Douma Chemical Massacre - Victim Analysis - Why the OPCW Left Evidence Buried in Douma
November 29, 2021
last edits 11/30
On 1 March 2019, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM)'s final report on the Douma incident, S/1731 (PDF link), was released . Its conclusions included that there were "reasonable grounds" to believe chlorine gas had been used in Douma on April 4, 2018 in an attack by Syrian military, "which witnesses said killed 43 people."
This is generally read as saying the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) found proof the Syrian government dropped chlorine on Douma, actually causing the deaths of those 43 people. But there was never proof that it was an attack as opposed to the staged incident it seemed, and no plausible explanation has ever been offered as to how that chlorine could have killed those people as reported. They might well have been murdered in another way and arranged at the scene, just like the chlorine cylinder seemingly was.
The final report did seek the advice of at least two sets of forensic toxicologists, trying to secure that link. But the experts refused to correlate the sudden immobilization or other observed signs and were unable to link the deaths to any specific chemical. The report tries - at least in spots - to make it sound like this was because the FFM was unable to examine the bodies of the deceased. Paragraph 2.11 states: "with the absence of biomedical samples from the dead bodies or any autopsy records, it is not currently possible to precisely link the cause of the signs and symptoms to a specific chemical." 2.10 explains: "the team did not have direct access to examine dead bodies, as it could not enter Douma until two weeks after the incident (see paragraph 2.2), by which time the bodies had been buried." And once they're under the dirt, apparently, it's just too late.
The OPCW had a chance to examine fatalities following on the Ghouta alleged attack in 2013 killed an "estimated" 1,429 people, but for dubious reason they had opted not to do it. UN disarmament chief Angela Kane was involved and spoke to this decision in an interview on RT: “there were so many victims who are still alive that there was really no need to exhume bodies.” Her bizarre and completely incorrect reasoning: “a dead body can’t tell how the person dies … a living person can tell you that.” (RT October 3, 2013. ‘No sarin detected in West Ghouta environment, only in human samples' - UN's Angela Kane. RT video, published October 3, 2013. (time-stamp: 12:29) https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x16udmn - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CcfIj6WLqRk )
And so, in 2013, the OPCW chose to extrapolate from insurgent-screened alleged survivors who claimed to be relatives of the dead. Many of these did test positive for sarin, but at what seems to be incongruously low levels, and their high rate of positives from Moadamiya wound up looking odd next to the almost total lack of sarin returns in the environment there. It seems likely these stand-ins had volunteered for token doses. Since 2004, tests can show sarin presence at concentrations as low as 5 picograms per milliliter of blood which - by my efforts to estimate it - is about 0.002% or 2/100,000 of a fatal dose at most - probably too little to even feel. And it seems the OPCW eschewed quantitative testing for that, just looking for presence at any level, allowing for such easy fakery. (See Sarin-faking in Syria)
As for the real reason to avoid confirmation: they might have been afraid of what they would find. As noted right away by Dr. Denis O'Brien, the fatalities in Ghouta did not appear to have died from sarin at all, especially the unusually pink ones in Kafr Batna, and especially the one whose neck the insurgents had to cut to finish the job. But without really checking, the OPCW decided sarin was to blame for, and that it came from the rockets widely believed to be fired by the Syrian military. (that belief has pretty well proven incorrect.)
From there, OPCW's second effort to even investigate on the ground in 2014 ended in disaster, but a fortunate one for the blaming of Damascus. A team from the newly-minted FFM set out to investigate some alleged chlorine attacks in Hama, but they were also given the locations where insurgent allegedly assembled the "barrel bombs" and stored the chlorine associated with the claims. Perhaps learning of that, insurgents attacked and arrested the FFM team en route - maybe as "spies for Assad" - before sending them back to Damascus empty-handed. Soon a plan was arranged where the FFM would stay out of rebel areas and far away from any CW facilities they ran, and let insurgents and their closer allies like the "White Helmets" handle evidence collection for such investigation.
That was always a gross violation of OPCW protocols. But after the attack and a "loss of trust," what choice was there but to go all-out trusting them or else sit out the whole regime-blaming exercise? That policy produced consistent results implicating the government time and again, mainly based on crediting any claims of aircraft involvement, however grounded they were in the evidence. This held until 2018 in Douma, where the establishment of government control made direct on-site examination of an alleged government attack possible, for the first time in nearly five years. Interestingly, this is where the blame machine ran into its biggest problems.
