Adam Larson
May 18, 2020
(rough, incomplete)
The latest batch of leaked documents relating to the OPCW's scandalous investigation of the 2018 alleged chlorine attack in Douma comes via Max Blumenthal and Aaraon Mate at The Grayzone:
Exclusive: OPCW chief made false claims to denigrate Douma whistleblower, documents reveal
This was May 6 (about ten days ago) and received good attention, considering how distracted many of us are with coronavirus effects, news, and idiotic debates. A bit late, I come back to it for my own write-up. It's a good way to make sure I've reviewed it, and can have my own prior thoughts to come back to, and everyone else can too. As it happens I add a few thoughts that might moderate previous thoughts, but also solidify the case as we move forward.
(almost as late:
the Jimmy Dore show with Mate discussing this article, May 15)
As I first
summed it up: "I missed the latest batch of #Douma #OPCW leaks, but thanks to Aaron Mate's excellent analysis, all caught up. Documents prove what we knew: OPCW leadership lied about Ian Henderson when he dared to expose their bigger lies. Will they lie about this proof?" More likely, they'll just ignore it.
Official narrative: Henderson's involvement was
a meaningless "custom"
 |
| Ian Henderson, from UNSC video appearance |
The new documents affirm the role of inspector Ian Henderson, and refute the claims
he was never part of the official OPCW team handling the investigation, its Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM).
When it became clear he was involved in significant aspects of the FFM's work,
the new Director-General Fernando Arias painted Henderson's involvement as minimal, temporary, external to the FFM, and spurred only by happenstance
centered on his being stationed at the OPCW's command post in Damascus at the right time.
Statement of DG Arias, May 28, 2019: "[at] the time of the FFM deployment in Douma in 2018, this staff member
[Henderson] was a liaison officer at our Command Post Office in Damascus. As such, and as is customary with
all deployments in Syria,
he was tasked with temporarily assisting the FFM with information collection at some sites in Douma."
https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/06/Remarks%20of%20the%20Director-General%20Briefing%20for%20States%20Parties%20on%20Syrian%20Arab%20Republic%20Update%20on%20IIT-FFM-SSRC-DAT_1.pdf
In later comments, after the OPCW's "independent" investigation concluded its work in February, Arias expanded on the subject.
Again he explained how Mr. Henderson was assigned to the command post, noting the order for that was issued by the Director-General personally. Then he proceeds to labor the point of how pointless Ian Henderson and his findings are:
"As such he provided, as is customary, support to the FFM team investigating
the Douma incident. It is customary for the inspectors serving, at the relevant moment, in the command post in Damascus to provide assistance
to missions deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic—not only to the FFM, but also to the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) and the biannual missions
to the Scientific Studies Research Centre. This support is essential and composed of United Nations Office for Project Services personnel,
interpreters, and drivers. … As described by the independent [sic] investigators, Inspector A played a minor supporting role in the investigation of the Douma incident."
https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/02/OPCW%20Director-General’s%20Statement%20on%20the%20Report%20of%20the%20Investigation%20into%20Possible%20Breaches%20of%20Confidentiality.pdf
So he'd do all sorts of things, a bit of each. All help he rendered to the investigation was "limited" and "temporary" and would seem mainly operational. This impression happens to add to all the other problems previously cited by OPCW leadership allowing Henderson's
actual investigative findings to be sidelined, replaced, and ideally never spoken of. For good measure, Arias added "the investigators specifically found that Inspector A [Henderson] did not have access to" a list of evidence and analysis that h admits all materialized "only after Inspector A had stopped working in support of the investigation." That only makes sense - he was excluded from a new "core team" formed, it seems, to exclude him and others. But as far as we know from that, he was involved in
every aspect prior to that (though it wouldn't
seem that way judging by such statements).
 |
| Some of Henderson's observation: blast signs at "location 2" the official FFM probe never explained |
Sebastien Braha, the DG's Chief of Cabinet, had called Henderson "someone who was not part of the FFM,” in an internal e-mail, possibly to address confusion about that among staff (besides Henderson himself). Arias agrees he was external to the mission, involved only in a meaningless, "customary" way for whoever runs the command post "at the relevant time." The DG's statements are pretty clear on the issue, and have been read this way by amplifiers of OPCW positions.
