November 22, 2015
(last edits Dec. 4)
The clearest blame for the 2013 Latakia Massacres, in Human Rights Watch's investigation, fell on Islamist groups not beholden to Western-approved “moderate” opposition, as is supposedly the case with the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Those units under its central command anyway were not clearly implicated in the killings, which is convenient since they answer to the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), the Turkey-based "legitimate representatives of the Syrian people," to some minds.
This SNC proclaims the usual standards for things like Human Rights. On the basis of this affiliation, being almost the SNC's army, the Free Syrian Army presents itself as a moderating force in the Latakia offensive and beyond. They claim to be bitterly opposed both to the Syrian government and to Islamic extremists, with no gripe against civilians of any religion or political belief and no tolerance for violations of human rights - for civilians anyway.
This SNC proclaims the usual standards for things like Human Rights. On the basis of this affiliation, being almost the SNC's army, the Free Syrian Army presents itself as a moderating force in the Latakia offensive and beyond. They claim to be bitterly opposed both to the Syrian government and to Islamic extremists, with no gripe against civilians of any religion or political belief and no tolerance for violations of human rights - for civilians anyway.
However, FSA fighters on the ground are disparate, only loosely linked to the SNC or even the FSA's command, and those with a notable presence on the battlefield tend to be Islamist and often brutal. The true prevalence of sectarian attitudes among them is worth considering, as some were clearly involved in the battles that enabled the massacres, and possibly in the killings themselves.
If the attitudes of those fighters follows the patterns presented below, it's a bad sign. Whatever its fighters and commanders did or didn't do, leaders of the "moderate" FSA and linked SNC (and their activist support network) helped make the crime happen. Some encouraged the criminal thinking that fed into the massacre, while others have moved to conceal the crime or even blame it on "the Assad regime." Others yet apparently assisted in the kidnapping of hundreds of civilians and in conveying the terrorist groups' demands. And that's just from what we can see publicly.
If the attitudes of those fighters follows the patterns presented below, it's a bad sign. Whatever its fighters and commanders did or didn't do, leaders of the "moderate" FSA and linked SNC (and their activist support network) helped make the crime happen. Some encouraged the criminal thinking that fed into the massacre, while others have moved to conceal the crime or even blame it on "the Assad regime." Others yet apparently assisted in the kidnapping of hundreds of civilians and in conveying the terrorist groups' demands. And that's just from what we can see publicly.
The SNC Affirms its Principles
The SNC's first word on the August 4 rebel takeover and massacre in Latakia was this on August 5: "The Syrian Coalition applauds Free Syrian Army fighters on the Syrian Coast, as well as their fellow fighters across Syria.” Noting they were previously used for "artillery strikes on innocent civilians," they gushed at the “liberation” of "the military posts of Inbata, Baruda, and Tela.”
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| Shamieh Darwish protected by a rebel fighter on a video released by Ansar al-Din. She and here disabled son were then executed and buried in the backyard.(HRW report) |
Was the FSA actually there? Was it there the day before? The double use of "now" suggests they meant to leave this question open but leaning towards late arrival. It also suggests they and probably the SNC know damn well there was a massacre that day. But they never stopped, punished, or even reported one.
The statement goes on to affirm that the FSA has no problem with the Alawi or any group of Syria's people and promised again "the new Syria will ... safeguard the rights of all citizens." Within days of this test case of the "new Syria," there were credible reports of an atrocity and the SNC felt compelled to come back with this "principled" refutation on August 9:
The FSA issued a statement about the Syrian Coast in which they pledge to protect civilians and families in the area, ... they will only target ... Assad’s militia. The statement emphasizes that the role of the FSA is not to target civilians but to protect them from Assad forces.
They say nothing about protecting them from the Islamist brigades that seemingly took the lead in this glorious “liberation.” There's no open mention of a massacre or rumors of one, but it seems these were the reason for this reminder.
After Human Rights Watch issued its report on the aftermath of the victory in October, the FSA's Supreme Military Council (SMC) was given and failed this chance (HRW PDF) to address the problem. The SMC said it “wholeheartedly condemns the alleged atrocities...” It's alleged - neither confirmed nor denied. Why the difficulty in figuring out whether or not a massive bloodbath occurred just one day prior to their alleged period of control, and somewhat into that period?
The killings, the statement continues, were allegedly “committed by extremist groups," and "we stress that the (five centrally blamed groups) do not represent the values of the FSA or the Syrian revolution. These extremists have attacked the FSA and have killed numerous FSA officers.” But if any of those FSA guys were killed during this joint operation, it would be "friendly fire" by the Islamists they either chose to fight alongside, or pretended to fight alongside, just to seem relevant. Take your pick.
