people allegedly exposed there (see WhoGhouta). And this was just a couple of days after the incident, not two weeks. That's a suspected false-flag fail due to poor coordination. The same could have happened in Douma, potentially, especially under the losing conditions.

Also recall in the 2013 Ghouta attack, from all the alleged 1,429, 1,700 fatalities, or whatever it really was (hundreds are for sure), none of them at all was tested by the UN-OPCW, who chose to rely on the alleged survivors with dubious patterns like that mess-up in Moadamiya. (see here) Again in Douma, 2018, so far the pivotal people are left out of the science part of things. The bodies of all chemical victims ("some 50" to the reported total of 43) were said, by alleged CW program defector Zaher Sakat, to be buried in a secret location in or near Douma. (EA Worldview). This is reportedly a singular mass grave, as the Islamists usually do for useful massacre victims with really busy families, I guess. The OPCW was reportedly informed of the location, but the regime apparently didn't know it. Mohammed Alloush, a senior official of Jaish al-Islam (the former occupying force in Douma), "claimed on Tuesday night that Assad forces are digging up graves in a search for the bodies of victims, hoping to remove them before the OPCW inspectors can test for chemical exposure." (EA Worldview, same link)

So the tested "casualties" are not any of the dead, and could be people who claim to have been in one of the gassed buildings, or to have encountered the gas in the streets or elsewhere. We're not sure even what's alleged about their exposure, except that implicitly, it's to the gas Assad dropped that day, the stuff in question.

A table A 3.2 shows 11 samples set aside (for testing?). Nine are taken on April 21, with two taken on the 18th, but not tested by lab DL02 for some reason (both were "handed over by 1757" - see table A 4). The nine others have results saying: "No relevant chemicals found" from lab 2, with lab 3 offering a more specific blanket list of what wasn't found, apparently for all 11: any of 3 major signs of nerve agent exposure to G type agents (including sarin, or GB) and V-type agents (like VX).
Note this all says nothing for or against chlorine exposure, which doesn't leaves any lasting traces you can test for. Physicians for Human Rights (supports the Syrian opposition, seems credible on this point) has a PDF that explains "Diagnosis of acute chlorine gas toxicity is primarily clinical, based on respiratory difficulties and irritation." Many things can cause these symptoms, however. It says you can also look for signs of stress and damage to the lungs or heart consistent with CL, or anything else that causes such damage (same problem). So the presence of the chlorine smell is one of the best methods to diagnose it. Otherwise, the environment can be tested for CL release by air monitoring right after, or testing soil, etc. later on, and if it's found, one can presume that the patient was exposed there. But from this and all else I've seen, there's no direct medical test  for exposure, even very soon after the fact. (adding: CDC document says "There are no medical tests to determine whether you have been exposed specifically to chlorine."

These results do clearly  rule out sarin or anything similar, at least in the cases of those alleged casualties. Hamish de Bretton-Gordon thinks the clues had all degraded. But for that to apply to biological samples as well, it's not likely to fade that much in 11 of 11 selected blood samples, collected between 10 and 23 days after the incident. As explained above, it turns up in previous OPCW tests on blood drawn for up to a month after exposure, at least in the one case out of nine.

Furthermore, the table above shows that lab DL03 ran tests for peptide/nerve agent adducts (nonapeptide). As I hear this paper explains, these tests aren't affected by aging
of the adduct, so such a short delay is well-nigh impossible to cause a false-negative. 
Marsillach J, Costa LG, Furlong CE. PROTEIN ADDUCTS AS BIOMAKERS OF
EXPOSURE TO ORGANOPHOSPHORUS COMPOUNDS. Toxicology. 2013;307:46-54.
doi:10.1016/j.tox.2012.12.007.
http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3747771
"These OP-adducted enzymes remain in circulation for times that are dependent on their half-lives, which are generally much longer than the half-lives of the parent OP compound or its metabolites, providing a longer window for detection than the analysis of urinary metabolites or free OPs in blood or urine. Further, it is possible to learn something about the OP of exposure due to the mass differences between different adducts."

