Attacks of September 4/5

Ukraine's Systematic Shelling of the ZNPP: Attacks of September 4/5

September 26, 2022 (rough, incomplete) 

last edits 9/27

Clashing Reports

In the IAEA's September report (PDF), they relate how:

• On 4 September, Ukraine reported further shelling impacting the top of Special Building 1, the railway/road in front of Reactor Building 2, and an elevated walkway for personnel between Buildings 2 and 3.

I can't find any public announcement to this effect on the 4th, but that might be reported to IAEA on the 4th, or it's some kind of time zone issue. "On Sunday (4 Sept.), Russia’s Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov announced that Russian forces thwarted an attempt by the Ukrainian army to attack the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which remains in normal condition, with eight drones." (IPE Club) But that's a different story. "Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that approached the nuclear plant were “blocked by Russian electronic warfare equipment,” Konashenkov specified, adding that Ukrainian forces also launched homing grenades at the facility." 

As for the successful attack with the described damage, others say it happened on the 5th. Sources with these details and photos to match (see below) appeared only on the afternoon of the 5th, although they were initially unclear as to just when the event happened. 

Vladimir Rogov, a member of the Russian-affiliated local administration in Energodar, wrote on his Telegram channel the earliest mention I've found with the right details: Telegram: Contact @vrogov 7:32 AM here - 5:32 PM in Ukraine. 

"The consequences of artillery shelling by militants of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of the Zaporizhzhya NPP. Artillery strikes were recorded in the following places: special building of the nuclear power plant, communication overlap to the right of the special buildings, concrete fence. A container with distilled water was damaged in the immediate vicinity of the second power unit. There were no casualties."

Telegram: Contact @rian_ru 7:34 = 5:34: "A new Ukrainian strike hit a special building of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, and a tank with distilled water was also damaged in the immediate vicinity of the second power unit, local authorities said." This is the earliest post I've seen to include photos, four of them - the first 4 shown below. Zaporijie24 posting (link f/c) adds at least one other photo of the water tank leaking (5th photo below).

Other sources with the photos and the "Russian" story: life.ru Sept. 5 - topwar.ru Sept. 5 - southfront.org Sept. 5, adding "One of the power units of the Zaporozhye NPP is working at 80% as a result of the shelling by the AFU." 

The solar elevation for the roof photo is about 27 deg. = 4:27 PM on Sept. 5, give or take a few minutes. ESRL Global Monitoring Laboratory - Global Radiation and Aerosols (noaa.gov) That's about an hour before that first posting, which makes sense. The damage could be from minutes before this, or the day before, etc. But it can't come any later. Same goes for the photo: it might have been taken the day before. But soon before posting makes the most sense.

Add 9/27: It's not crucial but interesting, and I wanted to check the time better: a straight ellipse may not capture the perspective. So ...

I took the wide photo atop a Maxar satellite view, perspective skewed and scaled it until the clear edge, start of green patches, and bases of the 3 nearest pipes all matched the flat view. The structure near us also lines up pretty well. It got fuzzy, but now that shadow - or any of the 3 - can be read like a sun dial. 

shadow is 47° from building north (47° from vertical here) 

building north is 21° clockwise from true 

combined: shadow runs 68° from north.

Inverted = solar azimuth 248° (sun in that direction)

NOAA solar calculator says that that would happen at 4:24 PM. Damn. 

Neither of these is totally exact, but there's the spread: 

4:24-4:27, give or take 2 minutes on each end = 4:22 to 4:29 for sure. (end 9/27)

Soon after that first posting, the same photos appeared as proof of a Russian attack that occurred "literally half an hour ago" or about an hour after the photos of the damage were taken. ТРУХ English, 5:50: "It is reported that literally half an hour ago the invaders again fired at the ZNPP." Guessing 12 minutes before first posting (?), that would be about 5:20. Post includes one photo, another in a reply. - https://twitter.com/TpyxaNews/status/1566800948546228225

5:55 PM, XD DNEPR (454,224 subscribers): "Literally half an hour ago, the occupiers again shelled the ZNPP." Damage is cited as "local "authorities" reported." - https://t.me/hyevuy_dnepr/35355

This post was cited, along with the photos, by others like Ukrainian News24 the same minute ("The Russians continue to engage in nuclear terrorism" "literally half an hour ago"), and Euromaidan Press hours later ("Russian forces continue attacks" on the plant, citing XD DNEPR).

Aside from "shelling" and "artillery" the exact weapon used is not clear in the local reports or the uninformed pro-Kiev recycling of those reports.

Cameras Not Lying

The Rashists once again fired at the #ZNPP and published their own pictures. 10 Stupid things a military does during a war: 1. Attack the largest nuclear power plant in Europe...

https://twitter.com/NeilHawker2/status/1566819807940452353

There were five photographs gathered from various sources and replaced with higher resolutions as I went - presented here in my own order of numbered impacts or areas 1-4

Impact 1) the top of Special Building 1 - area and detail views - this Special or specialized building w - (SB1 of 2) - as I follow - handles radioactive waste and houses water treatment plants, equipment repair shops and waste management facilities for the nearby reactors.

The roof impact fits right in with those of Aug. 28, which attack was done with Warmate drones. Here's from a satellite view of Sept. 21 showing two of the 8/29 impacts repaired and one remaining, with the new one near it in red. It seems a bit more limited than the southern 2, which raises the question: what's even weaker than a Warmate? FWIW, it also has a similar angled damage pattern, with a flight path perpendicular, so from the northeast around Illinka, I think, or perhaps from the southwest (the pattern isn't that obvious to me). The vent pipe with a cap knocked off is to the south. The first reports said artillery, but if this is a drone impact, that probably won't reveal its point of origin. 

Impact 2) - "an elevated walkway for personnel between Buildings 2 and 3." I think all of these passages also hold water pipes that connect the reactors to the Special Buildings - the damage here is quite similar to the drone strikes we've seen nearby. It will surely have damaged pipes inside.

However, I'm not clear on the location, angle of view, and/time of day for this scene - the other photos seem to be afternoon - the one timed around 4:30 - so this should be facing NW - the foreground looks just like the elevated walkway's roof as seen in an IAEA photo (see below, where this damage would probably be just off-frame to the right, if it had existed then). 