The killings, the statement continues, were allegedly “committed by extremist groups," and "we stress that the (five centrally blamed groups) do not represent the values of the FSA or the Syrian revolution. These extremists have attacked the FSA and have killed numerous FSA officers.” But if any of those FSA guys were killed during this joint operation, it would be "friendly fire" by the Islamists they either chose to fight alongside, or pretended to fight alongside, just to seem relevant. Take your pick.
Reuters reported in October, as HRW's report came out, a response from Syrian National Coalition spokesman Khaled Saleh said the SNC condemns all human rights abuses and if any had been committed by rebels affiliated with the coalition, they would face justice." His written statement was quoted as saying "all the brigades that work for us" were always held to regular standards of "human rights or international laws," and punished for violations if found guilty. It sounds like this is limited to Idriss-commanded FSA, a sector quite possibly not involved directly in the killings. "The incidents in Latakia are not an exception and we will treat them as we treated previous cases," Saleh added. Otherwise, everything says, the moderates will describe the killers as unaffiliated "enemies" and keep on cooperating with them anyway to avoid battlefield irrelevance.
Consider this even sharper statement from the SNC, as quoted by Global Post, that almost blames the Syrian government for the massacre:
“The incident reported by HRW in today's report does not represent an effort by the true Syrian opposition, but rather a shameful one-time attack by outlier extremist groups that thrive under the hand of [President Bashar al-Assad's] regime” the statement read.They forgot to mention the hand of Iran or Russia in the creation of these groups, whose Latakia massacres at least "thrived" in an area removed from government control. In fact, the same SNC had just described the area as under the control of the "Free Syrian Army." Islamist slaughter jackals enjoyed free reign there. "Allegedly."
And like the FSA, the SNC leaders in Turkey never reported, confirmed, denied, or brought up the very real atrocity until someone else forced them to address it. And then, as we can see, they addressed it poorly. They don't even know if it happened, but they seem sure it was a "one-time attack," certainly not part of any dangerous pattern set to repeat or needing careful study. No, they suggest it was a bad crime, by groups that thrive and grow under Syria's government ... but it was just a fluke, and apparently not worth mentioning.
And like the FSA, the SNC leaders in Turkey never reported, confirmed, denied, or brought up the very real atrocity until someone else forced them to address it. And then, as we can see, they addressed it poorly. They don't even know if it happened, but they seem sure it was a "one-time attack," certainly not part of any dangerous pattern set to repeat or needing careful study. No, they suggest it was a bad crime, by groups that thrive and grow under Syria's government ... but it was just a fluke, and apparently not worth mentioning.
It's at least ironic that on Aug. 4 - the day the massacre was launched and seemingly the worst day by far, as hundreds of Alawites were being slaughtered just a ways south, the Syrian National Coalition in Turkey requested "an Immediate Investigation into Human Rights Abuses" in Syria, all of which they thought were by "Assad." And then, in October, their allied FSA's supreme military council said out loud it “encourages Human Rights Watch and the international community to focus on the institutional crimes against humanity being committed by Assad’s security apparatus,” apparently instead of this "alleged" terrorist crime. The SMC has therefore moved to hush this up, to protect the killers who were allies of the FSA and maybe the FSA itself. The SNC leaders in Turkey rubber stamped this "moderate" decision by FSA central command, its most civilized branch.
FSA/SNC Members Call for “Balance of Terror”
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| Anas Ayrout, CNN Arabic image |
Anas Ayrout, CNN Arabi
Salafist preacher, would-be Baniyas emir, member of Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, "Sheikh" Anas Ayrout spoke to Reuters' Khaled Oweis on July 10, 2013, "by telephone from Istanbul, where he attended a meeting of the opposition National Coalition (SNC), of which he is a member." In a public message to Syria's anti-government fighters, less than a month before some of them carried out their massacre, Ayrout said, in part, the following:
"One has to concentrate on their strongholds and on their dwellings and their infrastructure. If (Alawites) continue living as they're doing in peace and safety while wedded to the regime they will not be affected. They will not think of abandoning Assad ... (Alawites) are relaxed while areas that have slipped out of regime control are always under shelling (by government forces), always in pain ... If you do not create a balance of terror, the battle will not be decided. ... We have to drive them out of their homes like they drove us out. They have to feel pain like we feel pain ... We do not favor a sectarian war. But they brought it upon themselves."