And finally, the same point raised above; the OPCW should have mentioned it if there was any serious chance the time delay alone caused the false negative in blood or plasma samples. 

As noted, the opposition story makes little sense with no nerve agent. Its failure to appear in people claiming to be affected by that attack is something the Russians and Syrians cannot have messed up. It's most likely to have persisted until sampling time, but none was found. The clear conclusion: none of those people was ever exposed to sarin, and no sarin was released at either attack site, and so ... the opposition story makes little sense.

And there are some other really weird things about these crime scenes anyway.

Unexplained Fire Evidence, Missing Valve Evidence
The burned wall just beneath the cylinder hole at site 2 is a real mystery. It also has two cleaned spots on it (along the left edge of the black area - see below). Did the Russians or Syrians try washing this off and stop early? Or did someone fleeing, someone in a bigger rush, abandon this project? Ahmed or Boris scrubs a spot with soap and water to depressing effect. Then Hafiz or Ivan tries with this oxygen stuff or a solvent higher up the wall and it works great. But both agree that either way, it would take too long to clean that all up. Hopefully it would just go ignored.

Let's keep both kinds of possible site-scrubbers in mind, but for this bit of work, neither is probably to blame. The OPCW interim report lists samples 21 and 22 as wipes taken "from the burnt wall in the room located under the cylinder" on level 2 (where ground floor is level 0). Entry 21 (bottom smudge, I presume) was taken with water, and 22 with DCM (Dichloromethane - a standard solvent). These samples are not tested yet, or testing results were not published in the July report. It will likely show what kind of accelerant was used to start the fire, at least.

So no one cleaned that up or tried, because it doesn't seem very possible, and maybe not worth it. But that fire in the corner in fact may be a telltale clue; someone might eventually regret being unable to erase it. It was lit, apparently on purpose, on top of the concrete rubble, but sometime before the first video around 10pm on April 7. This I explain here for the benefit of some folks at or working with the New York Times, who seem to have no idea there was an unexplained fire involved, as they called its soot on the gas cylinder some kind of "corrosion" from chlorine contacting the metal.

If one accepts that rubble is from the cylinder's impact around 7:30 that same night, as most do, and release started then … why on Earth would someone be sitting in the gas cloud to light a fire as a first order of business? Why would they also drag a curtain, a package of blankets (?) and so on on top of that rubble? As fuel for the fire, perhaps, not knowing how much was needed for … that unclear purpose.

The black material over (and rinsing off of) the gas cylinder's yellow paint looks like the same soot the OPCW sampled, from the mostly unmentioned fire - so it was set in that hole at the time, and the black part is the underside in that position, the part set over the hole. As seen at 10pm, the fire is done, soot will be deposited as it is around the upper walls and ceiling. But on the cylinder we can't see it, because now it's releasing its gas slowly, causing auto-refrigeration and the frosted underside in that same area, which also has the lowest elevation. (thanks to the folks at Bellingcat for helping us figure this out).

My theory: the fire was set beneath the staged cylinder to melt the fusible plug in its valve assembly. It's a little-known but fairly safe and easy way to release the chlorine. (see above link) The purpose would be just for staging and "realism." The smell doesn't help with video, but the frost comes through. Chlorine color stains appear at the other site, and it seems chlorinated compounds resulted and were found in both spots. Mission accomplished?

It's noteworthy the visible part of the valve assembly is missing the whole time. It could be broken off on impact and lost, or unscrewed manually and hidden from view. Its twin found on the bedrest cylinder didn't vanish (see below, left), but most others we've seen over the years do, at least by video time if not on impact. In that case, the gas would pour uncontrollably out of the broken stem. So it's plausible that happened here, despite the less-than-usual damage seen with both Douma cylinders.

Below right is the first known view of the gas cylinder after the attack, during a time of complete Islamist control, mid-day on April 8. (compare: the intact valve on the bedrest cylinder at left). From a side-view, broken off cleanly or already unscrewed and gone is impossible to say. And those oddly-placed slats of metal prevent a good view of the valve area from below in every view I've seen. It's possible this is why they were placed, to block our view of this point of evidence.

