What Caused the Collapse of the Nova Kakhovka Dam?

June 13, 2023 (rough)

minor edits 6/16, update June 20

Blame Review 

Who, if anyone, intentionally destroyed the Nova Kakhovka dam a week ago remains unclear. Ukraine was just launching a new offensive and Russia would want to complicate it. Depending on their plans either side might see some benefit in flooding the Dnieper river basin, to allow their own moves or hinder the enemy's. 

It seems the Russian side loses more, with Russian-occupied villages on the south bank mainly flooded, with minefields and defenses the Russians had placed primarily washed out away. The reservoir's sudden draining also threatens water supply to Crimea and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, both Russian-controlled (though both have reserves and backup plans, and will likely avoid disaster).

The Ukrainian side will probably suffer some headaches as well, including flooding parts of Kherson city, but on balance ... they planned to use limited flooding against the Russian occupiers, even "testing" it in one of their several strikes on the dam using US-supplied HIMARS rockets, as the Washington Post famously reported in December, citing Major General Andrey Kovalchuk, head of Ukraine's offensive in the Kherson area. "The Ukrainians, he said, even conducted a test strike with a HIMARS launcher on one of the floodgates at the Nova Kakhovka dam, making three holes in the metal to see if the Dnieper’s water could be raised enough to stymie Russian crossings." They hoped to limit flooding in villages, which is wise - that danger is why such strikes are deemed illegal. (cited via http://zububrothers.com/2023/06/06/dont-forget-wapos-report-from-december-about-kievs-plans-to-blow-up-the-kakhovka-dam/)

In contrast, we've heard kneejerk assertions that the Russians obviously did it on the evidence that they're evil, and as we've long known, they're SO evil they don't mind shooting themselves in the foot. We also hear that they had plans to do it that were intercepted by US intel, and that a Russian phone call about doing it was intercepted by Ukrainian intel. Least fake, as read, is a law passed in Russia just days before the disaster seeming to bar investigations of any dam disaster in occupied Ukraine (Newsweek via MSN). That's worth looking into next, but for now let's just consider that, even if this pans out, it isn't such clear proof we should stop looking at the evidence.

Russia called it a Ukrainian attack, but gave no specifics like weapon used, and failed to produce any video evidence showing the event. They have footage from moments after an initial breach and before the final collapse (see below), but they don't show either relevant moment. 

Huge on-site explosives were either necessary or most likely, and now seismic data is said to show this. We'll come back to that soon. I've wondered about floating mines or something heavier sent downstream, or divers somehow placing heavier explosives under the water without the Russians noticing, as happened with the Nord Stream pipelines. I don't know how plausible that is here. The Ukrainians could have had an insider help them smuggle some explosives into the powerhouse. 

And the Russians could have done it much easier in a number of ways with their control of the site. 

I've followed the signs of accidental collapse following on damage and erosion, as traced out here. But in the end I can't even suspect this is the cause and - especially considering the timing - some criminal act seems at least 50% likely. Even after all the following analysis, I only have my hunch Ukraine is somehow to blame, but nothing to convince skeptics or even myself. Others might bring more knowledge or evidence to bear, and this all seems worth exploring just in case it does contain the answer, or some part of it.

McBeth Analysis

Ryan McBeth is a pro-Ukraine, anti-Russia "OSINT" guy, who recently posted a video explaining "How Russia Destroyed the Kakhovka Dam." (At right, cleverly citing himself as part of a well-organized multimedia display.) They did it passively by negligence, he suspects. But then "if incompetence or negligence causes a natural disaster, it's no different than if you planted a bomb." 

Previously, I've found McBeth set on absolving Ukrainian forces for a shelling attack on civilians in Donetsk on 19 September. That killed 13 people, most of them shredded to bits at a bus stop. Initially McBeth suspected the scene was all ghoulishly staged, with fake or re-purposed cadavers, just to malign the Ukrainians. He then accepted it was all genuine, and read the shell impact backwards (as coming from the SE, not the NW) to dismiss the massacre as some almost comical Russian or DPR friendly fire incompetence (see here). Even if he had gotten that right, it still fails to explain the same kind of thing happening hundreds of times before and after, spanning back to 2014, with nearly all of several dozen that I've checked traceable to Ukrainian positions.