But what that is at an angle is unclear. It doesn't seem like the crossing passages to the reactors look like that (it would be the one visible at right in the photo below). There's nothing else I'd expect to see in there with a lip and ladder like this. It's a better fit with SB2 roof, seen from atop the crossing passage in the morning, except that would take sunlight from the north you don't usually see in the northern hemisphere.

Either way, the damage is roughly perpendicular to this walkway, for a similar incoming angle roughly parallel with the walkway and the edge of SB1 - from northeast or the southwest. 

A dark linear patch seems to appear on the later satellite view in just one spot - right where it should be if that crossing passage is what we see, looking NW, just off the right edge in the above photo, and right where I had already guessed it must be. So confusion aside, I marked that green in the graphic below. 

Impact 3) "the railway/road in front of Reactor Building 2" 

This fits best with a photo of a mid-sized crater under the walkways, I think at a juncture, facing northwest to reactor block 2. Visually, it's not clear which reactor, except the distant water tank (next photo) has a number starting with 2 (the walkway markings 2/6 & 3/6 not making immediate sense), and Reactor 2 is the only one anything is said to happen in front of. In the near distance is the rail line that passes and connects into each reactor (see "3D" view below).

This crater impact looks different, more powerfully explosive. The crater and ejecta might suggest a trajectory from the west, somewhat alongside this nearest pillar. and somewhat into it. The fragmentation marks on the low pipe nearby supports that it's a fragmentation warhead on such a trajectory (forward fragments spread higher). That could be an exact direction to an artillery o rocket firing spot, or an unreadable final trajectory for a drone or guided missile from anywhere.

Impact/Area 4) Probably connected to the IAEA report's impact 3, local authorities also cited "a tank with distilled water was also damaged in the immediate vicinity of the second power unit." 

A fifth photograph from a different source shows this tank numbered 2TB something, probably 40B62 as seen in the above photo. The tank isn't damaged visibly, but it and/or a downed pipe are leaking water all over. This could connect to impact 3 if I read that wrong, or there might be some other impact not shown or mentioned. It's too far to connect with impacts 1 or 2.

Rogov also mentioned damage to "communication overlap to the right of the special buildings" but I'm not sure what this refers to.

All photographed mapped on satellite image said to be from September 21 (via: https://twitter.com/gbrumfiel/status/1572623372856578051) This shows one pre-existing roof impact (northern pink box), incurred Aug. 28, along with 2 other impacts - apparently of UAF-fielded Warmate drones - and the crash of a Warmate that was shot down. The southern impacts are repaired by this time. The 9/4 impact is still there (1, red), looking similar to the previous one nearby. As noted, a dark line appears for impact 2, green. Nothing is visible to support impact 3 or to confirm its location, but that's about where it seems to be.

Here is a big 3D view of the ground-level stuff, using an August drone video of trucks being moved into reactor 1's turbine housing). Rail lines in green, mostly hidden by the elevated passages (white) - at each reactor, bulk stuff can be brought in and out by a rail spur to a gate (gold boxes). Each reactor has 2 big water reservoirs.

Conclusion

This attack, as I've seen it, is not the clearest in revealing just what happened or when or how. But it fits the general pattern of sustained tension that Kiev constantly exploits, to demonize and complicate Russia's control of the plant, Ukraine's systematic shelling of the ZNPP.

In a statement on the 5th, President Zelenskyy would speak of the plant's situation. "the last power transmission line connecting the plant to the energy system of Ukraine was damaged due to another Russian provocative shelling. Again - this is the second time - due to Russian provocation, the Zaporizhzhia plant is one step away from a radiation disaster." 

He was referring to incident the day before (the plant's last dedicated power line was down due to attack, but it was still supplying power through a reserve line - IAEA - and their report lists that separately on the 3rd). He made no specific comment there, or probably anywhere since, on the attacks considered here that, unlike the others, had photographs to go with them. But he would probably take it as fitting the same pattern and making the same case, which Zelenskyy  described so:

"I consider the fact that Russia is doing this right now, right on the eve of the IAEA conclusions, very eloquent. Shelling the territory of the ZNPP means that the terrorist state does not care what the IAEA says, it does not care what the international community decides. ..." 

He also noted "by the way, the conclusions of the mission are to be presented tomorrow. I hope they will be objective." But he feared they might be "pro-Russian propagandists" like Amnesty International and half the world, especially since the IAEA mission was Russia's idea to start with, while Kiev and their plant managers initially "argued any visit would legitimise Russia's presence there." (BBC)

Showing his deep understanding of the cartoon program he was cast as the hero of, Zelenskyy continued:

Russia is interested only in keeping the situation the worst for the longest time possible.

This can be corrected only by strengthening sanctions, only by officially recognizing Russia as a terrorist state - at all levels.

Ukraine has a very clear, transparent and honest position: while we controlled the plant, there was no threat of a radiation disaster. As soon as Russia came, the worst scenario imaginable immediately became possible. This requires an international response - from the UN to every normal state.

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/obstril-teritoriyi-zaes-oznachaye-sho-rosiyi-bajduzhe-sho-sk-77533

There you have it. Russia is evil and wants bad things because they are bad. They cannot just allow the plant to be run smoothly to their or anyone's benefit, because nuclear tension is bad so they desire it. They thrive on creating needless and constant danger, and reaping the outsized waves of negative opinions that elicits. Those "orcs" even take chances like the eve of an IAEA report to "provoke" and remind the world again how mindlessly spiteful Russians are. Because the world forgets, Zelenskyy thinks, he again reminds us how the Russians remind us of their own subhuman status, with actions like this shelling of the ZNPP that poses a real (if overstated) danger to people far and wide, who will have to take notice. 

I mean, wouldn't you want that if you were Russia? To turn as much of the world as possible against you? Keeping in mind that being Russia would entail being mindlessly evil and self-destructive like that?  Many folks are aggressively keeping that nonsense in mind.

But of course, according to the non-cartoon evidence, these attacks are largely or totally carried out by the Ukrainian side. Like the real world tends to do, that makes direct but terrible sense. And part of what makes realities like this so terrible is how they're allowed to thrive and deepen their rot under a lack of accountability. 

Warmate Drones

Ukraine's Systematic Shelling of the ZNPP: Warmate Drones

September 24, 2022 (rough, incomplete) last edits 9/26

Polish-made "Warmate" loitering munition drones, made by WB Group - manufacturer's site: https://www.wbgroup.pl/en/produkt/warmate-loitering-munnitions/

First noted in Ukraine is April: "the performance characteristics of Warmate are frankly weak. And the nature of the hostilities is such that this kamikaze drone is unlikely to affect the situation." https://t.me/epoddubny/10044 

The weapon could have outsized effect, however, if it were used where minor damage can have major political effect, like a nuclear power plant. 