He later "clarified," as CNN Arabic reported, (Google translated) "I deny what was attributed to the statements, inciting the content on the Alawite sect.” Is he disputing what Oweis put in parentheses? Who else with "homes" and "areas" could he mean that "brought (a sectarian war) upon themselves?" Ayrout also took the chance to “stress my full commitment to the principles of Syrian Revolution and full equality for all Syrians and," as if offering a qualifier, "in conformity with the law of God." And he complained about media distortion.
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| Citizens no longer "immune," a "balance of terror" ... attempted. (HRW report) |
But an August 14 report from Al-Monitor passed on Ayrout's comments along with some other statements in a similar tone. SNC member Saleh al-Mubarak, for example, "told Al-Monitor that he endorses the opposition’s attack on Latakia’s countryside “so that the battle may be moved to the ruling family’s heartland, and the Alawites be given notice that they cannot be safe if the rest of the people are unsafe.”" FSA commander Mohammad Moussa is quoted as saying "the objective is to reach Qardaha (the ruling Assad family's home town) and hurt them like they are hurting us. The Alawites have been huddling in their mountain thinking that they can destroy Syria and remain immune."
All three seem to be saying the same; The Alawi as a whole are "destroying Syria" without consequence, by supporting the government as it supposedly attacks all Sunnis, who are all rebelling. To solve the problem the whole Alawi community must be hurt, become unsafe, feel terror, flee and - it was hoped - stop supporting the government so all that can stop.
That's the essence of terrorism, and these folks publicly argued that the battle to liberate the Syrian people could not be achieved without it. And they're probably right. Lots of terrorism on the ground and by NATO from the Sky, with no humanitarian stoppers, could finally win this in a matter of, say 27 months tops. It's not a popular thing to say, but for the rebel victory so many insist on, this will have to happen sooner or later. For that to happen and be sustainable (supported by public opinion) someone would have to make the case for it first, as these guys were bravely doing.
They don't say anything about killing off all the Alawi (like some on their side have), but killing at least some is inevitable under any such course of action. And, again, these goals were voiced from leaders of the SNC/FSA, whose fighters would swear they were there to protect. How did or would the Free Syrian Army balance the acknowledged need to terrorize the citizens of Latakia with their stated goal of protecting them?
SNC Kidnapping Manager?
Even if no FSA fighter or Islamist SNC chatterbox is implicated in personally shooting or slicing the families of Sheikh Nabhan Mountain, one of the latter -
a border-crossing Islamist organizer of some importance - is implicated in the part where about 200 citizens were stolen.
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| "respected Aussie imam" Fedaa Majzoub |
Fedaa Majzoub, an Australian member of the SNC and founder of the Turkey-based "Syrian Islamic Council," is considered a "respected Aussie imam," described as an "honest broker" trying to "build bridges" between the SNC and the newly-created FSA, by one journalist who interviewed him on August 7, 2012. He was in Salma, Latakia at the time, one year before the massacre in question launched from there. (Sydney Morning Herald, Aug. 7, 2012)
His younger brother Mustafa Majzoub was a "respected cleric" doing "humanitarian work," according to family propagandists including Fedaa, when he was killed fighting near Salma, just 12 days after Fedaa's interview there. (VDC has Aug 19 and non-civilian). Mustafa had called for Jihad against the Alawites, and clearly did die in fighting, shortly after helping capture (and perhaps "slaughter") dozens of "Shabiha." And this was at the edge of the 2013 massacre, as if hoping it would happen then. (see Crikey, Jan 2014) Fedaa was there too ... "building bridges" at the future massacre launch site, bridges later used to impart a bit of FSA-SNC “legitimacy” and expectations of "moderation" to that genocidal campaign.
Dr. Tim Anderson writes for Pravda how Fedaa was involved in the hostage-taking portion of this massacre as well as with the attack on the nearby Christian village of Kessab in March, 2014. As for the former, in December 2013 Syria's Communications Minister Omran al-Zoubi told an Australian delegation including Anderson how Majzoub was responsible for the kidnapping of 106 people in Latakia, using Australian telephone networks, and yet moved freely through Europe with no sign of concern from any of those governments. Majzoub denies involvement in the Latakia kidnapping, telling Aussie media "I heard about it, I know about it but I was not involved in it at all." He claimed he had been in Europe, working on preparations for the Geneva peace talks, and suggested the smear was made up to tarnish his reputation in these talks. (see again Crikey).
However, Majzoub admits his involvement in the Kessab kidnappings, which happened after these prior charges. But he called them a humanitarian evacuations. A Turkish journalist set out to refute "baseless accusations" against his country spoke to "one of the top officials of the
Free Syrian Army (FSA), Fedaa Majzoub, who organized the evacuation." He said "we captured the town as a part of our war
strategy. ... Young Armenians and Arabs left the town. We
helped the old people and sent them to Turkey." (see also Pravda).