So he absolves Ukraine's ongoing genocide of ethnic Russians in the former Ukraine. Maybe he's paid to do that (he does accept and probably follows donations, and seems to get plenty of farm-grown bots sent to feign and inspire mass support). But maybe he's just a sheep like so many others, if an upper-tier one. Either way, he seems capable of making good points, I realized after watching this latest. Russian incompetence MIGHT be at play this time. 

McBeth blames Russia for negligent management, hardly seeming to care their work was complicated by Ukrainian forces on the far bank, using snipers (as he finds obvious) and shelling (which he doesn't mention), overflooding (not mentioned), and perhaps other measures. So his conclusion is again dubious and partial. But it's put together with explanations that makes it all pretty useful to watch. I'm actually recommending it.

He might be right that the disaster was not caused intentionally by either side, but that's not sure enough to bet on. Either way, he raises a number of technical points that seem highly relevant. though they may not explain the event. As far as I can tell, it could be the Russians placed a bomb right there, or their enemies managed to do so, and Ryan McBeth is going soft on someone's war crime. 

Enough rambling prelude. Now to the rambling relation of what he covered and what he ignored.

Seismic Readings: A 2-Stage Collapse with No Bomb?

At 9:55 in his video, McBeth discusses the vaunted seismic readings said to prove a Russian bomb blew the dam.  As he notes, with no amplitude scale, it's not clear what size of vibrations it truly shows, which should be a red flag. And he notes "the explosion AND subsequent collapse should come in as two different kinds of waves," while we see a concentration of spikes that could just be the rumble of the dam breaking and the start of violent flooding. 

The widely-cited source: https://www.jordskjelv.no/meldinger/seismic-signals-recorded-from-an-explosion-at-the-kakhovka-dam-in-ukraine

"Data from regional seismic stations show clear signals on Tuesday 6 June at 2:54 local time (01:54 Norwegian time). Time and location (coordinates: 46.7776, 33.37) coincide with reports in the media about the collapse of the Kakhovka dam. The signals indicate that there was an explosion. The magnitude estimate is between 1 and 2."

"The figure below shows signals from the Bukovina (BURAR) seismic array, a station that is approximately 620 km from the dam."

Here's the published image, with my notes based on the provided time scale. "Magnitude estimated between 1 and 2" (vertical scale, vague) and timespan shown - (it's 2:55 into 2:56, not 2:54 like they said). By this, the possible bomb blast occurs over about 1.5 to 2 seconds, but its amplitude is about the same as - often weaker than - the rumble that follows for about 20 seconds of dam collapse and initial flooding. This continues noticeably for about a minute before it fades into the backdrop. 

Same site: "UPDATE: Based on new analysis, we have also observed weak signals from an earlier seismic event from approximately 02:35 (local time in Ukraine) originating from the direction of the Kakhovka Dam." That should be even weaker than the above, so not much of a bomb if it was one at all. It could be a mid-sized bomb was used just to create a small initial breach, letting the massive water pressure do the rest of the work. 

In between, we saw video released by the Russians (not sure who exactly), taken at 2:46am by its timestamp. In line with the above, the dam is partly breached, some 11 min. after the first recorded event, What seems to be a small mine on or at the intact part of the dam detonates just as a seagull or a pair of them passes close, but the dam stays the same as the video ends. I posted this on Twitter, wondering "Why a mine there, going off on its own? Were there others before?" And could that matter much if so? No regular mine could come close to breaching the dam. It might be one washed down from upstream or one the Russians laid on the dam, triggered by vibrations of the ongoing collapse. 