April 27 A drone of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the Polish manufacturer "Warmate" attacked the city of Energodar in the Zaporozhye region. Both drones were shot down by Russian forces. - https://twitter.com/GarryP40090847/status/1519355510008471552 - Shows Czech-made AXi electric motor - https://twitter.com/jesusfroman/status/1519362897150980106

The Armed Forces of Ukraine tried to attack the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant and the administration of the city of Energodar with kamikaze drones, but the National Guard shot them down. 

https://twitter.com/UKRWarSitRep/status/1519363016348913664

Photo: yet to geolocate

July 12: "First Documentation of the UAF kamikaze drones shot down near Zaporozhye NPP published. Ukrainian militants used these drones to carry out an attack in the area of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and the city heating and water canal in Energodar. 12-07-2022" https://twitter.com/Lastkombo/status/1547319135520100352 Photo: a little outside the plant grounds, near the road in. See Sept. 1. 

July 12: Ukrainian drones have been aiming at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant,to create false flag. "today,Ukraine have tried to use drones in attacks on Energodar 6 times.3 of them were shot down,”a spokesman for the city - https://twitter.com/coope125/status/1546906932707053575 - video includes an apparent Warmate and another, more slender model with longer wings. - The Armed forces of Ukraine tried to hit the Zaporozhye NPP with kamikaze drones. This was stated in the administration of Energodar, reports @rian_ru . Of the six, two barrage ammunition was aimed at the nuclear power plant. - https://twitter.com/talsalihy3/status/1547084521169895424 - https://twitter.com/GueberB/status/1547011397397233666

July 20: at least 2 Warmate drones used to attack MLRS, military tent camp on the ZNPP grounds. 3 soldiers reportedly killed, 12 wounded.

https://defence-blog.com/polish-made-kamikaze-drone-slam-into-russian-military-camp/ - https://t.me/rian_ru/171737 - https://twitter.com/MaroussiaAML/status/1550149250687926273 - https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/09/the-militarization-of-znpp-part-2.html

from 7/20 or 21: Remains of Polish Kamikaze drone 'Warmate' after the attack near Enerhodar, Ukraine - https://twitter.com/PrateekRoutray/status/1550210595852587010 - scene video - https://twitter.com/trx_guillaume/status/1550040403822497793 - The Ukr attacked the Nuclear Power Plant in #Energodar with 2 kamikaze drones (Polish Warmate's). 1 was shot down and the other crashed on the premises but luckily didn't cause any serious damage - https://twitter.com/FeWoessner/status/1550808832896634882 - Shows Czech-made AXi electric motor.

July 28: The military-civilian administration of Energodar showed the consequences of a UAV drone strike on a residential building where employees of the Zaporozhye NPP live. No one died in the attack - https://twitter.com/ntvru/status/1552590588565852160 - https://twitter.com/william_jengu/status/1552645475714535424

July 30: “Kiev used drones to attack #civilian vehicles in the city of Energodar. The cars had the markings of a humanitarian mission. The overnight attack occurred on empty vehicles parked on the street and that there were no casualties.” - https://twitter.com/friendofrussia/status/1553387023238561793

Aug. 14: The armed forces of Ukraine again hit the Zaporozhye NPP and the city of Energodar. The shelling was carried out with the use of barrage ammunition — kamikaze drones. Previously, a local resident's dog died. There is no exact information about the fate of his master. - https://twitter.com/ivan_8848/status/1558825698357387266 - another cut of the video includes a dead dog - https://twitter.com/trx_guillaume/status/1558911685661958146

Aug. 16: Stocks of Warmate and other drones may be running low. "Lithuanian online TV channel Laisves TV has started a fundraiser to buy a fleet of loitering munitions for Ukraine’s armed forces. The new campaign, humorously called Legion of Boom, hopes to raise between €4 and €5 million ($4.1-$5.1 million) to acquire between 80 and 100 drones. It is set to run until August 24, 2022, the Independence Day of Ukraine." - https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/31922-lithuania-tv-fundraiser-legion-of-boom

Aug. 26: Lithuanian Defense Minister Arvydas Anusauskas announced on August 26 that Lithuania will purchase 37 kamikaze drones for Ukraine with the funds raised by the Legion of Boom fundraising campaign for arms for Ukraine, organized by Lithuanian journalist Andryus Tapinas and dedicated to Ukraine’s Independence Day on 24 August. According to Tapinas, by the time the collection was completed, Lithuanians had donated 1.545 million euros.

As Tapinas reported on Facebook, 27 Polish Warmate kamikaze drones will be purchased for 1 million euros, and their manufacturer, WB Group, will provide ten more drones to Ukraine free of charge.

... The kamikaze drones purchased by Lithuania with funds collected within the Legion Of Boom are to be delivered to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in October-November, as was stated by the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the Republic of Lithuania Petro Beshta at an online briefing on Wednesday, the correspondent of Ukrinform reports.

https://euromaidanpress.com/2022/09/21/27-kamikaze-drones-bought-by-lithuanians-in-fundraising-campaign-will-arrive-in-ukraine-in-october-november/

Aug. 28, with crowdfunded replacements on the way, at least 4 Warmates are used up at ZNPP. The first attack I know of since July 20 targeted special building 1 with stored radioactive waste

One drone shown above (re-assembled later) was shot down on the roof, landing at its elevated middle (scene below). The other 3 impacted the roof on a NE-SW flight path and detonated, causing moderate damage (impacts A, B, C below). Two big tears were made in the southern half of the roof and seen up-close, and one was made on the north half, only seen by satellite - next to the southern 2, some blown-off wingtips nearby (right) - facing south to the training center, the impacts are just off-frame to the right. 

https://t.me/intelslava/36118

https://libyancivilwar.blogspot.com/2022/09/ukraines-systematic-shelling-of-znpp_15.html

Aug. 31: A Ukrainian drone was shot down by the Russian military near the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. As the Russian security forces who arrived at the scene told us, this is presumably a Polish-made Warmate drone....31-08-2022. https://twitter.com/Lastkombo/status/1565168575555551233 

A wing and (power unit?) are seen. Location: alongside the road into the plant - Google Maps street view - July 12 crash site is a bit north, and I think east, under the 2nd set of power lines.