Former Guardian Middle East editor Brian Whitaker, who has eagerly attacked the OPCW whistleblowers,
echoes the claim of Henderson's "customary" involvement, with the explanation:
"
When the FFM arrived in Syria to investigate the alleged chemical attack,
Henderson was already
in Damascus as a liaison officer in the OPCW's Command Post there..." (the FFM arrived by April 14, just as F-UK-US missiles landed nearby)
https://www.al-bab.com/blog/2020/01/douma-chemical-weapons-investigation-and-role-ian-henderson
Bellingcat contributor Marcel Vandenberg: "The OPCW has a command post in Damascus. The Command Post team leader (the so-called “liaison” function)
prior to the alleged chemical attack in Douma was Ian Henderson. ...
OPCW states Henderson was a team leader at the command post in Damascus but not a member of the FFM team." (This has him there before April 7.)
https://feitoffake.wordpress.com/2020/01/04/opcw-technical-secretariat-structure-and-ffm-team-members/
Even after the documents proving otherwise were released, just the other day, Bellingcat founder Eliot Higgins was incredulous: "So you're claiming Henderson wasn't at the command post when the inspection took place?" (he may have been eager to learn Henderson was therefore not involved in the investigation - since being at that post was supposedly his only reason to be included.)
https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1259484716610306049
After all, that's what DG Arias had said, and was taken as an article of faith.
April 27: Henderson Joins the FFM in Damascus,
Leads Site Investigations
But now, as Aaron Mate explains, "The Grayzone has obtained an “F038” notification document advising the Syrian government that Henderson is joining the Douma mission
as a member of the FFM team. “PLEASE NOTE THAT INSPECTOR HENDERSON, IAN WILL BE PART OF THE TEAM CONDUCTING THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT VISITS.” Henderson is listed as the newly added member of a 7-person “LIST OF INSPECTORS” at the bottom of the page.
This is dated April 27. It should be noted the FFM had already assembled in Damascus on the 14th and investigated at locations 2 and 4 on the 21st and 25th, prior to his assignment. I'd noticed how apparent dates in the Evidence Reference Numbers (in the interim report) suggest evidence collection ran from 4-21 to May 1st. Henderson may have missed all that work, or been involved with sample collection on
4-27 (alleged CW warehouse), 4-30 (alleged CW lab, swabs from a valve), and 5-1 (location 4 visit, hospital visit with samples collected). British journalist Peter Hitchens
had reported earlier on communications with the OPCW whistleblowers, answering the claim Henderson was not listed on the mandate:
"When the first FFM team was assembled, Inspector A was on a mission in Nepal. Therefore,
obviously, he couldn’t have been on the mandate for the team first deploying. When he returned to HQ, it was agreed at the operational level that there was a need to add expertise and experience to the FFM. He was then notified to the
Syrian Arab Republic as an additional FFM team member and he joined them in Damascus forthwith."
So he wasn't on the original list, but was added to it, contrary to what DG Arias suggested (perhaps referring only to the original list in some "oversight"). Hitchens also passed on how
"The F038 Notification to the Syrian Arab Republic, advising that Inspector A [Henderson] was joining the FFM team, was for the period prior to his taking over the Command Post from another inspector who was there during the Douma deployments. ... Documents support this." So they do.
Thereafter, he was referred to as a member. The Grayzone also shares a list of OPCW “Mission Personnel” and their roles. Henderson is listed, one of four described as “FFM” (one with "medic" added.)
Translators and drivers are listed separately. Allegedly, Henderson was organizing these as command post liaison, but it seems he was being driven and served by them, as an investigator. (I don't know what FSA and LSA stand for - Syrian authorities, federal and local?)