That camera view shows the far (NW) quarter of the powerhouse, while the 3rd quarter just off-frame here would be destroyed in some discontinuous damage - most logically in a separate event and later than this. Being off-frame, it might be destroyed here, but there's no indication of it, and we hear there was just one noise. The second and louder event might have been there, and it might have been a bomb set in the powerhouse, although the signal doesn't clearly prove that (or it needs clarified). McBeth proposed if the Russians HAD bombed the dam, this is how they'd do it. Maybe they did.

Later drone views show the missing section of the powerhouse, with light smoke coming from inside the remainder, consistent with an explosion in the section now gone, starting wider fires. I'll need to review more images to say if explosives are suggested, or maybe a natural explosion related to the collapse, or just a second collapse somehow centered there and a related fire inside. Any of those seems possible as well.

Map of the dam collapse:

So we have 2 stages of breach recorded as seismic events, and at least one smaller mine blast in between. No single event - no smoking gun bomb - clearly emerges, although it remains quite possible. It could be a bomb in the powerhouse plus a mysterious and obviously related earlier breach, in some planned attack to either aid or thwart the Ukrainian offensive. But there is the accident angle to consider, with more mundane details, some of which likely play into the events either way.

Hydrologic Overload?

McBeth points out how the dam was collapsing already over a span of days leading up to the final failure. Charles Wood helped me to realize right away, pointing to Maxar satellite images posted by Christiaan Triebert showing a curved section of roadway collapsing between images of May 28 and June 5. McBeth had a look at and shared some satellite views he purchased - dated November 11 2022, March 3, June 1 and June 2, 2023 (and maybe just those 4?). He also spoke with some experts and did some research on dams that seems good to me, if incomplete and debatable (I debate it below). 

Two issues McBeth highlights relate to water over and maybe under the dam. He emphasizes "overtopping," where an overfilled reservoir spills over the top of the dam. He notes mild turbulence all across the dam in the June views, indicating this (below, June 1). It's also evident in late May and perhaps also in the March 3 view, if more mild. As he shows, this would be fatal for an earthen dam, but with a concrete one like this, it probably does nothing but indicate that it's totally full. 

 

As shown above, the few sluice gates on the southeast end, nearest to the hydroelectric powerhouse, were kept open constantly, as far as he saw. The above shows this, as do images from March and May. As McBeth notes, this is likely to cause "hydrodynamic scouring," where turbulent water digs under an obstruction, eventually causing it to collapse. (his illustration at top , and I would think the other side being scoured makes more sense, but the idea is the same). 

McBeth wondered if such scouring could work itself "back and back" to undermine the dam. I doubt that. It won't happen on the reservoir side because turbulent water happens at release, at the far end of a ramp, and then moves away from the dam. So I don't see how this could cause the dam to collapse. (bottom illustration by me to show what would need to happen. The ramp is probably not that long, but the idea is the same).

I wouldn't expect this to even budge well-anchored external structures, but we can see such objects in this vicinity actually moving. Hydrodynamic scour might be what dislodged part of a flow guide (proper name?) sometime between March 3 (left - intact) and May 28 (right - broken). 

It's probably the same force, acting just meters away, that took out the supports for the curved section of roadway that collapsed a few days before the dam was breached, as McBeth logically proposes. These were washed away or toppled so they were fully submerged and not even visible. (see below.)

Why were these few gates so overused? They're the ones closest to the Russian side, and McBeth nonchalantly suggests they kept using that position for fear of Ukrainian snipers on the other side targeting the plant's staff.  "I could teach an NPR reporter to hit a man-sized target at 800 meters with an optic and a rifle that I bought at Wal-Mart," he says.  

https://t.me/militarydonetsk/74024 March 25 report: "Ukrainian militants are shelling the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station and approaches to it from a large-caliber sniper rifle, the commander of the station’s security told RIA Novosti." That's when we see only these gates furthest from the snipers being used. So the snipers sure didn't help matters.

We'll come back to hydrologic overload and the reasons for it. First, an issue McBeth failed to address.

Ukrainian Shelling Attacks

McBeth notes a mysterious brown patch appearing on the curved section of roadway in an image from March 3. He doesn't know what it is, but it seems to come from Ukrainian shelling of the dam, perhaps with US-supplied HIMARS rockets. 