So relocating non-Sunni people in the path of extremist offensives, with the work done by the attackers after the conquest, is sometimes his area of expertise. But he says, as surely as his brother was a civilian, someone else must have run that aspect in the 2013 case. Maybe Fedaa just doesn't have good enough contacts in or interest in the Salma front? Maybe the Geneva stuff was keeping him so busy his slow Australian phone couldn't make the necessary calls in the remaining time?
HRW heard that all 200+ prisoners (or at least "control over the hostage file") were transferred to Ahrar al-Sham in September, who are made to seem the good guys in this drama. It's worth noting Suqour al-Izz's leader was in charge of financing the operation, with Ahrar al-Sham's leader as a deputy. ISIS and JMA were hoping for payment to fund their operations, just then greatly expanding, and probably got it direct, from this allied, "moderate," and well-funded group (rich donors in the Persian Gulf).
Many of the children at least were eventually released (the rest, I'm not actually sure...). But along the way, of course their husbands, fathers, etc. were murdered, their homes were destroyed, and then they suffered whatever abuses in the captivity of people who think of them as devil-inspired infidels. That's generally not clear, but one boy at least listed by HRW as a hostage (Jaffar al-Sheikh Ibrahim, age 7) is also reported (Jaffar al-Sheikh, but age 4) as dead, stabbed to death by his captors, on or before August 7.
Many of the children at least were eventually released (the rest, I'm not actually sure...). But along the way, of course their husbands, fathers, etc. were murdered, their homes were destroyed, and then they suffered whatever abuses in the captivity of people who think of them as devil-inspired infidels. That's generally not clear, but one boy at least listed by HRW as a hostage (Jaffar al-Sheikh Ibrahim, age 7) is also reported (Jaffar al-Sheikh, but age 4) as dead, stabbed to death by his captors, on or before August 7.
Anyway, Fedaa Majzoub, who is respected, insists he had no hand in managing this “humanitarian relocation” like he did in Kessab. But all the clues suggest minister al-Zoubi was probably correct.
"Opposition Activists”
Finally, let's consider the nonviolent activists who help the opposition fighters report their version of events to the world, and are generally treated as credible and dedicated to truth and justice. Three at least come into focus in this Latakia offensive … one of whom died, one with a similar name, and one of whom is unnamed but does surprisingly well on the truth part.
Among those killed on the bloody first day was Abo al-Hasan Ammar, as the VDC records him, a civilian from Salma. Occupation: Media Activist, killed 2013-08-04 by shooting. Notes: “Martyred during covering the battles taking place in Lattakia Suburbs.”
There doesn't seem to much information about him around; he's not Ammar Hassan, media spokesman, Member coordinators revolution, Latakia News Network, as mentioned here. (L.N.N. Youtube channel - nothing added since August, 2013, but late in the month, long after the 4th). This activist with a similar name was still speaking on August 6 as "Ammar Hassan, a local activist in Latakia," telling Reuters' Oweis 60 rebel fighters died in the offensive and "Assad is sending huge reinforcement from Latakia, but liberation will continue.”
Rather this is the Abou Al Hassan Ammar (FSA spokesman) listed as killed in action at the Wikipedia page for 2013 Latakia offensive, citing a Facebook post now gone (but copied here). The date isn't mentioned, and VDC's data isn't gospel, but it seems he died on the 4th. It does seem strange to have 2 media activists in the same small area with Hassan and Ammar in the names, but not too strange. Both names are common. Alternately, this is somehow one guy, and Oweis spoke to him before he died, or he died after the 6th.
As for Abu Hassan, with a fighter-like nom-d'guerre, he was more than likely he a straight supporter of the operation, killed while filming it. However … consider how pro-rebel and Assad-blaming but ostensibly moderate activists like Razan Zaitouneh sometimes report on extreme crimes of the Islamist groups and wind up disappearing. With such a massive and important crime planned for that day, with such complicated PR aspects to manage, any deaths in the slim media pool might be of interest. That is, it's possible he was distrusted by someone involved and assassinated at the outset, to prevent him reporting the wrong things.
At any rate, Abu Hassan cannot be the activist(s) HRW spoke to, who wound up covering events (his replacement(s)?) One who might be Ammar Hassan, but unnamed, sounds like he might have been wearing a black ski mask. Responsible for coordinating between the attacking groups (ISIS, etc.), he alerted HRW to the murder of over 100 men and abduction of hundreds of women and children so: “We caught 150 women and 40 children, and killed all the men … We want a prisoner exchange without conditions,” or else … unspecified. That's an opposition activist, and he's not the first of his kind.