Comparing the (power unit?) of the Aug. 28 and Aug. 31 drones - two of the same thing = if one is Warmate, both are. There's a serial number the WB Group at least could check.

Aug. 31: The moment of the impact of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the use of a kamikaze drone bombarding the mayor's office of Energodar - https://twitter.com/Lastkombo/status/1565169962624450560 - https://twitter.com/theLemniscat/status/1565261819425525760 - nighttime surveillance camera footage

Sept. 1-2: IAEA team visits the plant. No drone attacks in this time. 

Later on Sept. 2 Ukrainian drone with a warhead was shot down in the area of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, the projectile did not detonate, the Energodar administration told RIA - https://twitter.com/Vasilisa_2_0/status/1565758207619907586

Sept. 3: Another UAV was shot down a few hundred meters from the station Drone With Warhead Shot Down Near Zaporizhzhia NPP - Energodar Administration - UrduPoint

Sept. 4/5 possible use (Dedicated post): "On Sunday (4 Sept.), Russia’s Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov announced that Russian forces thwarted an attempt by the Ukrainian army to attack the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which remains in normal condition, with eight drones. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that approached the nuclear plant were “blocked by Russian electronic warfare equipment,” Konashenkov specified, adding that Ukrainian forces also launched homing grenades at the facility." 

IAEA report on a successful attack: On 4 September, Ukraine reported further shelling impacting the top of Special Building 1, the railway/road in front of Reactor Building 2, and an elevated walkway for personnel between Buildings 2 and 3. - https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/09/ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf

The date issue may not matter, but it was Sept. 5 in the later afternoon that shelling was reported just then, with photos showing hits to s.b.1 roof, walkway, and in front of reactor 2, as described for the 4th. 

It is reported that literally half an hour ago the invaders again fired at the ZNPP. 9/5 5:55 PM in Ukraine - https://twitter.com/MarkRid89403375/status/1566802234532405248

Literally half an hour ago, the occupiers again shelled the ZNPP. As a result of the shelling of the ZNPP, strikes on the special corps were recorded. A damaged container with water in the immediate vicinity of the second block, local "authorities" reported. 9/5 5:50 PM in Ukraine - https://t.me/hyevuy_dnepr/35355

"Authorities" = first reported by Russian-affiliated local authorities in Energodar or Russian defense representatives at the plant? Original source and attached claims to be tracked down and added, if possible.

The manner of attack - missile, drone, or what - is unclear. But the roof impact fits right in with those of Aug. 28, which attack was done with Warmate drones. Here's from a satellite view of Sept. 21 showing two of the 8/29 impacts repaired and one remaining, with the new one near it in red. It seems a bit more limited than the southern 2, which raises the question: what's even weaker than a Warmate? FWIW, it seems to have a similar incoming angle from the northeast. 

The walkway impact (green) is also quite similar, and may be a second drone impact. It seems to appear on the later satellite view. However, I'm not clear on angle of view/time of day for this view; it's PM as in other photos of the set, and facing NW, presumably. But that doesn't look right for the crossing walkway - it's a better fit with SB2 roof, seen from atop the crossing passage in the morning ... (or ??), Either way, the damage is roughly perpendicular to this walkway, for a similar incoming angle roughly parallel with the walkway - from northeast or the southwest. The impact under the walkway in front of reactor 2 looks different, more powerfully explosive. The crater and ejecta might suggest a trajectory from the west. There might also be an unseen impact closer to the water tank that isn't damaged visibly, but it and/or a downed pipe are leaking water.

From there, a pattern emerged of Warmates used to attack administration and civil society groups in Russian-occupied Energodar. Their crowdfunded replacements might help amplify such outreach programs in the future.

Sept. 5: Two drones were shot down when they attempted to strike the headquarters of the "We are together with Russia" volunteer movement in #Energodar #Zaporozhye [#Zaporizhzhya] NPP, no casualties. - https://twitter.com/MeridionaliAura/status/1566727130871988225 - https://twitter.com/GueberB/status/1566764324093366276

Sept. 6: A Ukrainian drone dropped a projectile on the roof of the passport office in Energodar (ZNPP satellite city) , a part of Energodar civilian administration.  There were no casualties - https://twitter.com/elenaevdokimov7/status/1567045994419990528 - https://twitter.com/ProgettoLepanto/status/1567039674018930690

Sept. 8: A kamikaze drone of the Armed Forces of Ukraine attacked the administration of Energodar....08-09-2022 - https://twitter.com/Lastkombo/status/1567965264771444738 - image at right - "Drone fell onto the roof of the Energodar administration. Operator has reportedly been captured." - https://twitter.com/ControlCompli8/status/1567859039719104512 - roof damage photo below

Total: just from this incomplete search, 16+ Warmate drones and some other UAVs used in Energodar and at the ZNPP, with at least 9 of them since the announcement, a month ago now, that replacements were on the way.

Ukrainian Militarization: the "Root Cause" of Attacks on the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant?

September 23, 2022 (rough, incomplete) last edits 9/27

Let's consider an incident recently at the Pivdennoukrainsk (South Ukainian) nuclear power plant (SUNPP), aka Yuzhnoukrayinsk plant, for the town it's near. 

"Russian missiles struck the Pivdennoukrainsk Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine's southern Mykolaiv province overnight, Ukraine's state energy company Energoatom said on Monday. A blast took place 300 meters (1,000 feet) away from the reactors just after midnight, Energoatom said." It occurred overnight, just after midnight on September 19 (DW).

Vitaliy Kim. the head of Mykolayiv Regional Military Administration, said it was a powerful Iskander missile, and "he believes that this strike near the NPP is in order to cause minor damage and to blackmail the Ukrainian people in the future." (Center Ukraine on Twitter)

An extremely short, 15-second video of the attack was published by Energoatom - one posting by Ukrainian network TSN: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aWuVgZ2oXnk

Frequent collaborator Michael Kobs had a look at the video and some photos of the crater and noted some anomalies. (Twitter thread)

"Ukraine said yesterday a RU Iskander missed a reactor at the Yuzhnoukrayinsk NPP by 300 meters. The news was immediately amplified unchecked and not without calling for more weapons. However, as with the NPPZ, the published footage presents some puzzles."