The OPCW's samples 3 and 4 are swabs taken on the 21st from "inside the cylinder orifice (level 3)," meaning this one (the other cylinder has no level associated, just a bed, and they were gathered a different day). This suggests the valve was removed by then anyway, and they wiped from the exposed threads in there. The chlorine traces were found on it, but very faint; a dry sawb revealed nothing, one with water yielded "chloride" and dichloracetic acid - which is caused when chlorine mixes with water. Only a trace amount (that appears more readily when activated by water?) came in contact later, as most of the chlorine poured out through the valve assembly, which was in place then and only removed later. 

So it seems quite likely someone removed this key piece of evidence from the scene. It's impossible so far to be sure when this happened other than before the OPCW's FFM had their look. But if they were trying to hide the extra hole melted in its side, they were covering for evidence manipulations carried out when the Islamists were still firmly in control.

Other Signs of Cover-up and False-Flag (select)

- minimal/illogical damage - as seen above, the extreme ceiling damage compared to minimal cylinder damage and its stopping next to the hole is illogical - if it just stops after sustaining a minor dent, then what force flung some of the concrete's reinforcing bar so far out of place? At the other site, we see limited bed damage after severe roof damage, a cylinder with a very slight overall bend and its harness still on, and an extremely non-vertical angle suggested between the hole and the bed. That's not likely dropped from 2km up, but either hurled in on a catapult or, more likely, planted.

- the explosives residue the OPCW found at each site could prove there was a prior attack in each spot with a mortar or some such (anything that employs TNT), causing the holes and the rubble blamed on the cylinders. Or they could be meaningless background traces. This is a point I'll be addressing in another post...

- scrape marks on cylinder and minimal/illogical damage suggest manual planting at the site of prior damage, much better than they support an aerial drop. Noting these repeated double-scratches are the same distance apart as some loose bars of the damaged lattice:

- Frost on the cylinder underside at 10:06 pm might suggest gas release began well after the alleged impact time around 7:30. This deserves more scrutiny by experts. New York Times investigators heard that, depending on conditions, a full cylinder can take "hours" to empty. The implication is it usually takes a time better described as "minutes." It better take more than 2.5 hours in these conditions. (and be sure to use reliable local weather records, from METARS, Damascus airport, and the right day - not from sources that use predictive models, like the OPCW does). 

- Unexplained vapor device: seen in the stairwell in the 10pm video, as rescuers rush about in gas mask, just now rescuing people, this canister with tube is seen emitting a mystery smoke or gas (whitish, unclear weight, consistent with many things, poorly seen). It's partly hidden under some black material, possibly a shoulder bag, but shuffled to be almost fully visible, in the middle of the stairs from floor 2 down to the landing. On the next flight of stairs from the landing down to ground floor is a similar size piece of fabric or bag off to the side halfway down, possibly concealing a second canister like this. There's been no mention of or explanation yet for this. (see Human Rights Investigations analysis )

- Bleached clothing vs. white eyes: Some bodies in or near the stairwell display wet spots on their clothes as if splashed with bleach and/or laid in it, or more likely by the variety, had still-wet clothes contact chlorine gas. It their clothes were exposed, their eyes must have been. But they never did turn red, so the chlorine exposure happened only after they were already dead (no moving blood to get them bloodshot). And since they remain white, we can be fairly sure their eyes weren't exposed to chlorine before death either. But they died, then chlorine rolled over their bodies. 

- The victims who were dead before any chlorine exposure also appear planted, clustered and even piled fairly near the exit/entrance, up to water sources, where they apparently had their hair and faces washed, well after death but before the first images of the scene. A post coming to explain some details better. The strange washing is explained already here.