He says the brown (or rust-colored) spot was not there on November 11, and from the view presented, it seems so. But via video, again, it's pretty blurry.

The spot may be present in a Nov. 12 view (https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70003), along with some strange rough edges ...  

... and both had seemed to be there in a view from October 18 (Reuters).

Anyway, a view from May 28 this year gives a clearer look at this rust-colored patch and the rough edges in the same area ...

... which corresponds to the section of roadway that collapsed - as McBeth finds - between images from June 1 and 2 (other views show it down on the 4th and - Maxar, below - on the 5th).

McBeth doesn't know what the brown spot is. Neither do I, exactly, but it seems connected to the 4 visible HIMARS rocket impacts very nearby. 

A closeup of the elongated impact of an arrival from the north - note some damage to the powerhouse building in the background, including windows out.

Looking across the dam - some fragmentation damage on the opposite surface

This damage was seemingly incurred in an attack on August 10. That day, Rybar on Telegram had video (stamped Rudenko, 3 frames shown above). This showed the new damage in some detail, as well as passing traffic, refuting Ukrainian claims to have destroyed the bridge. The visible hits were from just a few rockets, Rybar reported, with the rest intercepted by Russian Air Defense. "Colonel Cassad" posted a still shot from that video, noting the rockets' accuracy but weak explosive charge. "It can be seen that they were aiming at one specific span of the oversluice passage, and they were trying to drop the entire slab," but they failed. "I think that the consumption here was at least 2 full sets of HIMARS (i.e. 12 charges), and maybe three, because part was intercepted by air defense. In general, at least $1.8 million was injected - but the effect is doubtful."

Interestingly, a Russian-led modernization of 2 turbines began just before this, on August 7. (https://t.me/militarydonetsk/36204). It would be complicated.

I didn't find Ukrainian references to this attack of the 10th, but they boasted of an attack on the 12th leaving the road unusable. Ukrinform: "On August 12, Ukrainian defenders struck a road bridge over the dam in Nova Kakhovka, which was used by the invaders. The spokesperson of the Operational Command South announced this, Ukrinform reports. ... Earlier, Kherson Regional Council deputy Serhii Khlan announced the destruction of this bridge. According to him, this is the last crossing in the region that could be used to transport equipment."

Eva K. Bartlett passed on the following day: "The management of the Kakhovskaya HPP made a number of statements:

- One turbine of the hydroelectric power plant is disabled after missile strikes from the APU;

- Shelling of the Kakhovskaya HPP by the Armed Forces of Ukraine can lead to a disaster at the Zaporizhzhya NPP; 

- The station is operating in emergency mode due to constant shelling."

Aug 13, video https://t.me/militarydonetsk/37145

"As a result of regular shelling of the Kakhovka HPP with GMLRS missiles from the American HIMARS MLRS by the Ukrainian Armed Forces - in particular, the shelling that occurred on August 12, 2022, three of the six turbines of the hydroelectric power plant were stopped. The facility is in pre-emergency mode." (Maybe just one turbine plus the 2 down for modernization = 3 down total)

How was a turbine shut down? In a video report, "Izvestia correspondent Ivan Litomin showed the consequences of the APU's strike on the machine building of the Kakhovskaya HPP. Due to the shelling of the nationalists, the glass was broken, the fragments fell into the oil tank, after which two turbines had to be urgently turned off. Now the station is operating in emergency mode, the journalist said. ... "A couple more blows, and they can simply put her out of action."  Video inside the powerhouse shows no visible damage, but a coated windowpane is shown on the floor, and external views show some missing panes at the NW end. 

"The journalist also said that the passing capacity of the bridge next to the hydroelectric power station has been restored. Civilian cars are already passing quietly." Impact location unclear, but on the roadway near the powerhouse, NW end - about where the August 10 attack happened. New damage across from the old ...

... new roadway damage and the whole area looking brownish, reporter with ill-fitting clothes ...