Missile Impact Location

The camera in the video faces south from a tall building just south of the plant's 3 nuclear reactors. Michael broke the scene down by features, color-coded. I verified that it was correct, but decided to re-do it here with some minor changes. The magenta building is ~430m south of the nearest reactor, number 3, and the initial blast is clearly some ways further south of that. This is not going to be 300 meters from the reactors, or the 270m some have cited. 

My version - not originating the work, but I think improving it - field of view, then traced on the map, lines of sight from tall building on the left to the blast seen, and on the right 2 lines from building corners to help set camera position and overall view. 

This adds another line of sight from the south. Early morning photos show a large crater in the brush south of the plant, helping pick this closest match on the line of sight - just about 700m from the nearest reactor - over twice the distance claimed, but about 300m from the outer perimeter of the broader plant grounds. That likely being what they meant, it's probably no further out. 

The building in the background may be the larger special building 2, some 500m north. In between: tall trees, as marked above in blue - not clear which trees. Closest is the likely wall of that southern lot, traced in pink - not all that close. We can also note the crater is on a downslope, maybe of a small ravine, which seems to run E-W along this area 25m south of the wall. This lines up with the video blast not so well - perhaps even further east than drawn above. Maybe the two things don't correlate, and there were two strikes out there, one seen on video and the other in photos.

Add 9/27: A Reuters report adds a crater photo allowing a better geolocation. Mapped out below, a bit inexactly. Aside from the trees (dark blue), this lines up quite well with what we already had.  Maybe it's a bit west of this, explaining the trees.

A detailed France 24 report raises questions: "A few dozen metres from the gaping hole, a building ... appeared to have had its doors and windows blown out." The photos don't come through here. Reuters has a photo that doesn't match the nearby building near the lot's edge. Rather it seems to match the plant's special building, its corner marked yellow here, and is described as "a production facility ... at a compound of the Pivdennoukrainsk Nuclear Power Plant." 

If so, it's some 500 meters from the blast we've seen, something else not seen must have damaged its windows. That something might have been just 300m from the reactors, but it's not the distant blast they showed happening on video shortly after midnight, or anything in that field of view for those 15 seconds.

Trajectory: France 24 added: "Ivan Zhebet, security chief at the Pivdennoukrainsk plant ... pointed in the direction that the projectile arrived from. A compass reading by an AFP journalist indicated that it was fired from [or that Zhebet pointed towards/ the southeast, territory under Russian control." The soil dispersion in this photo is not terribly clear, suggesting either an impact from WEST (to the east - yellow) or, as Michael saw it, from the NORTH-northeast (to the SSW - orange). Nothing I see suggests southeast, displacing soil to the NW. But there is some soil there, it's foreshortened and on the far side. Undecided. (end 9/27 update)

As Michael noted (9/27: not from the above photo) "the earth was thrown out of the crater to the south or south-west. This would suggest that the projectile ... came from the northeast, from about the direction consistent with the earlier smoke trails." That is, it's likely came from the targeted area. 

Also: "so far I found no evidence for an Iskander" It's quite a large crater, but Iskanders tend to make even bigger ones. I'm not sure that's what he meant.

Rocket Exhaust Trails!

Michael: "Before the explosion, however, there already seem to be smoke trails in the air, but they seem to lead to the NE."

This is what really matters here. Before the blast, the video shows a faint trail of rocket exhaust angling up from the ground even closer to the plant than the Russian strike, testifying to projectiles recently launched from close to the plant, in this Ukrainian-held area. Regular then enhanced view, with outer edged of the plume(s) traced in red - a darker line runs down the middle, suggesting this is two plumes.

Location: lines of sight have the origin approximately lined up with the end of the left-hand elevated pipes marked gold (right-had pipes when seen from above). That's somewhere in this parking lot, NW corner to middle, some 80-120m from the edge of the plant, 450-490m from reactor 3.

Trajectory: The plumes run mostly perpendicular to the field of view, perhaps a bit towards the camera as well, or roughly northeast. Michael's line maps out pointing towards Rivne, Kropyvnytskyi, and Kremenchuk. The distance of travel isn't clear, and the angle may be different - perhaps less north. I'm not clear what Russian forces are around this area they might be firing at.

Energoatom are good patriots, and refused to show the video of these missiles being fired. That would complicate their politicized narrative of unprovoked Russian aggression against the plant. 

Compared to ZNPP

9/9 statement by Western governments that have always supported Ukraine calls on Russia to leave the larger Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP): "We emphasize that Russia’s seizure and militarization of the ZNPP is the root cause of the current threats in the field of nuclear safety and security. We recall that the heightened risks of a nuclear incident will remain dangerously high as long as Russia remains present on the site of ZNPP."

Joint statement - High-level meeting on the safety and security of civil nuclear facilities in armed conflicts (New York, 09 Sept. 22) - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (diplomatie.gouv.fr)

Shelling that was almost certainly all by the Ukrainian side is the actual cause of the dangers. But the direct cause is ignored in favor of the "root" cause that underpins that shelling - as if Ukraine has no choice in the matter. By this logic, Ukraine's militarization of the SUNPP other plant, and launching attacks from nearby, is the root cause of that troubling attack just 700m from a nuclear reactor. To ensure safety, Ukrainian forces should demilitarize the plant. But none of those leaders would ever say as much.

Comparing ZNPP and SUNPP: At ZNPP, Russian forces seem to have fired Grad rockets from within the plant grounds, albeit in the outer spray ponds area. And in response to this and any other real attacks, Ukraine has attacked that spot and a military tent camp with kamikaze drones on 20 July and admitted it, besides many attacks it denies; it has many times shelled more sensitive locations at the reactors (50m and less away), dry spent fuel storage (35m away), special buildings and pipes of the cooling system (several direct hits). At SUNPP, Ukraine fires from just outside the grounds, and Russia responds even further from the plant. Despite the inverted situations and different responses, Russia has been blamed for all problems at both plants, and Ukraine for none of them. That won't be 100% opposite of the truth, but far closer to that than to 100% true.

This missile battle at the SUNPP also shows what Ukraine would do if they're allowed to re-militarize the Zaporizhzhia plant like they did at the start of Russia's invasion, when they triggered a 2 hour battle inside the plant. 