- Very unusual clinical signs suggest the victims were controlled captives of the retreating Islamists, killed in a deliberate and strange chemical extermination. The mask-like stains on their faces have never been seen before, and are best explained by the victims hanging upside down, with swimmer's goggles protecting their eyes, left coughing a yellow-brown fluid up their faces until dead, staining the area all around but not in their eyes (pooling up under the goggles before rolling around and dripping away). See Douma's mask of death

Stranger than fiction, truth can be, and I wouldn't just decide to make up something so strange. I'm looking for anything less crazy but adequate. So far this is the best I or anyone. I've asked can think of to explain those bizarre mask-like stains all around, but not in, the victims' non-irritated eyes, and sometimes not along lines like tight straps (right: artistic extract of the pattern as seen in an extra-vivid but icky case). Aside from the weirdness of it, this explanation fits what we see perfectly. The same clues would explain extra face and hair washing so widely suggested - these ugly signs were probably worse on first delivery.

Bondage and googles could even explain how chlorine actually could kill 35 people without causing any red eyes. But then, a killing done with impure sarin would look roughly the same, or with just the impurities, or with many things, so lets' wait for the science if possible. But whatever the poison, this manner of delivery clearly would place the crime on local terrorists tying people up, not on some passing helicopter. 
- less forensically, we have the usual package of circumstantial clues - the adult male all-seeing miracle survivors who labor to explain their alleged share of the dead - the complete lack of a rational motive for the infidels selected for blame by the deceitful Islamists probably behind the whole thing, etc.

- VDC reports April 9 on Russian police visit to the sites, wondering if they tampered with anything as they kept locals away from. But they note "Simultaneously, Jaish Al-Islam also made it difficult to hold independent investigation and documentation of the site yesterday and tried to bar witnesses from documenting and photographing any evidence." (thanks Qoppa999)

Saturday, July 28, 2018

Swept Under the Rug, Part 1

Swept Under the Rug
The Plot to Delay the OPCW Douma Probe and Manipulate the Evidence

Part 1: Delaying the Probe
July 28/29, 2018
update Aug. 5

The Douma Incident and Probe Creation
Some 12km northeast of central Damascus, Douma was by April, 2018, the last opposition-held area in the capitol's East Ghouta suburbs. It too was squeezed to partial surrender by April 7, when a Syrian government helicopter allegedly dropped two chlorine bombs on two buildings, killing at least 43 civilians.

The last of the occupying Islamist opposition forces surrendered the following day, either "to save lives" as they claimed, or because they finally had no choice. Militants and civilians who opted to would be allowed to leave for rebel-held territory in Idlib, and already were before the final surrender. But most residents chose to remain, and some former residents started trying to return.

Under the surrender agreement, Russian military police - not the Syrian Arab Army - would run security in Douma. Russian troops visited the sites of the alleged chemical attack on the afternoon of April 9th, claiming to find no signs of a chemical attack, and sharing some video of their investigation (right: arriving at the site with 35 bodies). This clearly fed into the following accusations that the Russians tampered with the site to erase signs of their allies' crime.

That same day, an urgent investigation was formed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with everyone - including the Syrian and Russian governments - agreeing. The OPCW's Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) investigators got organized, and were ready to set out by the 13th. They were in Syria and ready to work on Saturday the 14th. So all this explains the first week of delay following the attack - nothing unreasonable, and nothing yet that can be blamed on Syria or Russia.

On that same day, April 14, the U.S., U.K., and France showed confidence in their own pre-investigation findings by launching missile strikes on suspected chemical weapons sites in Syria. These powers then gave it a full two days before they started crying foul over the delay in an investigation they weren't waiting for anyway.

Note: the widely-noted reports from medics, the boy Hassan Diab, many other locals, as passed on by Robert Fisk and many others, are valid evidence against an open, widespread gas release with the 500 alleged patients. That's evidence, not proof (I personally accept their version, but obviously not everyone does). Their version is disputed by other residents, but not in a convincing and consistent manner. The "no attack" witnesses clearly win, in my opinion. But even if their claims are true, and even considering the apparent staging and fake claims lodged by the opposition, consider this: only two sites were reportedly stricken, one of which had almost everyone inside allegedly die. These reports from around Douma and in clinics can't prove there was no limited release inside such a place - the gas wouldn't spread much or at all past those walls, and few if any inhabitants would be rushing the clinics, as they mainly dropped dead (allegedly).