Uzumcu bragged this was "going to be the first time" bodies were exhumed and studied, but it hadn't been done yet by the 6 July Interim Report (S/1645/2018). All it said on the subject was the intention "was communicated to the Syrian Arab Republic" (some details given) and that "preliminary preparations were undertaken by the Secretariat for this eventuality." There was no word on progress, and three months after the event it was getting very late.
In fact this heralded exhumation was never done and the reasons for that remain muddled. Three extremely different reasons have been proposed:
1) Assad blocked the OPCW from finding the truth of his guilt
2) experts advised there was nothing to find, and so the FFM chose not to look
3) the OPCW's investigators wanted to avoid an unacceptable and unclear "risk" related to reason 2 but predating it, perhaps concerned there was evidence of insurgent guilt they would rather not see.
Reason 1: Assad Kept OPCW From Finding the Evidence
It was on 26 April the OPCW communicated its interest in exhuming bodies, with a "note verbale NV/ODG/214827/18." On 3 May we heard those comments regarding that plan, and then the next day came the Syrian reply. Ten months later the final report would explain:
"The Syrian Arab Republic replied in Note Verbale No. 45 on 4 May 2018 and enumerated the conditions to be met in order to conduct the exhumation. With due consideration of the time elapsed since the alleged incident, the possibility was eventually not explored any further."
"Eventually" it had become too far out to bother. But the editing at least makes it sound like Damascus' conditions - which are never specified - had a part in this, perhaps in stalling it so long. In fact the Syrian government complained about this in another note verbale of 11 March, 2019, question 7:
"Paragraph 7.8 implicitly blames the Syrian Arab Republic for the fact that the bodies were not exhumed from their graves. The Technical Secretariat Sent Note Verbale NV/ODG/214827/18, dated 26 April 2018 and the Syrian Arab Republic replied, through Note Verbale 45, dated 4 May 2018, that it would continue to cooperate with the FFM and it was ready to provide all that is necessary to facilitate the work. However, the issue of exhumation is particularly sensitive and requires numerous procedures involving various entities (judicial, religious, medical). The Technical Secretariat, however, did not follow up on this issue with the Syrian National Authority, as mentioned in the same paragraph."
The OPCW response: "No blame was understood or implied by the FFM in paragraph 7.8 of the report." Some people might read it that way, but they insist that wasn't their intention. (Source: S/1755/2019, 21 May 2019, Annex 1 pp 6-7 PDF link )
Along with representatives of US, UK, and France, the OPCW, and the United Nations, professor Lucas has suggested Syria and Russia had stalled the Douma probe in order to erase signs of sarin. The very possibility of that is debatable, and the only stalling anyone can identify was by the UN's security agency UNDSS, whose recon team was rushed into a grenade attack by militants, which stalled things a bit further (Monitor on Massacre Marketing: Swept Under the Rug, Part 1 and part 2 ) Lucas, for his part, has said "Evidence of an attack couldn't be completely scrubbed, but a lot of it could be put beyond inspectors, e.g., the bodies of the victims." (1/2/20 )
Lucas' extremist-linked sources have him unusually prone to believing sarin or similar was also involved: Early on he was firm: "From the multi-sources I have - Doctors, activists, Citizen Journalists - there was a stronger agent used, This was not just chlorine used in Douma." (video) He suggests this agent's total absence from the scene is because it was "scrubbed" away, and there was a similar effort to hide clues in those bodies. And while he's since accepted that chlorine alone could explain the deaths, at least with the help of a "funnel effect," as recently as September 6 (2021) he still suggests there was more to it that remains hidden: "So why were witnesses still speaking of "stronger agent" than chlorine in #Douma attack almost 3 weeks later? Because 43 victims had to buried quickly as #Russia-regime occupied city. So no one could verify actual agent."
There was an effort to give the OPCW the location of the mass grave containing the bodies, but as Lucas explains, "Russia-regime control meant no way round talks w Damascus." (4/30/19) Those talks led to the airing of conditions, and "#Assad regime's blocking of exhumations came thru "conditions" which eventually brought OPCW withdrawal of attempt --- you can track this fm early May in other public sources." (4/30/19) This refers to the statements of intent followed immediately with the conditions and then by no exhumation, along with some "open-source" insinuations as to cause and effect. And so, he says, "OPCW never obtained “authorization” from #Assad regime to exhume bodies" (4/30/19)
When the statement "No blame was understood or implied by the FFM" was mentioned by Dr. Piers Robinson and Sander Hildenbrandt, Lucas replied "That's not what #OPCW final report on #Douma said so don't misrepresent it" and "That's very diplomatic language by OPCW about why they didn't go --- they refused #Assad regime conditions over further pursuit of bodies." Professor Lucas noted that the report sure read as blaming Damascus, and should be read that way, whatever they told the Syrians with tender diplomacy. Still no one can specify what these conditions were, but it's suggested they were so extreme they forced the OPCW to again abandon the study of actual fatalities in an alleged CW attack in Syria.