Add 9/25: Clarifying the implications of this statement: Western leaders cannot pin the actual shelling of the Russian-occupied plant on the Russians. They would do so if they could. Instead, they focus on the "root cause" in that Russian occupation. Now how does this translate to blame for the actual shelling attacks? Two options:

* The root cause of Russians attacking the plant is ... because Russian forces are there

* The root cause of Ukrainians attacking the plant is ... because Russian forces are there

Obviously it's the latter, and this emphasis on root cause rather than actual cause shows that Western leaders understand that Ukraine is responsible for the actual and deliberately reckless attacks on the plant. They could demand that Ukraine stop, but instead, they shift the focus and try to ignore the facts, because they share the same goal as the attackers - to demonize and complicate Russia's occupation of the plant and hopefully force it to end. 

Add 9/27: Commenting on the strike on the Telegram messaging app, Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said: "The invaders wanted to shoot again, but they forgot what a nuclear power plant is. Russia endangers the whole world. We have to stop it before it's too late." https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-strikes-pivdennoukrainsk-nuclear-power-plant-reactors-2022-09-19/

The "Militarization" of the ZNPP, Part 2: Russian Shelling FROM ZNPP?

September 21, 2022 

last edits 9/26

Earlier, I wrote of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) "Russian forces are accused of militarizing the site by basing forces there (seems undeniably true to some degree) and launching attacks from there (not so sure, but troubling if so - I'll have some to say on this in another post)." This is that post. 

Part one, The Battle of March 4, was originally included with this, but it seemed tedious that way, so I gave that its own post. In summary: Russian tried to force their way into the plant in the early hours of March 4. As a detailed NPR report NPR report put it "On March 3, the nuclear plant was preparing for a fight. A news release posted to its website just hours before the assault described the facility as operating normally, with its assigned Ukrainian military unit ready for combat." In the plant's publicized surveillance video, the defenders shot "missiles" or shells at the first 2 tanks to cross the perimeter, finally hitting and disabling the second one. "That marked the beginning of a fierce firefight that lasted for roughly two hours at the plant," NPR correctly notes. This can't be good for nuclear safety, but the Ukrainian side fired the first shots. And they fired some other shots too.

In review: Russian forces are seen firing tank cannons, RPGs and more in many directions, many times. This shelling damaged and set fire to the training center and administration buildings, damaged electrical lines, and disrupted sensitive systems. The surveillance video shows how it caused unclear damage and fires around the north half of Special Building 1, near reactor 5 or 6, and up on the block/dome of reactor 1 or 2, and the elevated passage to reactor 1 has 2 holes punched in it. I haven't seen visible shooting from any buildings of the plant to explain the repeated shelling of those buildings, but the Russian column did take fire from 4 visible directions, likely alongside other hits that came invisibly from these and other directions:

* from the right, disabling a tank

* left low, hitting far back

* left + fwd + high, hitting far back 

* right + fwd, hitting near 3 tanks in the front.

This resistance stopped the Russian takeover about as much as a peaceful surrender would have. To resist anyway contributed to avoidable risks and could be called reckless. No one complained about how the Ukrainian military unit occupying the nuclear plant acted to endanger it. But along with the Russians came a new and dreadful reality: the ZNPP would be occupied by military units who might put it at risk.

Marching Forth from March 4th: ZNPP is "Militarized" 

Overview map, with explanations below - NOT oriented to true north. It says it's to Sept. 4, but the most recent placed impact (star) is at the inner spray ponds yesterday (9/20 - geolocation tweet) - I added the star but forgot to change the date.

I'll start with Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, 15 September 2022 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (mid.ru): 

"In this hall, there have already been calls for the "demilitarization of the ZNPP" or the creation of a kind of "demilitarized perimeter" around it. These calls are meaningless, as the station has never been militarized." 

Well, definitions vary. On the night of March 3/4, the plant was already occupied - debatably "militarized" - by a Ukrainian "assigned military unit." Russian attacks in and around the plant were in response to attacks by those forces. It was framed as dangerous and unacceptable on the Russian end, and Ukraine could be faulted for nothing. 

Later, the "assigned military unit" would be Russian, not Ukrainian. The place had suddenly been "militarized." They may not be sparking battles inside the plant, like Ukraine's garrison did, but they allegedly launched shelling attacks from there. And then we see and hear about attacks against the plant as the Russians allegedly shelled themselves in response. Clearly, Ukraine could be faulted for nothing in that absurd scenario. 

Russia's explanation for the forces at the plant are reflected in Ambassador Ulyanov's comments (continued):

"Russian law enforcement agencies at the ZNPP are represented only by units of Rosgvardia (an analogue of the French gendarmes and Italian carabinieri) and specialists from the troops of radiation, chemical and biological protection (RCBP). Rosgvardia is needed to ensure the protection of the station. CBRN specialists – to overcome the consequences of possible accidents and radiation emergencies that may result from continuous Ukrainian shelling. There are no heavy weapons and equipment on the territory of the ZNPP. Only equipment for the transportation of Rosgvardia personnel and electronic warfare equipment that helps neutralize Ukrainian drones. There are no ammunition or explosives at ZNPP, the detonation of which could pose a threat to the safety of the nuclear power plant. Thus, there were and are no military targets that could serve as a pretext for justifying Ukrainian shelling and attacks on the station."

But of course Ukrainian sources tell it differently. The New York Times would report on claims from Enerhodar mayor Dmytro Orlov, who was in exile but had contacts at the plant. "[O]ver the past three weeks" since early July, "the Russian military has parked Grad multiple rocket launchers between the reactor buildings, to protect them from retaliatory strikes." 

But the visual record can only support a single Grad launcher between the outer spray ponds. A July 22 video from the Main Intelligence Agency of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry shows a likely MLRS unit, BM21 Grad, as it's attacked by a kamikaze drone to no visible effect (below left, after it was hit). A graphic in the IAEA's September report (PDF) credited a launcher as stationed there, amid the pools, in a Maxar satellite view of August 29 (below, right, in a slightly different spot - and it's not clear what the July spot was). It's not clear if the IAEA saw it there during their visit on September 1 and 2, or if their staff who remained has seen it since.

StopFake called out "Russian propagandists" for claiming Ukraine had shelled the plant in this attack. That was "fake" because they targeted Russian equipment, not the plant, and the attack "did not take place in the immediate territory of the ZNPP." 