So the option of a chemical attack would remain open, neither proven nor disproven, and not even firmly challenged by the valid but limited views of the residents we've heard from. Here we focus on just these two sites with the chlorine gas cylinders allegedly dropped from the air, and primarily on the famous one that had some 35 dead civilians found inside (as I count them: 12 girls, 10 women, 6 boys, 5 men, 2 infants (perhaps both girls)).

On July 6, the OPCW issued an interim report (S/1645/2018 - PDF link) that gives some new insights into the delays in their investigation of the April 7 incident, and oddities with the evidence that might be linked to that. This will be frequently cited in this article as 'the OPCW interim report.'

The Case for Tampering
New York Times, April 16:
Chemical arms inspectors were blocked on Monday [the 16th] from the site ... raising Western suspicions that Syria and its Russian ally were scrubbing the stricken area of evidence.
The inspectors, who wanted to take samples and interview people, “are currently being prevented from doing so by the regime and the Russians,” Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain said in Parliament."
May "accused Syria and Russia of blocking access and attempting to cover up the attack," the Guardian reported on April 16, as "the UK’s OPCW delegation urged "Russia & Syria must cooperate." The suggestion is they were not cooperating for some pretty evident reason, and required pressure.

The French Foreign Ministry said they believed it was "highly likely that evidence and essential elements disappeared from the site, which is completely controlled by the Russian and Syrian armies." (DW)

The U.S. ambassador to the OPCW, Kenneth Ward, said since "the Russians may have visited the attack site," there was "concern" that "they may have tampered with it with the intent of thwarting the efforts of the OPCW fact-finding mission to conduct an effective investigation.” This was said at a closed-door OPCW meeting, but was swiftly made public on the 16th, presumably to increase the pressure on the stonewalling villain states. (Washington Post)

U.S. State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert followed up on the 17th, reiterating Ward's comments and adding: "We've seen that the Russian government and the Syrian government - their whole goal in this is to try to cover up. Their goal is to try to deflect attention." However, when pressed, she explained "in terms of what exactly is happening on the ground to prevent (the OPCW team) from getting there in a quicker time frame is not something that I can discuss or get into." For some reason, she refuses to explicitly blame them; as if she knew there was another cause.

Non-Issues on Both Sides
One issue Nauert and others labored to refute was part of that "deflection" by the Syrian government; on the 17th SANA, Syrian state TV, reported that the OPCW's FFM investigators actually had entered Douma. But that seems more like an error by SANA: As the Daily Sabah report noted: "Syrian state media reported Tuesday that inspectors ... had entered Douma, but the Syrian government later said that only a U.N. advance security team had entered."

That would be a pretty dumb and short-lived lie. Luckily it was thoroughly debunked. Scott Lucas, EA Worldwview: "The Assad regime continued to stall ...even resorting to the lie that the (FFM) had reached Douma. State news agency SANA put out the false information, which was circulated by many mainstream outlets. … Finally, the Assad regime’s UN ambassador Bashar al-Ja’afari walked back the line.." or corrected the error, depending. "Finally" is later that day. Baseless gripes move fast.

The Russians seem to have some baseless charges too. a Reuters report stated "Moscow denied the charge and blamed delays on retaliatory U.S.-led missile strikes on Syria on Saturday." This rebuttal seems like a red herring; it's apparently based on an impression that the site to be visited was under bombardment in the strikes on April 14. The Guardian's report added this explanation by the Russian deputy envoy at the UN, Dmitry Polyanskiy: “If you go to a site which was just bombed I imagine you might have certain logistic problems."

This was just as the FFM arrived, but didn't continue, and struck areas entirely outside of Douma (though one major target was fairly nearby). The same explanation was repeated recently (Sputnik News), and then again (TASS): Georgy Kalamanov, Russia's head delegate to the OPCW said of the Western coalition attacks "their missiles were about to hit the OPCW mission." But it doesn't seem that's the reason for the small delay.