Another file is a leaked message said to be from April (but undated) that refers to Office of the Director General (then Ahmet Uzumcu):
"ODG is happy if the visits to the cylinders and hospital are led by Ian Henderson."
This is probably after the F038 message and just before or after his arrival. The nearest Monday was April 30. As Henderson has said, he never visited location 2,
but did measurements at location 4 (source...). OPCW report S/1731/2019 has a "mission timeline" that gives April 26 as the date of a Note Verbale (NV/ODG/214836/18) requesting Syrian authorities to "transport the cylinders
observed at Locations 2 and 4 to a secure location for packing and facilitate the application of OPCW seals by the FFM for possible future evaluation by the Secretariat."
The timeline reflects a dispute over the sealing (May 1, "A SAR representative informs the TL
that SAR Government will not accept the sealing of the cylinders."), but it was finally done on June 3. But they were likely moved before Henderson even had a chance to see them in situ. If so, he would likely be leading a visit to "the cylinders" together in storage (he dealt with these). and a later visit to the hospital.
5-20 note: I'm doing some slow review of this, so don't quote me on the above, or I guess the below. Unless you want to.
If this is the case, we could correct Mate, in the current article: ODG "specifically requested that Henderson lead inspections at three high-priority locations in Douma" including
"the two locations where the gas cylinders were found" and the relevant hospital. (noting "a fourth, redacted location" with a short name - the alleged CW facility or warehouse?)
It might be to just one storage site and the hospital. As for redacted, he did visit location 4 and take measurements, possibly before or after the visits listed in this message.
And a Working Group on Syria Propaganda and Media (WGSPM)
briefing note had said, perhaps based on the same misunderstood detail: “We have confirmed that as the engineering expert on the FFM, Henderson was
assigned to lead the investigation of the cylinders and alleged impact sites at Locations 2 and 4.”
It seems impossible that he led the initial site visits, but otherwise he led some of that work, seemingly due to his expertise. This might include:
April 27: FFM visits the alleged (opposition) CW warehouse, collects samples, takes photos and conducts physical measurements.
April 30 (Monday): FFM deploys to the facility suspected of producing chemical weapons, samples taken. Henderson was apparently tasked with leading this (redacted location?)
May 1st: FFM visits Location 1 (hospital) and revisits Location 4 (takes photos and physical measurements). ODG was happy to have Henderson lead these, and he reportedly did so.
Is it "customary" for a serving or scheduled command post team leader to assist the FFM by
leading missions to gather evidence?
On Henderson's Qualifications
Mate's article includes several background documents to explain why Henderson might be picked for a leading role in Douma. He was one of the fist-trained team leaders, consistently earning "the highest rating possible," according to superiors, in other leaked documents. He "contributed to CBCP [Capacity Building and Contingency Planning Cell] cell achievements significantly," one says. He was seen as a valuable "asset" with "a wealth of knowledge ... negotiation talent ... technical knowledge and skill."
"Being one of the best Inspection Team Leaders, Mr. Henderson is aware that he can expect to be selected to lead the most demanding and sensitive assignments."
As Mate also explains, Mr. Henderson was praised in 2017 for “leading and participation" in the OPCW’s inspection of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) in Barzeh. Henderson also claims in his UNSC testimony to have inspected the same again after its destruction on 4-14-2018, suggesting it still had no CW link by saying
Barzeh was "another story altogether." (video and transcript also at
The Grayzone)
To Hitchens, Henderson explained (via an intermediary) he "has (very unusually) been rehired by the OPCW because of his experience" including being
"a qualified chemical engineer ... a former artilleryman with considerable ballistics experience." The latter especially is clearly a recommendation of his most relevant work - the analysis of the improbable "impact" sites of those chlorine cylinders. It seemed to him non-ballistic; the cylinders were placed manually.
https://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2020/01/a-response-to-bellingcat-form-sources-close-to-the-veteran-opcw-chemical-weapons-inspector-ian-hende.html
May 3-6: Henderson Finally Takes the Post with the "Customary" Assistance …
to a Probe that's Completed
So he's qualified, but that would seem irrelevant to his selection allegedly based on simply being there at the right time.