Additional damage correlating with this appears in later satellite views - see below. There were also attacks on the dam reported on at least these dates: July 19, Aug. 21, 24, 29, October 1, November 6, 12. See list below. The last was most likely done by the Russians, and the rest by the Ukrainians.

Update 6/20: a video of the dam taken in March shows the rust-colored patch is a number of rusty metal slats laid across more holes in the bridge. Of course. Why didn't I guess that? https://twitter.com/novakakhovka_ua/status/1634654270791249920

Damage assessment: the 4 spots punctured on the 10th, soon patched over, form a unique pattern of 4 scars at the roadway's curve, which I located on a Maxar views of May 28, in the blue polygon below. Repaired damage from other attacks, perhaps all of them later, are traced in yellow here, including the "brown" spot and a damaged structure closer to the gates (likely Aug. 12 impact), and perhaps to the road on the other side and even the rail for moving the gantry cranes that open the gates, where a section of rail may be missing. 

The hits perforated the roadway so it would have broken away, if not for its mighty supports that were barely affected. But then these supports were seemingly washed loose and disappeared. One of the two appears misaligned already on the 28th (compare spacing of the green curves above). The, of course, the roadway finally fell, breaking at the perforations provided at great cost to US taxpayers. Only then was Ukraine's goal achieved. But then a few days later the whole dam collapsed.

It's likely one of these attacks that damaged a sluice gate, as Kovalchuk told the Washington Post ("The Ukrainians, he said, even conducted a test strike with a HIMARS launcher on one of the floodgates at the Nova Kakhovka dam, making three holes in the metal")

An August 13 video (cited above) shows one of the gates bottom-to-top, with no leaking holes visible in the gate, but near the top are some possible light marks from shelling nearby (pink boxes), and some definite marks on the structure above that (red), including in a pipe of unclear importance. The location of this gate is unclear, but probably close to the August 10 attack to knock out windows on the powerhouse. Likely spot indicated in map of attacks below.

The repeated shelling it's troubling, but it's unlikely to have caused or even contributed to the collapse. Nothing seen comes close to threatening this massive structure. Even the mechanism for raising the gates is unlikely to be fazed by shrapnel of this size. But like the snipers, this shelling of the dam couldn't have helped matters.

June 20 update: video and analysis from March show a heavily damaged gate spraying water, and that it's gate #1 closest to the Russian side and to those repeated roadway attacks. Props to "Diagonal" for the this tip (see comments). As far back as Nov. 12, there's turbulence from this leakage, but no such sign on October 18 (see images used above). This gate was probably damaged in between those dates.

Deliberate Flooding?

Did Ukraine open their own dams upstream after the dam collapse to worsen the flooding for their own advantage?  Mikael Valtersson on Twitter made this claim, alongside a dated video of a gushing dam that can't help (I asked for clarification if he was just confused or had a solid source). 

There were claims they had flooded the reservoir before, in April and May, as water levels at the dam in May and June were by far the highest they had been in many years, perhaps ever. But then the Russians controlled the sluice gates (or floodgates) to let the excess pass on by. So if it built up that badly, it would be their fault. 

But it seems they DID open the floodgates as wide as they could and still couldn't keep the reservoir much below 100% full. The dated video - from April - might help illustrate how this came to be.

All spring, we can see open floodgates pouring water in every 2023 image I've seen. That seems unusual (no release in any of the historical images below). Perhaps 6-8 of the 28 gates are open in most views, by the width of turbulent water, but only 1-2 points are visibly draining on the other side. However many gates were opened, the reservoir appears to be draining almost as fast as it could; the outlet side appears flooded all Spring. It might be the river that was past capacity, and the dam just had to follow suit. Already in March, some islands usually present are submerged (below: Google Earth historical views of springs past vs. March 3).  

In May, the water is deeper yet, and the flow guide was displaced. It was deeper yet on June 1-5 as more supports and the roadway section are washed clean away; just some green tree tops of those islands stick out now. And all this while levels behind the dam remain at decade high-levels and spilling over. This is not normal. 