Fake Security Concerns?
Amid the accusations from some governments, it's unsettling that the departing director general of the OPCW himself voiced concerns, as early as April 16, that the Russians and Syrians were stalling them on purpose. Or, at least, his comments were widely read that way. As The Guardian reported:
Russia and Syria had cited “pending security issues” before inspectors could deploy to the town outside Damascus, said Ahmet Üzümcü, the director general of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), at a meeting of its executive council.
Syrian authorities were offering 22 people to interview as witnesses instead, he said, adding that he hoped “all necessary arrangements will be made … to allow the team to deploy to Douma as soon as possible”.
That Uzumcu has to "hope" they aren't stalling suggests he thinks they are, as they seem to offer alternatives "instead" of allowing access. The implication is the security problem was fake, just an excuse to delay. Most media reports passed it on in that context, scare quotes included. (original statement hard to find - NPR article links to a broken e-mailed PDF link. I didn't locate it anywhere else yet.)

Note: Uzumcu has just now stepped down in a planned retirement. Having headed the OPCW since 2010, he's been at the helm the whole time Syria has been blamed for CW attacks on often dubious evidence. (one important but little-noted example - another) He's from Turkey, has previously been Turkey's ambassador to NATO, and to Israel - not the best qualifications to be an impartial agent in a campaign against a common enemy in the Syrian government.

The Russians offered an alternate reason for the delay; it was the United Nations stalling, but over valid security concerns. This was swiftly rebutted and made to look like a lie by people speaking for the supposedly neutral UN. New York Times, April 16:
Russia — which has questioned whether the Douma attack even happened — ridiculed the Western accusation, asserting that the United Nations had exercised its authority to delay the inspectors for security reasons. 
The United Nations disputed the Russian explanation, saying it had no security issues and wanted the inspectors to reach the site quickly. … a spokesman for the United Nations, Stéphane Dujarric, said the United Nations had given the inspectors “all the necessary clearances.”
But this doesn't seem to be true.

The UN agency that would have security issues - the one he should be referring to - is called the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). It's they who would be responsible for the safety of any OPCW mission. Immediately on deployment, the UNDSS set to assessing the obviously complex situation in Douma, as it emerged from six years of occupation by foreign-backed Islamists. As the OPCW report states:
6.1 ... According to Syrian Arab Republic and Russian Military Police representatives, there were a number of unacceptable risks to the team, including mines and explosives that still needed to be cleared, a risk of explosions, and sleeper cells still suspected of being active in Douma. This assessment was shared by the representative of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). 
So it wasn't a fake concern, as suggested publicly, but a real one the UN's security people shared. Jason Ditz was correct to note at Antiwar.com "Though British officials blamed Russia for the delay, it is now clear that the UNDSS is driving the scheduling." They were delaying work over security concerns, just like the Russians said, and Mr. Dujarric is looking dishonest in disputing that.

In a April 16 meeting under intense pressure, the UNDSS came to an agreement with the Syrian and Russian authorities on accessing the attack sites. As the OPCW interim report explains, the Russian Military Police then in charge could run "security within Douma," while the Syrian government would be in charge everywhere else. (point 6.3) And another small delay was added - by the UN security team. An OPCW statement of April 18 explains "the UNDSS preferred to first conduct a reconnaissance visit to the sites." This was planned for the 17th, with hopes of FFM site inspections by the 18th if the advance mission went well. Russia and Syria agreed to facilitate this. That's the progress on the probe-stalling for the 16th of April, the day the OPCW were reportedly "blocked from the site."

An especially flawed New York Times video report says (at 0:38) "the regime went to great lengths to conceal the evidence." On-screen, a Russian military vehicle is shown driving across the camera's line of sight. Well, it seems we just examined those "great lengths," and there's nothing at all to prove that bold claim. Even a deliberate delay is unproven, let alone active concealment. As we'll see, to propose anything more substantial would require a "conspiracy theory," as they call it.