And finally, Lucas asserts this is exactly why the OPCW could not prove that chlorine immobilized then killed all those people: "The reason why final #OPCW FFM report does not make definitive conclusion re chlorine is because inspectors were unable to examine bodies of victims." (12/20/19) He claims that was Assad's fault, and that the OPCW blames him for it, albeit with "diplomatic" language. And that alone suggests government guilt; after all, why block access if there's nothing to hide? It would seem like the bodies held the proof, and Assad just couldn't risk it being found.
Reason 2: OPCW Told There Was No Evidence TO Find
This June 6 meeting has been the issue of some controversy. In the end, two groups of toxicology experts were consulted for the FFM's investigation. One set in September and October, 5-6 months after the incident, was cited in the final report in 2019, while this earlier visit in June was omitted from all public sources until the minutes of the meeting were leaked later in 2019. (WikiLeaks - actual_toxicology_meeting_redacted and see also my post from then: Douma Toxicology: Erasing-and-replacing the Correct Answers)
Just the other day, Aaron Maté at the Gray Zone published an e-mail by OPCW whistleblower Brendan Whelan to then-former colleagues at the OPCW protesting how that meeting was erased from the record, and urging them to help elevate these concerns so they might be addressed. In part, Whelan said: "I believe it is our professional and moral obligation to ensure the DG appreciates the gravity of the matter. There may be a justified reason for the omission – though I can’t imagine what. At a minimum a satisfactory explanation has to be provided." This was on August 23, 2019 and it doesn't seem to have been much help. Soon the minutes were leaked so the public could help raise the issue instead and, as the article notes, the OPCW started a process of investigation and punishments against Whelan.
It's worth noting Whitaker's effort to minimize this hushed-up consultation. As he explains its purpose: "[The investigators] wanted to know what information might be gleaned from exhuming the bodies and, in particular, whether this might reveal any evidence of exposure to chlorine gas." That sounds like the entire purpose. "The toxicologists advised that for a variety of reasons, including the time since burial, “there would be little use in conducting exhumations, as the chances of gathering evidence would be almost impossible.”
Their input on the subject was sound, but that question alone hardly seems worth a whole meeting, even in-country. Exposure to a caustic gas like chlorine leaves little to no identifying chemical trace, just non-specific damage to the lungs that can be observed as consistent. See Australia study: "the absence of biomarkers and non-specific findings at autopsy complicate the diagnosis [of chlorine poisoning], particularly as environmental levels are not stable." This applies from the moment of death, but two weeks of decay couldn't help matters.
In fact, the German experts "were unaware of any such exhumations being done in the past to provide evidence of chlorine exposure," and they saw little reason to expect otherwise in Douma. Furthermore, the lung tissue where signs would be clearest "would likely have degraded" too badly by then to say anything at all. And so, as the summary phrases it, "the highly experimental nature of of the exercise in such a public forum would represent a risk to benefit ratio that was unacceptably high." We'll return to this phrase.
"Following that, the plan for exhumations was abandoned," Whitaker writes, and "the FFM based its decision on the toxicologists' advice." Later on, the FFM would claim "with the absence of biomedical samples from the dead bodies or any autopsy records, it is not currently possible to precisely link the cause of the signs and symptoms to a specific chemical." In fact even with these things it seems unlikely, as they privately knew. But this "inability" to access the bodies was semantically pinned on Damascus elsewhere in the report, and so they had to keep highlighting that as something that mattered. Publicly.
So... expert advice said don't bother digging up the bodies, and that's exactly why the FFM never did so. This is certainly a more grounded explanation than prof. Lucas offers or than the FFM's final report would suggest, and seems to be at least part of the real answer. But this reading does gloss over at least one important issue; exhumation might NOT have been a waste of time.
Assuming the bodies buried are the same ones we've seen, there was probably little value in confirming the non-specific lung damage behind the pulmonary edema that was already evident in the images. An April, 2019 briefing note of the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media (WGSPM) agreed, but explained:
"...it would still have been possible to obtain DNA samples, which might have allowed victims to be identified through matching with living relatives and with each other. Other identifying information might have been obtained from clothing, items in pockets or X-rays. Establishing the identity of the victims would have been critical in determining whether those who came forward to give interviews reporting that their relatives had died at Location 2 were telling the truth."