But as mentioned, he was in Nepal until re-directed to Syria on April 27. Someone else would in charge at the command post then, at least 13 days after the FFM team gathered
("the relevant time").
And another OPCW document shared by The Grayzone shows that Henderson only took over the post not upon arrival but only
on (or after) May 3. On that day, Henderson and the prior post-holder signed off on the transfer of authority, related documents, etc. This was, Mate writes,
"two days after Henderson and the FFM wrapped up 10 days of inspections in Douma" (more like 4 days for Henderson's part, but still - only after that).
To Hitchens: "[Henderson took] control over the Command Post from another inspector who was there during the Douma deployments.
The handover was conducted on May 6,
after the end of the Douma deployments, after which Inspector A took over the Command Post. Documents support this." The 3rd was a Thursday - Friday and Saturday is the weekend in Syria, so the 6th would be the first day of the next workweek.
https://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2020/02/a-and-b-respond-to-the-opcws-attacks-on-them-the-full-rebuttal.html
Brian Whitaker had Henderson at the post already in mid-April, adding "he continued in that role for five more weeks after the FFM had left."
Otherwise, it seems the shift is 5-6 weeks normally, so that would best fit with taking the post only at investigation's end, which it seems he did.
(Arias 2-6: "A Secretariat official is assigned from The Hague to the command post in six-week rotations.")
But Henderson only served five weeks, as if one was lost to his FFM work, while the previous guy served a week 7.
So he was likely scheduled to start around the 27th, about the same time he was finally sent.
OPCW could claim they never lied here; they could say they just meant his scheduled assignment, his being in country or en route for that, is at least part of why he was selected. In fact that seems likely. It could be that was perhaps accelerated (since he'll be going soon, have him go a week early) or, as the timeline suggests, he even went at the usual time.
But rather than being picked for some minor help that's "customary" to that scheduled job, it seems the posting was unusually delayed; someone else held the post
for another week, apparently to allow Henderson "to add expertise and experience to the FFM."
Eliot Higgins was incredulous (as mentioned above), and had a hard time digesting the idea,
asking
"So why have you concluded the signed handover document is the date when he began working at the outpost as an inspector?"
But the document is when he took over AFTER being an inspector, not "working at the outpost AS an inspector".
Only misleading claims by OPCW leadership made it seem his inspection work followed on the assignment as command post TL.
Rather, it seems this was a separate job of enough value it
delayed the assignment.
Concluding Thoughts
To summarize, we see documents showing he was involved AS a member of the FFM, not as an external helper. He did
hold the post with the "customary" helping function, but only after he was done with his immediate work AS an FFM investigator,
in fact leading the last of their primary work - visiting sites to gather physical evidence.
These documents affirm the claims of Ian Henderson and other whistleblowers and contradict the shifting claims of the coverup managers in OPCW
(Technical Secretariat) leadership.
Mr. Henderson's
scheduled role at the
command post might be part of the reasoning by which he was select to assist in the FFM's work. But it
clearly does not follow as a "custom" on the post he didn't even take until after that work was done.
In fact is seems his taking the post was delayed to allow for FFM work that hadn't originally been planned.
This the opposite of what Arias suggests; he wasn't brought in by a meaningless tradition; rather, the usual routine was interrupted to make sure he had a part in the probe.
Another and likely the major reason was to have Henderson on board was the man's unique qualifications to render the kind of solid analysis he eventually did. But then they didn't want to hear it. So why bring him in at all? Did they misjudge his pliancy?
It seems possible he was
brought in only because it couldn't be avoided,
given the plan to have him there anyway, and his qualifications - how could they explain NOT having him involved? In that sense
it might have been "customary" to let him in, in the sense that it was not really desired by leadership. There's some room to question
why he was left in Nepal until the 27th rather than called in from the start.