Water levels, 2016-2023 - Hydroweb (theia-land.fr)

With Ukrainian help upstream, levels reached 14m in February, their lowest level by far in 7 years, as rain refused to fall, or was stored up for some reason. At 6:40 in the video, McBeth explains "you want levels to be lower in winter because you have to be prepared for the spring snow melt." Most years they did not want it that low, and it was kept between 15.5 and 16.5m year-round. 

What was different in 2023? Russian management. Some call them incompetent. Some note they were beleaguered and attacked. But the new management is clearly the initial cause of whatever happened.

From that winter low, there was just a little water accumulated to the end of March, raising the level to 14.5m. Input must have been high, since output was high by March 3, as noted. Maybe March 3 was a misleading picture, but I suspect it looked similar on most days - always draining. Maybe they were dealing with excessive flow and, worried about the coming flow being even worse, labored to keep space available. 

Then some new and heavy rains came and/or a stored mass of water was released over the weeks of April and early May, likely exceeding release capacity so it built up to a maximum level of 17.5 meters on May 8. After that, levels didn't rise because they couldn't - it was 100% full and spilling over. 

For whatever reason, this level is usually avoided. Once in 2021 it peaked near 17m and was soon corrected. It's never filled well past that and left that way for a month.

Output increased and/or input decreased over May so the level held steady around 17.36m, aside from another peak to 17.54 on the 21st. There was a slight decrease to about 17.3m achieved at the end of May to June 4. But to do that, they exceeded the river's normal capacity, raising the water level probably over a meter. To drain any faster would risk area-wide flooding. Still, they couldn't keep up, and at the end it was spilling over again. 

So the Russians might have failed to manage a completely unmanageable situation - they released too much water, and also not enough water. They also released it from too few gates in the same area, for one part they could have managed better. But there were the snipers. And why was there so much water to deal with? 

McBeth suspects scouring from this excessive release wound up undercutting the dam. If so, it seems Ukraine contributed greatly to that outcome. But as I explained above, it's not clear to me how - or if - this chronic flooding of the reservoir contributed to the dam's failure. I see no reason to expect hydrodynamic scouring on either side to undercut the dam, and these downstream structures vulnerable to it should not be propping it up in any way. 

It may not be the why the dam collapsed, but like the snipers and the shelling, any deliberate over-flooding couldn't have helped matters. It's not clear how much Ukraine deliberately contributed to this disastrous situation. This question merits some study (e.g. how does reservoir level compare to actual precipitation vs. deliberately altered release patterns?)  It probably shows hostile intent on Ukraine's part, and that intent that might entail the rest of the explanation. 

The possible deliberate flooding, the rocket attacks, the sniper threat, and other possible measures ...  was Russia negligent in allowing these Ukrainian actions? If so, and these things caused or contributed to the disaster, then they are to blame in that regard. As McBeth says: "if incompetence or negligence causes a natural disaster, it's no different than if you planted a bomb." 

Otherwise, something yet unexplained - or not understood by me - probably has to be involved. It was most likely intentional, and I could see either side doing it. As far as I can tell, the Russians DID plant a bomb for some twisted reason. Or they just mucked up managing the needlessly difficult situation. I don't know. But those are some thoughts and observations that might help to reach the truth. 

Appendix: Attacks List

Map of attacks

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

https://russiaun.ru/en/news/100623_k

This June 10 letter lists Ukrainian rocket attacks on the dam on these dates: July 11, 24, 26, 29/30 August 5, 7, 9, 12, 18, 19, 21, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, September 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, October 18, 24, November 6, NOT on Nov. 12, and none listed since then. Not even on June 6. Total: 25 attacks.

"Overall, during the summer and fall of 2022, the total of more than 300 missiles were launched from MLRS HIMARS alone against the Kakhovka HPP." Not all of them hit their target.