"The Incident"
The next day, that plan was implemented. DW:
Syria's UN ambassador told the United Nations Security Council Tuesday (the 17th) that a UN security team traveled to the town of Douma, outside the capital Damascus, to ascertain whether it was safe for global chemical weapons experts to visit the site of a suspected chemical weapons attack last week that killed dozens.
Bashar Ja'afari said if the team decides "the situation is sound," the fact-finding mission from the international chemical weapons watchdog — Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons — will start work there Wednesday. 
The situation was not sound. As the OPCW report passes on the details:
"During the reconnaissance visit by UNDSS on 18 April 2018 to assess the first two locations planned to be visited the following day, the security detail was confronted by a hostile crowd and came under fire from small arms and a hand grenade that exploded" This "reportedly resulted in two fatalities and an injury to a Russian soldier."
Whose reports they're relying on isn't mentioned, and it's not explained who was killed. As it turns out, most of those details are wrong. Ambassador Jaafari and all others agree the mission this incident came amid was on the 17th, not the 18th. There were two incidents, not one (one had a crowd, the other had violence). And a Syrian officer, not a Russian one, was wounded. No one else mentions fatalities but still, that part might not be an error.

Sputnik News reports on a statement by the Russian center for Syrian reconciliation, an informed source:
According to the statement released by the Russian center for Syrian reconciliation, which has been observing the ceasefire in the Arab Republic, an exchange of fire between Syrian security officers and unidentified assailants took place in Douma on April 17.
"As a result of the shootout, a Syrian security officer was slightly injured. There were no Russian servicemen at the site of the incident," the statement said.
The Syrian officers have been providing security for UN personnel on a reconnaissance mission to Douma.
The Russian Defense Ministry is cited for a supporting claim that no Russian military personnel were present or involved. The plan was to have the Russians run security, but as Syrian Oberver, reported April 17 report notes "Russian military police have withdrawn from Douma" rather suddenly, in favor of Syrian army troops. This had sparked fears of a massacre, as the Oberver heard (none was ever reported). This little-noted last-minute switch may be the cause of that confusion.

Who, if anyone, died, is also unexplained here. It might well be the attacking militants, or no one, in another reporting error. But it's less likely to report two deaths in error than it is to just not mention it in most reports. Some possible story twists of great significance remain over this issue. (I checked the VDC records for good measure, and they don't seem to list any such victims, unless it's that guy from Dumair.)

OPCW DG Üzümcü's reaction at the time agrees the report's date is wrong. Daily Sabah, April 18: "The head of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said Wednesday [April 18] that a U.N. security team doing reconnaissance in Douma, Syria came under gunfire a day earlier, sources told Reuters." He was said to acknowledge this was a real attack, and what some would call "pending security issues" would delay the FFM's work, after seeming to scoff at the notion recently. As his same-day statement says:
… At present, we do not know when the FFM team can be deployed to Douma. Of course, I shall only consider such deployment following approval by the UNDSS, and provided that our team can have unhindered access to the sites. … This incident again highlights the highly volatile environment in which the FFM is having to work ...
There's no mention of Uzumcu suggesting which side was behind the disruption or what their motive would be. But Al Jazeera's Zeina Khodr noted the accusations of regime stalling, and added "what we understand is that Douma is under the control of the Russian military and the Syrian government. Both of them claimed just a few days ago that the area had been 'fully liberated from terrorists'." Maybe they really had cleansed the place good in just a few days, so that anyone shooting now must be with the government's approval or even on their orders. Maybe the regime admits they have total control, but then makes up lies about "sleeper cells" to delay things … and then maybe they get people to stage sleeper cell violence with real weapons, to make the lies seem true and stall further.

Some people seem sure of this. Hadi al-Bahra of the Saudi-backed High Negotiations Committee, in a tweet, called the shooting incident "a criminal act and efforts for concealment of evidence, in an area where all armed groups have left and handed over completely, as per terms of agreement." He's sure all Saudi-backed Islamists disarmed and left, honoring their pledge like good Saudi-backed Islamists would clearly do. But neither the Russians, the Syians, or the UNDSS was so sure about this, considering "sleeper cells" of them to be a potential danger. That could be who was behind the attack, knowing that anything can be blamed on Syria and Russia, no matter the evidence.