Perhaps that too pressing to interrupt, or maybe he was left at it in an early effort to
make his contributions minimal, temporary (just at the end), somehow fit to dispose of.
He would deserve better than such sabotaging management, and was most likely extended it, to start with. And it seems he was allowed to do much past
the unavoidable work on the ground.
As even the hostile "Bellingcat Team" conceded:
"On return from Douma, Henderson claims to have been assigned the task of “analysis and assessment of the ballistics of the two cylinders”. After this point, Henderson claims to have been “excluded from the work”, presumably by the FFM team, but that he chose to continue working on his engineering report.
and he does claim to have received some form of authorisation from the Director of Inspectorate (DoI) in order to gain access to engineering computational tools to continue his work."
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2020/01/17/the-opcw-douma-leaks-part-2-we-need-to-talk-about-henderson/
DG Arias concedes "Inspector A was assigned to conduct an inventory of the Highly Protected information collected on the cylinders and
determine what information was needed to carry out further studies." (but then he complains A "without authorisation" directly contacted
engineering experts in July. The team leader (Sami Barrek) "instructed Inspector A to refrain from making contact with any external third parties,"
almost as if A (Henderson) were "internal" to the team. And it was a big deal when he
"did not accept this, disregarded instructions, and decided he was going to complete his study alone - without informing the FFM team leader." He was
still able to access the secure documents server and insert his engineering report in February, 2019, requiring Chief of Cabinet Braha
to "remind" people Henderson was not part of the FFM, and to order the report and all traces of it be removed. How had so much confusion arisen and persisted this long? Is this really the course of some minor, temporary, "customary" involvement following his running the command post, ranging so widely and so long past that 5-week stint? No. the management's shifting stories simply fail.
Henderson may have been invited on board in good faith with no though to his adherence to the known script. But by the time
management saw or had whiff of his findings, they would know he was barking up the right tree, which they didn't want.
In the Douma case at least, the best investigative methods produced the "wrong" answers, politically speaking.
Ad so, we presume, they cast doubt on his role now for the same reason they threw his work under the bus at first chance.
As explained, they had to reject his findings as irrelevant opinions of someone never in the FFM, maybe in it but not in the later "core team" devised, it seems, to exclude him and others. His findings were considered, we hear, and rejected for some presumably fair reason.
For one thing, DG Arias complained Henderson's findings "pointed at possible attribution" which is too political; they can't do this except, it seems, if the blame points at Damascus. Henderson's report was handed to the new IIT, after they were made public anyway.
As told by the suits in The Hague, Ian Henderson is a reckless loose cannon who defied orders, who "took matters into his own hands,"
insistently pursuing "theories" that must be wrong,
considering how three "independent" experts disagreed. Into 2020 he might have been described as a security risk, or somehow denied entry to speak his case (in person) at the UN Security Council session of January 20, 2020. (maybe just a "national security" risk as it would be in support of the "Russian stunt")
Originally they gave no reason to exclude his engineering assessment, simply
pretending it didn't exist, mentioning only the second
try with outside experts and its vague, illogical, but acceptable findings. It was only after the public saw the more credible engineering report
that OPCW leadership had to start scrambling for valid-seeming reasons that have each failed. That "customary" involvement claim just adds another example,
in case anyone out there still fails to grasp what a web of lies has been spun to protect the core lie of the OPCW's sham investigation of the Douma incident.
Lest we forget,
this unexplained event claimed the lives of at least 38 women, children, and less men than you'd expect, and possibly the full 187 civilians reported to be killed (I have a hunch the unseen 149 would be almost entirely men of a few local families). Strange and conflicting
"witness" claims aside, the best evidence still suggests their killing was deliberate, chemical, and engineered by the same local terrorists
who would have manually placed the gas cylinders at their fake crime scenes. Lest we forget,
the OPCW's core lie here covers for a hideous act of mass murder that still calls out for true justice.