This launcher is on the ZNPP grounds, by most definitions, but near the eastern perimeter. There's a decent case for minimizing attacks there. It's 460m from the nearest reactor and ~600m from spent fuel storage. Spray ponds hold used water with just trace radioactivity that is by design sprayed into the air so it can cool before re-use. There's probably no danger in some of this spraying wider than usual. I marked this area yellow in the map above, for "mild" danger, and that may even exaggerate the risk. 

But if it's a fine spot to attack, it's also a fine spot to station weapons that might need attacked.

Wall Street Journal, July 5: Russian Army Turns Ukraine’s Largest Nuclear Plant Into a Military Base (archived) Russian forces at the plant "have in recent weeks deployed heavy artillery batteries and laid anti-personnel mines along the shores of the reservoir whose water cools its six reactors, according to workers, residents, Ukrainian officials, and diplomats. ... Russian forces deployed a Smerch artillery vehicle last month in the shadow of the 5.7 gigawatt complex’s striped chimneys, adding to the grad rocket launchers, tanks and personnel carriers." But there were no link or supports for the Smerch claim, and I haven't seen anything else in support. 

But a photo with the article shows "A Russian tank outside Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in a picture released mid-March." It's parked and covered, but present. Number 120 on the turret, when I hear Russia painted over its numbers. Maybe not in this case. We know at least one Russian tank was disabled very near the spot it's parked (A on the map above). It doesn't look damaged, but is it the same one? Was it there past March? Were there others? Were they used or just parked there?

Interfax reported "a kamikaze drone" was used in the July 20 attack, to hit "a car with anti-aircraft guns and a BM-21 Grad," and no other military equipment they could name. I haven't seen any more detail on this car that might have been there just to shoot down such drones that attack inside the nuclear plant.

Otherwise, satellite and drone views show just armored personnel carriers (APCs) and supply trucks, and a military tent camp that was attacked on July 20 (video) or the 19th by other reports (CNN), in the area marked C on the top map. The July 22 video linked above was mainly about the attack on the encampment, as was the Interfax report: "The Ukrainian military, with a precise strike by a kamikaze drone, destroyed a tent camp of Russian invaders near the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant," starting a fire that "could not be extinguished for a long time." As a result, Ukrainian intelligence reported, "three invaders were killed and 12 wounded," 

Below is the moment of detonation as seen in the video (black box). There's no fire afterwards, but in the end all 3 surrounding tents burned down, probably after unseen strikes following this. Dozens of people run out after this blast. It's not visibly clear if they're all soldiers or if they might include civilian specialists or others. Location:  just south of the spray ponds, not far from the Grad launcher, and some 300m from reactor 1.

A detailed NPR report provided before and after images of the site. On July 3, were a couple of supply trucks in the same area and 4 big tents, 3 of which burned down. A nearby a vehicle area was also vacated (area D above). It had included several supply trucks, some busses, and maybe a few APCs. No attacks here were shown, and the signs aren't clear, but there's a possible crater and ejected soil at the lot's north end,

Where did those vehicles go? Secret video in August (thedrive.com) and public IAEA images in September (PDF - image at right) agree that V-marked Russian military SUPPLY trucks were parked inside the blast-proof turbine hall of nuclear reactors 1 and 2. 

Ukrainian drone video from The Insider (on Twitter Aug. 6) shows several supply trucks driving into the cavernous hall of reactor 1. Add 9/26: One report I found traces a likely connection: "Russia on Wednesday (20 July) accused Ukraine of targetting a nuclear power station in the Zaporizhzhia region using drones. ... Energoatom alleged that Russian forces were demanding access to the machine halls of three reactors for storing tanks and equipment there, reported Reuters. However, the company also did not comment on the drone attack by Ukrainian forces." Good patriots, those.

The trucks got their access. Also shown entering are perhaps two "tanks," in that they're on treads. But lacking cannons, they're probably just APCs. 

Russia already stood accused of leaving "armoured personnel carriers parked recklessly near the reactors" (Daily Mail) before they tried parking them inside the houses the reactors lived in. This is all reckless because ... the things are known to spontaneously combust? No. This great crime prevented Ukrainian attacks on these particular supply trucks and APCs. Or it required much heavier weapons to actually destroy them and start fires inside the reactor housing. Maybe thinking ahead, mayor-in-exile Orlov complained to the Times "The vehicles block a fire access route ... posing a hazard to the entire plant."

Or - here's an idea - they could just leave these trucks and APCs alone. 

Alleged Attacks from the Russian-Occupied ZNPP

Back on March 4, terrible questions were raised in some minds. Would the Russians blow up the nuclear plant now that no one could stop them? Or might they attack military or civilian targets from its grounds, requiring dangerous defensive fire back into the plant? 

From my quick review, it doesn't seem they did either, even allegedly, for over 4 months. However occupied it was, the plant was allowed run with its existing Ukrainian staff, and to keep providing electricity to citizens on both sides of the line with no meltdown. 

But that didn't make the Russians look evil or insane.  Obviously, something would have to change, and it suddenly did in the middle of July. The New York Times would report "The Russians have been firing from the cover of the Zaporizhzhia station since mid-July, Ukrainian military and civilian officials said, sending rockets over the river at Nikopol and other targets." The reason seems to be the increasing use of long-range HIMARS missiles that made other firing spots too vulnerable. 

It was on July 16 that Petro Kotin, the President of “Energoatom” (the utility that runs the ZNPP) reported "The Russians have been controlling Zaporizhzhia NPP since the beginning of March. Now the occupiers are using the NPP as a bridgehead to deploy new military equipment. ... Missile complexes are brought there, from which the other side of the Dnipro is shelled – this is the territory of Nikopol.” 

This may be the one grad launcher noted above, or something wider and also real. But even if a lot of serious weapons were parked there, their mere presence is weak reason to launch dangerous attacks. What goes beyond is the claim of external attacks launched from the site or with those weapons. True or not, these claims helped justify the July 20 drone attack on a military encampment that killed 3 and wounded 12. 

Just one video that I've noticed even claims to corroborate these claims, emerging more than 6 weeks after the claims did. "Russian MLRS firing from the territory of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant " The Insider, September 18. - video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jSQw35mJrA. One "expert" on Russian evils, Luke Harding, advertised the video & report as "showing a #Russian multiple rocket launcher firing from the territory of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. It confirms what Kyiv has long alleged: that #Moscow is using the station for offensive military strikes across the Dnipro river"

The video was reportedly filmed the night of September 2/3, from the north, facing south across the Dnieper River. It clearly shows the smokestacks of the Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant on the left. A ways west of there (to the right), rapid rocket fire angles up like a string of pearls, directed further west or maybe northwest (roughly perpendicular to the line of sight). 

