Adam Larson
June 21-23, 2021
updates June 25, Aug. 16
It's been 7 years and 10 months since the infamous Ghouta sarin attack / chemical massacre of 21 August 2013 claimed several hundred lives, perhaps even the 1,429 "estimated" by US intelligence agencies. It's been nearly as long since a UN-OPCW investigation allowed the blaming of Syria's government and threats of US military action that was narrowly averted, and that long the blame on Damascus has continued to argue for ongoing sanctions, lawsuits and arrest warrants, theft of oil resources, denial of reconstruction funds, etc. - to the increasing detriment of Syria's people.
Much neglected evidence suggests it's been nearly eight years with not even a start at true accountability, 7 years and 10 months in which the real perpetrators of a false-flag event and probably a hideous, genocidal mass murder have avoided punishment or even - in most circles - a hint of blame. In fact they're still widely seen as heroes standing up to the "butcher Assad."
Taking that as long enough, a small group of researchers including myself have completed a detailed visual explanation of an important new discovery, which ties together and amplifies that neglected evidence. As related in two new reports and in this summary image (not included in either report), the discovery is as follows:
We've had the basic NW firing area identified for a few years, based on the first five or so trajectory estimates. Yet we (or I) failed to notice that video match earlier, even in the off-and-on review of 2017-2020, or in collaborator Michael Kobs' 2020 report summarizing that (PDF, ACLOS hosting). For my part anyway, most of 2020 was wasted on Covid-19 debates (learned: no one ever changes their mind on that) before, in early March, Michael drew my attention to that burned field's similarity to the scene in the videos. First word outside Twitter: firing spot post here.
Ever since, we've been immersed in piecing together a report to explain this, but it wound up being two reports. Michael headed a discussion involving (among a few others) veteran geolocator Chris Kabusk and Rootclaim founder Saar Wilf, who took an immediate interest in the finding (Rootclaim had previously calculated opposition guilt for Ghouta at 87% probable (link) or updated to 92% and now, I guess, to 100% "resolved.").
They made so many cool 3D models... I was invited to collaborate but by a social media snafu never got the invitation and didn't even know if the discussion had started. So I was left working on a report myself, thinking it might be the basis of ours, once we got going. But by the time we all got connected, I'd developed mine too far to surrender much, and they had a different approach nearing completion (or so it kept seeming for some weeks...). When we couldn't quickly agree on a single form that seemed adequate to me, I decided it would all be presented in two reports and I would decide the remainder.
There were delays from there to absorb new findings, hash out details, wait on elements and correct errors, clarify points, tweak the formatting, etc. The collective report was finished and finally released on June 18. Mine is still pending final touches and publication as I write this 2 days later. The main idea of this blog post is to make sure there's one spot including both reports, and to give some preview or good overview for those not yet ready to dive into the PDFs, and also a space for comments, perhaps rebuttals or corrections, a bit of whatever is sparked here.
Each report takes a slightly different approach, airing different points and varying in some readings, so both are worth some review. However, both start from the same text and images used in the 2020 report, differently changing and adding to them. So ... with the same stuff now partly repeated in three PDFs, there will be some redundancy in that area (filling some 1/3 or more of each report)
Ghouta sarin attack: Review of Open-Source Evidence
This is the report with the well-developed visual explanation, numerous 3D models and even stereoscopic 3D images (glasses required - valid method, from 2 diff. frames interpolated). I'm named but, as noted, was not as involved as the others. Just noticing Saar Wilf is not named, despite a pretty central part in pulling it all together.
"Part 1: Locations and Trajectories" covers rocket impacts, damage analysis and carefully-derived trajectory estimates. It works from the 2020 report slightly revised with "pool" impact added, and the possibly unrelated "shutter door" impact removed. See below the 3D modeling for UN-OPCW "impact site 4" - 105° as published in their report, 136° as found by careful visual analysis.
They said that 105° described the angle "precisely" and it would up pointing towards a government missile base. But that base was at a distance 5x further than the rockets could fly, and the angle seems to be some 30° off (we only call it approximate, with a deviation of +/- 2°). This would be quite a perplexing error, if it were truly an error.
That site 4 reading winds up the clearest among 7 trajectory estimates considered. As Part 2 explains, these estimates converge about 2km out (or a bit further for some) near an island of government control in northern Jobar. Final combined areas and compass readings are shown below, with site 4's narrow estimate in red. Two trajectories per an Al-Jazeera report included: the "pool" one placed in solid dark blue, the other one in dotted light blue, running 110° (2 versions of that line are run from 2 reported impact locations - it wasn't visually placed like the rest).