Noting bodies should be stripped, washed, and specially wrapped prior to burial - and some were seen so wrapped - the pockets clues would be unlikely (and of dubious value to begin with). But the rest all held some promise of shedding light on the mysterious circumstances of their deaths. I'll go into this in a little more detail below under reason 3, OPCW risk avoidance.
Whitaker sums up the Working Group's thrust fairly enough before trying to rebut it (bolding mine):
"Among those who defend the Assad regime against accusations of using chemical weapons, the quasi-academic Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media has previously criticised the OPCW for its "failure to proceed with exhumations". The Working Group suggests the bodies photographed in Douma were not local residents killed by the regime in a chemical attack but captives killed by rebels in a "managed massacre". It implies the OPCW didn't exhume them for fear of what might be revealed."
"However, the leaked minutes of the June meeting offer a far more straightforward explanation: that the FFM based its decision on the toxicologists' advice."
They don't seem to have addressed DNA identification, or any other aspect aside from that of chemical exposure. Despite the limits, much could have been learned from a look at the fatalities. But the FFM tossed these clues aside without adequate explanation. There must be a reason, and we can guess it was "fear of what might be revealed."
Whitaker suggests exhumation was the only question raised in the June meeting, specifying "it appeared not to have been regarded as a full-scale “expert consultation” about the likely cause of deaths." This suggests it was always the plan to look into that central question only in September and October, at least 5 months after the incident. This is similar to the engineering study of how the cylinders came to be where they were seen, another important question officially un-addressed until October-November, but secretly addressed months before with an inconvenient and omitted engineering report. As such, the "on-going" work in these two areas that was mentioned in the public interim report of July (PDF) was allegedly still months away from even beginning. Or perhaps the reasonably-timed first tries had failed to produce the results they wanted.
Whitaker is also clear that the value of exhumation is what the FFM "wanted to know" in June. Maybe it was not the only thing they asked about, but "in particular" it was the meeting's "most immediate purpose" or (in an earlier piece) it was "the first topic raised" in Germany. Their meeting, he wrote, "lasted about an hour and after the discussion of exhumations it turned" - as conversations sometimes wander off course - "to the question of possible chlorine use" and whether it even could explain the observed fatalities. The experts offered a resounding NO. In fact, after seeing numerous images "the experts were also of the opinion that it was highly unlikely that victims would have gathered in piles at the centre of the respective apartments at such a short distance from an escape" to fresh air, and then just lay there and die, if they had simply been exposed to chlorine. Also:
In the opinion of one employee who had been at the meeting and heard the fuller explanation, that suspicion was "fueled by" by how the deaths "do not match chlorine rather than corpses arranged for propaganda purposes." (WikiLeaks - correctly_redacted_emails_re_toxicology_minutes)
These are notably astute observations, but luckily - as Whitaker tells it - those questions weren't really raised or relevant at the moment. A "full-scale “expert consultation” about the likely cause of deaths" was only slated for a few months later. These experts did chime in the point, but only the later opinions were actually sought and actually mattered.
However, it turns out cause of death was something they wanted to know already. The meeting minutes start by explaining "The purpose of the visit was two-fold:
"The rapid, and in some reported cases, immediate onset of frothing described by victims is not considered consistent with exposure to chlorine-based choking or blood agents. The opinion of a number of toxicologists, specialists in chemical-weapons-related intoxication supported this assessment."..."It should be expected that on encountering the irritant gas, victims would instinctively have retreated and exited the building, which was within a few metres away." ... etc. (source: WikiLeaks - FirstdraftInterimReport)
On 22 May, the first laboratory results were received by the FFM team, and "no nerve agents or their decomposition products were detected" among them, just chlorine, a basic irritant or caustic agent. There should be nothing much to confirm, and this raised the question if that even could explain the deaths, and those are the two things they asked about in Germany. The draft report, circulating sometime in June, apparently after the Germany meeting, includes the same passage we've seen about intent to exhume, here as paragraph 6.8, followed by a second paragraph that was cut out of the public report, giving some follow-up we weren't supposed to see.
It's worth noting how Brendan Whelan primarily drafted this, perhaps as he was already forming his more "activist" views. As such, we can't be sure this is just what the FFM would otherwise be planning to say publicly. A passage like this can't show anyone's true and secret thinking, but this one... might include some "snark" or reveal more than usual. Otherwise, let's take it as what the interim report was planning to say.