The Insider wasn't so clear on what all is shown, but they asked "the Experts of the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) to study the video" and the Bellingcat-types at CIT added "to the west of the TPP is the territory of the nuclear power plant itself, but whether rockets are really launched from the territory of the station, it is impossible to establish exactly." And so they decided "the footage shows that the MLRS are located in the immediate vicinity of the power unit." 

That struck me as lazy. At best they ccould set a line of sight, not a specific area, and that only if it were set up in more detail. So I had a try at doing it right, suspecting the Insider and CIT could be shown wrong.

I started with Michael Kobs LoS analysis with compared views. My own mapping including reactors (yellow box/line) is below. The plant's six reactors are visible on the horizon, spaced so we can see each one's tallest part pretty distinctly (so they're seen neither from the side nor face-on, but more at a 45-degree angle). The firing spot lines up roughly the same width (yellow line re-done in orange) off to the left. Electric towers may be visible  - 2 faint lines marked in green - but it works better with the left-hand option, roughly lining up with the launches. This plus the stack-building lineup at the TPP (blue) suggests filming from western Dobra Nadiia, looking a bit from the left of the comparison view, and a rocket launch from ... exactly where that BM21 was seen?

That still doesn't show an area of firing but a line of sight to it - the firing is somewhere on that red line, or close to it. The firing could be just outside the grounds nearly 1km from reactor 6, or just inside the grounds south of that, or off the grounds to the north or the south. But it also passes exactly over the IAEA report's "probable BM21 Multiple Launch Rocket (MLR)" seen a few days before (Aug. 29) among the spray ponds (black circle). 

But another possible limit plays in. Noting the flares of each rocket appear dimly at the horizon and are never seen against the horizon - whatever the highest elevation is, the firing may be from the south of that.

Google Maps shows little variation in topography. The thermal plant and the nuclear plant seem to sit on artificially raised ground, but otherwise the most marked rise is the tree-lined crest before the fileds, well south of the plant. The firing may be from south of that line. 

But that would be an odd coincidence how well it lines up with the known launcher. I'm not so into coincidences, and it seems more likely than not this is the weapon and the spot used, and some closer elevation difference hides its origin. 

In Context

So Russian firing from the sensitive plant is surprisingly well illustrated on this occasion, if not quite proven. And if it happened once, it's likely enough in other cases - although it has only been documented the once that I've seen. It's far from ideal, to say the least. Even if this were rare and well-deserved retaliatory fire, it drags the nuclear plant into the fighting in a way the Russians acknowledge shouldn't be done (they take pains to deny it). 

But then, as noted above, this is just in the spray ponds area, and opinions vary if this even counts as part of the plant. When the rockets are flying, the Insider complains it's not just on the plant grounds but from "the immediate vicinity of the power unit" - just the kind of thing that makes it "impossible" for the Ukrainians to respond, as they frequently say. But when they have attacked that very spot in the past, StopFake got to point out how it was "not ... in the immediate territory of the ZNPP" at all. 

Ukrainian response to this and other alleged attacks from around the ZNPP: allegedly nothing past the July 19 attack they acknowledge, and a few they have barely denied. Otherwise Kiev says they were just watching, in terrified awe, as the Russians launched attacks from the plant and then shelled themselves in return, over and over. 

Looking into at least seven incidents with published details and images, rockets, drones and shells have hit the Russian-occupied plant in areas far from that launcher and right among the reactors, sometimes where AFVs were parked, and other times where minor damage could just keep tensions high. Impact spots I know of are marked with black stars on the top map. These have been mostly blamed on the Russians, but that's always been illogical, and the evidence seems to disagree; some attacks were done by kamikaze drone like in that July attack, and some were by artillery or rockets shown as fired from Ukrainian areas, despite Ukrainian claims (August 6 from the northwest, August 27 from the northwest or north). Some other attack analysis is pending (Sept. 1, 4, 20, maybe others).

As the statement by Mikhail Ulyanov claims: 

"According to the Ministry of Defense of Russia, since July 18, 2022, Ukrainian armed formations have shelled the territory of the ZNPP and its infrastructure more than 30 times, firing more than 120 artillery shells and using at least 16 kamikaze drones." 

"The satellite city of ZNPP Enerhodar, where the station's employees and their families live, was shelled more than 70 times during the same period (10 times from drones and more than 60 times from barrel artillery and multiple launch rocket systems). As a result of these attacks, there are casualties and injuries among the employees of the nuclear power plant and residents of the city."

International Atomic Energy Agency chief Rafael Grossi would say on September 9. "This is an unsustainable situation and is becoming increasingly precarious. Enerhodar has gone dark. The power plant has no offsite power. And we have seen that once infrastructure is repaired, it is damaged once again," Grossi called for "the immediate cessation of all shelling in the entire area."  (Reuters) 

Attack reports did fall off or even stop at this time, as the final reactor 6 was switched off for safety. but on the 20th, Russian-affiliated sources reported another attack. Photos show a ruptured pipe in the inner splash ponds, just 140m from special building 1, which was also reportedly damaged, along with the occupied cafeteria. Then that night, according to Ukrainian officials, Russian shelling damaged the communication equipment of reactor 6 and cut the power supply, requiring an emergency switch to diesel generators.  with the open switchgear of the ZNPP. Due to power loss, two diesel generators of the safety system for cooling the reactor were started in an emergency (hromadske.ua)

Grossi knows but cannot say who needs to stop and still hasn't. It's Kiev, not Moscow, that benefits from a situation "that cannot stand." It underline the need for change, like Russia agreeing to surrender the plant to Ukrainian militarization. Both sides claim they want the shelling to stop, but the perpetrators keep shelling while blaming the other side, probably based on a rational motive. Logically and according to much direct evidence, Ukraine is the perpetrator of this shelling. But for the Western-dominated "world community," Ukraine can do no wrong in its war with Russia, while Russia can do no right, so holding the guilty to account won't be an option for them. It was already clear that words aren't enough to stop the shelling. So far, it might be that Russian artillery and rockets - wherever they're fired from - are the only tools willing and able to stop the attacks, if only for a moment.