If our analysis is any good, the firing spot should be somewhere near the left-center of this image, between 2 and 2.5km out from the furthest impact. The closest few open areas of adequate size for rocket firing are shaded red. The bus station on the government side is probably out of range, but a larger L-shaped area on the opposition side fits nicely.
Some smaller areas in the vicinity might also work, but it's only within that area (the L's lower left) is where we found the clearly consistent scorching. That alone wouldn't be so decisive, but it appears at a spot that looks just like the site in those videos.
Comparing: my rough composite image of the scene from the SW* view:
* At night, actual directions are unclear - all those mentioned "would be" east, etc. if the field were oriented the same as the one we found (and the odds of a field in this area matching so well w/consistent burned spot - but all at some other rotation - is quite unlikely)
Saar managed to produce some brand-new super-enhanced copies of the videos - next steps may include re-doing the composite view above based on this. Matching the characteristics of the site with this footage, the report establishes the D-30 cannon is in the same field's northeast corner. Below: some cropped frames to show that approached from the east (north of a pole, south of a row of small trees), then the launcher seen from the southwest (same pole, eastern trees clearly visible, northern ones faintly visible)
Modeling and analysis considers details like lighting that differs between videos, for example leaving the D-30 effectively invisible from the southwest view of the rocket launches. Some fairly advanced analysis yields findings like this:
According to our analysis of the videos, the launcher in the Liwa al Islam videos has an azimuth of 30°. This means that the intended firing direction at deployment was 120 ° +/- 30°. In this position, it could reach all known impact locations of the sarin attack, all of which correspond to the Volcano range at an elevation angle close to 45°
The launcher can only rotate so far when fixed to such a vehicle, estimated at 30°. By that, they could fire 90-150° without moving the truck. The truck could be moved, but maybe wasn't; trajectory estimates to located impacts vary from 110° to 141° (or 109° to unverified "LCC9", 145° to "LCC1" - as I call them and as I measured it).
At least one firing direction was analyzed for the report; the visual appearance of the rockets, with one nearly covering the other but not quite, could be explained by two launch directions. It seems 110° is the correct choice, suggesting this might be the unplaced rocket Al-Jazeera's investigation read at that trajectory. From this field, a 110° comes out near 2 spots reported to HRW and nearer to one reported to Syrian Archive, as plotted above. (Otherwise it could visually be about 136° as to impact site 4.)
From the conclusion:
These new findings clearly indicate the 2013 sarin attack was carried out by an opposition faction from within opposition territory ... Until now, all Western authorities over-confidently placed blame on the Syrian government, often pushing for military escalation. This failure demonstrates that Intelligence agencies have not learned the lesson of the Iraq WMD fiasco, and NGOs and the media need to develop more reliable and independent investigation methods.
That may not be a very good review as I'm wrapping up my own report, the following almost copy-paste bulk review, other promotional materials and some other things too. But there's the link above - go have a look and form your own view.
Mapping to Accountability for the 2013 Ghouta Chemical Massacre
Pretty much by me, based on Kobs and collective work, 74pp - Finally published on June 23 at ACLOS
It seemed worth sharing an alternate, expanded trajectory analysis I had worked up, and to convey the context and fuller explanation of the primary material and a range of secondary questions and supporting evidence. E.G. many potential readers will start off wondering why we shouldn't just trust the UN-OPCW investigation. So that's addressed right off with The introduction "A Short Story About Some Too-Long Lines and Wrong Angles." That and some reference maps comprise a section 1 before turning to Impacts Analysis / Trajectory Estimates.
Section 2 is based on the 2020 report, with some impacts heavily revised and others left about the same but explained more. For each one I assign broad and narrow trajectory estimates and new analysis including deflection considerations. These additions have not been thoroughly tested, but that could happen now. Eight located impacts reported as relevant, including "Shutter Door" and "Impact Site 5" ("Apartment") not included in the parallel report, but excluding the unplaced Al-Jazeera 110° impact.
Much of the report's 22,000 words are spent here. This can make for tedious reading, aside from being mostly redundant to some readers. But in both reports, its main point is just to be available to follow and check our analysis. Review as needed - let us know of any errors. It was all necessary to get to the truly interesting point...
Section 3: Trajectory Crossover Analysis - Combined areas for broad estimates and again for narrow estimates - the latter is shown below, 8 triangles traced back exactly 2km, with the tiny crossover area shaded white. That's too exact to read literally, considering the small imperfections in analysis and that 2km is not an absolute max. range. But again, it should be inside or pretty near that little wedge of land.