Here paragraph 6.9 says "the plans for exhumations were halted" as or because "proceeding with the exhumations presented a risk to benefit ration [sic] that was no longer acceptable." This was when they got back the samples in late May - NOT after hearing Assad's impossible "conditions" in early May, NOR after consulting with experts on June 6, as Brian Whitaker's book argues.
The wording here does clearly recall the advice from the German exerts; as put in the summarized minutes, "the highly experimental nature" of digging for chlorine clues 2 months on "would represent a risk to benefit ratio that was unacceptably high." But it's not clear if that was the experts' own wording added to the pre-existing case against exhumation. It may also be an idea the Fact-Finding Mission had formed two weeks earlier, maybe tacked onto a prior consultation over cause of death, and the experts were just seen as confirming it. But either way, when the question was put to them, it may have been to secure a public reason for a decision the FFM had already made, perhaps for other reasons.
It's not immediately clear what "risk" is referred to here. Again, no specific chemical signs were expected, which speaks to lacking the kind of "benefit" they had hoped for with sarin returns. And the same lack of specifics might be read by some as a lack of evidence that should exist, or as evidence against a chemical release. Although a solid case could still be made based on all evidence combined, a risk of confusion would be raised. The bit about it all being in "such a public forum" supports that.
Exhumation takes work and raises complications, but aside from misreading, it shouldn't pose any legitimate risk, although a few illegitimate kinds are possible. Consider that chlorine could hardly explain the deaths anyway, as the FFM had clarified by the same experts in Germany. The value of confirming something that doesn't even help the case might be low, and in fact it might be better left unconfirmed, to leave possibilities open. As Aaron Maté recently reported:
"When the original report was being finalized, there were still dozens of samples remaining to be analyzed. Accordingly, the inspectors left it open that further analysis could in theory turn up new evidence and hypothesized that: "a. The victims were exposed to another highly toxic chemical agent that gave rise to the symptoms observed and has so far gone undetected."
"This passage — with its mention of the toxicologists’ assessment and a hypothesis leaving open the possibility of a staged incident — was never published by the OPCW. And the team would never get the chance to continue this critical area of investigation."
Final lab results still showing no nerve agents at the scene would clarify that point only in February, 2019, allowing the final report in March. But until then hope was held out; in June, the toxicology minutes have team leader Sami Barrek pursuing this line of inquiry with little effect
Maybe the OPCW's investigation leaders didn't want to to risk their wiggle-room to hypothesize different agents to blame Syria with. Ruling that out with autopsies would end it. And then if it was found the victims died from sarin or similar after all - when environment samples didn't show the same thing - it could mean site-scrubbing if that were possible, OR probably that those Syrian people died somewhere else that the OPCW's insurgent partners were hiding.
Or they might have found some contradictory clue as to how the victims died, like that they weren't gassed at all. The draft report had mentioned a possibility that "The fatalities resulted from a non-chemical-related incident," suggesting the scene was staged with corpses from elsewhere. And again there was the risk of finding by DNA that the victims were not the people claimed. It could even be shown that they specifically were other people last seen being kidnapped by the Jaysh al-Islam militants occupying Douma and Eastern Ghouta at large. And the search might have found signs of bondage during the gassing, or some other clues of how they died the OPCW leadership and its sponsors didn't want to risk seeing.
When there can be no good answer worth proceeding on, what's the motive to find which bad answer is true? Especially if one is able to use the flexibility of ignorance to further one's agenda? The course the OPCW's investigators chose has left the situation mysterious and malleable for the Lucasses and Whitakers of the world, and that may be the main reason they left that evidence buried in Douma.
Conclusion
In summary, the clinicopathologic evidence was seen as presenting a stated "risk," and perhaps other secret risks, which the OPCW's Fact-Finding Mission wanted to avoid. The nature of that is still unclear, and may be innocent, as Brian Whitaker proposes; they risked finding nothing. But it seems the decision to leave the fatalities unexamined was internal to the OPCW and driven by a desire to actually avoid some of the evidence.
This is what the WGSPM briefing note had suggested, and as it still seems was the case with Ghouta, as well as with all the incidents in between where the OPCW allowed the likely perpetrators to handle much of the investigation. Such avoidance would be in line with suppression or omission of engineering, toxicological, and other evidence that complicated the politically convenient findings for Syrian guilt.
And whatever the true reason for neglecting this evidence, OPCW leadership saw fit to put forth unfounded suggestions of other reasons that would themselves implicate the government side. Altogether this suggests - as the global public is finally coming to realize - this corrupted organization's intent was never to ascertain the truth, but just to further the dirty information war against Syria on behalf of the corrupting powers that have seized it.