Sources (incomplete - mostly with visuals)

July 19: Izvestia: "the very fact of shelling a purely "civilian" object once again showed Ukraine as a terrorist state." Later, August 10, it was noted that such reports "accidentally revealed destroyed Russian military equipment placed there, including a valuable R-439-MD2 satcom vehicle and 5 KAMAZ-based vehicles."

August 10: covered above. Links again: Col. Cassad (pic + opinion, cited above) - Rybar video, cited above

August 12: UKRINFORM: On August 12, Ukrainian defenders struck a road bridge over the dam in Nova Kakhovka, which was used by the invaders. The spokesperson of the Operational Command South announced this, Ukrinform reports. ... Earlier, Kherson Regional Council deputy Serhii Khlan announced the destruction of this bridge. According to him, this is the last crossing in the region that could be used to transport equipment.

https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1559288642300006401

Planet satellite imagery from August 13 shows the damaged Nova Kakhovka rail and road bridge.

Ukraine hit very precisely 2 places along the bridge. 

https://t.me/Reality_Theories/8098 (cited above): One generator down, "The station is operating in emergency mode due to constant shelling."

https://t.me/militarydonetsk/37145 (cited above)

https://t.me/izvestia/99951 (cited above) 

August 21, 24

https://twitter.com/cryptobarbossa_/status/1563224038667071491

NOVA KAKHOVKA DAM/LOCK: Russian convoy was targeted while attempting crossing the Lock. Recently Lock was targeted 2 times during 24/08 and once on 21/08. I assume that here we see the result of latest attack.

Views show major damage, flipped military vehicles and in some view, killed Russian soldiers. The location is on the road to the dam, at the twin buildings flanking the eastern canal.

video 

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1563214188054548481

https://twitter.com/new_geopolitics/status/1563223416722767873

August 29

https://twitter.com/GlasnostGone/status/1564555989793357829

Smoke is rising from the canal section of the Nova Kakhovka bridge - not the Hydroelectric Power Plant, which is further along the bridge. #Ukraine's hit this bridge area numerous times & each time made sure it missed the hydroelectric dam.

October 1

NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 on Twitter: "Smoke rising from the Novaya Kakhovka lock is visible in today's satellite imagery. https://t.co/tZDXmSKnEX" / Twitter

November 6: "Nov 6 (Reuters) - Ukraine's Russian-held Nova Kakhovka dam was damaged in shelling by Ukrainian forces, Russian news agencies reported on Sunday, citing emergency services."

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-russian-held-nova-kakhovka-dam-damaged-shelling-russian-media-2022-11-06/

November 12:  

https://twitter.com/EUFreeCitizen/status/1591336410598051840

 RV journalists confirmed the blowing up of the bridge across the #Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station. This is first photo of the bridge this morning. The 3 bridge crossing the #Dnieper have now been destroyed by the russians

https://t.me/boris_rozhin/70003

Damage to the dam of the Kakhovskaya HPP.

So far, the damage is not enough for a big flood, but in the course of subsequent hostilities it cannot be ruled out that it will still be broken.

Nov. 12 Maxar views (one shown above, one below).  

Ryan McBeth shows a Nov. 11 image with the dam's northeast (Ukrainian) end intact and one gantry crane at an open gate near that north end. He correctly notes an attack on the 12th hit there and destroyed the road surface, finally making the dam unpassable as a bridge. He called this a Russian planned demolition to prevent a Ukrainian crossing, and that might be so. Earlier, Ukraine was trying to disrupt this road, but by then "The situation ... is getting worse," wrote the pro-Russian "WarInMyEyes" on Telegram. "The RF Armed Forces have completely withdrawn their forces from the right bank of the Dnieper River. As soon as our guys left, the Antonovsky bridge and the bridge to the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station were immediately blown up. The railway bridge, which is located next to Antonovsky, was also destroyed."

This fits the scene. A second view of Nov. 12 is zoomed on the damage and the north shore, dense with trenches (Russian?), shelling craters and other signs of battle, with the road to the dam now severed and, as the other image shows above, the gantry cranes both pulled back as far as possible from Ukrainian guns.