The report spends a moment assessing the government-held bus station for consistent scorching, but that's only found at likely firing spot, which is about 50m NW of that white triangle - here dubbed “PLI Field” (for Possible Liwa al-Islam, noting the ambiguity about just who those people were). Just what's expected or consistent is a bit speculative, but founded on available evidence (my own quick review). Some further consideration might be in order, to either challenge or solidify this finding.
Here's an image Michael whipped up at the last minute for my report, with the whole burned patch of the PLI Field rendered orange. Its center is ~10m x 10m or about the the size and placement of the ignition flash, plus an extra span to the left/north. As it happens, the wind observed in the videos is to the north/northeast (rough measures, at 2 points following cannon fire and a rocket launch).
Table: for each impact spot, this gives range/distance to this spot (to within a few meters), given in meters, the trajectory and then reverse azimuth of that line, and then the estimated reverse azimuth for that impact (most likely center, exact number and +/- deviation), and finally difference from the central predicted angle and the line to PLI Field.
Section 3.3 "Crossover Area: Further Context" tells of the dreaded (until Aug. 24) Tohme checkpoint and a little-known Jobar sarin attack (on the same day - against other Syrian troops - just 400m away from the PLI field).
This emphasis-worthy point was squeezed into the parallel report, despite its general paucity of such context development. The exact 400m proximity may be a relative coincidence, but but it seems:
- E. Ghouta militants had functional sarin loaded into weapons and used by 8/24;
- sarin was in the rockets fired, almost certainly from areas they controlled, on 8/21;
- or perhaps it was just planted at the sites later, which they also controlled.
And still, nothing real has emerged to explain how the Syrian government could have a hand in any of that, even though they did also have sarin.
Much of section 3.3 strays into general context and might have gone in section 4, "concluding material." This includes "CW Lawfare, Laid Bare"- excerpt below on the evidence collected by the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM), the Soros-funded Open Society Justice Initiative, and Syrian Archive, in furtherance of suing the Syrian government over this sarin attack, hopefully resulting in an arrest warrant for president Assad and others implicated. They mainly established chain-of-command (who to punish IF the government is guilty), but also evidence to show they are, including witnesses with impossible claims, and some comparable work on rocket impacts and trajectory analysis. Let's compare.
(This part happens to line up with that nice sidebar.)
The report concludes with "What We Do Not Know" and how it should humble us a bit more. Opposition activist Razan Zaitouneh's sad legacy and Liwa al-Islam's crimes give some perspective leading into four possibilities as to how the victims died, including the controversial gassed prisoners theory. Finally it asks "what does Nema know?" LI/JI spokesman and core member Majdi Nema aka Islam Alloush was arrested in France some time ago. That was in connection with the Zaitoneh case and other general human rights abuses, NOT in connection with the Ghouta false-flag and mass murder suggested by the evidence. In fact the charges against him were brought by the same SCM suing Damascus over that. That opportunity for answers is noted, before this closing:
If the world community had any ethical duty to those killed in Syria’s Eastern Ghouta on 21 August 2013, it would be to hold the true perpetrators to account. That would require careful consideration of all the evidence, in actual proportion and without political considerations. We could do this... regardless of which foreign powers backed the criminals. We could do this … despite the risk to the decade-long regime-change campaign (by eliminating an excuse for further hostility posing as justice). And obviously, we could keep failing to do this, for those and other reasons.
Developments
Lated add, Aug. 16: Michael, Saar and I appeared on Push Back with Aaron Maté back on July 26 to explain our findings.
Companion article at the GrayZone
Notable early discussion: Rootclaim on Twitter - Michael Kobs on Twitter - Aaron Maté on Twitter
Challenges, Attacks, Attempted Debunks: first efforts - failed even worse than I had expected. Not a single real challenge to the core forensic findings, just attempted shortcuts.
July 13: Scott Lucas' derisive non-efforts fail even worse, on a number of levels.
August 16: What "the Rocket Man" Eliot Higgins want us to see in Ghouta (incomplete)
space for noting more ...
July 27: immediately after our Push Back appearance, anti-Semitism/Nazi accusations were leveled against co-author Chris Kabusk, and they were not completely unfounded. - Aug. 6: slowly-crafter statement in response here: https://twitter.com/CL4Syr/status/1423620560152522752
Super job Adam
ReplyDeleteOn behalf of everyone who did the work, I say thanks!
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