The OPCW's statement of April 18 (PDF link) agrees the incident "took place yesterday," and explains it as having two parts:
On arrival at Site 1, a large crowd gathered and the advice provided by the UNDSS was that the reconnaissance team should withdraw. At Site 2, the team came under small arms fire and an explosive was detonated. The reconnaissance team returned to Damascus. .
It's worth noting the crowd that became an issue at the first site was, on its surface, there to protest the Western-power airstrikes the OPCW is seen as in league with (and not without reason). So most likely they were pro-government people, not anti. The Independent: "An official close to the Syrian government said the UN security team had been met by protesters demonstrating against the US-led strikes. “It was a message from the people,” said the official..."  But that doesn't prove anyone sent them. There's no mention of their being a clear threat anyway, just a presence the team retreated from in caution.

At site 2, no clues are given about the assailants except they were armed and launched a small attack. There's no mention here of any fatalities or even injuries.

So, the Russian-Syrian coverup plot ... there must be some clues of it in there. Did they trick the UNDSS into believing a fake terrorist threat in its first days? Did they launch a false-flag attack against their own security detail on the 17th, wounding a Syrian officer and perhaps losing two of their own attackers to defensive fire? All just to stall the probe in a deniable way, and get another few days of evidence-scrubbing done? 

The Final Delay and Tally of Time Lost
This shooting incident on the 17th shows, ten days after the incident, it wasn't clearly Russia and Syria but mystery militants in Douma blocking the work. OPCW report:
Following the incident, the planned deployment of the FFM team was postponed until the security situation could be reassessed... New routes of access to the locations of interest were identified and modifications to the initial FFM deployment plans were formulated...
This took a few more days, but the investigators were at the sites and collecting samples on the 21st, according to news reports (Reuters) and the later OPCW interim report.

April 7 to 21 is two weeks, the total time lost before first on-site investigation. Half of that time was lost in forming the mission prior to arrival. Once Syria was hosting them, two precious days were lost to setting up the details of a visit, perhaps too rushed for the security situation. A day was spent with the needed pre-mission that encountered violence and other problems, and in recovering from this before reporting it the next day. Then four even more precious days were lost planning it over and getting the FFM actually to the sites.

By the (apparent) dates in the Evidence Reference Numbers (in the interim report), the first visit was April 21, and they made several collection trips up to at least the 27th. The report states crowds and gunmen were kept at a distance, and no further security incidents occurred in this time.

After the rush: the team flies back to Europe, logs details and files paperwork. 29 samples are tested in OPCW-certified labs, with results on May 22. Some statements and such precede the interim report published July 6, 1.5 months after results were available, 3 months after the incident. The bulk of testing and a final report will take some more time...

There was a point when the process seemed much more urgent. Of course, this was when the relevant chemicals were breaking down naturally, if not being scrubbed. In fact the plotters could just hold the probe off until the clues had broken down to nothing (the time frame for that is considered in part 2). No doubt time is a serious issue for the science.

But this was also when it helped score cheap points against the Syrian and Russian governments for allegedly daring to stall the probe. We can see dishonest and misleading statements to the effect of scoring such points, so I suppose this was the main motive. For all anyone knew, what the FFM found might wind up embarrassingly absurd or incriminating the local Islamists. The OPCW and others could try to spin it, but might fail, and have to drop the issue.

As part 2 explores a bit, and as most readers already know, no nerve agent turned up in the environment or in the supposed victims' blood. It's not universally noted, but that's absurd and embarrassing. The media coverage of these OPCW findings are not covered as enthusiastically as Russia was denounced for delaying the findings.

Luckily, there was a ready widely-sown explanation for anything amiss - the presumed cleanup the villain states would have done with that bought time. In part 2, we'll consider what the OPCW should and shouldn't have found,  did and didn't find, what that might mean, and who might have tampered with what evidence.

Aug. 5: Part 2 is now online